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Chapter	  1	  –	  Introduction:	  A	  Self-­‐Reflexive	  Study	  	  
	  
"Self-­‐knowledge	  is	  no	  guarantee	  of	  happiness,	  but	  it	  is	  on	  the	  side	  of	  happiness	  and	  can	  
supply	  the	  courage	  to	  fight	  for	  it."	  	  
-­‐Simone	  de	  Beauvoir,	  Force	  of	  Circumstances	  	  
	  
“Today	  I	  believe	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  love;	  that	  is	  why	  I	  endeavour	  to	  trace	  its	  
imperfections,	  its	  perversions.”	  	  -­‐Frantz	  Fanon,	  Black	  Skin,	  White	  Masks	  	  
	  	  
	   For	  some	  years	  now,	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  been	  under	  attack	  by	  critics	  from	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  conservative	  opponents	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context	  has	  been	  University	  of	  Toronto	  professor	  Jordan	  Peterson	  who,	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  2016,	  uploaded	  a	  series	  of	  YouTube	  videos	  that	  would	  propel	  him	  into	  the	  public	  eye.	  These	  videos	  announced	  his	  views	  on	  what	  he	  perceives	  as	  a	  dangerous	  scourge	  spreading	  across	  university	  campuses	  in	  recent	  years:	  the	  political	  correctness	  (PC)	  movement.1	  	  In	  Peterson’s	  view,	  this	  movement	  is	  comprised	  of	  “social	  justice	  warriors”	  or	  “equity	  authoritarians”	  –	  that	  is,	  members	  of	  identity-­‐based	  struggles	  such	  as	  feminists	  or	  anti-­‐racists2	  	  –	  who	  are	  bound	  to	  an	  ideology	  in	  which	  they	  see	  the	  world	  as	  divided	  between	  “oppressors”	  and	  “victims.”	  In	  aligning	  themselves	  with	  the	  victims,	  “PC	  extremists”	  engage	  in	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  He	  has	  especially	  been	  opposed	  to	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  imposition	  of	  non-­‐binary	  gender	  pronouns	  and	  bill	  C-­‐16	  which,	  in	  his	  terms,	  would	  “ad[d]	  the	  ill-­‐defined	  categories	  of	  gender	  expression	  and	  gender	  identity	  to	  the	  list	  of	  prohibited	  grounds	  of	  discrimination”	  	  (see	  Jordan	  B	  Peterson,	  2017/05/17:	  Senate	  Hearing	  on	  Bill	  C16,	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnIAAkSNtqo&feature=youtu.be).	  	  	  See	  his	  YouTube	  channel	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  videos	  and	  interviews	  in	  which	  he	  discusses	  these	  views:	  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCL_f53ZEJxp8TtlOkHwMV9Q	  	  2	  Identity-­‐based	  movements	  or	  “identity	  politics”	  refer	  to	  political	  mobilizations	  that	  articulate	  along	  lines	  of	  identity	  such	  as	  race,	  ethnicity,	  gender,	  social	  class,	  sexuality,	  ability,	  age,	  and	  more.	  
	   2	  
toxic	  form	  of	  moral	  righteousness	  in	  which	  they	  use	  shame	  and	  guilt	  to	  defeat	  their	  chosen	  enemies,	  over	  fighting	  for	  true	  social	  change.	  For	  Peterson,	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  are	  inherently	  prone	  to	  tribalism	  and	  dangerously	  motivated	  by	  hatred	  and	  resentment.	  Referencing	  George	  Orwell’s	  The	  Road	  to	  Wigan	  Pier,	  Peterson	  claims	  that	  Leftist	  radicals	  are	  driven	  more	  by	  their	  hate	  for	  the	  successful	  than	  their	  love	  for	  the	  oppressed.	  	  While	  Peterson’s	  perspectives	  are	  deeply	  problematic	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds	  –	  most	  notably	  his	  dismissal	  of	  structural	  oppression3	  –	  his	  critique	  bears	  some	  similarity	  to	  challenges	  that	  have	  been	  emerging	  amongst	  members	  of	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  themselves.	  British	  radical	  feminist	  Julie	  Bindel,	  for	  example,	  decries	  contemporary	  identity	  politics	  as	  being	  characterized	  by	  a	  “tendency	  towards	  putting	  trigger	  warnings	  on	  everything	  and	  wrapping	  each	  other	  in	  cotton	  wool.”4	  Referring	  specifically	  to	  feminism,	  she	  argues	  that:	  Moral	  superiority	  and	  “call	  out”	  culture	  has	  trumped	  political	  activism.	  Feminists	  have	  a	  proud	  history	  of	  taking	  state	  institutions	  and	  corporations	  to	  task.	  It	  would	  seem	  this	  is	  being	  lost	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  vitriol.	  We	  built	  this	  movement	  on	  a	  desire	  and	  willingness	  to	  question	  and	  challenge	  old	  assumptions	  and	  truisms.	  We	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  autocrats	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  There	  are	  many	  reasons	  for	  which	  Jordan	  Peterson	  is	  an	  indefensible	  character.	  Some	  of	  these	  include	  his	  refutation	  of	  social	  phenomena	  (racism,	  for	  example)	  merely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  methodological	  objections;	  his	  defense	  of	  socio-­‐biological	  arguments	  that	  reinforce	  social	  inequalities	  and	  discriminatory	  stereotypes;	  his	  staunchly	  positivistic	  epistemological	  bias	  which	  permits	  him	  to	  automatically	  dismiss	  other	  types	  of	  knowledge	  production;	  his	  sweeping	  denunciation	  of	  academic	  disciplines	  such	  as	  sociology	  and	  women’s	  studies;	  his	  participation	  in	  reinforcing	  discrimination	  against	  members	  of	  the	  trans	  community;	  his	  tacit	  support	  for	  and	  incitement	  of	  right-­‐wing	  groups	  and	  conservative	  ideologies;	  his	  tendency	  toward	  hyperbolic	  statements	  such	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  radical	  left	  is	  animated	  by	  a	  ‘murderous’	  ideology;	  and	  his	  messianic	  delusions	  of	  grandeur.	  See	  his	  YouTube	  channel	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  videos	  and	  interviews	  in	  which	  he	  discusses	  these	  views:	  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCL_f53ZEJxp8TtlOkHwMV9Q	  	  4	  Julie	  Bindel,	  “Feminism	  Is	  in	  Danger	  of	  Becoming	  Toxic,”	  The	  Guardian,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  sec.	  Opinion.	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would	  rather	  organise	  a	  pile-­‐on	  than	  try	  to	  change	  systems.	  The	  life	  blood	  of	  feminism	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  bile.5	  	   Like	  Peterson,	  Bindel	  argues	  that	  current	  forms	  of	  identity	  politics	  are	  driven	  more	  by	  resentment	  and	  moral	  superiority,	  than	  a	  commitment	  to	  social	  change.	  Although	  positioned	  on	  opposing	  ends	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum,	  both	  thinkers	  raise	  some	  important	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  contemporary	  identity-­‐based	  struggles	  and	  ‘negative’	  emotions	  such	  as	  hatred	  and	  resentment,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  political	  possibilities	  that	  are	  available	  and	  foreclosed	  when	  the	  latter	  drive	  the	  former.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  investigate	  some	  key	  emotions	  associated	  with	  one	  expression	  of	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  –	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.6	  These	  include	  the	  negative	  feelings	  of	  outrage,	  anger,	  hatred,	  mistrust,	  suspicion,	  envy,	  resentment,	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  revenge.	  While	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  affirmative	  dimension	  of	  negative	  emotions	  and	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  solidarity-­‐building,	  consciousness-­‐raising,	  and	  political	  mobilization,	  my	  concern	  is	  that	  they	  have	  become	  dominant	  within	  many	  articulations	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  with	  troubling	  consequences.7	  A	  central	  question	  animating	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  negative	  feelings	  driving	  the	  political	  actions	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists?	  And	  moreover,	  how	  might	  a	  political	  project	  driven	  by	  outrage	  and	  resentment	  toward	  an	  oppressor	  (a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Julie	  Bindel,	  “Feminism	  Is	  in	  Danger	  of	  Becoming	  Toxic.”	  6	  My	  choice	  to	  focus	  on	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  is	  based	  in	  my	  own	  personal	  investment	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  movement.	  Although	  this	  focus	  is	  maintained	  through	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  present	  work,	  Chapter	  5	  places	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  within	  the	  context	  of	  identity	  politics	  as	  I	  explore	  how	  the	  problems	  I	  locate	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  belong	  to	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  as	  a	  whole.	  7	  Indeed,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  dissertation,	  sharing	  negative	  emotions	  and	  outrages	  provides	  a	  common	  language	  and	  outlook,	  while	  also	  promoting	  belonging,	  intimacy,	  and	  political	  solidarity.	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changing	  signifier)	  diminish	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  ability	  to	  envision	  and	  move	  towards	  an	  emancipated	  society	  built	  on	  alternative	  and	  affirmative	  principles?	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  I	  investigate	  the	  feelings,	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  using	  conceptual	  tools	  drawn	  primarily	  from	  sociology,	  social	  psychology	  and	  from	  identity	  movements	  themselves.	  By	  examining	  a	  range	  of	  voices	  from	  both	  academic	  and	  activist	  fields	  of	  the	  movement,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own	  experiences,	  I	  undertake	  an	  exploration	  that	  is	  relevant	  not	  just	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  but	  also	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  struggle	  along	  lines	  of	  identity	  that,	  I	  suggest,	  share	  a	  common	  culture	  and	  collective	  character.	  In	  this	  introductory	  chapter	  I	  reflect	  on	  my	  personal	  motivations	  for	  this	  project,	  and	  then	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  that	  orient	  the	  chapters	  to	  come.	  	  	  
A	  Self-­‐Reflexive	  Study	  This	  project	  is	  informed	  by	  feminist	  insights	  that	  have	  made	  a	  case	  for	  the	  crucial	  connections	  between	  the	  personal	  and	  the	  political.8	  	  Challenging	  objectivist	  methods,	  feminists	  have	  argued	  in	  favour	  of	  using	  personal	  and	  everyday	  experience	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  from	  which	  to	  access	  wider	  political	  and	  social	  processes.	  Moreover,	  they	  have	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  self-­‐reflexivity	  as	  a	  central	  principle	  of	  feminist	  approaches.	  As	  Michelle	  D.	  Young	  and	  Linda	  Skrla	  explain,	  “reflexivity	  involves	  self-­‐reflection	  of	  one’s	  research	  process	  and	  findings,	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  one’s	  social	  positionality,	  values,	  and	  perspectives	  and	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8Barbara	  Merrill	  and	  Linden	  West,	  Using	  Biographical	  Methods	  in	  Social	  Research	  (SAGE,	  2009).	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critiques	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  one’s	  words	  and	  actions…”9	  Rather	  than	  imagining	  the	  scholar	  or	  researcher	  as	  a	  disembodied	  and	  disinterested	  universal	  subject,	  feminist	  inquiry	  reimagines	  her	  as	  a	  “real,	  historical	  individual	  with	  concrete,	  specific	  desires	  and	  interests.”	  10	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  discuss	  how	  my	  experiences,	  desires,	  and	  interests	  animate	  this	  particular	  project.	  	  	   What	  is	  my	  personal	  relationship	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  and	  how	  did	  it	  lead	  me	  to	  the	  current	  investigation?	  I	  have	  identified	  as	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  for	  much	  of	  my	  adult	  life.	  My	  introduction	  to	  feminism	  in	  its	  more	  general	  form	  came	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  my	  undergraduate	  degree	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Victoria	  (UVic)	  in	  British	  Columbia.	  It	  was	  there	  that	  I	  took	  my	  first	  Women’s	  Studies	  course,	  which	  acted	  in	  many	  ways	  as	  a	  consciousness-­‐raising	  experience.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  course	  that	  I	  was	  finally	  given	  the	  language	  with	  which	  to	  articulate	  a	  number	  of	  feelings,	  experiences,	  structures,	  and	  relationships	  that	  I	  had	  hitherto	  lacked	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  to	  fully	  understand.	  I	  remember	  this	  to	  be	  an	  exhilarating	  experience	  and	  can	  still	  recall	  the	  excitement	  and	  energy	  with	  which	  I	  would	  walk	  home	  with	  my	  classmates	  to	  our	  residence	  after	  class.	  This	  initial	  experience	  was	  followed	  by	  more	  courses	  in	  Women’s	  Studies	  and	  Sociology	  that	  strengthened	  my	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  feminist	  analysis	  and	  critique,	  and	  which,	  in	  turn,	  solidified	  my	  commitment	  to	  the	  movement	  as	  well	  as	  my	  identity	  as	  a	  feminist.	  	  What	  is	  it	  that	  made	  these	  lessons	  in	  feminism	  exciting	  and	  energizing?	  For	  me,	  feminism	  validated	  my	  experiences	  of	  everyday	  unfairness	  and	  inequality.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9Michelle	  D.	  Young	  and	  Linda	  Skrla,	  Reconsidering	  Feminist	  Research	  in	  Educational	  
Leadership	  (SUNY	  Press,	  2012),	  53.	  10	  Sandra	  Harding,	  “Introduction:	  Is	  There	  a	  Feminist	  Method?,”	  in	  Feminism	  and	  
Methodology,	  ed.	  Sandra	  Harding	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  9.	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many	  instances	  of	  unequal	  treatment,	  dismissal,	  objectification,	  silencing,	  shaming,	  humiliation,	  and	  double	  standards	  that	  I	  had	  personally	  experienced	  as	  well	  as	  witnessed	  around	  me	  were	  finally	  exposed	  for	  what	  they	  were:	  manifestations	  of	  oppression	  that	  operated	  on	  both	  personal	  (micro)	  and	  societal	  (macro)	  levels.	  The	  naming	  of	  this	  oppression	  as	  oppression	  was	  a	  crucial	  first	  step	  in	  giving	  me	  the	  confidence	  with	  which	  to	  challenge	  it.	  Importantly,	  this	  confidence	  was	  also	  rooted	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  I	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  this	  fight	  but,	  rather,	  I	  now	  belonged	  to	  a	  worldwide	  movement	  committed	  to	  recognizing,	  exposing,	  and	  challenging	  all	  forms	  of	  gendered	  oppression	  and	  injustice.	  This	  for	  me	  was	  a	  very	  new	  and	  very	  powerful	  feeling,	  and	  it	  energized	  me	  a	  great	  deal.	  	  I	  discovered	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  when	  I	  moved	  to	  Toronto,	  Ontario	  for	  my	  Master’s	  degree.	  While	  my	  feminist	  education	  at	  UVic	  had	  used	  an	  intersectional	  lens	  to	  emphasize	  the	  interlocking	  oppressions	  of	  gender,	  race,	  and	  class,	  11	  the	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  university	  and	  of	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole,	  was	  very	  much	  slanted	  toward	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  “white”	  feminism.	  That	  is,	  while	  racial	  and	  other	  oppressions	  were	  noted,	  there	  were	  few	  (if	  any)	  professors	  and	  courses	  that	  offered	  in-­‐depth	  instruction	  as	  how	  to	  practice	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  My	  educational	  experience	  at	  York	  University	  was	  completely	  different.	  It	  was	  here	  that	  I	  took	  a	  number	  of	  classes	  that	  centered	  on	  anti-­‐racist,	  post-­‐colonial,	  and	  third	  world	  feminism	  taught	  by	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  scholars.	  It	  was	  also	  at	  York	  that	  I	  met	  a	  number	  of	  fellow	  women	  of	  colour	  with	  whom	  I	  would	  attend	  and	  participate	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  was	  before	  other	  forms	  of	  oppression,	  most	  notably	  those	  pertaining	  to	  sexuality,	  were	  (commonly)	  included	  in	  intersectional	  analysis.	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anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  academic	  (conferences,	  talks,	  book	  launches,	  reading	  groups),	  and	  activist	  (rallies,	  marches,	  sit-­‐ins)	  events.	  	  Whereas	  my	  undergraduate	  experience	  gave	  me	  a	  feminist	  orientation	  and	  identity,	  my	  graduate	  (MA)	  experience	  was	  a	  complete	  immersion	  in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  politics	  and	  everyday	  practice.	  Almost	  every	  facet	  of	  my	  life	  reflected	  my	  commitment	  to	  this	  movement	  including	  the	  courses	  I	  took,	  the	  professors	  I	  chose	  to	  work	  with,	  the	  books	  I	  read,	  the	  films	  I	  watched,	  the	  coffee	  shops	  and	  restaurants	  I	  frequented,	  the	  cultural	  events	  I	  attended,	  the	  clothes	  I	  wore,	  and	  the	  people	  that	  I	  invited	  into	  my	  life.	  This	  latter	  point	  was	  especially	  salient	  as	  I	  formed	  very	  intimate	  bonds	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  who	  during	  this	  time	  became	  my	  closest	  friends	  and	  companions	  on	  this	  path.	  Like	  me,	  these	  friends	  were	  of	  colour	  (brown,	  black,	  and	  Asian),	  cis	  females,	  either	  heterosexual	  or	  heterosexual	  passing,12	  from	  middle-­‐class	  immigrant	  families,	  and	  pursuing	  graduate	  studies	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  	  These	  friendships	  were	  extremely	  meaningful	  and	  impactful	  in	  the	  validation,	  belonging,	  and	  support	  they	  offered.	  Even	  more	  than	  the	  resonances	  I	  found	  with	  classmates	  in	  Victoria,	  my	  friendships	  in	  Toronto	  went	  much	  deeper	  in	  affirming	  my	  experiences	  of	  gendered	  and	  racial	  oppression,	  and	  providing	  the	  confidence	  and	  support	  with	  which	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  these	  forms	  of	  injustice.	  In	  many	  ways,	  these	  friendships	  offered	  a	  community	  that	  very	  much	  felt	  like	  a	  home.	  	  This	  home,	  however,	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  “happy”	  one.	  The	  feelings	  of	  confluence,	  support,	  and	  affirmation	  were	  also	  accompanied	  by	  rage,	  resentfulness,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  By	  “heterosexual	  passing”	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  those	  of	  us	  whose	  sexualities	  were	  more	  complex	  than	  just	  “straight”	  but	  who	  maintained	  femme/straight	  presentations	  often	  for	  cultural	  reasons.	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outrage,	  hatred,	  mistrust,	  suspicion,	  frustration,	  bitterness,	  despair,	  and	  sadness	  (among	  other	  emotions)	  against	  the	  gendered	  and	  racial	  oppression	  that	  we	  felt.	  It	  became	  common	  for	  us	  to	  get	  together	  and	  “rage,”	  so	  to	  speak,	  about	  men,	  or	  white	  men,	  or	  white	  women.	  Of	  course	  these	  were	  not	  un-­‐provoked	  instances.	  What	  I	  began	  to	  notice,	  however,	  is	  that	  whatever	  the	  incident,	  if	  it	  involved	  a	  white	  person,	  we	  would	  automatically	  label	  it	  as	  “racist”	  or	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  person’s	  racial	  privilege.	  The	  lines	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  blurry	  between	  hating	  whiteness	  and	  the	  institution	  of	  white	  supremacy,	  and	  hating	  white	  people	  themselves.	  Personally,	  I	  made	  a	  decision	  to	  ensure	  that	  most	  of	  my	  graduate	  courses	  were	  taught	  by	  women	  of	  colour,	  and	  if	  this	  was	  not	  possible,	  then	  at	  least	  by	  a	  woman.	  I	  also	  refused	  to	  read	  anything	  written	  by	  a	  white	  man	  during	  the	  years	  of	  my	  Master’s	  degree.	  Many	  of	  my	  friends	  made	  similar	  decisions.	  	  If	  white	  people	  were	  our	  enemy,	  then	  people	  of	  colour,	  and	  especially	  women	  of	  colour,	  were	  our	  automatic	  friends/sisters	  in	  solidarity.	  Following	  standpoint	  perspectives	  (discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter),	  we	  held	  the	  work	  of	  feminists	  of	  colour	  as	  most	  authoritative,	  actively	  collecting	  and	  sharing	  whatever	  books	  and	  articles	  we	  came	  across.	  We	  also	  submitted	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  whoever	  suffered	  the	  most	  oppression	  should	  be	  granted	  most	  space	  and	  most	  authority.	  	  For	  me,	  these	  “radical”	  and	  intensely	  emotionally	  charged	  years	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  lasted	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  my	  (two	  year)	  Master’s	  degree,	  the	  few	  years	  between	  my	  MA	  and	  PhD,	  and	  the	  first	  year	  of	  my	  PhD.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  my	  PhD	  that	  I	  experienced	  a	  shift	  in	  my	  thinking	  and	  feeling	  –	  a	  shift	  brought	  about	  by	  an	  extreme	  emotional	  burnout.	  “Burnout”	  is	  a	  common	  term	  used	  in	  activist	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circles	  (as	  well	  as	  helping	  professions).	  In	  the	  activist	  context	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  “physical,	  emotional,	  and	  spiritual	  exhaustion	  that	  causes	  a	  decline	  in	  your	  ability	  to	  experience	  joy	  and	  feel	  and	  care	  for	  others.”	  13	  	  My	  burnout	  was	  not	  necessarily	  due	  to	  taking	  on	  excessive	  tasks	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  activist	  organizing	  but	  rather	  the	  cumulative	  toll	  of	  embodying	  an	  emotional	  and	  attitudinal	  disposition	  that	  drove	  me	  into	  a	  deep	  state	  of	  exhaustion,	  despair,	  depression,	  and	  anxiety.	  It	  felt	  like	  a	  complete	  emotional	  collapse.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  this	  collapse,	  there	  were	  a	  few	  things	  that	  made	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  me	  as	  I	  “recovered,”	  so	  to	  speak,	  and	  which,	  as	  a	  result,	  have	  found	  their	  way	  into	  this	  dissertation.	  One	  was	  the	  chapter	  “Wounded	  Attachments”	  written	  by	  Wendy	  Brown	  that	  I	  felt	  gave	  some	  language	  to	  aspects	  of	  my	  experience,	  and	  which	  I	  wished	  to	  explore	  at	  greater	  length.	  Another	  influence	  was	  the	  work	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  on	  humanism	  and	  positive	  freedom,	  which	  inspired	  an	  interest	  in	  imagining	  an	  affirmative	  and	  emancipatory	  vision	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  And	  the	  third	  was	  the	  practice	  of	  mindfulness	  that	  has	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  helping	  me	  put	  back	  together	  the	  pieces	  of	  my	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  envision	  new	  types	  of	  relationality.	  	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  emotional	  exhaustion	  that	  I	  experienced	  did	  not	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  my	  engagement	  or	  identification	  with	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  It	  did,	  however,	  prompt	  my	  interest	  in	  asking	  the	  questions	  that	  I	  do	  in	  this	  dissertation	  around	  the	  types	  of	  practices	  and	  tendencies	  that	  I	  have	  encountered	  (and	  embodied),	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  articles	  that	  discuss	  burnout	  in	  the	  activist	  context,	  see	  Melissa	  A.	  Fabello,	  “Burn-­‐Out	  Prevention	  and	  Intervention,”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  February	  7,	  2014,	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2014/02/burn-­‐out/;	  Aliya	  Khan,	  “Activist	  Burnout	  Is	  Real	  –	  And	  You	  Probably	  Need	  to	  Read	  These	  4	  Ways	  to	  Manage	  It,”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  May	  27,	  2015,	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/05/dealing-­‐with-­‐activist-­‐burnout/.	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nature	  of	  our	  political	  agenda	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  freedom	  within	  it.	  Why	  this	  interest	  in	  freedom?	  I	  came	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  spend	  my	  entire	  life	  fighting,	  challenging,	  opposing,	  and	  reacting.	  I	  began	  to	  wonder	  what	  it	  would	  be	  like	  to	  envision	  an	  emancipatory	  future.	  That	  is,	  I	  became	  interested	  in	  how	  we	  –	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  –	  might	  achieve	  the	  admittedly	  naïve	  sounding	  objectives	  of	  happiness,	  peace,	  unity,	  love,	  freedom,	  and	  futurity.	  And	  more,	  I	  became	  concerned	  that	  if	  these	  objectives	  are	  indeed	  plausible,	  they	  have	  been	  shrouded	  in	  the	  garb	  of	  Western	  white	  male	  liberalism	  –	  thus	  leading	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  these	  objectives	  were	  not	  for	  us	  if	  they	  did	  exist,	  or	  something	  that	  we	  were	  too	  disillusioned	  (for	  good	  reason)	  to	  believe	  could	  exist	  for	  anyone.	  Although	  I	  understand	  both	  positions,	  this	  dissertation	  attempts	  to	  challenge	  them	  as	  well	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  perhaps	  we	  should	  reconsider	  these	  objectives	  as	  worthy	  of	  our	  sights	  too.	  	  The	  question	  remains,	  however,	  of	  how	  did	  I	  make	  the	  leap	  from	  my	  personal	  experience	  in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  to	  that	  of	  the	  wider	  movement?	  That	  is,	  what	  makes	  me	  think	  that	  the	  types	  of	  thinking,	  feeling,	  and	  acting	  that	  I	  personally	  encountered	  are	  relevant	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  as	  a	  whole?	  Could	  they	  not	  just	  be	  expressive	  of	  my	  localized	  context	  as	  a	  graduate	  student	  at	  York	  University,	  or	  even	  as	  a	  graduate	  student	  at	  York	  University	  with	  a	  particular	  group	  of	  friends	  who	  practiced	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	  a	  particular	  way?	  While	  I	  certainly	  believe	  that	  my	  specific	  positionality,	  background,	  and	  context	  are	  germane	  to	  my	  experience,	  I	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  not	  alone	  responsible	  for	  my	  experience	  with	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  Rather,	  I	  propose	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  emotional	  expressions,	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attitudes	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  only	  more	  widespread	  but	  that	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  forming	  a	  common	  culture	  across	  activist	  groups,	  university	  campuses,	  and	  cities.	  I	  have	  come	  to	  believe	  this	  not	  only	  through	  my	  encounters	  with	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  and	  other	  activists	  and	  academics	  of	  identity	  in	  my	  own	  social	  and	  political	  context	  (but	  outside	  of	  my	  friend	  group)	  –	  within	  the	  university	  and	  at	  activist	  events	  –	  but	  also	  through	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  commentary,	  reflections,	  and	  reports	  I	  have	  come	  across	  written	  by	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  other	  activists/academics	  of	  identity,	  and	  critics	  from	  across	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  To	  be	  sure,	  critiques	  of	  identity	  politics	  –	  such	  as	  that	  presented	  by	  Peterson	  –	  are	  much	  more	  readily	  available,	  especially	  as	  we	  see	  a	  rise	  in	  reactionary	  right-­‐wing	  political	  movements	  in	  recent	  years.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  though,	  I	  have	  encountered	  a	  number	  of	  thoughtful	  self-­‐critiques	  from	  progressive	  scholars	  and	  activists	  –	  such	  as	  Bindel	  –	  	  who,	  while	  committed	  to	  combatting	  social	  oppression,	  have	  also	  noted	  some	  concerning	  and	  self-­‐sabotaging	  trends	  in	  the	  identity	  movements	  (including	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism)	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  part.	  It	  is	  among	  these	  self-­‐critiques	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  situate	  the	  present	  discussion,	  and	  which	  I	  would	  like	  to	  explore	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  	  
A	  Theoretical	  Analysis	  While	  the	  impetus	  for	  this	  project	  is	  decidedly	  personal,	  the	  dissertation	  advances	  a	  primarily	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  the	  problem,	  in	  which	  I	  present	  the	  insights	  of	  a	  number	  of	  theorists	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  their	  relevance	  and	  explanatory	  power.	  Given	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  I	  am	  investigating,	  I	  draw	  upon	  ideas	  and	  theories	  that	  have	  sometimes	  been	  seen	  as	  marginal	  within	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sociology.	  These	  include	  the	  work	  of	  diverse	  thinkers	  situated	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy,	  psychology	  and	  psychoanalysis,	  feminist	  theory	  (including	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism),	  social	  movement	  theory,	  literary	  theory,	  and	  (secularized)	  Buddhist	  mindfulness.	  The	  socio-­‐psychological	  contributions	  of	  German	  sociologist	  and	  psychoanalyst	  Erich	  Fromm	  are	  particularly	  germane.	  His	  concepts	  of	  social	  
character	  and	  the	  social	  unconscious	  will	  be	  employed	  as	  key	  tools	  for	  grasping	  how	  emotions	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  identity	  movements,	  while	  his	  theory	  of	  radical	  humanism	  will	  be	  explored	  for	  the	  affirmative	  suggestions	  and	  inspiration	  it	  offers	  with	  which	  to	  move	  forward.	  Political	  philosopher	  Wendy	  Brown	  also	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  dissertation,	  especially	  in	  the	  first	  few	  chapters	  which	  are	  dedicated	  to	  formulating	  and	  understanding	  the	  issue	  of	  ressentiment	  as	  a	  central	  emotional	  feature	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  The	  following	  outline	  of	  the	  chapters	  to	  come	  gives	  some	  sense	  of	  how	  I	  engage	  with	  the	  work	  of	  these	  theorists	  and	  others.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  provide	  a	  contextual	  sketch	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  looking	  at	  its	  history,	  contributions,	  and	  aims.	  I	  then	  explore	  the	  experiences	  of	  activists	  and	  scholars	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  and	  other	  identity	  movements	  who	  have	  registered	  similar	  observations	  to	  the	  ones	  that	  I	  have	  in	  this	  introduction.	  Indeed,	  activists	  and	  scholars	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  refer	  to	  identity	  movements	  (including	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism)	  as	  exemplifying	  a	  “culture	  of	  outrage,”	  “call	  out	  culture,”	  “dragging	  culture,”	  “outrage	  addiction,”	  and	  “toxic	  culture	  of	  the	  Left.”14	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Assam	  Ahmad,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture,”	  Briarpatch	  Magazine,	  March	  2,	  2015,;	  Stacey	  Patton,	  “Is	  Outrage	  Addiction	  Derailing	  Our	  Most	  Important	  Conversations?,”	  Dame	  
Magazine,	  June	  26,	  2017;	  Bailey	  Lamon,	  “Why	  This	  Radical	  Activist	  Is	  Disillusioned	  by	  the	  Toxic	  Culture	  of	  the	  Left,”	  The	  Independent,	  February	  29,	  2016,;	  Julie	  Bindel,	  “Feminism	  Is	  in	  Danger	  of	  Becoming	  Toxic”	  The	  Guardian,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  sec.	  Opinion.	  	  
	   13	  
In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  explore	  some	  theoretical	  concepts	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  social	  movements.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  emotions,	  practices,	  and	  attitudes	  I	  have	  described	  might	  more	  usefully	  be	  understood	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  collective	  character,	  given	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  are	  psychologically	  embodied	  by	  members	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  movement.	  I	  develop	  this	  idea	  through	  examining	  the	  field	  of	  social	  movement	  theory,	  focusing	  especially	  on	  its	  relation	  to	  emotion.	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  theory	  of	  social	  psychology	  and	  his	  ideas	  around	  social	  character	  and	  the	  social	  unconscious	  as	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  a	  way	  of	  speaking	  about	  the	  collective	  character	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  Chapter	  4	  explores	  exactly	  what	  type	  of	  social	  character	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  embody.	  Following	  Wendy	  Brown	  and	  Rebecca	  Stringer,	  I	  examine	  the	  Nietzschean	  concept	  of	  ressentiment	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  may	  give	  insight	  into	  the	  current	  predicament	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  ressentiment	  does	  indeed	  capture	  salient	  aspects	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  social	  character,	  Nietzsche’s	  bias	  against	  the	  oppressed	  demands	  revision.	  I	  thus	  engage	  his	  theory	  self-­‐reflexively	  by	  balancing	  accountability	  for	  troubling	  tendencies	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  racial	  pain	  that	  lies	  beneath	  a	  ressentimental	  social	  character	  on	  the	  other.	  	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  I	  examine	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  contention	  that	  identity	  politics	  is	  constitutionally	  bound	  to	  ressentimental	  attachment.	  I	  investigate	  a	  number	  of	  charges	  that	  have	  been	  levelled	  against	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  (like	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism)	  and	  argue	  that	  while	  not	  all	  such	  movements	  are	  necessarily	  
ressentimental	  in	  character,	  the	  divisiveness,	  envious	  investment	  in	  state	  and	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capitalist	  power,	  and	  attachment	  to	  injury	  certainly	  make	  identity	  movements	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  grasp	  of	  ressentiment.	  	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  present	  the	  humanistic	  perspective	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  as	  a	  future-­‐oriented,	  anti-­‐capitalist,	  emancipatory	  theory	  that	  foregrounds	  interconnection,	  love,	  accountability,	  and	  positive	  freedom.	  I	  argue	  that	  Fromm’s	  insights	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  building	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism,	  with	  some	  important	  correctives	  offered	  by	  Civil	  Rights	  writer	  James	  Baldwin.	  	  	  Chapter	  7	  returns	  to	  both	  the	  idea	  of	  racial	  pain,	  and	  of	  ressentiment.	  Drawing	  on	  an	  online	  course	  facilitated	  by	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  educator	  Sandra	  Kim,	  I	  explore	  how	  mindfulness	  provides	  a	  method	  through	  which	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  can	  touch	  our	  pain,	  rather	  than	  cover	  it	  with	  ressentimental	  rage.	  In	  making	  contact	  with	  our	  pain,	  Kim	  argues	  that	  we	  open	  ourselves	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  compassionate	  activism	  that	  centers	  co-­‐existence	  and	  co-­‐operation,	  over	  the	  
ressentimental	  type	  character	  discussed	  previously.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  Kim	  provides	  a	  useful	  methodology	  to	  healing	  pain	  and	  building	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  more	  affirmative,	  future-­‐oriented	  movement,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  need	  to	  cut	  out	  negative	  emotions	  completely.	  Indeed,	  as	  philosophers	  Jean	  Améry	  and	  Thomas	  Brudholm	  argue,	  there	  is	  a	  moral	  value	  in	  emotions	  like	  ressentiment,	  which	  while	  not	  necessarily	  politically	  effective,	  are	  nonetheless	  humanizing.	  I	  conclude	  the	  dissertation	  by	  suggesting	  that	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  need	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  imagine	  new	  possibilities	  for	  living,	  being,	  and	  relating	  to	  one	  another	  if	  we	  are	  to	  re-­‐orient	  ourselves	  toward	  the	  future.	  	  
	   15	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  my	  intention	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  neither	  to	  decisively	  define	  or	  critique	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  nor	  to	  suggest	  proper	  ‘solutions’	  that	  might	  be	  implemented	  to	  ‘fix’	  things.	  Rather,	  as	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  who	  feels	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  affection,	  love,	  need,	  and	  pride	  for	  her	  movement,	  my	  central	  aim	  is	  to	  open	  a	  conversation	  around	  what	  things	  might	  be	  hurting	  us	  and	  promote	  a	  greater	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  the	  movement	  itself.	  Given	  the	  diversity	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  aims,	  objectives,	  visions,	  and	  forms	  of	  mobilization,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  expected	  that	  this	  exploration	  will	  resonate	  with	  all	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  nor	  represent	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	  any	  cohesive	  sense.	  Instead,	  my	  concerns	  and	  perspectives	  stem	  from	  my	  personal	  experiences	  within	  the	  movement	  from	  my	  particular	  social,	  historical,	  generational,	  and	  geographical	  context.	  That	  is,	  as	  rooted	  in	  my	  experiences	  in	  largely	  graduate	  and	  activist	  spaces	  in	  Toronto,	  Ontario,	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  or	  so,	  and	  in	  conversation	  with	  women	  of	  colour	  activists	  and	  scholars	  largely	  from	  my	  generation	  (i.e.	  born	  between	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  the	  late	  1980s).	  Although	  I	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  these	  experiences	  are	  echoed	  beyond	  these	  boundaries,	  it	  is	  still	  important	  for	  me	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  context	  from	  which	  I	  am	  writing	  as	  it	  informs	  much	  of	  my	  analysis.	  I	  might	  also	  emphasize	  that	  despite	  the	  critiques	  that	  I	  present	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  am	  by	  no	  means	  above	  them.	  To	  the	  contrary	  –	  unlike	  the	  types	  of	  analyses	  offered	  by	  critics	  like	  Jordan	  Peterson	  –	  this	  project	  is	  undertaken	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  self-­‐compassion	  as	  well	  as	  compassion	  and	  understanding	  toward	  my	  fellow	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  for	  whom	  I	  write	  this.	  It	  is	  an	  imperfect	  work	  for	  an	  imperfect	  social	  movement	  that	  I	  hold	  with	  fierce	  love	  and	  an	  optimistic	  hope	  for	  the	  future.	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Another	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  sociological	  study	  of	  social	  movements	  (social	  movement	  theory),	  which	  continues	  to	  underestimate	  the	  importance	  of	  psychological	  factors	  in	  influencing	  the	  direction	  and	  possibilities	  of	  political	  expressions.	  As	  I	  argue	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  social	  movement	  theory’s	  ambivalence	  toward	  integrating	  an	  analysis	  of	  emotions	  in	  their	  investigations	  of	  social	  justice	  movements	  severely	  curtails	  the	  field’s	  ability	  to	  fully	  grasp	  how	  psychic	  dynamics	  influence	  political	  behaviour.	  Before	  considering	  this	  relationship	  between	  the	  emotional	  and	  the	  political,	  however,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  first	  provide	  some	  background	  and	  context	  on	  this	  dissertation’s	  object	  of	  study:	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Anti-­‐racist	  feminism:	  A	  Culture	  of	  Outrage?	  	  
	  
	  “Some	  of	  us	  are	  fighting	  for	  freedom,	  while	  others	  don’t	  want	  freedom,	  because	  if	  we	  
have	  it,	  then	  they	  will	  no	  longer	  have	  anything	  to	  make	  them	  the	  center	  of	  attention.	  
Those	  people	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  wear	  oppression	  like	  coats	  they	  refuse	  to	  take	  off,	  and	  
the	  very	  act	  of	  being	  marginalized	  is	  what	  defines	  them.	  It	  is	  what	  gives	  them	  purpose.”	  
-­‐Luvvie	  Ajayi,	  Facebook	  public	  post	  
	  
“We	  are	  currently	  living	  under	  an	  outrageous	  regime	  that	  gets	  more	  outrageous	  by	  the	  
minute.	  But	  have	  we	  become	  addicted	  to	  our	  own	  sense	  of	  outrage?	  Are	  we	  starting	  to	  
alienate	  ourselves	  from	  one	  another	  because	  of	  our	  rage	  at	  the	  world?”	  -­‐Stacey	  Patton,	  Dame	  Magazine	  	  	  	   In	   the	   introductory	   chapter	   I	   discussed	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   as	   one	  expression	   of	   an	   identity-­‐based	  movement.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   explore	   its	   particular	  historical	   formation,	   impact,	   and	   objectives.	   I	   then	   provide	   an	   analysis	   of	   some	  problematic	   emotional	   and	   behavioural	   features	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   –	   as	  discussed	   by	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	   feminists,	   and	   activists/academics	   of	   identity	   –	  which	  I	  suggest	  are	  indicative	  of	  a	  certain	  culture	  within	  the	  movement.	  	  
(2.	  1)	  Anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  	   Anti-­‐racist	   feminism1	  is	   at	   once	   a	   part	   of	   the	  wider	   feminist	  movement,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   it.	   It	   belongs	   to	   the	   greater	   movement	   in	   that	   it	   is	   also	  committed	   to	   exposing	   and	   dismantling	   patriarchy,	   and	   establishing	   equality	  between	   the	   genders.	   It	   stands	   apart,	   however,	   in	   its	   insistence	   that	   gender	  oppression	   is	   coterminous	  with,	   and	   inextricable	   from	  other	   forms	   of	   oppression,	  particularly	  racial.	  While	  the	  recognition	  of	  overlapping	  oppressions	  is	  increasingly	  becoming	  a	  mainstream	  feminist	  position,	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Indeed,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Also	  known	  as	  “critical	  race	  feminism”	  and	  “intersectional	  feminism.”	  Anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  is	  a	  term	  I	  have	  found	  to	  be	  used	  more	  in	  Canada	  than	  other	  countries.	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first	   and	   second	  wave	   periods	   of	   feminism	   (1830s-­‐early	   1900s	   and	   1960s-­‐1980s	  respectively)	  have	  been	  critiqued	  by	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists	  as	  being	  centered	  on	  the	  issues	  and	  concerns	  of	  white	  middle-­‐class	  women	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  voices	  and	  experiences	  of	  women	  of	   colour.	  Anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   is	  part	  of	   the	   contemporary	  third	  wave	   that	   began	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   across	   Canada,	   the	  US,	   and	  Britain,	   as	   “a	  definite	   body	   of	   literature…emerged	   in	   sociology,	   political	   science,	   history,	   and	  women's	   studies	   that	   clearly	   focused	   on	   the	   interconnections	   between	   race	   and	  gender.”2	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  women	  of	  colour	  were	  finally	  able	  to	  make	  an	  indelible	  impression	  on	  what	  had	  largely	  been	  a	  white	  middle-­‐class	  movement.	  	  Before	   exploring	   some	   of	   the	   interventions	   and	   aims	   of	   the	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  project,	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  who	  exactly	  are	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists?	  While	  the	  movement	   is	   largely	  comprised	  of	   “women	  of	  colour,”	   this	   term	  is	  not	  without	  difficulties.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  usage	  reflects	  a	  certain	  commonality	  of	  experience	  in	   terms	  of	   our	   exclusion	   from	  white	   feminism	   (and	  white	   society	   as	   a	  whole),	   as	  well	  as	  allows	  us	  to	  express	  and	  make	  demands	  from	  a	  place	  of	  political	  solidarity.3	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   the	   concept	   is	   also	   contested	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   it	  obfuscates	   important	   differences	   between	   women	   of	   colour	   in	   terms	   of	   our	  particular	  histories,	  experiences,	  opportunities,	  the	  forms	  of	  domination	  that	  we	  are	  subjected	   to,	   and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  we	   organize	   around	   these	   particularities.4	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Enakshi	  Dua	  and	  Angela	  Robertson,	  Scratching	  the	  Surface:	  Canadian,	  Anti-­‐Racist,	  Feminist	  
Thought	  (Canadian	  Scholars’	  Press,	  1999),	  13.	  3	  Gayatri	  Spivak’s	  concept	  of	  “strategic	  essentialism”	  is	  relevant	  here.	  	  4	  See	  Dua	  and	  Robertson	  (1999)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  using	  the	  term	  “women	  of	  colour.”	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  additional	  difficulty	  of	  determining	  whether	  people	  who	  are	  not	  women	  of	  colour	  can	  be	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	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such,	   although	   I	   refer	   to	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   as	   a	   singular	   movement	   in	   this	  dissertation,	   it	   can	   perhaps	   more	   accurately	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   umbrella	   term	   for	  different	  mobilizations	  that	  center	  race	  as	  a	  key	  marker	  of	  identity,	  experience	  and	  oppression.	   These	   mobilizations	   includes	   black	   feminism	   (Kimberlé	   Crenshaw,	  Angela	   Davis,	   Patricia	   Hill	   Collins,	   bell	   hooks,	   Andrea	   Davis,	   Afua	   Cooper),	  Indigenous	   feminism	   (Andrea	   Smith,	   Bonita	   Lawrence,	   Leanne	   Betasamosake	  Simpson,	   Winona	   LaDuke,	   Linda	   Tuhiwai	   Smith),	   Third	   Word	   and	   Postcolonial	  feminism	   (Gayatri	   Spivak,	   Chandra	   Mohanty,	   Trinh	   T.	   Minh-­‐ha,	   Jaqui	   Alexander,	  Saba	   Mahmood),	   Queer	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   (Sara	   Ahmed,	   Audre	   Lorde,	   Gloria	  Anzaldua,	   Jasbir	   Puar,	   Gayatri	   Gopinath),	   and	   feminism	   that	   might	   simply	   be	  characterized	   as	   “anti-­‐racist”	   (Enakshi	  Dua,	   Tania	  Das	   Gupta,	   Roxana	  Ng,	   Sherene	  Razack,	   Nandita	   Sharma,	   Malinda	   Smith,	   Sunera	   Thobani,	   Himani	   Bannerji,	   Njoki	  Wane).5	  Each	   of	   these	   feminist	   groupings	   is	   distinct	   (as	   are	   the	   feminists	   within	  them),	   and	   not	   without	   tensions.6	  Still,	   though,	   the	   foregrounding	   of	   overlapping	  oppressions	   and	   attendant	   critiques	   against	   white	   feminism,	   the	   advancing	   of	   a	  particular	  epistemic	  standpoint,	  and	  the	  reclaiming	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  histories,	  are	  important	  points	  of	  connection	  which	  engender	  strong	  ties	  of	  solidarity	  amongst	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  is	  not	  an	  exhaustive	  list,	  and	  moreover,	  the	  feminists	  listed	  are	  not	  necessarily	  confined	  to	  these	  designations	  as	  many	  of	  them	  define	  themselves	  as	  belonging	  to	  multiple	  feminist	  schools	  of	  thought.	  	  6	  A	  good	  example	  of	  a	  tension	  is	  the	  debate	  between	  feminists	  Bonita	  Lawrence	  and	  Enakshi	  Dua	  (2005),	  and	  Nandita	  Sharma	  and	  Cynthia	  Wright	  (2008),	  over	  the	  role	  people	  of	  colour	  play	  in	  settler	  colonialism,	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  Aboriginal	  perspectives	  from	  the	  mainstream	  anti-­‐racist	  movement.	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many	  of	  us,	   and	   that	  make	   “anti-­‐racist	   feminism”	  a	  meaningful	  designation.7	  I	  will	  now	  explore	  these	  three	  interventions	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  The	   first	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   intervention	   is	   based	   in	   the	   insight	   that	  gendered	  oppression	  always	  intersects	  with	  racial	  and	  class	  oppression.	  This	  point	  is	   articulated	  by	   the	   theory	  of	   intersectionality,	  developed	  by	  Kimberlé	  Crenshaw,	  which	  describes	  how	  multiple	  social	   identities	  overlap	  simultaneously	  to	  structure	  experiences	   of	   social	   oppression. 8 	  Intersectional	   theory	   was	   formulated	   as	   a	  challenge	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   “some	   uniform	   experience	   common	   to	   all	  women”9	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “notion	  that	   'gender'	  was	  the	  primary	  factor	  determining	  a	  woman's	   fate.”10 	  Writing	   in	   1984,	   bell	   hooks	   argued	   that	   “white	   women	   who	  dominate	  feminist	  discourse	  today	  rarely	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  perspective	  on	  women’s	  reality	  is	  true	  to	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  women	  as	  a	  collective	  group.”11	  Hooks	   has	   emphasized	   that	   by	   using	   the	   banner	   of	   “common	   oppression”	   in	  fomenting	   the	   feminist	  movement,	   the	   vast	   differences	   among	  women	   have	   been	  silenced	  and	  subsumed	  by	  white	  women’s	  “opportunistic”	  political	  platform.12	  Anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   are	   thus	  quick	   to	  point	   out	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  white	  women	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  not	  all	  feminists	  of	  colour	  share	  this	  view.	  For	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  limitations	  of	  women	  of	  colour	  organizing	  ,	  see	  Andrea	  Smith,	  “Heteropatriarchy	  and	  the	  Three	  Pillars	  of	  White	  Supremacy:	  Rethinking	  Women	  of	  Color	  Organizing,”	  in	  Are	  All	  the	  
Women	  Still	  White?:	  Rethinking	  Race,	  Expanding	  Feminisms,	  ed.	  Janell	  Hobson	  (SUNY	  Press,	  2016),	  61–71.	  8	  Kimberlé	  Crenshaw,	  “Mapping	  the	  Margins:	  Intersectionality,	  Identity	  Politics,	  and	  Violence	  against	  Women	  of	  Color,”	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  43,	  no.	  6	  (1991):	  1241–99.	  Also	  see	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement	  (1977)	  for	  an	  early	  formulation	  of	  simultaneous	  oppressions.	  9	  Nancy	  A.	  Naples,	  Feminism	  and	  Method:	  Ethnography,	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  and	  Activist	  
Research	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2003),	  70.	  10	  bell	  hooks,	  Feminist	  Theory:	  From	  Margin	  to	  Center	  (Routledge,	  [1984]	  2014),	  xiii.	  11	  hooks,	  Feminist	  Theory,	  3.	  12	  hooks,	  Feminist	  Theory,	  44.	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historically	  colluded	  with	  racializing	  powers	  against	  women	  of	  colour,	  objecting	   to	  the	  insincere	  ways	  in	  which	  “sisterhood”	  has	  been	  evoked.	  In	   response	   to	  mainstream	   feminism’s	   essentialist	   ideas	   of	   the	   category	   of	  “woman”	   and	   our	   “common	   oppression,”	   women	   of	   colour	   have	   articulated	  alternative	   theories	   that	   represent	   specific	   situated	   perspectives	   and	   experiences.	  This	   leads	   to	   the	   second	   intervention:	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   lives	   and	   experiences	   of	  women	  of	  colour	  matter,	  and	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  unique	  epistemology.	  For	  some	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	   this	   distinct	   epistemology	   is	   articulated	   through	   the	   lens	   of	  standpoint	   theory.	   Developed	   by	   Nancy	   Hartsock,	   feminist	   standpoint	   theory	  contends	   that	   the	   fact	   that	  women	  and	  men’s	   lives	  are	  structured	  differently	   from	  one	  another	  has	  epistemological	  consequences;	  namely,	  that	  patriarchal	  oppression	  positions	  women	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   offers	   a	  more	   complete	   and	   accurate	   vision	   of	  social	   relations.13	  Building	   on	   this	   theory,	   Patricia	   Hill	   Collins	   argues	   that	   black	  women’s	  ways	  of	  knowing	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  subjugated	  knowledge	  that	  grants	  them	  a	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  privilege.14	  Other	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  such	  as	  Himani	  Bannerji,	  eschew	   the	   idea	   of	   privileged	   “subjugated	   knowledge,”	   arguing	   instead	   that	   the	  “strength	   of	   a	   standpoint	   epistemology	   is	   that	   it	   allows	   for	   a	   more	   sophisticated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Nancy	  Hartsock,	  “The	  Feminist	  Standpoint.,”	  in	  The	  Feminist	  Standpoint	  Theory	  Reader:	  
Intellectual	  and	  Political	  Controversies,	  ed.	  Sandra	  G.	  Harding	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2004).	  See	  also,	  Sandra	  G.	  Harding,	  Feminism	  and	  Methodology:	  Social	  Science	  Issues	  (Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  14	  For	  more	  on	  Collins’	  theory	  of	  black	  feminist	  epistemology,	  see	  her	  influential	  l	  Collins,	  
Black	  Feminist	  Thought:	  Knowledge,	  Consciousness,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Empowerment	  (Routledge,	  2002).	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understanding	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   discourse	   of	   race	   shaped	   the	   contingent	  character	  of	  colonialism,	  imperialism,	  and	  capitalism.”15	  Thirdly,	   and	   relatedly,	   “given	   the	   neglect	   of	   women	   of	   colour	   in	   feminist	  historiography,”16	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   has	   made	   efforts	   toward	   reclaiming	   our	  histories	   –	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   oppressions	   faced,	   and	   the	   political	  mobilizations	  against	   these.	   This	   archiving	   has	   revealed	   that	   women	   of	   colour	   have	   indeed	  engaged	  in	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  struggle	   for	  many	  years:	  “Black,	  other	  Third	  World,	  and	  working	  women	  have	  been	   involved	   in	   the	   feminist	  movement	   from	   its	   start,	  but	   both	   outside	   reactionary	   forces,	   and	   racism	   and	   elitism	  within	   the	  movement	  itself	  have	  served	  to	  obscure	  our	  participation.”17	  In	  fact,	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  political	  resistance	  has	  existed	  even	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  white	  feminism.	   Some	   Indigenous	   women	   have	   indeed	   made	   the	   claim	   that	   for	   them,	  feminism	  began	  in	  1492,	  upon	  “contact”	  with	  colonial	  forces.18	  	  As	  Enakshi	  Dua	  and	  Angela	  Robertson	   similarly	   recount,	   the	   “rich	  history	  of	   resistance	  began	  with	   the	  arrival	  of	  Europeans.	  Since	  contact,	  First	  Nation	  women	  fought	  the	  marginalization	  of	   indigenous	   peoples	   through	   activities	   that	   ranged	   from	   negotiating	   treaties	   to	  organizing	   armed	   resistance	   to	   the	   appropriation	   of	   indigenous	   lands.”19	  Dua	   and	  Robertson	  also	  unearth	  the	  largely	  undocumented	  political	  resistance	  of	  women	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  Scratching	  the	  Surface,	  19.	  	  16	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  11.	  	  17	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement:	  Black	  Feminist	  
Organizing	  in	  the	  Seventies	  and	  Eighties	  (Kitchen	  Table:	  Women	  of	  Color	  Press,	  1986).	  18	  See	  Christa	  Craven,	  “Women’s	  and	  Feminist	  Activism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada,”	  in	  
The	  Wiley	  Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Gender	  and	  Sexuality	  Studies	  (John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Ltd,	  2016),	  705.	  19	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  11.	  See	  also,	  Sherene	  Razack,	  Sunera	  Thobani,	  and	  Malinda	  Smith,	  
States	  of	  Race:	  Critical	  Race	  Feminism	  for	  the	  21st	  Century	  (Between	  the	  Lines,	  2010),	  1–2.	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colour	  during	  the	  first	  and	  second	  waves	  of	  feminism.	  Speaking	  within	  the	  Canadian	  context,	   they	   explore	   how	   the	   most	   pressing	   issues	   for	   first	   wave	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	   “were	   treaties,	   immigration	   policies,	   settlement	   policies,	   and	   access	   to	  democratic	   rights”20;	   while	   second	   wave	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   “initiatives	   included	  challenging	  the	  racism	  of	  the	  police,	  challenging	  discriminatory	  immigration	  policies	  (especially	  towards	  domestic	  workers),	  organizing	  those	  sectors	  in	  which	  women	  of	  colour	  were	  concentrated,	  challenging	  racism	  within	  the	  women's	  movement,	  [and]	  creating	   a	   shelter	  movement	   to	   provide	  women	   of	   colour	  with	   a	   space	   safe	   from	  both	  male	  violence	  and	  racism.”21	  The	  second	  wave	  was	  also	  a	  period	  in	  which	  many	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  writers	   employed	  a	   socialist	   feminist	   position	   in	   exploring	   the	  connections	  between	  gendered	  and	  racial	  oppression.22	  	  The	  third	  wave	  (mid	  1980s-­‐present)	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  the	  continuation	  of	  second	   wave	   concerns,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   number	   of	   new	   issues	   and	   initiatives	  corresponding	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  climate.	  In	  Canada,	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  this	  period	  were	  dominated	  by	  an	  analytical	  focus	  on	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  state	  –	  looking	  at	  gender	  and	  race	  in	  relation	  to	  immigration,	  citizenship,	  multiculturalism,	  and	   labour,	   as	   neo-­‐liberal	   ideology	   became	   entrenched	   in	   government	   policies.	   In	  more	   recent	   years,	   a	   number	   of	   themes	   have	   come	   to	   impact	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  scholarship	   and	   activism.	   Some	   of	   these	   include:	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   racialized	  construction	  of	  “us	  vs.	  them”	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  “war	  on	  terror,”	  especially	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  12.	  21	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  12–13.	  22	  Dua	  and	  Robertson,	  Scratching	  the	  Surface.	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  work	  of	  Himani	  Bannerji,	  
Returning	  the	  Gaze:	  Essays	  on	  Racism,	  Feminism	  and	  Politics	  (Sister	  Vision,	  1993).	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regards	  to	  the	  Othering	  of	  Muslim	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  other	  racialized	  peoples23;	  an	   interest	   in	   dismantling	   Canada’s	   peacekeeping	   image	   to	   reveal	   the	   state’s	  complicity	  with	  “empire,”	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  participation	  in	  neo-­‐imperialist	  wars,	  and	  “neo-­‐liberal	  globalized	  capitalism”24;	  a	  commitment	  to	  recognizing	  the	  Canadian	  state	  as	  an	  ongoing	  white	   settler	   colonial	  project	   that	   continues	   to	  enact	  material,	  cultural,	   emotional,	   physical,	   sexual	   and	   spiritual	   violence	   on	   Indigenous	   men,	  women,	   and	   children;25	  a	   focus	   on	   decolonization,	   Indigenous	   self-­‐determination,	  and	   the	   recovery	   of	   Indigenous	   knowledges26;	   an	   analysis	   of	   anti-­‐blackness	   as	   a	  particular	   type	   of	   oppression	   that	   leads	   to	   disproportionate	   forms	   of	   social	  inequality,	   and	   physical	   violence	   (especially	   police	   violence)	   against	   black	   men,	  women,	  and	  children27;	  a	  deepened	  understanding	  of	  how	  sexuality	  intersects	  with	  race,	  gender,	  and	  class	  to	  produce	  particular	  experiences,	  oppressions,	  and	  ways	  of	  knowing	  for	  queer	  and	  trans	  people	  of	  colour28;	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  academy	  as	  a	  white	  space29;	  and	  finally	  (but	  not	  exhaustively),	  an	  interest	  in	  exploring	  whiteness	  as	  “inextricably	  connected	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Other.”30	  	  The	   diversity	   of	   these	   above	   projects	   begs	   the	   question	   as	   to	  whether	   any	  underlying	   aims	   or	   objectives	   can	   be	   located	   that	   animate	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  Razack,	  Thobani,	  and	  Smith	  (2010).	  24	  Razack,	  Thobani,	  and	  Smith,	  xv.	  See	  Sherene	  Razack	  (2008),	  Sunera	  Thobani	  (2002)	  25	  See	  Sherene	  Razack	  (2000),	  Winona	  LaDuke	  (2005),	  Andrea	  Smith	  (2015)	  26	  See	  Audra	  Simpson	  (2014),	  Leanne	  Simpson	  (2008,	  2011),	  Andrea	  Smith	  (2005)	  27	  See	  Angela	  Davis	  (2011,	  2016),	  bell	  hooks	  (2015),	  Katherine	  McKittrick	  (2006),	  Tania	  DasGupta	  (2008)	  28	  See	  Sara	  Ahmed	  (2006),	  Audre	  Lorde	  (1984),	  Gloria	  Anzaldua	  (2007),	  Jasbir	  Puar	  (2007),	  Gayatri	  Gopinath	  (2005)	  29	  See,	  Malinda	  Smith	  (2017),	  Himani	  Bannerji	  (1992),	  Sara	  Ahmed	  (2012),	  Sherene	  Razack	  (1998)	  30	  Razack,	  Thobani,	  and	  Smith,	  States	  of	  Race,	  10.	  See	  Sedef	  Arat-­‐Koç	  (2010).	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movement.	   In	   general	   terms,	   I	   would	   identify	   some	   central	   aims	   as:	   exposing	  structures	   of	   domination	   including	   white	   supremacy,	   neo-­‐colonialism,	   racism,	  classism,	  heterosexism,	  and	  the	  suffering	  they	  cause	  for	  people	  of	  colour;	  contesting	  current	  forms	  of	  oppression	  and	  inequality	  through	  scholarship,	  direct	  action,	  legal	  redress,	   and	   publicization;	   demanding	   recognition	   and	   justice	   for	   past	   (historical	  and	   recent)	   injustices;	   fighting	   for	   equal	   access,	   inclusion,	   and	  opportunity	  within	  societal	   institutions,	   and	   the	   labour	   market;	   and	   demanding	   protection	   from	   all	  forms	  of	  discrimination	  and	  violence,	  including	  that	  enacted	  by	  the	  state.	  These	   objectives	   form	   a	   (partial)	   list	   of	  what	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   aims	  that	  address	  and	  relieve	  immediate	  forms	  of	  oppression	  and	  suffering.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  set	  of	  ambitions	  is	  a	  second	  order	  that	  concerns	  a	  somewhat	  more	  ambiguous,	  fraught,	   and	   even	   ambivalent	   aim:	   that	   of	   freedom.	   Indeed,	   as	   an	   emancipatory	  movement,	   feminism	   has	   always	   been	   linked	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   this	   ideal.	   Its	  articulation,	   however,	   is	   a	   more	   complex	   matter,	   as	   many	   feminists	   are	   aware.31	  How	  might	  the	  emancipatory	  ambitions	  of	  feminism	  be	  understood?	  To	  begin	  with,	  Western	  feminism,	   from	  its	   inception,	  has	  been	  informed	  by	   liberal	  Enlightenment	  ideas	   that	   take	   freedom	   as	   its	   normative	   object.	   The	   desire	   for	   freedom	   is	  recognized	  as	  both	  an	   “a	  priori	  assumption”	  and	  a	  universal	  aim.32	  In	   terms	  of	   the	  meaning	  given	  to	  freedom,	  liberal	  definitions	  conceive	  it	  as	  “the	  capacity	  to	  realize	  an	  autonomous	  will,	  one	  generally	  fashioned	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  dictates	  of	  ‘universal	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  For	  a	  good	  discussion	  of	  feminist	  hesitations	  and	  negotiations	  regarding	  freedom,	  see	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  chapter	  1.	  	  32	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  in	  Saba	  Mahmood,	  Politics	  of	  Piety:	  The	  Islamic	  Revival	  and	  the	  Feminist	  
Subject	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  10.	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reason’	   or	   ‘self-­‐interest,’	   and	   hence	   unencumbered	   by	   the	   weight	   of	   custom,	  transcendental	   will,	   and	   tradition”	   or	   “the	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐mastery	   and	   self-­‐government.”33	  	  Despite	  early	  feminism’s	  rootedness	  in	  these	  liberal	  formulations	  of	  freedom,	  liberation	   as	   conceived	   in	   these	   terms	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   critique	   among	  feminists	   from	   various	   traditions	   for	   some	   decades.	   For	   example,	   feminists	   have	  taken	  issue	  with	  liberalism’s	  “autonomous,	  self-­‐interested,	  excessively	  individuated	  subject”	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   its	   decidedly	   androcentric	   and	   bourgeois	   character.34	  Autonomy,	  as	  a	  liberal	  ideal,	  has	  also	  been	  polemicized	  as	  a	  masculinist	  concept	  that	  diminishes	   traditionally	   “feminine”	  values	   such	  as	   relationality,	   emotion,	   intimacy,	  and	  embodiment.35	  In	   addition	   to	   these	  points,	   feminists	  have	  also	  questioned	   the	  value	   and	   meaning	   of	   freedom	   in	   conditions	   of	   gendered	   inequality.	   As	   Wendy	  Brown	  discusses,	  	  a	   liberal	   formulation	   of	   freedom,	   proffering	   liberty	   as	   individual	   license,	  appears	   to	   aggravate	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   socially	   weak	   to	   the	   socially	  privileged,	   and	   thereby	   to	   facilitate	   as	  well	   as	   legitimize	   the	  exploitation	  of	  wage	  labor	  by	  capital,	  the	  racially	  subordinate	  by	  the	  racially	  dominant,	  and	  the	  sexually	  vulnerable	  by	  the	  sexually	  exploitative.36	  	  This	   has	   prompted	   feminists	   to	   consider	   whether	   it	   might	   be	   equality	   and	  protection	  that	  women	  need	  most,	  rather	  than	  freedom.37	  	  Post-­‐structural	  feminism	  has	  also	  challenged	  the	  grounding	  of	  feminism	  in	  an	  ideology	  of	  freedom.	  Following	  the	  interventions	  of	  Michel	  Foucault,	  these	  feminists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Mahmood,	  Politics	  of	  Piety,	  11.	  34	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  19.	  35	  See	  Chodorow	  (1978),	  Gilligan	  (1982),	  Mahmood	  (2011),	  Brown	  (1995).	  	  	  36	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  20.	  	  37	  For	  more	  on	  this	  position,	  see	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Feminism	  Unmodified:	  Discourses	  
on	  Life	  and	  Law	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1987).	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eschew	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  rational	  and	  autonomous	  liberal	  subject;	  the	  notion	  of	  power	  as	   strictly	  domination;	   and	   the	  belief	   that	   resistance	  and	  autonomy	  can	  ever	  exist	  outside	   of	   relations	   of	   power.	   For	   Foucault,	   power	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   “a	  strategic	   relation	   of	   force	   that	   permeates	   life	   and	   is	   productive	   of	   new	   forms	   of	  desires,	   objects,	   relations,	   and	   discourses.”38	  The	   process	   of	   subject	   formation,	   or	  
subjectivation	   is	   a	   paradoxical	   one	   in	  which	   the	   very	   forces	   of	   power	   that	   render	  one’s	   subordination	   are	   the	   same	   that	   furnish	   his/her	   possibilities	   for	   agency.39	  Following	   these	   insights,	   post-­‐structural	   feminists	   like	   Judith	  Butler	   repudiate	   the	  idea	   of	   a	   pre-­‐determined	   emancipatory	   project,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   pre-­‐discursive	   subject	   with	   an	   intrinsic	   yearning	   for	   freedom.	   Rather,	   Butler	   locates	  possibilities	   for	   agency	   in	   the	   disruption	   of	   social	   norms,	   which	   only	   come	   to	   be	  through	  processes	  of	  continual	  reenactment.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  instability	  of	  this	  process	  of	  iteration	  that	  “gaps	  and	  fissures	  are	  opened	  up”	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  subversion	  can	  be	   realized.40	  This	   resistance,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   resisting	   subject	   herself,	   however,	  always	  exists	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  power,	  and	  “is	  no	  way	  constrained	  to	  a	  radical	  or	   emancipatory	   aim.”41	  Post-­‐structural	   thinking	   of	   this	   sort	   has	   led	   Brown	   to	  remark	  that	  “the	  death	  of	  the	  essential	  subject	  appears	  to	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	   free	   subject,	   as	   the	  death	  of	   the	   essential	  world	   eliminates	   the	  possibility	  of	   a	  free	  world.”42	  Moreover,	   it	  has	  resulted	   in	  Butler	  having	   to	   “defend	  herself	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Mahmood,	  17.	  	  	  39	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Power/Knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  and	  Other	  Writings,	  1972-­‐1977	  (Pantheon	  Books,	  1980).	  40	  Judith	  Butler,	  Bodies	  That	  Matter:	  On	  the	  Discursive	  Limits	  of	  “Sex”	  (Psychology	  Press,	  1993),	  10.	  	  41	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury	  22.	  	  42	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury	  19.	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the	  charge,	  levelled	  against	  her	  by	  a	  range	  of	  feminists,	  that	  her	  work	  has	  the	  effect	  of	   undermining	   any	   agenda	   of	   progressive	   political	   and	   social	   reform	   by	  deconstructing	  the	  very	  conceptions	  of	  subject	  and	  power	  that	  enable	  it.”43	  Anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   have	   also	   contested	   liberal	   notions	   of	   freedom	   in	  dialogue	  with	  the	  above	  critiques.	  As	  Brown	  writes,	  “freedom,”	  for	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  cultural	  feminists,	  “has	  been	  swept	  onto	  the	  dust	  heap	  of	  anachronistic,	  humanistic,	  androcentric,	  subject-­‐centered,	  and	   ‘Western’	  shibboleths.	  Challenged	  politically	  as	  a	   token	   of	   the	   bourgeois-­‐individualist	   modern	   West,	   freedom’s	   valorization	   has	  been	  marked	  as	  ethnocentric	  and	  its	  pursuit	  as	  implicitly	  imperialistic.”44	  Anti-­‐racist	  feminists	   have	   exposed	   freedom’s	   imperialistic	   markings	   in	   recent	   years	   as	  militarist	  projects	  have	  borrowed	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  ‘fight	  for	  freedom’	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  to	  enact	  horrific	  forms	  of	  violence	  on	  racialized	  peoples	  both	   domestically	   and	   globally. 45 	  Anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   have	   also	   questioned	  dominant	  definitions	  of	  freedom	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  freedom	  is	  positioned	  against	  oppression.	  For	  example,	   in	   the	  1970s,	  Black	  and	   Indigenous	   feminists	   challenged	  mainstream	   feminism’s	   denunciation	   of	   the	   nuclear	   family	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   its	  oppression	  against	  women,	  arguing	   that	   their	  understandings	  of	   freedom	  included	  the	   ability	   to	   form	   families,	   given	   the	   assault	   on	   familial	   bonds	   during	   their	  respective	   histories	   of	   slavery	   and	   colonialism.46	  More	   recently,	   in	   her	   work	   on	  Egyptian	  women’s	   participation	   in	   the	   Islamist	   revival	  movement,	   Saba	  Mahmood	  has	   challenged	   liberalism’s	   assumption	   of	   the	   universal	   desire	   for	   freedom	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Mahmood,	  21.	  44	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury	  18-­‐19.	  45	  See	  Razack	  (2008),	  Thobani	  (2002).	  	  46	  Mahmood,	  Politics	  of	  Piety.	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foreclosing	   feminism’s	   ability	   to	   “analyze	   operations	   of	   power	   that	   construct	  different	  kinds	  of	  bodies,	  knowledges,	  and	  subjectivities	  whose	   trajectories	  do	  not	  follow	  the	  entelechy	  of	  liberatory	  politics.”47	  	  For	   Brown,	   the	   above	   factors	   –	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   socialism;	   the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  language	  of	  ‘freedom’	  by	  libertarian,	  militarist,	  and	  Right	  wing	  forces;	  and	   the	  anxiety	   that	   the	  responsibility	  of	   freedom	  places	  upon	   the	  modern	  subject	   in	   an	   age	   marked	   by	   unprecedented	   helplessness,	   despair,	   and	  disenchantment	  –	  have	  attenuated	  the	  Left’s	  very	  desire	  for	  freedom.	  As	  she	  states,	  	  The	  question,	   then,	   is	   not	  whether	   freedom	  can	  be	  discerned	   as	   the	  aim	  of	  politics	   or	   of	   history	   in	   the	   political	   projects	   of	   the	   present	   but	   a	   more	  modest,	   albeit	   still	   tendentious	   one,	   which	   borrows	   as	   much	   from	   the	  revolutionary	  outlook	  of	  Rousseau	  as	  from	  the	  teleological	  thinking	  of	  Marx:	  Might	   the	  desire	   for	   some	  degree	  of	   collective	   self-­‐legislation,	   the	  desire	   to	  participate	  in	  shaping	  the	  conditions	  and	  terms	  of	  life,	  remain	  a	  vital	  element	  –	  if	  also	  an	  evidently	  ambivalent	  and	  anxious	  one	  –	  of	  much	  agitation	  under	  the	   sign	  of	  progressive	  politics?	  Equally	   important,	  might	   the	   realization	  of	  substantive	  democracy	   continue	   to	   require	  a	  desire	   for	  political	   freedom,	  a	  longing	   to	   share	   in	   power	   rather	   than	   be	   protected	   from	   its	   excesses,	   to	  generate	   futures	   together	   rather	   than	   navigate	   or	   survive	   them?	   And	   have	  we,	  at	  the	  close	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  lost	  our	  way	  in	  pursuing	  this	  desire?	  With	  what	  consequences?48	  	  Brown’s	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  contemporary	  flight	  from	  freedom	  in	  progressive	  politics	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	   capitulation	   to	   “despair,	  misanthropy,	   narrow	  pursuit	   of	  interest,	   or	   bargains	   of	   autonomy	   for	   state	   protection”	   that	   run	   the	   risk	   of	  “twist[ing]	  into	  a	  more	  dissimulated	  political	  discourse	  of	  paralyzing	  recriminations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Mahmood,	  14.	  More	  specifically,	  Mahmood	  looks	  at	  the	  women’s	  piety	  movement	  in	  Cairo	  as	  exhibiting	  a	  form	  of	  political	  agency	  that	  “exceed[s]	  liberatory	  projects”	  (x)	  and	  the	  feminist/leftist	  analytic	  of	  subordination	  vs.	  resistance	  that	  animate	  them.	  Her	  ethnographic	  work	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  developing	  an	  alternative	  means	  of	  analyzing	  political	  practice	  that	  considers	  “the	  work	  they	  perform	  in	  the	  making	  of	  subjects,	  in	  creating	  life	  worlds,	  attachments,	  and	  embodied	  capacities”	  (xi).	  	  48	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  4	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and	   toxic	   resentments	   parading	   as	   radical	   critique.”49	  Indeed,	   she	   sees	   this	   as	   an	  already	  dominant	  manifestation	  in	  feminism	  (and	  other	  identity	  movements),	  as	  “in	  its	  economy	  of	  perpetrator	  and	  victim,	  this	  project	  seeks	  not	  power	  of	  emancipation	  for	   the	   injured	   or	   the	   subordinated,	   but	   the	   revenge	   of	   punishment,	   making	   the	  perpetrator	  hurt	  as	  the	  sufferer	  does.”50	  Following	   Brown,	   this	   dissertation	   seeks	   to	   pose	   some	   similar	   questions	  pertaining	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  and	  the	  aim	  of	  freedom	  –	  including:	  what	  are	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  long-­‐term	  desires	  and	  visions?	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  these	  involve	  “a	  desire	   for	  political	   freedom,	   a	   longing	   to	   share	   in	  power	   rather	   than	  be	  protected	  from	   its	   excesses,	   to	   generate	   futures	   together	   rather	   than	   navigate	   or	   survive	  them?”	  And	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  a	  lack	  of	  such	  a	  desire	  –	  as	  Brown	  fears	  –	  make	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   vulnerable	   to	   becoming	   a	   recriminatory/	   reactionary	   political	  project?	   While	   Brown’s	   site	   of	   investigation	   is	   the	   turn	   to	   legal	   redress	   and	  recognition	  as	  a	  means	  of	  securing	  justice	  for	  social	  injury,	  this	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  a	  different	  site:	   the	  more	  micro,	  everyday	   feelings,	   thoughts,	  and	  practices	   that	  some	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   exhibit	   in	   engagement	  with	   those	  who	  are	   identified	   as	  “the	  oppressor.”	  It	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  my	  desire	  to	  discuss	  freedom	  as	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  aim	  should	  not	  imply	  a	  dismissal	  of	  the	  feminist,	  post-­‐structural,	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  critiques	  considered	  above.	  In	  terms	  of	  Butler’s	  position,	  while	  I	  believe	  that	  her	  objection	  to	  freedom	  as	  an	  a	  priori	  aim	  is	  a	  legitimate	  one,	  I	  echo	  the	  concerns	  of	  other	  critics	  who	  have	  argued	  that	  her	  formulation	  poses	  challenges	  for	  envisioning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  xi.	  	  50	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  27.	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the	   possibility	   of	   wholesale	   social	   change.51	  Anti-­‐racist	   objections,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   are	   important	   in	   that	   they	   signal	   the	   importance	   of	   cultural	   and	   political	  context	  in	  determining	  whether	  political	  agency	  should	  be	  equated	  to	  emancipatory	  action	   or	   if	   an	   alternative	   and	   more	   appropriate	   framework	   should	   be	   pursued.	  Critiques	   like	   that	   of	  Mahmood’s,	   however,	   overstate	   the	   centrality	   of	   “liberation”	  today	  as	  a	  central	  feminist	  objective	  in	  the	  Western	  context.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  while	  there	   is	   indeed	   an	   emphasis	   on	   “agency”	   and	   “empowerment,”	   I	   contend	   that	  dominant	  expressions	  of	  contemporary	  feminism	  –	  including	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  –	  focus	  more	  on	  exposing	  and	  contesting	   current	   forms	  of	  oppression,	   seeking	   legal	  redress	   and	   recognition,	   demanding	   equality	   and	   inclusion,	   and	   forging	   strong	  communities.	   My	   argument	   in	   this	   dissertation	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	   importance	   of	  these	   as	   they	   certainly	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   struggle	   toward	   social	   change.	  Rather,	  my	  position	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  recuperating	  freedom	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  aims	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	  order	  that	  we	  might	  develop	  an	  anti-­‐oppressionist	  future	  based	  in	  affirmative	  values	  and	  possibilities.	  With	  this	  being	  said,	  this	  recuperation	  need	  not	  mean	   the	   re-­‐instalment	  of	   freedom	  as	   correspondent	   to	   an	  autonomous,	  self-­‐interested	  masculine	  bourgeois	  Western	  subject.	  Instead,	  following	  Brown,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  asking	  the	  much	  more	  basic	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  might	  wish	   to	   engage	   in	  projects	   of	   collective	   self-­‐determination	   and	   in	  the	  creation	  of	  alternative	   futures,	   rather	   than	  simply	   “navigate	  or	   survive	   them”?	  What	   this	  means	  and	   the	  precise	   forms	   these	  projects	   take	  are	  something	   that	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  See	  Mahmood,	  Politics	  of	  Piety;	  Susan	  Bordo,	  Unbearable	  Weight:	  Feminism,	  Western	  
Culture,	  and	  the	  Body	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2004);	  Nancy	  Fraser	  et	  al.,	  Feminist	  
Contentions:	  A	  Philosophical	  Exchange	  (Routledge,	  2013).	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must	   determine	   for	   ourselves.	   In	   Chapter	   6	   I	   explore	   Erich	   Fromm’s	   concepts	   of	  negative	  and	  positive	  as	  a	  means	  of	  offering	  a	  place	   to	  start.	  For	   the	  remainder	  of	  this	   chapter,	   however,	   I	   concentrate	   on	   investigating	   the	   everyday	   feelings,	  thoughts,	   and	   practices	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   that	   I	   argue	   can	   be	   seen	   as	  manifesting	  a	  distinctive	  culture.	  	  
(2.	  2)	  A	  Culture	  of	  Outrage	  
	   What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  “culture”	  of	  a	  political	  struggle?	  	  Sociologists	  of	  social	  movements	  have	  argued	  that	  movements	  often	  have	  distinctive	  cultures	  that	  both	  influence	  and	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  outside	  culture.52	  While	  movement	  cultures	  are	  protean	  and	  evolving,	  they	  nonetheless	  allow	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  distinct	  expressions	  and	  practices	  come	  together	  to	  make	  up	  a	  perceivable	  social	  form	  recognizable	  to	  those	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  movement.	  The	  culture	  of	  a	  movement	  includes	  its	  worldview	  (or	  ideology)	  and	  how	  it	  seeks	  to	  align	  this	  worldview	  with	  potential	  recruits	  and	  sympathizers;	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  a	  group	  and	  how	  it	  expresses	  this	  identity;	  behavioural	  routines	  or	  rituals	  that	  translate	  ideology	  into	  practice;	  and	  the	  material	  and	  discursive	  productions	  of	  the	  movement.53	  The	  charge	  that	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  suffer	  from	  a	  culture	  of	  outrage	  implies	  that	  negative	  emotions	  both	  produce	  and	  drive	  these	  different	  aspects	  of	  movement	  culture.	  That	  is,	  it	  suggests	  that	  an	  ethos	  of	  outrage	  permeates	  the	  attitudes,	  practices,	  and	  productions	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Doug	  McAdam,	  “Culture	  and	  Social	  Movements,”	  in	  Culture	  and	  Politics:	  A	  Reader,	  ed.	  Lane	  Corthers	  and	  Charles	  Lockhart	  (Springer,	  2000).	  53	  Doug	  McAdam,	  “Culture	  and	  Social	  Movements”;	  Verta	  Taylor	  and	  Nancy	  Whittier,	  “Analytical	  Approaches	  to	  Social	  Movement	  Culture:	  The	  Culture	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Movement,”	  in	  Social	  Movements	  And	  Culture,	  ed.	  Hank	  Johnston	  (Routledge,	  2003).	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In	  this	  section	  I	  move	  from	  the	  personal	  experiences	  discussed	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter	  to	  those	  of	  other	  activists	  and	  scholars	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  and	  other	  identity	  movements54	  who	  have	  registered	  similar	  observations.	  Such	  challenges	  from	  within	  progressive	  movements	  are	  not	  common.	  Indeed,	  as	  one	  academic/activist	  confided,	  it	  is	  only	  upon	  learning	  that	  a	  fellow	  progressive	  academic/activist	  is	  also	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  critical	  observations	  about	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  movement	  that	  he	  will	  open	  up	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  views	  –	  the	  political	  environment	  is	  too	  intolerant	  otherwise.55	  In	  the	  following	  paragraphs	  I	  explore	  some	  recent	  examples	  of	  tactics,	  tendencies,	  emotional	  expressions,	  attitudes,	  and	  practices	  that	  make	  up	  this	  “culture	  of	  outrage.”	  These	  examples	  come	  from	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  give	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  political	  environment	  found	  across	  some	  university	  campuses	  and	  activist	  circles.	  I	  include	  the	  viewpoints	  of	  activists	  and	  scholars	  who,	  like	  me,	  advance	  critical	  observations	  and	  self-­‐reflective	  analyses,	  while	  remaining	  committed	  to	  the	  anti-­‐oppressionist	  movements	  to	  which	  they	  belong.	  To	  be	  clear,	  my	  purpose	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  to	  these	  forms	  of	  feeling,	  thinking,	  and	  action,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  to	  discount	  the	  richness	  of	  our	  history,	  the	  value	  of	  our	  contributions,	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  demands,	  the	  realness	  of	  our	  injury,	  or	  the	  deep	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  and	  support	  that	  has	  been	  so	  essential	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  many	  of	  us	  in	  an	  oppressive	  world.	  Nor	  is	  it	  my	  intention	  to	  flatten	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  into	  a	  singular	  and	  homogenized	  representation	  or	  to	  speak	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  As	  I	  stated	  in	  the	  introduction	  (and	  will	  discuss	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  Chapter	  4),	  I	  believe	  the	  culture	  that	  I	  am	  exploring	  as	  pertaining	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  to	  also	  belong	  to	  other	  identity-­‐based	  movements.	  	  55	  Personal	  conversation	  with	  educator	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  activist,	  Sheldon	  Holder,	  that	  took	  place	  after	  a	  workshop	  on	  racism	  and	  diversity	  at	  the	  Gestalt	  Institute	  of	  Toronto,	  March	  25,	  2018.	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behalf	  of	  a	  diverse	  movement.	  My	  contention,	  rather,	  is	  that	  the	  practices	  that	  I	  have	  observed	  and	  participated	  in	  in	  my	  own	  experience	  are	  a	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  cultural	  current	  that	  is	  worthy	  of	  self-­‐reflexive	  consideration	  and	  investigation.	  	  	   The	  first	  example	  I	  discuss	  is	  an	  episode	  of	  racial	  divisiveness	  at	  Reed	  College,	  a	  liberal-­‐arts	  school	  in	  Portland,	  Oregon,	  where	  in-­‐classroom	  protests	  have	  been	  raging	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  2016.56	  Organized	  by	  a	  student	  activist	  group	  –	  Reedies	  Against	  Racism	  (RAR)	  –	  formed	  in	  September	  of	  2016,	  these	  protests	  have	  been	  described	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  A	  Hum[anities]	  protest	  is	  visually	  striking:	  Up	  to	  several	  dozen	  RAR	  supporters	  position	  themselves	  alongside	  the	  professor	  and	  quietly	  hold	  signs	  reading	  “We	  demand	  space	  for	  students	  of	  color,”	  “We	  cannot	  be	  erased,”	  “Fuck	  Hum	  110,”	  “Stop	  silencing	  black	  and	  brown	  voices;	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  is	  already	  standing	  on	  their	  necks,”	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  signs	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	  photos	  of	  black	  Americans	  killed	  by	  police.	  	  As	  can	  be	  gathered	  by	  the	  above	  description,	  RAR’s	  activism	  is	  centered	  on	  challenging	  the	  white	  supremacy	  of	  required	  Humanities	  courses,	  as	  well	  as	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  marginalization	  of	  black	  and	  brown	  people	  both	  on	  campus	  and	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  While	  these	  demands	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  others	  outlined	  by	  the	  group	  are	  quite	  reasonable,	  it	  is	  the	  vitriolic	  character	  of	  their	  activism	  that	  has	  prompted	  concern.57	  One	  professor,	  Lucía	  Martínez	  Valdivia,	  revealed	  that	  “I	  am	  intimidated	  by	  these	  students.	  I	  am	  scared	  to	  teach	  courses	  on	  race,	  gender,	  or	  sexuality,	  or	  even	  texts	  that	  bring	  these	  issues	  up	  in	  any	  way	  –	  and	  I	  am	  a	  gay	  mixed-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  This	  story	  was	  covered	  in	  Chris	  Bodenner’s	  article,	  “The	  Surprising	  Revolt	  at	  the	  Most	  Liberal	  College	  in	  the	  Country,”	  The	  Atlantic,	  November	  2,	  2017.	  While	  the	  article	  is	  somewhat	  biased	  against	  RAR,	  it	  captures	  some	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  type	  of	  protest	  under	  investigation	  in	  this	  section.	  	  57	  See	  here	  for	  a	  full	  list	  of	  RAR’s	  25	  demands:	  http://reediesagainstracism.tumblr.com/demands	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race	  woman.”58	  A	  number	  of	  students,	  including	  students	  of	  colour,	  have	  also	  spoken	  up	  against	  this	  type	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  activism	  that	  privileges	  “unsolicited	  emotional	  theater”	  and	  “demagoguery”	  over	  “any	  comprehensive	  conversation	  about	  race	  outside	  of	  ‘racism	  is	  bad,’”	  and	  which	  sees	  people	  of	  colour	  (POCs)	  who	  do	  not	  participate	  as	  “race	  traitors.”59	  As	  one	  student	  of	  colour	  comments,	  RAR	  effectively	  squanders	  a	  “beautiful	  opportunity	  to	  address	  police	  violence”	  due	  to	  its	  extreme	  racial	  rhetoric	  and	  divisive	  tactics.60	  	  This	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  stories	  from	  academic	  settings	  that	  expresses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  two	  sides	  are	  pitted	  against	  each	  other,	  often	  within	  the	  progressive	  camp.61	  It	  is	  not	  only	  students	  who	  come	  head	  to	  head	  in	  this	  way,	  but	  professors	  as	  well.	  A	  recent	  example	  that	  attracted	  much	  attention	  was	  the	  publication	  of	  an	  article	  on	  transracialism	  in	  the	  Spring	  2017	  edition	  of	  the	  feminist	  philosophy	  journal	  Hypatia.	  The	  author	  of	  the	  article,	  feminist	  scholar	  Rebecca	  Tuvel,	  contends	  that	  given	  that	  we	  accept	  the	  grounds	  upon	  which	  transgendered	  individuals	  wish	  to	  change	  genders,	  we	  should	  also	  accept	  the	  decision	  of	  transracial	  individuals	  to	  change	  races,	  due	  to	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  arguments	  for	  transgenderism	  and	  transracialism.62	  The	  publication,	  however,	  resulted	  in	  what	  one	  commentator	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Bodenner,	  “The	  Surprising	  Revolt	  at	  the	  Most	  Liberal	  College	  in	  the	  Country.”	  59	  Bodenner.	  60	  Bodenner.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  one	  especially	  negative	  outgrowth	  of	  this	  type	  of	  activism	  is	  the	  conservative	  backlash	  that	  we	  see	  by	  critics	  like	  Jordan	  Peterson	  who	  advance	  a	  reactionary	  kind	  of	  politics	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  “freedom	  of	  speech.”	  61	  See	  related	  events	  at	  Evergreen	  State	  College:	  Anemona	  Hartocollis,	  “A	  Campus	  Argument	  Goes	  Viral.	  Now	  the	  College	  Is	  Under	  Siege.,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  16,	  2017;	  and	  UC	  Berkley:	  Jennifer	  Duplessie,	  “Berkeley	  Students	  Attempt	  To	  Protest	  Exam,	  Tell	  Professor	  To	  ‘Check	  His	  Privilege,’”	  Turning	  Point	  News,	  October	  2,	  2017.	  62	  Rebecca	  Tuvel,	  “In	  Defense	  of	  Transracialism,”	  Hypatia	  32,	  no.	  2	  (May	  1,	  2017):	  263–78,	  https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12327.	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called	  a	  “modern-­‐day	  witch	  hunt”	  as	  830	  signatories	  stood	  behind	  an	  open	  letter	  addressed	  to	  the	  journal,	  demanding	  the	  retraction	  of	  the	  article.	  The	  letter,	  signed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  feminist	  scholars,	  refuted	  the	  scholarly	  standard	  of	  the	  paper	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  including	  its	  failure	  to	  “seek	  out	  and	  sufficiently	  engage	  with	  scholarly	  work	  by	  those	  who	  are	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  intersection	  of	  racial	  and	  gender	  oppressions	  (women	  of	  color)	  in	  its	  discussion	  of	  ‘transracialism.’”63	  Indeed,	  the	  allegation	  that	  Tuvel	  spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  identities	  that	  she	  did	  not	  embody	  herself	  resulted	  in	  a	  charge	  of	  “epistemic	  violence,”64	  leading	  scholars	  like	  Rogers	  Brubaker	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  for	  scholarly	  writing:	  	   [T]he	  Tuvel	  affair	  raises	  issues	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  controversial	  notion	  of	  transracialism.	  First,	  it	  invites	  reflection	  on	  what	  might	  be	  called	  “epistemological	  insiderism.”	  This	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  identity	  qualifies	  or	  disqualifies	  one	  from	  writing	  with	  legitimacy	  and	  authority	  about	  a	  particular	  topic.	  Few	  would	  argue	  directly	  that	  who	  we	  are	  should	  govern	  what	  we	  study.	  But	  subtler	  forms	  of	  epistemological	  insiderism	  are	  at	  work	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  assessing	  scholarly	  arguments	  with	  central	  reference	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  author.	  Does	  the	  often-­‐mentioned	  fact	  that	  Dr.	  Tuvel	  is	  white	  and	  cisgender	  (as	  am	  I)	  disqualify	  her	  from	  raising	  certain	  questions?	  Is	  her	  identity	  relevant	  to	  assessing	  her	  argument	  for	  according	  more	  weight	  to	  an	  individual’s	  racial	  self-­‐identification	  and	  less	  weight	  to	  ancestry?65	  	  	   This	  idea	  of	  “epistemological	  insiderism”	  or	  “spokespersonship”66	  is	  indeed	  a	  key	  position	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  and	  other	  identity	  movements.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  feminist	  standpoint	  theory	  is	  a	  central	  tenet	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For	  the	  full	  open	  letter,	  see	  https://archive.is/lUeR4#selection-­‐127.3-­‐130.0	  64	  Lindsay	  McKenzie,	  “Journal	  Apologizes	  for	  Article	  Likening	  Transracialism	  to	  Being	  Transgender,”	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  Higher	  Education,	  May	  1,	  2017,	  https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/journal-­‐apologizes-­‐for-­‐article-­‐likening-­‐transracialism-­‐to-­‐transgenderism/118084.	  65	  Rogers	  Brubaker,	  “The	  Uproar	  Over	  ‘Transracialism,’”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  18,	  2017,	  https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/opinion/the-­‐uproar-­‐over-­‐transracialism.html?referer.	  66	  I	  borrow	  the	  term	  “spokespersonship”	  from	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.	  (2015).	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many	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  projects	  aimed	  at	  recovering	  and	  centering	  the	  voices	  of	  women	  of	  colour.	  While	  some	  earlier	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  acknowledged	  and	  were	  inclusive	  of	  the	  work	  of	  scholars	  and	  activists	  outside	  of	  this	  group	  who	  wrote	  about	  race,67	  the	  recent	  trend	  has	  been	  an	  outright	  dismissal	  of	  the	  views,	  perspectives,	  and	  scholarly	  work	  of	  people	  (especially	  white	  people)	  who	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  identity	  category	  that	  their	  work	  addresses.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  the	  oppressed	  themselves	  who	  are	  also	  best	  positioned	  to	  lead	  their	  anti-­‐oppressionist	  struggles	  in	  the	  field	  of	  activism.68	  	  Opponents	  like	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  a	  POC	  political	  scientist	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  have	  challenged	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  however,	  as	  an	  opportunistic	  strategy	  whereby	  “some	  racial	  identitarians	  ha[ve]	  grown	  bolder	  in	  laying	  bare	  the	  blur	  of	  careerism	  and	  arbitrary,	  self-­‐serving	  moralism	  at	  the	  base	  of	  this	  supposed	  politics.”69	  He	  uses	  the	  current	  Black	  Lives	  Matter	  movement	  to	  clarify	  his	  point:	  	  In	  an	  unintentionally	  farcical	  homage	  to	  Black	  Power	  era	  radicalism,	  various	  racial	  ventriloquists	  claiming	  to	  channel	  the	  Voices	  of	  the	  Youth	  leadership	  of	  the	  putative	  Black	  Lives	  Matter	  "movement"	  have	  lately	  been	  arguing	  that	  the	  key	  condition	  for	  a	  left	  alliance	  is	  that	  we	  all	  must	  "respect	  black	  leadership."	  Of	  course,	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  claim	  to	  shut	  up	  and	  take	  whatever	  anyone	  who	  claims	  that	  status	  says	  or	  does.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  For	  example,	  Dua	  and	  Robertson	  write	  that	  “Not	  all	  of	  those	  who	  write	  on	  the	  interconnections	  of	  race,	  class,	  and	  gender	  are	  women	  of	  colour.	  I	  want	  to	  be	  inclusive	  of	  these	  writers.”	  Scratching	  the	  Surface,	  9.	  	  68	  While	  this	  idea	  is	  perhaps	  especially	  strong	  in	  our	  current	  moment,	  we	  can	  trace	  its	  roots	  to	  a	  much	  earlier	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  stated	  in	  their	  1977	  manifesto	  that	  “We	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  profound	  and	  potentially	  most	  radical	  politics	  come	  directly	  out	  of	  our	  own	  identity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  working	  to	  end	  somebody	  else's	  oppression.”	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  Collective	  and	  their	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  identity	  politics	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  69	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “From	  Jenner	  to	  Dolezal:	  One	  Trans	  Good,	  the	  Other	  Not	  So	  Much,”	  
Common	  Dreams,	  June	  15,	  2015,	  https://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/06/15/jenner-­‐dolezal-­‐one-­‐trans-­‐good-­‐other-­‐not-­‐so-­‐much.	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Reed	  argues	  that	  spokespersonship	  requires	  the	  policing	  of	  racial	  boundaries	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  only	  those	  who	  speak	  “authentically”	  can	  represent	  the	  struggle.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  problem	  becomes	  one	  of	  a	  politics	  based	  in	  “who	  you	  are”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “what	  you	  do.”70	  	  While	  Reed’s	  lack	  of	  sympathy	  for	  the	  reasons	  why	  people	  of	  colour	  feel	  compelled	  to	  lead	  our	  own	  movements	  and	  take	  control	  of	  knowledge	  that	  pertains	  to	  us	  is	  problematic,	  his	  concern	  is	  valid	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  provokes	  an	  examination	  of	  which	  views	  and	  leadership	  are	  followed	  unquestioningly	  by	  virtue	  of	  someone’s	  “authentic”	  victim	  identity,	  and	  which	  are	  automatically	  rejected	  due	  to	  one’s	  “privileged”	  status.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  spokespersonship,	  there	  is	  the	  common	  practice	  of	  “calling	  out.”	  Calling-­‐out	  can	  be	  described	  as	  “a	  tactic	  to	  challenge	  privilege	  and	  bigotry	  in	  all	  their	  forms,	  within	  and	  outside	  activist	  circles	  to	  incite	  accountability.	  Calling-­‐out	  is	  a	  verbal	  or	  written	  retort	  to	  an	  organization	  or	  person	  that	  (at	  its	  best)	  isolates	  specific	  actions	  which	  are	  unacceptable	  and	  (in	  the	  very	  least)	  gets	  people	  to	  re-­‐think	  what	  they	  meant	  and	  where	  they	  are	  coming	  from.”71	  Often	  practiced	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  public	  reproach	  against	  someone,	  calling-­‐out	  has	  become	  a	  practice	  so	  widespread	  within	  progressive	  movements	  that	  it	  has	  been	  spoken	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “culture.”	  Calling-­‐out	  happens	  in	  a	  number	  of	  academic	  and	  activist	  settings	  –	  in	  scholarly	  papers	  (like	  in	  Tuval’s	  case),	  in	  classrooms	  and	  conferences,	  at	  activist	  meetings	  and	  protests,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  frequently,	  in	  online	  forums.	  	  In	  his	  widely	  circulated	  article,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture,”	  activist	  Assam	  Ahmad	  argues	  that	  “What	  makes	  call-­‐out	  culture	  so	  toxic	  is	  not	  necessarily	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.	  71	  Lynne	  Williams,	  “Calling	  People	  Out,”	  Rabble,	  (no	  listed	  date).	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frequency	  so	  much	  as	  the	  nature	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  call-­‐out	  itself.	  Especially	  in	  online	  venues	  like	  Twitter	  and	  Facebook,	  calling	  someone	  out	  isn’t	  just	  a	  private	  interaction	  between	  two	  individuals:	  it’s	  a	  public	  performance	  where	  people	  can	  demonstrate	  their	  wit	  or	  how	  pure	  their	  politics	  are.”72	  Besides	  the	  performative	  aspect	  of	  calling	  out,	  Ahmad	  is	  also	  critical	  of	  how	  it	  reduces	  people	  to	  their	  social	  status	  and	  polices	  boundaries	  between	  an	  “us”	  and	  a	  “them.”	  As	  he	  states,	  In	  the	  context	  of	  call-­‐out	  culture,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  forget	  that	  the	  individual	  we	  are	  calling	  out	  is	  a	  human	  being,	  and	  that	  different	  human	  beings	  in	  different	  social	  locations	  will	  be	  receptive	  to	  different	  strategies	  for	  learning	  and	  growing.	  For	  instance,	  most	  call-­‐outs	  I	  have	  witnessed	  immediately	  render	  anyone	  who	  has	  committed	  a	  perceived	  wrong	  as	  an	  outsider	  to	  the	  community.	  One	  action	  becomes	  a	  reason	  to	  pass	  judgment	  on	  someone’s	  entire	  being	  […]It	  isn’t	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  mild	  totalitarian	  undercurrent	  not	  just	  in	  call-­‐out	  culture	  but	  also	  in	  how	  progressive	  communities	  police	  and	  define	  the	  bounds	  of	  who’s	  in	  and	  who’s	  out.	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  this	  boundary	  is	  constructed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  appropriate	  language	  and	  terminology	  –	  a	  language	  and	  terminology	  that	  are	  forever	  shifting	  and	  almost	  impossible	  to	  keep	  up	  with.	  In	  such	  a	  context,	  it	  is	  impossible	  not	  to	  fail	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  time.	  And	  what	  happens	  when	  someone	  has	  mastered	  proficiency	  in	  languages	  of	  accountability	  and	  then	  learned	  to	  justify	  all	  of	  their	  actions	  by	  falling	  back	  on	  that	  language?	  How	  do	  we	  hold	  people	  to	  account	  who	  are	  experts	  at	  using	  anti-­‐oppressive	  language	  to	  justify	  oppressive	  behaviour?	  We	  don’t	  have	  a	  word	  to	  describe	  this	  kind	  of	  perverse	  exercise	  of	  power,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  occurs	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis	  in	  progressive	  circles.	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  call	  it	  anti-­‐oppressivism.73	  	   Ahmad	  is	  highlighting	  a	  number	  of	  concerning	  aspects	  of	  calling-­‐out	  here:	  the	  way	  in	  which	  people	  who	  are	  called-­‐out	  are	  stripped	  of	  their	  humanity	  when	  they	  are	  reduced	  to	  their	  social	  location	  or	  “privilege”;	  how	  this	  practice	  creates	  a	  system	  of	  insiders	  and	  outsiders,	  with	  outsider	  status	  immediately	  being	  bestowed	  upon	  anyone	  who	  breaches	  community	  standards	  (including	  POCs	  who	  are	  seen	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Aaisha	  Dadi	  Patel	  and	  Dana	  da	  Silva	  make	  a	  similar	  argument	  in	  their	  article,	  “Calling	  out	  Racism	  Online	  –	  Is	  It	  Helping?,”	  IOL,	  February	  10,	  2016.	  73	  Ahmad,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture.”	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disloyal,	  as	  seen	  with	  the	  ‘race	  traitors’	  designation	  in	  the	  Reed	  College	  example);	  and	  how	  this	  allows	  certain	  players	  who	  have	  perfected	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  to	  act	  in	  oppressive	  ways	  through	  weaponizing	  progressive	  language.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Ahmad	  is	  not	  saying	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  calling-­‐out	  are	  destructive	  or	  that	  calling-­‐out	  has	  no	  space	  in	  our	  movements.74	  Rather,	  he	  is	  arguing	  that	  “there	  are	  ways	  of	  calling	  people	  out	  that	  are	  compassionate	  and	  creative,	  and	  that	  recognize	  the	  whole	  individual	  instead	  of	  viewing	  them	  simply	  as	  representations	  of	  the	  systems	  from	  which	  they	  benefit”	  and	  how	  being	  attentive	  to	  “these	  other	  contexts	  will	  mean	  refusing	  to	  unleash	  all	  of	  our	  very	  real	  trauma	  onto	  the	  psyches	  of	  those	  we	  imagine	  to	  only	  represent	  the	  systems	  that	  oppress	  us.”75	  Ahmad	  is	  just	  one	  of	  many	  activists	  and	  scholars	  who	  have	  written	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  call-­‐out	  culture	  to	  anti-­‐oppressionist	  politics	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  fragments	  those	  with	  shared	  commitments	  to	  social	  justice.76	  POC	  activist	  and	  scholar	  Stacey	  Patton	  echoes	  Ahmad’s	  sentiments,	  referring	  specifically	  to	  online	  calling-­‐out	  practices:	  Many	  of	  us	  have	  witnessed	  these	  sorts	  of	  exchanges	  on	  social	  media,	  where	  a	  friend	  posts	  about	  a	  difficult	  topic	  or	  poses	  an	  uncomfortable	  question	  to	  spark	  a	  lively	  discussion.	  But	  before	  the	  conversation	  begins,	  the	  poster	  is	  attacked,	  criticized,	  and	  vilified	  and	  the	  dialogue	  is	  pre-­‐emptively	  derailed	  by	  a	  virtual	  playground	  fight.	  New	  terms,	  which	  are	  concocted	  and	  hurled	  every	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Indeed,	  he	  writes	  a	  follow	  up	  piece	  outlining	  instances	  in	  which	  calling-­‐out	  is	  an	  appropriate	  response	  in	  our	  anti-­‐oppressive	  work:	  “When	  Calling	  Out	  Makes	  Sense,”	  
Briarpatch	  Magazine,	  August	  29,	  2017.	  75	  Ahmad,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture.”	  76	  See	  for	  example:	  Kitty	  Stryker,	  “The	  Problem	  with	  Callout	  Culture,”	  The	  Walrus,	  May	  30,	  2016,	  /the-­‐problem-­‐with-­‐callout-­‐culture/.;	  Suzanna	  Danuta	  Walters,	  “Academe’s	  Poisonous	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture,”	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  Higher	  Education,	  May	  5,	  2017,	  https://www.chronicle.com/article/Academe-­‐s-­‐Poisonous-­‐Call-­‐Out/240016.;	  Aaisha	  Dadi	  Patel	  and	  Dana	  da	  Silva,	  “Calling	  out	  Racism	  Online	  –	  Is	  It	  Helping?”.	  	  	  	  An	  alternative	  to	  calling-­‐out,	  as	  discussed	  by	  Ahmad	  (2015)	  and	  other	  activists,	  is	  that	  of	  “calling-­‐in.”	  I	  discuss	  this	  further	  in	  Chapter	  7.	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time	  folks	  feel	  hurt,	  add	  more	  distractions	  and	  don’t	  result	  in	  real	  healing	  and	  empowerment.77	  	   As	   implied	   above,	   it	   is	   not	   just	   oppositional	   political	   exponents	   who	   are	  called-­‐out	   but	   allies	   too.	   An	   “ally”	   is	   someone	  who,	  while	   not	   occupying	   a	   certain	  status	  of	  oppression,	  is	  supportive	  in	  the	  fight	  to	  challenge	  it.	  Allyship	  refers	  to	  the	  “active,	  consistent,	  and	  arduous	  practice	  of	  unlearning	  and	  re-­‐evaluating,	  in	  which	  a	  person	   of	   privilege	   seeks	   to	   operate	   in	   solidarity	   with	   a	   marginalized	   group	   of	  people.”78	  Activist	  literature	  on	  allyship	  is	  replete	  with	  a	  number	  of	  responsibilities	  and	   guides	   for	   proper	   allyship. 79 	  Allies	   are	   to	   “actively	   acknowledge	   [their]	  privileges	  and	  openly	  discuss	  them”	  but	  also	  to	  know	  when	  to	  “shut	  up”	  and	  listen.80	  They	  are	  to	  “take	  guidance	  and	  direction”	  from	  the	  people	  they	  work	  with	  but	  never	  to	   ask	   questions	   or	   expect	   to	   be	   educated	   by	   them.81	  They	   are	   to	   “build	   [their]	  capacity	  to	  receive	  criticism”	  but	  to	  keep	  their	  emotional	  responses	  to	  themselves.82	  	  Indeed,	   in	   reference	   to	   this	   last	   point,	   people	   of	   colour	   in	   activist	   and	  academic	   communities	   frequently	   decry	   expressions	   of	   “white	   guilt”	   and	   “white	  tears”	  that	  are	  encountered	  in	  activist/academic	  spaces.	  White	  guilt	  and	  tears	  refer	  to	   the	   emotional	   fragility	   of	  white	   people	   in	   situations	  where	   their	   racism	   or	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Stacey	  Patton,	  “Is	  Outrage	  Addiction	  Derailing	  Our	  Most	  Important	  Conversations?”	  78	  PeerNetBC,	  “Allyship,”	  The	  Anti-­‐Oppression	  Network,	  November	  22,	  2016,	  https://theantioppressionnetwork.com/allyship/.	  79	  See	  for	  example,	  PeerNetBC.;	  and	  Jamie	  Utt,	  “So	  You	  Call	  Yourself	  an	  Ally:	  10	  Things	  All	  ‘Allies’	  Need	  to	  Know,”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  November	  8,	  2013,	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2013/11/things-­‐allies-­‐need-­‐to-­‐know/.	  80PeerNetBC,	  “Allyship.”;	  	  Tanya	  DePass,	  “One	  Last	  Time…on	  Performative	  Allyship,”	  
Medium,	  July	  16,	  2016,	  https://medium.com/@cypheroftyr/one-­‐last-­‐time-­‐on-­‐performative-­‐allyship-­‐1a2151beb0fe.	  81	  PeerNetBC,	  “Allyship.”	  82	  PeerNetBC.	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racism	  of	  others	  is	  exposed	  or	  discussed.83	  Sarita	  Srivastava	  traces	  the	  root	  of	  such	  emotionality	   to	   a	   number	   of	   overlapping	   moral	   discourses	   that	   frame	   Western	  feminism,	   including	   white	   female	   innocence,	   national	   narratives	   of	   tolerance	   and	  multiculturalism,	   and	   “moral	   visions	   of	   social	   justice	   and	   commitments	   to	  activism.”84	  	  She	  argues	  that	  these	  discourses	  coalesce	  in	  particular	  ways	  to	  explain	  why	   in	   “the	   face	   of	   antiracist	   challenges,	  many	  white	   feminists	  may	   feel	   that	   it	   is	  their	   self-­‐image—as	   good,	   implicitly	   nonracist	   people—and	   particularly	   their	  shared	  moral	  identity	  as	  feminists,	  that	  is	  under	  siege.”85	  The	   problem	   with	   such	   emotional	   responses	   is	   that	   they	   often	   centre	   the	  feelings	   of	   white	   people	   who	   feel	   entitled	   to	   shed	   tears	   or	   take	   up	   space,	   while	  ignoring	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   people	   of	   colour	   who	   have	   actually	   suffered	   the	  racism.	  As	  one	  activist	  writes,	  	  People	   of	   Color	   should	   not	   have	   to	   listen	   to	   your	   feelings	   about	   racism.	  Having	  to	  do	  so	  forces	  us	  to	  put	  aside	  our	  own	  complex	  emotions.	   It	   is	  also	  exhausting	  –	  because	  intentionally	  or	  not,	  you	  unloading	  on	  a	  Person	  of	  Color	  says,	  “My	  having	  to	  face	  my	  whiteness	  and	  the	  complex	  emotions	  that	  come	  with	   that	   is	  more	   important	   than	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  whiteness	   is	   a	   tool	   of	  violence	  against	  you.”86	  	   These	   criticisms	   are	   valid	   and	   signal	   a	   real	   issue	   regarding	  what	   has	   been	  called	  “white	  fragility”	  or	  “inability	  of	  white	  people	  to	  respond	  constructively	  when	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  Robin	  DiAngelo,	  “White	  Women’s	  Tears	  and	  the	  Men	  Who	  Love	  Them	  -­‐,”	  The	  Good	  Men	  
Project,	  September	  19,	  2015.	  84	  Sarita	  Srivastava,	  “‘You’re	  Calling	  Me	  a	  Racist?’	  The	  Moral	  and	  Emotional	  Regulation	  of	  Antiracism	  and	  Feminism,”	  Signs	  31,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  37.	  85	  Srivastava,	  “‘You’re	  Calling	  Me	  a	  Racist?’,	  30.	  86	  Jennifer	  Loubriel,	  “4	  Ways	  White	  People	  Can	  Process	  Their	  Emotions	  Without	  Bringing	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  Everyday	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  February	  16,	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  more	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  People’s	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Feminism,	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  22,	  2015.;	  Suey	  Park,	  “Challenging	  Racism	  and	  the	  Problem	  with	  White	  ‘Allies’:	  A	  Conversation	  with	  David	  Leonard,”	  [Young]ist	  (blog),	  December	  26,	  2013.	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[their]	  racial	  positions	  are	  challenged.”87	  For	  many	  people	  of	  colour,	  white	  fragility	  demonstrates	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   some	   white	   allies	   are	   more	   interested	   in	   the	  performance,	  identity	  or	  moral	  status	  that	  allyship	  confers,	  rather	  than	  in	  engaging	  in	   the	  actual	  work	  of	   it.	   It	  also	  reinforces	  a	  suspicion	   that	  white	  people	  ultimately	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  and	  that	  people	  of	  colour	  are	  better	  off	  sticking	  to	  ourselves.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  critiques	  above,	   I	  suggest	  that	  the	  often	  visceral	  reactions	  against	   hearing	   the	   pain	   of	  white	   people	   is	   also	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  we,	   as	  people	  of	  colour,	  have	  so	  much	  undigested	  and	  unrecognized	  pain	  of	  our	  own.	  I	  also	  believe	   that	   many	   of	   the	   responsibilities	   that	   we	   charge	   allies	   with,	   and	   the	  harshness	  with	  which	  we	  may	  police	   their	  behaviour	  are	  motivated	  by	   feelings	  of	  revenge	  and	  envy.	  Perhaps	  we	  want	   them	  to	  know	  how	   it	   feels	   to	  be	  silenced	  and	  told	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  back?	  And,	  in	  turn,	  perhaps	  we	  also	  wish	  to	  feel	  something	  that	  we	  never	  (or	  infrequently)	  got	  the	  opportunity	  to	  feel	  –	  whether	  it	  be	  belonging,	  or	  authority,	  or	  a	  sense	  of	  power?	  While	  such	  emotional	  strivings	  certainly	  make	  sense,	  and	  while	  I	  am	  no	  stranger	  to	  them	  myself,	  my	  concern	  is	  around	  the	  question	  of	  to	  what	   degree	   do	   such	   emotions	   drive	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   political	   behaviour	   and	  inhibit	  our	  ability	  to	  forge	  real	  political	  (and	  relational)	  ties	  with	  white	  allies?	  And,	  in	  Ahmad’s	  words,	   to	  what	  extent	  are	  we	  “unleash[ing]	  all	  of	  our	  very	  real	  trauma	  onto	   the	  psyches	  of	   those	  we	   imagine	   to	   only	   represent	   the	   systems	   that	   oppress	  us”?88	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Related	   to	   the	   concept	  of	   allyship	   is	   that	  of	   “safe	   spaces”	  which	   Indigenous	  scholar	  Andrea	  Smith	  describes	  as	  a	  growing	  concern	  in	  Western	  activism.	  As	  Smith	  discusses,	  “once	  we	  have	  confessed	  our	  gender/race/settler/class	  privileges,	  we	  can	  then	   create	   a	   safe	   space	   where	   others	   will	   not	   be	   negatively	   impacted	   by	   these	  privileges.”	  89	  	  She	  further	  describes	  how	  it	  is	  only	  “certain	  privileged	  subjects”	  that	  can	  make	  a	  space	  unsafe.	  	  This	   idea	   of	   “privilege”	   is	   another	   central	   tenet	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   and	  other	  identity-­‐based	  understandings	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  is	  embedded	  in	  our	  collective	  vocabulary.	   Privilege,	   commonly	   conceived,	   refers	   to	   the	   unearned	   and	   largely	  unacknowledged	   social	   benefits	   and	   advantages	   bestowed	   upon	   certain	   societal	  groups.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   one	   of	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   allyship	   is	   the	   open	  recognition	   and	   discussing	   of	   how	   one	   enjoys	   these	   benefits	   and	   advantages.	   As	  Smith	  argues,	  these	  confessions	  have	  limited	  political	  use,	  and	  they	  are	  often	  turned	  into	  political	  projects	  in	  and	  of	  themselves.	  Reflecting	  on	  her	  own	  experiences,	  she	  writes:	  The	   benefits	   of	   these	   confessions	   seemed	   to	   be	   ephemeral.	   For	   the	   instant	  the	  confession	  took	  place,	   those	  who	  do	  not	  have	   that	  privilege	   in	  daily	   life	  would	  have	   a	   temporary	  position	   of	   power	   as	   the	  hearer	   of	   the	   confession	  who	   could	   grant	   absolution	   and	   forgiveness.	   	   The	   sayer	   of	   the	   confession	  could	   then	   be	   granted	   temporary	   forgiveness	   for	   her/his	   abuses	   of	   power	  and	  relief	  from	  white/male/heterosexual/etc.	  guilt.	  Because	  of	  the	  perceived	  benefits	  of	  this	  ritual,	  there	  was	  generally	  little	  critique	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  end,	  it	  primarily	  served	  to	  re-­‐instantiate	  the	  structures	  of	  domination	  it	  was	  supposed	   to	   resist.	   	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   there	   was	   little	   critique	   of	   this	  practice	   is	   that	   it	   bestowed	   cultural	   capital	   to	   those	  who	   seemed	   to	  be	   the	  “most	  oppressed.”	  	  Those	  who	  had	  little	  privilege	  did	  not	  have	  to	  confess	  and	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were	   in	   the	   position	   to	   be	   the	   judge	   of	   those	   who	   did	   have	   privilege.	  	  Consequently,	  people	  aspired	  to	  be	  oppressed.90	  	  	   Smith	   is	   describing	   a	   cultural	   practice	   that	   does	  more	   to	   grant	   temporary	  feelings	   of	   power,	   and	   perhaps	   satisfy	   a	   need	   for	   revenge,	   than	   actively	   lead	   to	  collective	   social	   change.	   As	   she	   clarifies,	   this	   is	   not	   because	   accountability	   on	   the	  part	  of	  the	  dominant	  group	  is	  not	  important,	  as	  it	  surely	  is.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  ritual	  of	  confession	  becomes	  a	  political	  end	  rather	  than	  a	  step	  towards	  dismantling	  and	  changing	  oppressive	  structures	  themselves.91	  More,	  as	  Smith	  writes,	  it	  leads	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  oppression	  is	  valued	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  status	  it	  confers,	  manifesting	  in	  what	  some	  activists	  have	  called	  the	  oppression	  Olympics.	  As	  she	  describes,	  Inevitably,	   those	   with	   more	   privilege	   would	   develop	   new	   heretofore	  unknown	  forms	  of	  oppression	  from	  which	  they	  suffered.	  	  “I	  may	  be	  white,	  but	  my	  best	  friend	  was	  a	  person	  of	  color,	  which	  caused	  me	  to	  be	  oppressed	  when	  we	   played	   together.”	   	   Consequently,	   the	   goal	   became	   not	   to	   actually	   end	  oppression	   but	   to	   be	   as	   oppressed	   as	   possible.	   	   These	   rituals	   often	  substituted	   confession	   for	   political	   movement-­‐building.	   	   And	   despite	   the	  cultural	  capital	  that	  was,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  bestowed	  to	  those	  who	  seemed	  to	   be	   the	  most	   oppressed,	   these	   rituals	   ultimately	   reinstantiated	   the	  white	  majority	   subject	   as	   the	   subject	   capable	   of	   self-­‐reflexivity	   and	   the	  colonized/racialized	  subject	  as	  the	  occasion	  for	  self-­‐reflexivity.92	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  discussed	  some	  emotions	  (outrage,	  anger,	  suspicion,	  vengefulness,	  envy,	  pain,	  belonging);	  practices	  (calling-­‐out,	  spokespersonship,	  allyship,	  checking	  privilege);	  and	  concepts	  (white	  guilt/tears/fragility,	  privilege,	  oppression	  Olympics)	  that	  I	  suggest	  form	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	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  91	  Srivastava	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument,	  claiming	  that	  many	  anti-­‐racist	  workshops	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  self-­‐examination	  and	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  92	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culture.	  This	  culture	  permeates	  both	  academic	  and	  activist	  settings,	  and	  is	  perceptible	  in	  online	  as	  well	  as	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  encounters.	  	  Whereas	  the	  concept	  of	  “culture”	  gives	  some	  sense	  as	  to	  how	  these	  practices	  are	  embedded	  features	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  –	  rather	  than	  fleeting	  expressions	  –	  it	  does	  little	  to	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  emotions,	  attitudes,	  and	  practices	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  Moreover,	  cultural	  explanations	  are	  insufficient	  in	  articulating	  how	  these	  aspects	  might	  come	  to	  be	  psychologically	  embodied	  by	  members	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  embodiment	  contains	  a	  number	  of	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  elements,	  which	  this	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  explore	  and	  bring	  to	  awareness.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  look	  at	  some	  theoretical	  concepts	  and	  tools	  that	  give	  some	  ground	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  social	  movements,	  and	  how	  emotions	  and	  attitudes	  come	  to	  be	  psychically	  internalized	  by	  members	  of	  a	  movement.	  
Chapter	  3	  –	  The	  Political	  is	  Personal	  	  
“If	  we	  start	  close	  to	  home,	  we	  open	  ourselves	  out…in	  making	  sense	  of	  things	  that	  
happen,	  we	  also	  draw	  on	  histories	  of	  thought	  and	  activism	  that	  precede	  us…I	  thus	  
reflect	  on	  how	  feminism	  itself	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  affective	  inheritance;	  how	  our	  
own	  struggles	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  realities	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  become	  part	  of	  a	  
wider	  struggle,	  a	  struggle	  to	  be,	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  being.”	  	  
-­‐Sara	  Ahmed,	  Living	  a	  Feminist	  Life	  	  	  	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  lay	  the	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  groundwork	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  dissertation.	   I	   explore	   the	   relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  emotions	   through	  examining	   insights	   from	   social	   movement	   theory’s	   engagement	   with	   emotions	   in	  political	   protest,	   and	   Erich	   Fromm’s	   concepts	   of	   social	   character	   and	   the	   social	  
unconscious.	  I	  argue	  that	  Fromm’s	  concepts	  fruitfully	  build	  upon	  insights	  from	  social	  movement	   theory,	   offering	   an	   especially	   instructive	  means	   of	   capturing	  how	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   can	   share	   a	   common	   psychic	   character,	   in	   addition	   to	   how	   some	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   behaviours	   and	   practices	   can	   stand	   in	   opposition	   to	  emancipatory	  political	  aims.	  As	  per	  the	  title	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  suggest	  that	  as	  much	  as	  the	   feminist	   slogan	   “the	   personal	   is	   political”	   is	   true,	   the	   political	   should	   also	   be	  understood	   as	  personal,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	   driven	  by	   emotional	   forces	   rooted	   in	   the	  collective	  and	  individual	  psyche.	  	  
(3.1)	  Social	  Movement	  Theory	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Emotions	  	   Social	  movement	   theory	   can	   be	   described	   as	   having	   a	   fraught	   history	  with	  emotions.	   Once	   the	   dominant	   means	   through	   which	   political	   movements	   were	  understood,	   the	   1970s	   would	   mark	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   turn	   away	   from	   affective	  explanations	   and	   toward	   rational	   structural	   theories	   that	   still	   exert	   considerable	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influence	  in	  the	  field.1	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  that	  the	  question	  of	  emotions	  has	   once	   again	   emerged	   as	   a	   topic	   of	   study,	   influenced	   by	   developments	   in	   the	  sociology	  of	  emotions,	   feminist	  and	  queer	   theorizing	  of	  emotions,	  and	   the	  cultural	  turn	  within	  social	  movement	  theory.	   In	  this	  section	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  field	  of	  social	  movement	  theory	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  emotions,	  followed	  by	  an	  exploration	  of	  recent	  contributions	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  current	  study.	  Given	  the	   considerable	   limitations	   that	   still	   exist	   in	   the	   field,	   I	   argue	   that	   these	  contributions	  might	   be	   instructively	  paired	  with	  Erich	  Fromm’s	   concepts	   of	   social	  
character	  and	  the	  social	  unconscious.	  	  As	   Goodwin	   et	   al.	   discuss,	   “until	   the	   1960s,	   emotions	   were	   considered	   a	  key—for	  some,	  the	  key—to	  understanding	  virtually	  all	  political	  action	  that	  occurred	  outside	   familiar	   political	   institutions.”2	  Two	   schools	   of	   thought	   dominated	   in	   this	  time	   period:	   the	   collective	   behaviour	   approach,	   and	   theories	   inspired	   by	  psychoanalytical	   and	   personality	   perspectives.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   former,	   collective	  behaviour	   theory	   derives	   from	   the	   work	   of	   symbolic	   interactionists	   including	  Herbert	   Blumer,	   Ralph	   Turner	   and	   Lewis	   Killian,	   and	   Neil	   Smelser.3	  According	   to	  this	  approach,	  “collective	  phenomena	  are	  not	  simply	  the	  reflection	  of	  a	  social	  crisis	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1Donatella	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Mario	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Introduction	  (Wiley,	  1999).,	  Jeff	  Goodwin,	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  and	  Francesca	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics:	  Emotions	  and	  
Social	  Movements	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009).,	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2011):	  285–303.,	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  “Putting	  Emotions	  in	  Their	  Place,”	  in	  Social	  
Movements:	  A	  Reader,	  ed.	  V.	  Ruggiero	  and	  N.	  Montagna	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  n.d.).	  	  2	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  2.	  3	  See	  Herbert	  Blumer,	  “Collective	  Behaviour,”	  in	  Principles	  of	  Sociology,	  ed.	  Alfred	  McClung	  Lee	  (New	  York:	  Barnes	  and	  Noble,	  1939);	  Ralph	  Turner	  and	  Lewis	  Killian,	  Collective	  
Behavior	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  N.	  J.:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  1957);	  Neil	  Smelser,	  Theory	  of	  Collective	  
Behavior	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1963).	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but	   rather	   an	   activity	   aimed	   at	   producing	   new	   norms	   and	   new	   solidarities.”4	  Although	   the	   collective	  behaviour	   school	  may	  have	  been	   the	   first	  perspective	   that	  attributed	  meaning	  to	  social	  movements,	  the	  approach	  was	  challenged	  in	  the	  1960s	  for	   its	   tendency	   to	   classify	   less	   deliberate	   and	   structured	   phenomena	   under	   the	  same	   heading.5	  That	   is,	   collective	   behaviour	   as	   diverse	   as	   crowds,	   panics,	  manias,	  fashions	  and	  trends	  were	  interpreted	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  analytical	  field.	  The	  study	  of	  protest	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  “the	  crowd”	  would	  especially	   impact	   ideas	  around	  social	   movements	   and	   emotions:	   “Crowds	   were	   assumed	   to	   create,	   through	  suggestion	   and	   contagion,	   a	   kind	   of	   psychologically	   ‘primitive'	   group	   mind	   and	  group	   feelings,	   shared	   by	   all	   participants	   and	   outside	   their	   normal	   range	   of	  sensibilities.”6	  	  In	   opposition	   to	   the	   perspective	   that	   political	   protest	   was	   spurred	   by	  emotional	   contagion	   from	   outside	   oneself,	   the	   psychoanalytical	   approach	  understood	  political	  action	  as	  being	  rooted	  in	  one’s	  individual	  psychic	  disturbances.	  Theorists	  explored	  psychological	  dispositions	  and	  personality	  structures	  that	  would	  make	   an	   individual	   especially	   vulnerable	   to	   political	   protest.7	  Toward	   this	   aim,	  “Freudian	   psychology	   was	   often	   appropriated	   to	   show	   that	   participants	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements,	  6.	  5	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements.	  6	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  2.	  	  Preceding	  these	  studies,	  of	  course,	  is	  the	  influential	  early	  study	  on	  crowd	  psychology	  by	  Gustave	  Le	  Bon,	  The	  Crowd:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Popular	  Mind	  (Macmillan,	  1896).	  7	  Elizabeth	  D.	  Hutchison,	  “Spirituality,	  Religion,	  and	  Progressive	  Social	  Movements:	  Resources	  and	  Motivation	  for	  Social	  Change,”	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  &	  Spirituality	  in	  Social	  
Work:	  Social	  Thought	  31,	  no.	  1–2	  (January	  1,	  2012):	  105–27;	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  
Passionate	  Politics.	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immature:	   narcissistic,	   latently	   homosexual,	   oral	   dependent,	   or	   anal	   retentive.”8	  	  Non-­‐psychoanalytical	   personality	   theories	   also	   emerged,	   rooting	   political	  participation	   in	   factors	   like	   alienation	   and	   aggression.	   William	   Kornhauser’s	   The	  
Politics	  of	  Mass	  Society,	  for	  example,	  argued	  that	  “[p]eople	  who	  are	  atomized	  readily	  become	  mobilized,”9	  while	  Floyd	  Allport’s	  work	  examined	  factors	  that	  predisposed	  an	  individual	  to	  violence.10	  Orrin	  Klapp	  attributed	  political	  participation	  to	  “‘identity	  trouble,”	  characterized	  by	  “a	  feeling	  of	  being	  blemished,	  self-­‐hatred,	  oversensitivity,	  excessive	   self-­‐concern	   (including	   narcissism),	   alienation,	   a	   feeling	   that	   ‘nobody	  appreciates	   me,’	   a	   desire	   to	   be	   someone	   else,	   a	   feeling	   of	   fraudulent	   self-­‐presentation,	  Riesman’s	  ‘other-­‐directedness,’	  and	  an	  identity	  crisis.”11	  While	   both	   collective	   behaviour/crowd	   theory,	   and	  psychoanalytical/personality	   theories	   recognized	   the	   central	   role	   of	   emotions	   in	  political	   action,	   their	   analyses	   were	   inherently	   biased	   in	   their	   interpretation	   of	  social	   movement	   actors	   as	   deviant	   and	   pathological.	   Moreover,	   while	   the	   first	  approach	   ignored	   individual	   agency	   and	   motivation,	   the	   second	   precluded	   the	  possibility	  of	  political	  action	  as	  a	  response	  to	  external	  conditions.	  As	  Goodwin	  et	  al.	  contend,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  2–3.	  See	  for	  example,	  Harold	  D.	  Lasswell,	  
Psychopathology	  and	  Politics	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1930/1986).	  9	  William	  Kornhauser,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Mass	  Society	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1959),	  33.	  	  10Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics.	  See	  Floyd	  Henry	  Allport,	  Social	  
Psychology	  (Houghton	  Mifflin,	  1924).	  11Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  3.	  See	  Orrin	  Edgar	  Klapp,	  Collective	  
Search	  for	  Identity	  (Holt,	  Rinehart,	  and	  Winston,	  1969).	  	  Riesman’s	  “other-­‐directedness”	  refers	  to	  a	  character	  typology	  developed	  in	  his	  book	  The	  
Lonely	  Crowd:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Changing	  American	  Character	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  1950/2001).	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Protestors	  either	  already	  had	  their	  set	  of	  emotions,	  or	   they	  got	   them	  in	   the	  crowd.	  Driven	  by	   forces	  outside	   their	   control,	  whether	  subconscious	  drives	  or	   the	   mysterious	   pull	   of	   the	   crowd,	   they	   were	   not	   rational	   agents	   with	  purposes	   of	   their	   own.	   Most	   of	   all,	   the	   actual	   stuff	   of	   politics—moral	  principles,	   avowed	   goals,	   processes	   of	   mobilization,	   strategizing,	   the	  pleasures	  of	  participation—was	  absent.12	  	   A	  shift	  in	  perspective	  came,	  however,	  in	  the	  1970s	  when	  “attention	  turned	  to	  movements…and	  to	  struggles	  with	  which	  analysts	  had	  sympathy.”13	  By	  this	  time,	  a	  large	  enough	  contingent	  of	  sociologists	  had	  joined	  the	  ranks	  of	  academia	  with	  direct	  ties	   to	   progressive	   struggles	   of	   the	   moment	   (i.e.	   the	   civil	   rights	   movement,	   the	  women’s	   movement,	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement).	   These	   scholars	   were	   invested	   in	  casting	  political	  actors	  as	  rational	  beings	  fighting	  for	  legitimate	  aims.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  two	  major	  theories	  emerged	  to	  form	  the	  contemporary	  field	  of	  social	  movement	  theory:	  resource	  mobilization	  theory,	  and	  political	  process	  theory.	  
A	  Turn	  Away	  From	  Emotions	  	   Resource	   mobilization	   theory	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   both	   the	  rational	   and	   strategic	   elements	   of	   collective	   social	   action.	   According	   to	   this	  perspective,	   protest	   actions	   derive	   from	   “a	   calculation	   of	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits,	  influenced	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  resources	  –	   in	  particular	  by	  organization	  and	  by	  the	  strategic	  interactions	  necessary	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  social	  movement.”14	  Social	  movements	   cannot	   simply	   be	   explained	   through	   examination	   of	   the	   tensions	   and	  conflicts	  that	  mark	  a	  certain	  historical	  moment.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  “necessary	  also	  to	  study	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  4.	  13	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  “Putting	  Emotions	  in	  Their	  Place,”	  289.	  14	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements,	  8.	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the	  conditions	  which	  enable	  discontent	  to	  be	  transformed	  into	  mobilization.”15	  This	  means	  looking	  at	  the	  resources	  that	  facilitate	  mobilization	  –	  both	  material	  (labour,	  money,	   concrete	   benefits	   and	   services)	   and	   non-­‐material	   (authority,	   solidarity,	  moral	   engagement).	   Moreover,	   resource	   mobilization	   theorists	   are	   interested	   in	  how	   the	   “type	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   resources	   available	   explain	   the	   tactical	   choices	  made	   by	  movements	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   collective	   action	   on	   the	   social	   and	  political	  system.”16	  	  While	   the	   definition	   of	   social	  movements	   as	   being	   premised	   upon	   rational	  choice	   is	  among	  resource	  mobilization	   theory’s	   “most	   important	   innovations,”	   this	  characterization	   has	   also	   been	   the	   target	   of	   a	   number	   of	   criticisms.	   Firstly,	   it	   has	  been	   accused	   of	   eliding	   the	   structural	   sources	   of	   conflict,	   as	   well	   as	   “the	   specific	  stakes	   for	   the	   control	   of	   which	   social	   actors	   mobilize.”17	  Secondly,	   it	   has	   been	  charged	  with	   ignoring	   the	   self-­‐organizing	   of	  marginalized	   social	   groups	   due	   to	   its	  focus	  on	  resources	  controlled	  by	  select	  political	  entrepreneurs.18	  	  Finally,	  the	  focus	  on	   rationality	   in	   collective	   action	   has	   come	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   ignoring	   the	   role	   of	  emotions.19	  	  Political	   process	   theory	   (also	   known	   as	   political	   opportunities	   theory)	  similarly	  adopts	  a	  rational	  view	  of	  collective	  action.	  Unlike	  the	  resource	  mobilization	  approach,	  however,	  this	  perspective	  engages	  more	  systematically	  with	  the	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  8.	  16	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  8.	  17	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  9.	  18	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements.	  19	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  “Putting	  Emotions	  in	  Their	  Place.”;	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  
Movements.	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and	   institutional	   context	   in	   which	   social	   movements	   exist.20	  The	   political	   process	  approach	  “begins	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  social	   institutions,	  particularly	  political	  and	   economic	   institutions	   benefit	   the	   more	   powerful	   members	   of	   society,	   often	  called	   elites,	   and	   disadvantage	   many.”21	  While	   this	   relative	   disempowerment	   can	  make	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	  masses	   to	   contest	   dominant	   institutions,	   political	   process	  scholars	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  that	  can	  make	  these	  institutions,	  as	   well	   as	   the	   political	   system	   itself,	   vulnerable	   or	   receptive	   to	   challenges.22	  Theorists	   are	   thus	   interested	   in	   determining	   the	   degree	   of	   openness	   (or	  “closedness”)	  of	  a	  political	  system	  and	  how	  this	  might	  impact	  the	  kinds	  of	  collective	  actions	  that	  are	  possible.23	  	  Like	  the	  former	  approach,	  the	  political	  process	  perspective	  has	  also	  been	  the	  recipient	   of	   criticism.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   has	   been	   accused	   of	   “political	  reductionism,”	  whereby	   “theorists	   of	   political	   process	   have	  paid	   little	   attention	   to	  the	   fact	   that	   many	   contemporary	   movements	   (of	   youth,	   women,	   queer	   folks,	   or	  minority	  ethnic	  groups)	  seem	  to	  have	  developed	  within	  a	  political	  context	  and	  in	  a	  climate	   of	   cultural	   innovation	   at	   the	   same	   time.”24	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   as	   with	  resource	   mobilization	   theory,	   the	   political	   process	   perspective’s	   emphasis	   on	  rationalism	  has	  meant	  that	  it	  has	  tended	  to	  ignore	  the	  structural	  sources	  of	  protest,	  along	  with	  “non-­‐rational”	  elements	  such	  as	  emotions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements.	  21	  Hutchison,	  “Spirituality,	  Religion,	  and	  Progressive	  Social	  Movements,”	  108.	  22	  Hutchison,	  “Spirituality,	  Religion,	  and	  Progressive	  Social	  Movements.”	  23	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  Social	  Movements,	  9.	  24	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Diani,	  10.	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Craig	   Calhoun	   discusses	   how	   due	   to	   past	   (socio-­‐psychological)	   trends	   that	  conceptualized	  social	  movements	   in	   terms	  of	  pathology	  and	   irrationality,	   theorists	  have	   been	   discouraged	   from	   engaging	   with	   affective	   dimensions	   of	   collective	  action.25	  	   Moreover,	   Calhoun	   argues	   that	   due	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   emotions	   have	  been	  set	  in	  opposition	  to	  rationality	  (or	  seen	  as	  disruptive	  to	  rationality)	  in	  Western	  thinking,	  they	  have	  consequently	  been	  trivialized	  or	  ignored.	  Radha	  D’Souza	  echoes	  this	   analysis,	   arguing	   that	   the	   academy	   is	   pervaded	   by	   modernist	   dualisms	   that	  prevent	  social	  activist	  scholars	  from	  truly	  grasping	  the	  realm	  of	  action	  and	  activism,	  which	   is	   significantly	   governed	   by	   intuition,	   passion	   and	   emotion. 26 	  As	   such,	  emotions,	   due	   to	   their	   intrinsically	   messy	   character,	   and	   association	   with	  irrationality,	   have	   been	   effectively	   cut	   out	   of	   the	   conversation	   until	   relatively	  recently.	  	  
The	  Return	  of	  the	  Repressed	  	   In	   the	   last	   20	   years,	   social	   movement	   theory	   has	   become	   increasingly	  receptive	   to	   the	  recognition	  and	  study	  of	   the	  affective	  aspects	  of	  political	  struggle,	  with	  a	  number	  of	  theorists	  stressing	  the	  inextricable	  connection	  between	  emotions	  and	  political	  movements.	   A	   leading	   proponent	   of	   this	   recuperative	   effort	   is	   James	  Jasper,	  who	  writes:	  	  Emotions	   are	   present	   in	   every	   phase	   and	   every	   aspect	   of	   protest…They	  motivate	   individuals,	   are	   generated	   in	   crowds,	   are	   expressed	   rhetorically,	  and	  shape	  stated	  and	  unstated	  goals	  of	   social	  movements.	  Emotions	  can	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Craig	  Calhoun,	  “Putting	  Emotions	  in	  Their	  Place,”	  in	  Social	  Movements:	  A	  Reader,	  ed.	  V.	  Ruggiero	  and	  N.	  Montagna	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2008).	  26	  Radha	  D’Souza,	  “What	  Can	  Activist	  Scholars	  Learn	  from	  Rumi?,”	  in	  Pathways	  of	  Creative	  
Research:	  Towards	  a	  Festival	  of	  Dialogues,	  ed.	  Ananta	  Kumar	  Giri	  (Delhi:	  Primus	  Books,	  2010).	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means,	  they	  can	  be	  ends,	  and	  sometimes	  they	  can	  fuse	  the	  two.	  They	  can	  help	  or	   hinder	  mobilization	   efforts,	   ongoing	   strategies,	   and	   the	   success	   of	   social	  movements.	   Cooperation	   and	   collective	   action	   have	   always	   offered	   an	  opportunity	   to	   think	   about	   social	   action	  more	   generally,	   and	   the	   return	   of	  emotions	  is	  the	  latest	  inspiration	  for	  doing	  this.27	  	  	  	  	   Jasper	   identifies	   a	  number	  of	   factors	   that	  have	   influenced	   social	  movement	  theory’s	   “return	   of	   the	   repressed,”	   as	   well	   as	   theories	   of	   emotion	   that	   currently	  inform	  the	  field.	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  three	  of	  these	  bodies	  of	  scholarship	  –	  the	  sociology	   of	   emotions,	   feminist	   and	   queer	   theories	   of	   emotion,	   and	   cultural	  constructivism	   –	   looking	   at	   select	   thinkers	   whose	   work	   offers	   some	   direction	   in	  terms	   of	   how	   to	   understand	   the	   psyche	   and	   the	   political	   in	   relation	   to	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  
The	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions	  	   As	  a	  legitimate	  field	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  section	  to	  provide	   a	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   scholarship	   in	   the	   sociology	   of	   emotions.	  Instead,	  I	  focus	  on	  a	  key	  figure	  in	  this	  sub-­‐field	  who	  has	  been	  central	  in	  developing	  this	  disciplinary	  focus:	  Arlie	  Hochschild.	  28	  In	   her	   1975	   article,	   “The	   Sociology	   of	   Feeling	   and	   Emotion:	   Selected	  Possibilities,”	   Hochschild	   declares	   that	   “there	   is	   now	   no	   sociological	   theory	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  286.	  28	  Other	  foundational	  works	  in	  the	  sociology	  of	  emotions	  include	  Theodore	  Kemper’s	  social	  structural	  theory	  of	  emotions	  (A	  Social	  Interactional	  Theory	  of	  Emotions	  (Wiley,	  1978)).;	  David	  Heise’s	  affect	  control	  model	  (Understanding	  Events:	  Affect	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  
Social	  Action	  (CUP	  Archive,	  1979)).;	  and	  Randall	  Collins’	  theory	  of	  emotional	  energy	  (Conflict	  Sociology	  (New	  York:	  Academic,	  1975)).	  	  Despite	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  scholars	  in	  the	  field,	  Jasper	  argues	  that	  Hochschild’s	  work	  has	  effectively	  eclipsed	  their	  contributions.	  	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  field	  of	  the	  sociology	  of	  emotion,	  see	  Jonathan	  H.	  Turner	  and	  Jan	  E.	  Stets,	  
The	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005).	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feelings	  and	  emotions.”29	  She	   reasons	   that	   this	   is	  not	   so	  much	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  emotions	  have	  never	  been	  theorized	  in	  a	  sociological	  manner	  but	  rather	  that	  there	  is	  no	  cohesive	  theory	  that	  integrates	  these	  insights.	  For	  Hochschild,	  for	  such	  a	  theory	  to	   obtain,	   a	   new	   subject	   must	   be	   imagined.	   This	   new	   subject	   cannot	   just	   be	   the	  conscious	   cognitive	   actor,	   or	   the	   unconscious	   emotional	   actor,	   but	   the	   “sentient	  
actor	  who	  is	  both	  conscious	  and	  feeling.”30	  Emotions,	  for	  this	  sentient	  actor,	  take	  on	  their	   meaning	   according	   to	   normative,	   expressive,	   and	   political	   context.	   The	  normative	  context	  refers	   to	  what	   the	  actor	  should	   feel,	  as	  opposed	  to	  what	  he/she	  does	   feel.	   Here,	   Hochschild	   discusses	   “feeling	   rules,”	   or	   socially	   appropriate	  ways	  that	  we	  are	  expected	  to	  feel	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  In	  her	  view,	  not	  only	  are	  we	  aware	  of	  what	  we	  should	  feel,	  but	  we	  also	  actively	  manage	  our	  feelings	  so	  that	  they	  meet	  societal	  or	  situational	  expectations	  (i.e.	  trying	  to	  feel	  anger,	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  one	  
should	  feel	  moral	  outrage).	  	  While	   the	   normative	   context	   refers	   to	   one’s	   self-­‐evaluation	   of	   feeling,	   the	  expressive	  context	  points	  to	  the	   judgment	  of	  the	  other’s	  emotional	  display.	  That	   is,	  we	  evaluate	  how	  truly	  or	  falsely	  one’s	  emotional	  expression	  corresponds	  with	  their	  inner	   feeling.	   In	  a	   commercialized	  society,	  Hochschild	  argues	   that	  expressions	  can	  be	   likened	   to	   a	   medium	   of	   exchange	   whereby	   the	   trust	   we	   attach	   to	   someone’s	  emotional	  expression	  depends	  on	  the	  abundance	  or	  scarcity	  (so	  that	  a	  receptionist’s	  smile	  is	  devalued	  given	  its	  abundance).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Arlie	  Russell	  Hochschild,	  “The	  Sociology	  of	  Feeling	  and	  Emotion:	  Selected	  Possibilities,”	  
Sociological	  Inquiry	  45,	  no.	  2–3	  (April	  1,	  1975):	  280.	  30	  Hochschild,	  283.	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Finally,	   the	   political	   context	   speaks	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  emotion.	  While	  the	  other	  two	  contexts	  involve	  conscious	  management,	  Hochschild	  suggests	  that	  this	  third	  level	   is	  often	  unconscious.	  As	  she	  explains,	   the	  direction	  of	  our	  feeling	  often	  corresponds	  to	  hierarchies	  of	  power,	  so	  that	  positive	  feelings	  (respect,	  awe,	  gratitude	  etc.)	  are	  often	  directed	  upwards,	  and	  negative	   feelings	   (anger,	   hatred,	   disgust)	   are	   deflected	   downward.	   An	   example	  Hochschild	  gives	  is	  of	  a	  working	  husband	  who	  unleashes	  his	  frustrations	  (displaced	  from	  the	  office	  to	  the	  home)	  on	  his	  wife	  who,	  in	  turn,	  gets	  angry	  at	  her	  children,	  who	  then	   take	   it	   out	   on	   the	  dog.	   In	   the	   exceptional	   case	   of	   rebellion,	  Hochschild	  notes	  that	   the	   direction	   of	   affect	   can	   be	   reversed	   so	   that	   hostility	   is	   pointed	   upwards,	  toward	   the	  oppressive	  parties	   that	   are	   the	  aim	  of	   contestation.	  This	  dissertation’s	  discussion	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   feelings	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this	   redirection	   of	  affect.	  	  Hochschild	   develops	   her	   theory	   further	   in	   her	   1983	   book	   The	   Managed	  
Heart,	  where	  she	  focuses	  her	  inquiry	  on	  how	  women	  in	  the	  service	  industry	  manage	  their	  emotional	  lives	  in	  accordance	  with	  corporate	  expectations.	  In	  this	  volume,	  she	  draws	   from	   the	   work	   of	   Charles	   Darwin,	   Sigmund	   Freud,	   and	   Erving	   Goffman	  (among	   other	   interactionist	   theorists)	   to	   define	   emotions	   as	   biologically	   given	  senses	  that	  are	  deeply	  social.	  From	  Darwin,	  Hochschild	  preserves	  the	  link	  between	  emotion	   and	   action.	   From	   Freud,	   she	   takes	   the	   “signalling”	   function	   of	   emotions,	  although	  arguing	  that	  this	  function	  does	  not	  simply	  signal	  a	  truth	  about	  the	  outside	  world,	  but	  rather	  gives	  a	  comparison.	  That	  is,	  “when	  an	  emotion	  signals	  a	  message	  of	  danger	  or	  safety	  to	  us,	  it	  involves	  a	  reality	  newly	  grasped	  on	  the	  template	  of	  prior	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expectations.” 31 	  Finally,	   following	   Goffman,	   she	   elaborates	   on	   feeling	   rules	  (discussed	  above),	  and	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  affective	  deviant	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  it	  takes	  for	  one	  to	  affectively	  align	  themselves	  within	  a	  situation	  to	   achieve	   social	   solidarity.	  Moreover,	  Goffman’s	   “fly-­‐on-­‐wall”	   analysis	   shows	  how	  each	   situation	   is,	   in	   turn,	   loaded	   with	   a	   “social	   logic	   of	   its	   own	   that	   people	  unconsciously	   sustain.”32	  Hochschild	   strings	   together	   these	   insights	   to	   construct	   a	  sociology	  of	  emotions	  tailored	  to	   investigating	  how	  women	  in	  the	  service	   industry	  are	  expected	  to	  manipulate	   their	   feelings	  as	  part	  of	   the	  emotional	  labour	   that	   they	  perform.	  	  Hochschild’s	   formulation	   of	   feelings	   as	   socially	   and	   culturally	   constructed,	  organized	  by	  rules,	  managed	  by	  oneself	  and	  others,	  and	  socially	  evaluated	  has	  been	  influential	  to	  social	  movement	  theorists.33	  While	  her	  most	  important	  contribution	  to	  my	  project	   is	   in	  formulating	  the	  intrinsically	  social	  aspect	  of	  emotionality,	  she	  also	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  other	  points	  that	  are	  worth	  mentioning.	   	   	  Specifically,	  her	  work	  echoes	   my	   preliminary	   observations	   of	   how	   certain	   spaces	   and	   situations	   create	  affective	  economies	  of	  belonging	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  disrupted	  by	  affective	  deviance.	  Her	   emphasis	   on	   the	   self-­‐consciousness	   and	   self-­‐managing	  of	   emotion	   is	   useful	   in	  explaining	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   emotions	  may	  be	  oriented	   to	   align	  with	   the	   “feeling	  rules”	   of	   a	   situation	   or	   movement	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   social	   solidarity.	   Finally,	  Hochschild’s	  discussion	  on	  power	  and	  emotion	  is	  also	  helpful	  in	  understanding	  how	  emotions	  are	  oriented	   in	   certain	  ways	  and	   for	   certain	  aims.	  While	   this	   last	   insight	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Arlie	  Russel	  Hochschild,	  The	  Managed	  Heart:	  Commercialization	  of	  Human	  Feeling	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1983),	  221.	  32	  Arlie	  Russel	  Hochschild,	  214.	  33	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  12.	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begins	  to	  examine	  how	  emotions	  relate	  to	  politics,	  her	  theory	  has	  “not	  been	  applied	  to	  political	  action	  in	  a	  thorough	  and	  systematic	  way.”34	  	  
Feminist	  and	  Queer	  Theories	  of	  Emotion	  
	   Hochschild’s	   work	   has	   also	   been	   influential	   for	   feminist	   and	   queer	  theorizations	  of	  emotion.	  While	  this	  field	  has	  exploded	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years,	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  scholars	  whose	  work	  lies	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  feminist	  and	  queer	  theories	  of	  emotion,	  and	  who	  have	  especially	  pertinent	  insights	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  investigation:	  Sara	  Ahmed	  and	  Ann	  Cvetkovich.35	  Ahmed	   describes	   her	  work	   as	   also	   belonging	   to	   the	   sociology	   of	   emotions.	  Unlike	   Hochschild,	   however,	   Ahmed	   has	   been	   more	   explicit	   in	   articulating	   the	  relationship	  between	  feelings	  and	  politics.	  Inspired	  by	  Spinoza’s	  view	  of	  emotions	  as	  shaping	  what	   the	  body	   can	  do,	  Ahmed	  asks:	  What	  do	  emotions	  do?	  Ahmed	   refutes	  the	  belief	  that	  emotions	  are	  caused	  by	  an	  object.	  Rather,	  she	  argues	  that	  “emotions	  are	   shaped	   by	   contact	   with	   objects.” 36 	  Using	   affect,	   emotion,	   and	   feeling	  interchangeably,	   Ahmed	   is	   interested	   in	   developing	   a	   “sociality	   of	   emotion”	   that	  foregrounds	   the	   relational	   aspect	   of	   emotions.	   As	   she	   discusses,	   our	   feelings	   are	  shaped	   through	   contact	  with	   an	  object,	   in	   addition	   to	  our	  orientation	   toward	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  287.	  35	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  theorists,	  other	  notable	  feminist/queer	  thinkers	  who	  have	  been	  influential	  in	  the	  field	  include	  Judith	  Butler	  (1997a,	  1997b,	  2006),	  Lauren	  Berlant	  (1997,	  2011),	  Ranjana	  Khanna	  (2003),	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick	  (2002),	  Teresa	  Brennan	  (2004),	  Clare	  Hemmings	  (2005,	  2012)	  and	  Sianne	  Ngai	  (2005).	  See	  bibliography	  for	  full	  references.	  	  For	  a	  good	  summary	  of	  feminist/queer	  contributions	  to	  the	  field	  of	  emotion,	  see	  Carolyn	  Pedwell	  and	  Anne	  Whitehead,	  “Affecting	  Feminism:	  Questions	  of	  Feeling	  in	  Feminist	  Theory,”	  Feminist	  Theory	  13,	  no.	  2	  (August	  1,	  2012):	  115–29.	  36	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion	  (Routledge,	  2013),	  6.	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object.	  The	  object	  then	  often	  becomes	  imbued	  with	  the	  affective	  association	  that	  we	  give	   it,	   so	   that	   it	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   inherent	   property.	   This	   formulation,	   for	   example,	  allows	  Ahmed	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  immigrant	  or	  asylum	  seeker	  becomes	  coded	  as	   “fearsome.”	  Fear,	  as	  an	  emotion,	  arises	  only	  upon	  contact	  with	   the	  Other.	  One’s	  orientation	  towards	  this	  Other	  is	  determined	  by	  cultural	  history	  and	  memory.	  If	  one	  is	  taught	  that	  the	  Other	  is	  to	  be	  feared,	  then	  the	  quality	  of	  fearsome	  is	  attributed	  to	  the	  Other	  as	  an	  innate	  characteristic	  (immigrants	  are	  scary).37	  Ahmed	  is	  interested	  in	   this	   movement	   of	   emotions,	   and	   how	   they	   attach	   or	   “stick”	   to	   certain	   objects,	  while	  passing	  over	  others.	  	  Ann	  Cvetkovich’s	  work	   is	   also	  helpful	   in	   linking	   the	  psyche	   to	   the	  political.	  Like	  Ahmed,	  Cvetkovich	  employs	  affect	  “in	  a	  more	  generic	  sense,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  more	  specific	  Deleuzian	  sense,	  as	  a	  category	  that	  encompasses	  affect,	  emotion,	  and	  feeling.”38	  Cvetkovich	  locates	  her	  scholarship	  within	  the	  Public	  Feelings	  Project	  –	  an	  initiative	  that	  began	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  in	  the	  US	  in	  order	  to	  track	  the	  emotional	  dynamics	  of	  the	  consequent	  militarism	  and	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Ahmed’s	  discussion	  of	  this	  encounter	  between	  the	  Western	  self	  and	  the	  racialized	  Other	  is	  informed	  by	  her	  background	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  Other,	  see	  Ahmed’s	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  
Post-­‐Coloniality	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2000).;	  Edward	  Said’s	  Orientalism	  (Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2014).;	  and	  Frantz	  Fanon’s	  Black	  Skin,	  White	  Masks	  (Grove	  Press,	  1967).,	  among	  many	  other	  volumes	  on	  the	  subject.	  For	  additional	  perspectives	  by	  postcolonial	  and	  subaltern	  thinkers	  who	  engage	  with	  emotions,	  see	  Mahmood’s	  Politics	  of	  Piety	  and	  Dipesh	  Chakrabarty’s	  Habitations	  of	  Modernity:	  Essays	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Subaltern	  Studies	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002).	  38	  Ann	  Cvetkovich,	  Depression:	  A	  Public	  Feeling	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  4.	  Deleuzian	  theorists	  have	  used	  Spinoza’s	  insight,	  among	  others,	  to	  define	  affect	  as	  the	  “suspension”	  between	  activity	  and	  passivity;	  the	  indeterminate,	  pre-­‐personal,	  and	  pre-­‐conscious	  intensity	  that	  must	  be	  distinguished	  from	  emotion.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  differentiation	  between	  affect	  and	  emotion,	  see	  Brian	  Massumi’s,	  “The	  Autonomy	  of	  Affect,”	  Cultural	  Critique,	  no.	  31	  (1995):	  83–109.	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Iraq.	  Grounded	  in	  the	  insights	  of	  Eve	  Sedgwick	  (who	  draws	  upon	  Silvan	  Tomkins39),	  as	   well	   as	   queer	   theory,	   the	   project	   has	   since	   embraced	   the	   wider	   aim	   of	  depathologizing	   negative	   emotions,	   as	  well	   as	   exploring	   their	   political	   usefulness.	  Cvetkovich	   focuses	   on	   depression,	   arguing	   that	   it	   is	   both	   a	   public	   and	   political	  feeling	   that	  not	  only	   tells	  us	  something	  about	   the	  despair	  of	   the	  neo-­‐liberal	  order,	  but	  might	   also	  direct	   us	   toward	   the	   “hope	   that	   is	   necessary	   for	  political	   action.”40	  Cvetkovich’s	   project	   is	   also	   a	   response	   to	   the	   neoliberalization	   of	   the	   queer	  movement,	   which	   she	   argues	   has	   shifted	   its	   focus	   from	   the	   language	   of	  emancipation	  to	  demands	  for	  equal	  marriage	  and	  domestic	  partner	  benefits.	  As	  she	  states,	  “As	  a	  queer	  project,	  Public	  Feelings	  tries	  to	  reimagine	  a	  liberatory	  version	  of	  social	   and	   affective	   relations	   beyond	   the	   liberal	   versions	   that	   have	   come	   to	  dominate	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  gay	  politics.”41	  Feminist	   and	   queer	   theories	   have	   been	   essential	   in	   critiquing	   Western	  scholarship	  for	  “ignoring,	  denying,	  and	  denigrating	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  social	  and	  political	   life.”42	  In	   terms	   of	   my	   specific	   interests	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   Hochschild,	  Ahmed,	   and	   Cvetkovich’s	   work	   resonates	   with	   my	   own	   exploration	   of	   what	  emotions	   do	   socially	   and	   politically.	   Hochschild	   provides	   crucial	   inroads	   into	  understanding	   the	   fundamentally	   social	   nature	   of	   emotions.	   Ahmed’s	   similar	  emphasis	   on	   the	   sociality	   of	   emotions,	   in	   which	   the	   personal	   and	   political	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Tomkins	  belongs	  to	  the	  psycho-­‐biological	  school	  of	  emotions	  which	  sees	  affects	  as	  reflexive,	  autonomic,	  and	  genetically	  hardwired	  responses	  that	  developed	  for	  survival	  purposes	  over	  the	  course	  of	  human	  evolution.	  See	  Silvan	  S.	  Tomkins,	  Exploring	  Affect:	  The	  
Selected	  Writings	  of	  Silvan	  S	  Tomkins	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  40	  Cvetkovich,	  Depression,	  2.	  41	  Cvetkovich,	  6.	  42	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  288.	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mutually	  constitutive,	  and	  her	  claim	  that	  “emotions	  ‘matter’	  for	  politics,”	  are	  central	  premises	   that	   underlie	   my	   approach.	   Similarly,	   Cvetkovich’s	   insistence	   that	  seemingly	  private	  emotions	   such	  as	  depression	   should	  be	   regarded	  as	  political,	   in	  addition	   to	   her	   interest	   in	   locating	   the	   political	   usefulness	   of	   emotions,	   are	  extremely	   helpful	   for	   my	   purposes.	   Her	   focus	   on	   negative	   emotions	   is	   especially	  relevant	  given	  that	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  looking	  at	  the	  anger,	  bitterness,	  hatred,	  envy,	  suspicion,	  among	  other	  emotions,	  in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  In	  terms	  of	  my	  particular	  aim	  in	  tracking	  the	  political	  costs	  of	  being	  attached	  to	  these	  emotions,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  concern	  around	  how	  we	  might	  re-­‐orient	  our	  collective	  psyche	  toward	  emancipatory	  political	   possibilities,	   both	   Ahmed	   and	   Cvetkovich	   offer	   pertinent	   insights.	   For	  example,	   in	   asking	   “how	   emotions	   can	   attach	   us	   to	   the	   very	   conditions	   of	   our	  subordination,”	   Ahmed	   directly	   echoes	   a	   key	   concern	   of	   this	   dissertation. 43	  Cvetkovich’s	   emphasis	   on	   reimagining	   a	   liberatory	   politics	   through	   the	   interplay	  between	   the	   political	   and	   psyche,	   is	   moreover	   a	   fundamental	   goal	   of	   my	   work.	  Despite	   these	   resonant	   theoretical	   perspectives,	   however,	   neither	   Ahmed	   and	  Cvetkovich	   give	   a	   systematic	   model	   or	   framework	   with	   which	   to	   specifically	  understand	  the	  emotions,	  attitudes,	  concepts,	  and	  practices	  of	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  as	  explored	  thus	  far.	  	  
The	  Cultural	  Turn	  in	  Social	  Movement	  Theory	  	   While	   the	   feminist,	   queer,	   and	   sociological	   analyses	   of	   emotion	   have	   been	  influential	   to	   social	   movement	   theory’s	   development	   of	   an	   affective	   focus,	   “the	  analysis	   of	   the	   emotions	   of	   protest	   and	   politics	   departs	   from	   much	   work	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Ahmed,	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion,	  12.	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sociology	   of	   emotions,	   which	   has	   tended	   to	   concentrate	   on	   intimate	   settings	   and	  longstanding	   affective	   relationships.” 44 	  Instead,	   many	   protest	   theorists	   are	  interested	   in	   developing	   an	   emotional	   analysis	   rooted	   in	   the	   field’s	   cultural	  constructivist	   approach,	   which	   developed	   in	   the	   1990s.	   As	   Jasper	   discusses,	  “Cultural	  constructionism	  offer[s]	  other	  useful	  tools	  for	  understanding	  the	  emotions	  of	   politics,	   especially	   by	   suggesting	   that	   emotions	   are	   a	   part	   of	   culture	   alongside	  cognition	   and	  morality.”45	  Concepts	   such	   as	   frame	   alignment,	   which	   was	   hitherto	  understood	   on	   solely	   cognitive	   terms,	   have	   lent	   themselves	   to	   also	   uncovering	  emotional	  processes.46	  	  In	  social	  movement	   theory	   literature,	  a	   frame	   is	  defined	  as	   “an	   interpretive	  schemata	   that	   simplifies	   and	   condenses	   the	   ‘world	   out	   there’	   by	   selectively	  punctuating	  and	  encoding	  objects,	  situations,	  events,	  experiences,	  and	  sequences	  of	  actions	  within	   one’s	   present	   or	   past	   environment.”47	  For	   a	   social	  movement	   to	   be	  successful,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  organizers	  are	  able	  to	  align	  their	  frames	  with	  that	  of	  recruits,	  in	  order	  for	  there	  to	  be	  resonance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  and	  how	  to	  act	  upon	   it.	  David	  Snow	  and	  Robert	  Benford	   suggest	   that	   there	  are	   three	  kinds	  of	  framing	   needed	   for	   effective	   recruitment	   within	   a	   social	   movement.	   The	   first	   is	  diagnostic	  framing,	  referring	  to	  a	  movement’s	  ability	  to	  convince	  a	  recruit	  that	  there	  is	   a	   problem	   that	   requires	   attention.	   The	   second	   is	   prognostic	   framing,	   which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  13.	  45	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  288.	  46	  For	  more	  on	  cultural	  constructivist	  concepts	  and	  emotions,	  see	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest:	  Affective	  and	  Reactive	  Emotions	  In	  and	  Around	  Social	  Movements,”	  
Sociological	  Forum	  13,	  no.	  3	  (September	  1,	  1998):	  397–424.;	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  
Passionate	  Politics.	  47	  Snow	  and	  Benford,	  quoted	  in	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  6.	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persuades	   recruits	   in	   favour	   of	   certain	   strategies	   and	   tactics;	   and	   lastly	   there	   is	  motivational	  framing,	  which	  encourages	  members	  to	  directly	  participate	  in	  political	  action.48	  Although	   these	   types	   of	   framing	   have	   traditionally	   been	   understood	   as	  motivated	  by	  cognitive	   factors,	  cultural	  constructivists	  acknowledge	  that	  emotions	  also	  play	  a	  part	  in	  frame	  alignment.	  	  The	  application	  of	  emotions	   to	   injustice	   frames	   is	  especially	  relevant	   to	   the	  present	   investigation.	   Elaborating	   on	   William	   Gamson’s	   work,	   Goodwin	   et	   al.	  describe	   this	   type	   of	   framing	   as	   instrumental	   to	   “viewing	   a	   situation	   or	   condition	  that	  expresses	  indignation	  or	  outrage	  over	  a	  perceived	  injustice	  and	  which	  identifies	  those	  blameworthy	  people	  responsible	  for	  it.”49	  Adding	  emotions	  to	  framing	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  both	  feelings	  and	  cognition	  must	  be	  harnessed	  in	  order	   to	   inspire	  someone	   to	   join	  a	  movement.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	  to	   feel	  emotions	  such	   as	   anger,	   hostility,	   and	   suspicion	   but	   rather,	   these	  must	   be	   interpreted	   by	   a	  movement	  in	  order	  that	  blame	  might	  be	  directed	  toward	  a	  concrete	  target.	  Gamson	  and	  Goodwin	  et	  al.	  warn	  how	  strong	  emotions	  are	  furthermore	  capable	  of	  distorting	  the	  cognitive	  interpretive	  process,	   leading	  political	  actors	  to	  “misdirect	  their	  anger	  at	   easy	   and	   inappropriate	   targets.”50	  This	   is	   relevant	   to	  my	   analysis	   of	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	   that	   it	  allows	   for	  an	   investigation	   into	  how	  feelings	  relate	   to	   thoughts	  around	  injustice	  with	  demonstrable	  effects	  on	  political	  action.	  	  Cultural	   constructivist	   concepts	   like	   frame	   alignment	   have	   played	   an	  important	  role	  in	  ushering	  in	  the	  return	  of	  affect	  to	  the	  study	  of	  social	  movements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics.	  49	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  8.	  50	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  8.	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In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	   consider	   some	  analyses	   that	   further	  develop	   this	   connection	  between	  the	  psyche	  and	  the	  political,	  looking	  specifically	  at	  concepts	  and	  theoretical	  tools	   that	   can	   help	   to	   explain	   emotions,	   attitude,	   and	   practice	   in	   the	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  context,	  and	  how	  these	  come	  together	  to	  form	  a	  distinct	  cultural	  character.	  	  	  
New	  Research	  and	  Limitations	  	   As	  discussed	  earlier,	   the	   literature	  on	  social	  movement	   theory	  and	  emotion	  has	   grown	   considerably	   in	   the	   last	   two	   decades. 51 	  These	   studies	   have	   made	  significant	  strides	  in	  emphasizing	  that	  emotions	  matter	  to	  politics.	  As	  Jasper	  argues:	  	   Emotions	  are	  a	  core	  part	  of	  action	  and	  decisions,	  which	  we	  analysts	  ignore	  at	  our	   peril.	   Actions,	  whether	   consciously	  made	   as	   choices	   or	   not,	   come	  with	  long	   lists	   of	   potential	   risks,	   costs,	   and	   benefits.	   We	   need	   to	   include	   the	  emotional	   risks,	   costs,	   and	   benefits	   because	   these	   help	   shape	   actions	   and	  choices.	   These	   were	   excluded	   from	   rationalistic	   traditions	   as	   too	   hard	   to	  reckon	   with,	   but	   surely	   they	   guide	   decisions.	   If	   we	   are	   to	   understand	   the	  actions	   undertaken,	   we	   need	   to	   understand	   the	   emotions	   that	   lead,	  accompany,	  and	  result	  from	  them.	  If	  political	  actors	  care	  about	  them,	  analysts	  must	  too.52	  	   	  In	   this	   section	   I	   focus	   on	   just	   two	   theoretical	   developments	   within	   this	  growing	  body	  of	  scholarship	  that	  relate	  directly	   to	   the	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  context,	  and	   which	   specifically	   help	   me	   in	   developing	   an	   understanding	   of	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  emotions,	  thoughts,	  and	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  these	   come	   to	   form	   the	   collective	   character	   of	   a	   movement:	   Jasper’s	   theory	   of	  political	  emotions	  and	  Deborah	  Gould’s	  concept	  of	  emotional	  habitus.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  For	  a	  review	  of	  this	  scholarship,	  see	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research.”	  52	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  298.	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As	  mentioned	  previously,	  James	  Jasper	  has	  been	  a	  leading	  figure	  in	  exploring	  the	  affective	  dimensions	  of	  political	  protest.	  His	  work	  centers	  emotions	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	   proper	   understanding	   of	   social	   movements.	   Using	   a	   cultural	   constructivist	  perspective,	   Jasper	  makes	   three	   key	   points	   that	   are	   useful	   to	   understanding	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   emotions.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   social	   nature	   of	   emotions.	   Drawing	   on	  traditions	  within	  the	  sociology	  of	  emotions	  (e.g.	  Hochschild’s	  model),	  Jasper	  stresses	  that	   “emotions	   are	   constituted	   more	   by	   shared	   social	   meanings	   than	   automatic	  physiological	  states.”53	  Rather	  than	  relegating	  the	  study	  of	  emotion	  to	  biological	  or	  microsociological	  analysis,	  he	  argues	  (along	  with	  Goodwin	  et	  al.)	  that	  emotions	  “are	  collective	   as	   well	   as	   individual,	   and	   they	   permeate	   large-­‐scale	   units	   of	   social	  organization,	   including	   workplaces,	   neighborhood	   and	   community	   networks,	  political	   parties,	  movements,	   and	   states,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   interactions	   of	   these	   units	  with	   one	   another.” 54 	  This	   formulation	   of	   emotions	   as	   social	   and	   collective	   is	  especially	  important	  in	  thinking	  about	  how	  the	  emotional	  expressions	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  can	  constitute	  a	  shared	  affective	  character.	  	  Secondly,	   and	   relatedly,	   is	   the	   connection	   he	  makes	   between	   emotion	   and	  cognition.	  As	  he	  states,	  “we	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  feeling	  and	  thinking	  are	  parallel,	  interacting	   processes	   of	   evaluating	   and	   interacting	  with	   our	  worlds,	   composed	   of	  similar	  neurological	  building	  blocks.”55	  Although	  cognition	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  separate	  from	  emotion,	  Jasper	  underscores	  how	  political	  emotions	  are	  often	  deeply	  linked	  to	  cognitive	  processing:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Jasper,	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest,”	  400.	  54	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics,	  16.	  55	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	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  of	  Theory	  and	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Activists	   work	   hard	   to	   create	   moral	   outrage	   and	   anger	   and	   to	   provide	   a	  target	  against	  which	  these	  can	  be	  vented.	  Inchoate	  anxieties	  and	  fears	  must	  be	  transformed	  into	  moral	  indignation	  and	  outrage	  toward	  concrete	  policies	  and	   decision	   makers	   (Gamson	   et	   al.	   1982;	   Gamson	   1992).	   Activists	   must	  weave	   together	   a	  moral,	   cognitive,	   and	   emotional	   package	   of	   attitudes.	   By	  framing	   the	   problem	   as,	   say,	   “big	   business”	   or	   “instrumentalism,”	   they	  suggest	   a	   moral	   judgment:	   humans	   are	   being	   abused	   by	   greedy	  businesspeople	   or	   unfeeling	   bureaucrats.	   The	   proper	   emotion	   shifts	   from	  dread	   to	   outrage.	   There	   is	   someone	   to	   blame…Such	   characterizations	  enhance	   protestors’	   outrage	   and	   sense	   of	   threat,	   transforming	   emotions	   at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  cognitive	  beliefs.	  Demonization	  fuels	  powerful	  emotions	  for	  social	  movements,	  such	  as	  hatred,	  fear,	  anger,	  suspicion,	  and	  indignation.	  	   The	  above	  passage	  offers	  a	  useful	  ground	  on	  which	   to	  understand	  how	   the	  emotions	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   identified	   earlier	   (outrage,	   anger,	   suspicion,	  vengefulness,	   envy)	   interact	   with	   cognitive	   understandings	   and	   attitudes	  (producing	   concepts	   like	   white	   tears),	   which	   then	   lead	   to	   distinct	   practices	   and	  political	  behaviours	  (such	  as	  calling-­‐out).	  Jasper	  demonstrates	  how	  these	  cognitive,	  affective,	   and	   behavioural	   processes	   each	   stimulate,	   influence,	   and	   reinforce	   one	  another,	   together	   forming	  a	  “moral,	  cognitive,	  and	  emotional	  package	  of	  attitudes”	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  below	  as	  the	  “emotional	  habitus”	  or	  social	  character	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  The	   final	   contribution	   that	   I	  would	   like	   to	  highlight	   for	   its	   relevance	   to	   the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  context	  is	  Jasper’s	  differentiation	  between	  reciprocal	  and	  shared	  emotions.	  He	  describes	  the	  former	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	   Some	   of	   the	   emotions	   generated	   within	   a	   social	   movement—call	   them	  
reciprocal—concern	  participants'	  ongoing	  feelings	  toward	  each	  other.	  These	  are	  the	  close,	  affective	  ties	  of	  friendship,	  love,	  solidarity,	  and	  loyalty,	  and	  the	  more	  specific	  emotions	  they	  give	  rise	  to.	  Together	  they	  create	  what	  Goodwin	  (1997)	   calls	   the	   ‘libidinal	   economy’	   of	   a	   movement,	   yielding	   many	   of	   the	  pleasures	  of	  protest,	  including	  erotic	  pleasures.	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This	   is	  an	  important	  concept	   in	  that	   it	  allows	  for	  a	  means	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  specific	  “economy”	  of	  emotionality	  between	  members	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  movement,	  which	  I	  have	  argued	  include	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  support,	  affection,	  solidarity,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging.	  For	  many	  of	  us,	  I	   imagine	  this	  has	  been	  the	  only	  place	  in	  which	   we	   are	   able	   to	   feel	   a	   sense	   of	   acceptance,	   love,	   and	   recognition.	   In	   this	  particular	  context,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  “pleasures	  of	  protest,”	  however,	  are	  not	  stable	  or	  guaranteed.	  Rather,	  the	  moral	  policing	  described	  earlier	  means	  that	  one’s	  acceptance	  in	  the	  group	  is	  contingent	  on	  acting	  (and	  indeed,	  emoting)	  according	  to	  the	   “feeling	   rules”	   (to	   use	   Hochschild’s	   term)	   of	   the	   movement,	   or	   one	   may	   be	  called-­‐out	   and	   subjected	   to	   censure.	   What	   results,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter,	  is	  a	  culture	  of	  insecurity	  and	  anxiety	  in	  which	  views	  are	  often	  withheld	  or	  censored	  by	  members	  of	  the	  movement	  who	  fear	  public	  shaming.	  	  Shared	   emotions,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   are	   the	   common	   emotions	   that	   a	  political	   group	   holds	   against	   their	   stated	   enemy.	   Jasper	   elaborates	   on	   how	   these	  emotions	  interact	  with,	  and	  cultivate	  the	  first	  type:	  Other	   emotions—call	   them	   shared—are	  consciously	   held	   by	   a	   group	   at	   the	  same	  time,	  but	   they	  do	  not	  have	   the	  other	  group	  members	  as	   their	  objects.	  The	   group	   nurtures	   anger	   toward	   outsiders,	   or	   outrage	   over	   government	  policies.	   	   Reciprocal	   and	   shared	   emotions,	   although	  distinct,	   reinforce	   each	  other—thereby	   building	   a	   movement's	   culture.	   Each	   measure	   of	   shared	  outrage	  against	  a	  nuclear	  plant	  reinforces	  the	  reciprocal	  emotion	  of	  fondness	  for	  others	  precisely	  because	   they	   feel	   the	   same	  way.	  They	  are	   like	  us;	   they	  understand.	  Conversely,	  mutual	  affection	  is	  one	  context	  in	  which	  new	  shared	  emotions	   are	   easily	   created.	   Because	   you	   are	   fond	   of	   others,	   you	   want	   to	  adopt	  their	  feelings.	  Both	  kinds	  of	  collective	  emotion	  foster	  solidarity	  within	  a	  protest	  group.56	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  Jasper,	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest,”	  417.	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A	   number	   of	   the	   affects	   discussed	   earlier	   –	   rage,	   bitterness,	   envy,	  vengefulness	  –	   fall	   into	   the	  category	  of	   shared	  emotions.	  As	   Jasper	  suggests,	   these	  emotions	   are	   indeed	   central	   to	   forming	   bonds	   of	   solidarity	   among	   anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  reinforcing	  reciprocal	  affections	  and	  loyalties,	  and	  shaping	  the	  culture	  of	  the	   movement.	   Jasper’s	   terms	   for	   in-­‐group	   and	   out-­‐group	   emotions	   are	   also	  instructive	  in	  that	  they	  describe	  what	  protest	  emotions	  do	  within	  a	  movement	  and	  their	   central	   role	   in	   building	   the	  movement’s	   culture.	   This	   insight,	   along	  with	   his	  emphasis	   on	   the	   social	   and	   cognitive	   nature	   of	   political	   emotions	   provide	   some	  theoretical	  tools	  to	  better	  grasp	  the	  importance	  of	  emotions	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  and	   build	   on	   last	   chapters	   analysis	   of	   how	   these	   interact	   with	   cognitive	   and	  behavioural	   dimensions	   to	   produce	   a	   political	   culture.	   But	   how	   might	   we	  understand	  how	  these	  emotional,	   cognitive,	  and	  behavioural	  aspects	  harden,	   so	   to	  speak,	   into	   embodied	   collective	   dispositions	   or	   characters?	   For	   this,	   I	   turn	   to	  Deborah	  Gould’s	  work	  on	  emotional	  habitus.57	  	  Looking	  at	  AIDS	  activism	  among	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  in	  the	  US	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  Gould	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  emotional	  habitus	  as	  a	  means	  of	  “thinking	  of	  the	   emotional	   and	   the	   social	   together	   while	   simultaneously	   foregrounding	   the	  bodily,	  affective	  dimensions	  of	  emotion.”58	  She	  defines	  the	  concept	  as	  follows:	  With	   the	   term	   emotional	   habitus,	   I	   mean	   to	   reference	   a	   social	   grouping's	  collective	  and	  only	  partly	  conscious	  emotional	  dispositions,	  that	  is,	  members'	  embodied,	   axiomatic	   inclinations	   toward	   certain	   feelings	   and	   ways	   of	  emoting.	   By	   directly	   affecting	   what	   people	   feel,	   a	   collectivity's	   emotional	  
habitus	  can	  decisively	  influence	  political	  action,	   in	  part	  because	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  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  concept	  was	  initially	  introduced	  by	  Anne	  Kane	  (2001)	  who	  develops	  it	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Norbert	  Elias,	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  and	  Thomas	  Scheff.	  58	  Deborah	  B.	  Gould,	  Moving	  Politics:	  Emotion	  and	  ACT	  UP’s	  Fight	  against	  AIDS	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009),	  34.	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an	  important	  role	  in	  generating	  and	  foreclosing	  political	  horizons,	  senses	  of	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  and	  how	  to	  do	  it.59	  	   Gould’s	   concept	   builds	   on	   Pierre	   Bourdieu’s	   idea	   of	   habitus,	   which	   can	   be	  explained	   as	   “socially	   constituted,	   commonsensical,	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  understandings	  or	  schemas	  in	  any	  social	  grouping	  that,	  operating	  beneath	  conscious	  awareness,	   on	   the	   level	   of	   bodily	   understanding,	   provide	   members	   with	   a	  disposition	  or	  orientation	  to	  action,	  a	  ‘sense	  of	  the	  game’	  and	  how	  best	  to	  play	  it.”60	  Individuals	   who	   belong	   to	   a	   class	   or	   status	   group	   share	   a	   habitus	   due	   to	   their	  common	  early	  experiences	  and	  socialization.	  The	  habitus	  provides	  one	  with	  a	  frame	  with	  which	  to	  understand	  the	  world	  and	  one’s	  place	  in	  it.	  It	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  “cognitive	  and	  expressive	  mechanism	  that	  generates	  activity”	  or	  practices	  within	  a	  social	  field,	  as	  well	  as	  structures	  one’s	  relationship	  to	  others	  within	  it.	  Within	  a	  field,	  or	  social	  context,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  struggle	  between	  different	  social	  classes	  or	  status	  groups	   for	   economic,	   social,	   cultural	   and	   symbolic	   capital	   –	   or	   different	   types	   of	  social	  power.61	  We	  remember	  Andrea	  Smith’s	   reference	   in	   the	   last	   chapter	  of	  how	  oppression	   comes	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   cultural	   capital	   in	   activist	   settings,	   leading	   to	  what	  some	  have	  called	  the	  “oppression	  Olympics.”	  As	  one	  activist	   further	  explains,	  using	  the	  term	  social	  capital,	  “social	  capital	  can	  also	  be	  awarded	  because	  someone	  is	  intersectionally	   oppressed.	   For	   example,	   there	   may	   be	   a	   transwoman	   or	   black-­‐femme	   who	   can	   get	   away	   with	   acting	   abusively	   because	   they	   have	   too	   much	  oppressed	   social	   capital	   to	   get	   called	   out	   by	   anyone	   other	   than	   another	  with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59Gould,	  32.,	  emphasis	  added.	  	  60Gould,	  33.	  	  See	  Bourdieu	  (1977,	  1990);	  Bourdieu	  and	  Wacquant	  (1992).	  61	  Thomas	  Meisenhelder,	  “From	  Character	  to	  Habitus	  in	  Sociology,”	  The	  Social	  Science	  
Journal	  43,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1,	  2006):	  55–66.	  
	   71	  
same	   rough	   oppression	   tally,	   with	   whom	   they’ve	   built	   a	   personal	   solidarity	   or	  someone	  else	  who	  is	  exceptionally	  trusted,	  brave,	  and	  otherwise	  delicate.”62	  Returning	  to	  Gould’s	  work,	  she	  describes	  how	  habitus	  has	  also	  been	  usefully	  applied	   to	   social	  movements.63	  Extending	   the	   concept	   into	   the	   realm	  of	   affect,	   the	  emotional	   habitus	   “of	   a	   social	   group	   provides	   members	   with	   an	   emotional	  disposition,	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  and	  how	  to	  feel,	  with	  labels	  for	  their	  feelings,	  with	  schemas	  about	  what	  feelings	  are	  and	  what	  they	  mean,	  with	  ways	  of	  figuring	  out	  and	  understanding	  what	   they	  are	   feeling.”64	  The	  use	  of	  habitus	   to	  understand	  emotion	  furthermore	  “locates	  feelings	  within	  social	  relations	  and	  practices,	  thereby	  pointing	  toward	  their	  conventionality	  and	  countering	  a	  standard	  understanding	  of	  feelings	  as	  wholly	   interior	   to	   the	   individual.”65	  Gould	   notes	   that	   her	   concept	   departs	   from	  Bourdieu’s	   in	   that	   she	   uses	   emotional	   habitus	   to	   track	   how	   social	   groups	   enact	  social	   change,	   whereas	   Bourdieu	   was	   interested	   in	   how	   habitus	   facilitated	   social	  
reproduction.	   Her	   concept	   also	   emphasizes	   the	   malleability	   of	   the	   habitus,	   as	   an	  affective	  shared	  disposition	  that	  requires	  constant	  reiteration	  (à	  la	  Butler)	  through	  “practices	  that	  generate,	  stabilize,	  reproduce,	  and	  sometimes	  transform	  them.”66	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Emmi	  Bevensee,	  “The	  Conversations	  We	  Can’t	  Have:	  Social	  Capital	  and	  Violence	  in	  Radical	  Communities,”	  November	  25,	  2016,	  blog	  entry.	  63	  For	  examples	  of	  scholarship	  on	  social	  movements	  that	  employs	  Bourdieu,	  see	  Nick	  Crossley,	  Making	  Sense	  Of	  Social	  Movements	  (McGraw-­‐Hill	  Education	  (UK),	  2002);	  Hanna-­‐Mari	  Husu,	  “Bourdieu	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Considering	  Identity	  Movements	  in	  Terms	  of	  Field,	  Capital	  and	  Habitus,”	  Social	  Movement	  Studies	  12,	  no.	  3	  (August	  1,	  2013):	  264–79;	  Mustafa	  Emirbayer	  and	  Chad	  Alan	  Goldberg,	  “Pragmatism,	  Bourdieu,	  and	  Collective	  Emotions	  in	  Contentious	  Politics,”	  Theory	  and	  Society	  34,	  no.	  5–6	  (December	  1,	  2005):	  469–518;	  Joseph	  Ibrahim,	  Bourdieu	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Ideological	  Struggles	  in	  the	  British	  
Anti-­‐Capitalist	  Movement	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2015).	  64	  Gould,	  Moving	  Politics,	  34.	  65	  Gould,	  35.	  66	  Gould,	  36.	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Emotional	  habitus	  is	  an	  especially	  instructive	  term	  in	  my	  analytical	  context	  in	  that	   it	  offers	  a	  means	  of	  conceptualizing	  how	  emotion,	  attitudes,	  and	  practices	  can	  come	   together	   to	   form	  a	  relatively	  stable	  disposition	   for	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists.	  This	  concept,	  coupled	  with	  Jasper’s	  elaboration	  of	  political	  emotions,	  gives	  some	  sense	  of	  how	   emotions	   like	   anger,	   suspicion,	   hatred,	   spite,	   resentment,	   and	   envy	   can	   feed	  into	   cognitive	   attitudes	   or	   frames	   around	   injustice,	   to	   produce	   certain	   types	   of	  behaviour,	   and	   how	   each	   of	   these	   –	   emotion,	   cognition,	   and	   practice	   –	   feed	   and	  reinforce	  one	  another.	  	  Jasper	   and	   Gould	   give	   some	   helpful	   theoretical	   tools	   with	   which	   to	   start	  thinking	   about	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   emotions,	   thinking,	   and	  practices.	   As	   discussed	  earlier,	  their	  contributions	  belong	  to	  a	  greater	  effort	  to	  reincorporate	  affect	  into	  the	  field	  of	  social	  movement	  theory.	  While	  this	  recovery	  has	  been	  a	  major	  advancement	  in	   the	   discipline,	   the	   current	   treatment	   of	   emotions	   suffers	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   depth,	  which	  I	  argue	  is	  reflected	  in	  both	  Jasper’s	  notion	  of	  political	  emotions,	  and	  Gould’s	  concept	   of	   the	   emotional	   habitus.	   Specifically,	   there	   is	   ambivalence	   around	  
unconscious	  elements	  of	  the	  psyche,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  an	  overemphasis	  of	  conscious,	  active,	   functional,	   and	   strategic	   understandings	   of	   emotion	   in	   relation	   to	   social	  movements.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  means	  that	  explanations	  around	  emotions	  and	  emotional	  dispositions	   that	   might	   be	   contradictory,	   or	   even	   destructive	   to	   a	   movement	   are	  underdeveloped,	   given	   that	   there	   is	   little	   attention	   paid	   to	   the	   deeper	   forces	   that	  drive	   feeling	   and	   behaviour.	   Rather,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   emotions	   have	   become	  unhinged	   from	  deeper	   realms	  of	   the	  psyche,	   and	   the	   constitutive	   inner	  needs	  and	  forces	   that	   produce	   messy	   and	   often	   contradictory	   human	   emotions	   and	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behaviour.67	  As	  such,	  although	  emotions	  have	  been	  re-­‐introduced	  into	  the	  discipline,	  they	  have	  been	  “cleaned	  up”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  serves	  the	  field’s	  normative	  bias	  toward	  presenting	  social	  movement	  actors	  as	  rational	  agents.	  As	  Jasper	  himself	  recognizes,	  “The	   apparent	   threat	   to	   rationality	   remains,	   though,	   in	   any	   model	   of	   the	  unconscious.”68	  Despite	   this	   recognition,	  however,	   Jasper’s	  work	  continues	   to	  skirt	  the	   unconscious	   dimension	   of	   emotionality,	   preferring	   a	   cultural	   constructivist	  approach	  over	  one	  that	  incorporates	  aspects	  of	  depth	  psychology.	  	  Gould’s	  concept	  of	  emotional	  habitus	  is	  also	  weak	  in	  this	  regard.	  This	  may	  be,	  in	   part,	   due	   to	   Bourdieu’s	   own	   troubled	   relationship	   with	   psychology	   and	  psychoanalysis.	   While,	   as	   some	   theorists	   have	   argued,	   his	   thinking	   was	   certainly	  influenced	  by	  psychoanalytical	  ideas,	  he	  was	  reluctant	  to	  admit	  this	  confluence.69	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  Gould	  is	  able	  to	  recover	  the	  affective	  aspect	  of	  the	  habitus,	  which	  includes	   “preconscious”	   dimensions,	   the	   unconscious	   as	   that	   interior	   realm	   of	   the	  psyche	  composed	  of	   the	  often	  conflicting	   inner	  needs,	  desires,	  and	  drives,	   is	  never	  properly	  recuperated.	  	  	  As	  the	  father	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  and	  principle	  theorist	  of	  the	  unconscious,	   it	  might	  seem	  instructive	  to	  look	  to	  Sigmund	  Freud	  at	  this	  point.	  As	  social	  movement	  theorists	  have	  argued,	  however,	  “Freud’s	  hydraulic	   imagery	  of	   libidinal	   flows	  [first	  through	  the	  individual	  (either	  sublimated	  or	  released	  sexually),	  then	  out	  into	  social	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  This	  is	  admittedly	  a	  generalization.	  Jasper,	  for	  example,	  does	  speak	  of	  belonging	  as	  a	  human	  need,	  and	  one	  that	  can	  be	  satisfied	  in	  collective	  action.	  Still,	  there	  lacks	  an	  underlying	  theoretical	  system	  for	  understanding	  how	  these	  needs	  arise,	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  other	  needs,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  constituted	  generally.	  	  68	  Jasper,	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest,”	  403.	  69	  See	  Diane	  Reay,	  “Habitus	  and	  the	  Psychosocial:	  Bourdieu	  with	  Feelings,”	  Cambridge	  
Journal	  of	  Education	  45,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2,	  2015):	  9–23.	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networks]	  relied	  on	  an	  extreme	  mind-­‐body	  conflict	  that	  was	  less	  and	  less	  tenable.”70	  Indeed,	   Freud	   makes	   many	   assumptions	   and	   theories	   that	   make	   his	   work	  challenging	   to	   incorporate	   in	   its	   original	   form.	   There	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	  revisionary	   socio-­‐psychological	   works,	   however,	   that	   retain	   the	   depth	   element	   of	  psychoanalysis	   (i.e.	   the	   unconscious)	   while	   fruitfully	   engaging	   with	   the	   social.	  German	   sociologist	   and	   psychoanalyst	   Erich	   Fromm	   is	   one	   such	   theorist	   whose	  concepts	   of	   social	   character,	   and	   the	   social	   unconscious,	   are	   particularly	   useful	   in	  developing	   this	   missing	   aspect.	   Interestingly,	   Thomas	   Meisenhelder	   argues	   that	  Bourdieu’s	  concept	  of	  habitus	   is	  a	  sociologizing	  of	  Fromm’s	  social	  character.	  Social	  character,	   like	  habitus,	  “determines	  the	  thinking,	   feeling,	  and	  acting	  of	   individuals”	  and	   also	   gives	   explanatory	   power	   to	   how	   the	   social	   order	   is	   reproduced.71	  As	  Meisenhelder	  describes,	  however:	  Bourdieu’s	  use	  of	   the	  concept	  of	  habitus	  specifies	   the	  original	   idea	  of	  social	  character	  in	  a	  fully	  sociological	  way,	  without	  the	  biological	  or	  innate	  traits	  of	  some	   earlier	   conceptions.	   While	   like	   Fromm	   (and	   even	   Freud)	   Bourdieu	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  early	  experiences,	  habitus	  cannot	  be	  boiled	  down	  to	   innate	   or	   essential	   drives	   and	   needs	   being	   repressed	   or	   molded	   by	  experience	  with	  reality.	  Rather,	  habitus	  is	  a	  more	  sociological	  idea	  referring	  to	   the	   set	   of	   internalized	   (learned	   and	   shared)	   dispositions	   and	   tastes	   that	  guide	   perception	   and	   action	  within	   the	   structural	   situations,	   or	   fields,	   that	  compose	   society….Bourdieu	   stresses	   that	   habitus	   is	   manifested	   in	   specific	  shared	  bodily	  stances	  and	  practices	  but	  does	  not	  propose	  that	  these	  embodied	  
dispositions	  reflect	  internal	  “deep”	  drives	  or	  essential	  characteristics…	  It	  is	  not	  a	   part	   of	   some	   deep	   unconscious	  mind	   but	   a	   deep	   and	   durable	   subjective	  consequence	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  society	  and	  social	  structure.72	  	  	   Against	   Bourdieu’s	   eschewing	   of	   “the	   deep	   unconscious	   mind”	   and	   its	  “essential	  characteristics,”	  this	  dissertation	  will	  employ	  the	  insights	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research,”	  288.	  71	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom	  (New	  York:	  Discus	  Books,	  1965	  [1941]),	  305.	  	  72	  Meisenhelder,	  “From	  Character	  to	  Habitus	  in	  Sociology,”	  63,	  emphasis	  added.	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in	  arguing	  that	  shared	  psychic	  needs	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  human	  beings,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  understanding	   these	   unconscious	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   psyche	   that	   anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  can	  better	  grasp	  our	  behaviours,	  including	  our	  political	  actions.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	   I	   introduce	   Fromm’s	   socio-­‐psychoanalytical	   system,	   focusing	   on	   his	   ideas	  around	   social	   character	   and	   the	   social	   unconscious,	   to	   build	   on	  my	   discussion	   of	  political	  feelings.	  As	  I	  will	  show,	  Fromm’s	  insights	  are	  especially	  useful	  in	  providing	  a	   theoretical	   foundation	   with	   which	   to	   understand	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  social,	  the	  political,	  and	  the	  psychological.	  	  	  
(3.2)	  A	  Frommian	  Understanding	  of	  the	  Psyche	  and	  the	  Political	  	  	   Fromm	  often	  developed	  his	  theories	  by	  starting	  with	  Freud.	  In	  many,	  if	  not	  in	  most	   of	   his	   works,	   Fromm	   would	   analyze	   an	   issue	   by	   examining	   what	   Freud’s	  response	  would	  be,	  followed	  by	  his	  own	  corrective	  ideas/revisions.73	  In	  what	  ways	  did	   Fromm’s	   thought	   follow	   Freud	   and	   in	  what	  ways	   did	   these	   thinkers	   diverge?	  Although	  Fromm	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticized	  by	  a	  number	  of	  doctrinaire	  thinkers	  for	  his	  rejection	  of	  (orthodox)	  Freudian	  psychoanalysis,	  Fromm	  relied	  on	  a	  number	  of	  Freud’s	   concepts	   and	   theories	   for	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   own	   thought.74	  Primary	   among	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Kieran	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  (Springer,	  2014),	  69.	  74	  Some	  of	  these	  orthodox	  thinkers,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  length	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  included	  his	  former	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  thinkers	  such	  as	  psychoanalyst	  Otto	  Fenichel	  (Neil	  McLaughlin,	  “Nazism,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions:	  Escape	  from	  Freedom	  Revisited,”	  Sociological	  Theory	  14,	  no.	  3	  (1996):	  241–61;	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm).	  	  	  Indeed,	  despite	  these	  critiques,	  Fromm	  always	  maintained	  that	  his	  work	  “constitute[d]	  a	  needed	  development	  of	  [Freud’s]	  theories	  and	  an	  affirmation	  of	  what	  is	  their	  essence”	  (Erich	  Fromm	  and	  Michael	  Maccoby,	  Social	  Character	  in	  a	  Mexican	  Village	  (Transaction	  Publishers,	  1970),	  8).	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these	   was	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   unconscious	   –	   Freud’s	   key	   discovery.75	  As	   Fromm	  writes,	  	  [Freud]	   and	   his	   followers	   in	   modern	   psychology	   not	   only	   uncovered	   the	  irrational	  and	  unconscious	  sector	  of	  man’s	  nature,	  the	  existence	  of	  which	  had	  been	  neglected	  by	  modern	  rationalism;	  he	  also	  showed	  that	  these	  irrational	  phenomena	   followed	   certain	   laws	   and	   therefore	   could	   be	   understood	  rationally.	   He	   discovered	   that	   these	   irrationalities	   as	   well	   as	   the	   whole	  character	  structure	  of	  an	  individual	  were	  reactions	  to	  the	  influence	  exercised	  by	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  particularly	  by	  those	  occurring	  in	  early	  childhood.76	  	  Related	   to	   the	  unconscious,	   Fromm	  also	   embraced	  Freud’s	   concepts	   of	   repression,	  
character,	  and	  transference,	  although	  he	  modified	  them	  to	  better	  represent	  his	  own	  clinical	   discoveries.77	  Fromm’s	   modifications	   largely	   targeted	   Freud’s	   mechanistic	  and	   libidinal	   understanding	   of	   the	   psyche	   –	   both	   central	   points	   of	   critique	   for	  Fromm.	  	  Freud’s	   mechanistic	   approach	   was	   influenced	   by	   German	   physician	   and	  physiologist	  Ernst	  Brücke	  whose	  lectures	  he	  attended	  as	  a	  medical	  student.	  Brücke	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Perhaps	  “discovery”	  is	  inaccurate	  given	  that	  unconscious	  elements	  of	  the	  psyche	  were	  recognized	  by	  other	  thinkers	  before	  Freud.	  In	  Fromm’s	  view,	  Spinoza	  was	  the	  first	  thinker	  to	  form	  a	  clear	  concept	  of	  the	  unconscious	  (see	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion:	  
My	  Encounter	  with	  Marx	  and	  Freud	  (New	  York:	  Continuum,	  2009)).	  Nietzsche,	  who	  clearly	  speaks	  of	  what	  we	  today	  know	  as	  “repression”	  is	  another	  pre-­‐Freudian	  example.	  In	  Fromm’s	  words,	  though,	  “Freud	  went	  further	  than	  anybody	  before	  him	  in	  directing	  attention	  to	  the	  observation	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  irrational	  and	  unconscious	  forces	  which	  determine	  parts	  of	  human	  behaviour”	  (Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  23).	  	  	  	  For	  Fromm’s	  slight	  modifications	  to	  Freud’s	  idea	  of	  the	  “unconscious,”	  see	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man,”	  Fromm	  Forum	  17	  ([1969]	  2013):	  5–10;	  and	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  
Illusion.	  76	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  23–24.	  77	  What	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  is	  that	  Fromm	  maintained	  a	  clinical	  practice	  for	  most	  of	  his	  life	  with	  many	  of	  his	  theories	  finding	  empirical	  backing	  in	  his	  experiences	  with	  psychoanalytic	  clients	  (Erich	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  in	  From	  Beyond	  Freud:	  From	  Individual	  to	  Social	  Psychoanalysis,	  ed.	  Rainer	  Funk	  (New	  York:	  American	  Mental	  Health	  Foundation,	  2010).	  	  For	  a	  revealing	  account	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  Fromm,	  see	  Rainer	  Funk,	  The	  Clinical	  Erich	  Fromm:	  
Personal	  Accounts	  and	  Papers	  on	  Therapeutic	  Technique	  (Rodopi,	  2009).	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proposed	   the	   theory	   that	   all	   psychic	   phenomena	  were	   of	   physiological	   origin.	   As	  Durkin	   discusses,	   “[a]lthough	   Freud	   was	   later	   to	   demur	   from	   this	   quantitative	  natural-­‐scientific	   task…and	  explore	   the	  more	  qualitative	  and	  esoteric	   realm	  of	   the	  unconscious,	  his	   residual	  and	  underlying	  debt	  was	  nevertheless	   to	   the	  mechanical	  materialism	  of	  Brücke,	  which	   informs	  even	  his	  psychoanalytic	  work.”78	  Just	   as	   the	  “inner	   chemistry”	   of	   the	   body	   produces	   a	   tension,	   the	   reduction	   of	   which	   is	   the	  organism’s	   aim;79	  the	   psyche,	   for	   Freud,	   is	   similarly	   governed	   by	   this	   principle	   of	  “tension	   reduction.”	   According	   to	   his	   account,	   human	   psychology	   is	   composed	   of	  two	  biologically-­‐rooted	  forces:	  the	  ego	  (associated	  with	  the	  “reality	  principle”)	  and	  the	  libido	  (related	  to	  the	  “pleasure	  principle”).	  Freud’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “libido”	  here	  is	  rooted	  in	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  physiological	  or	  materialist	  basis	  for	  the	  human	  drives	  was	  found	  in	  sexuality.	  That	  is,	  psychic	  strivings	  were	  rooted	  in	  sexual	  sources.	  For	  Freud,	   “mental	   events	   are	   seen	   as	   precipitated	   by	   the	   libido	   and	   its	   concomitant	  psychical	   correlate,	   the	   pleasure	   principle,	   imposing	   a	   constant,	   quantitatively	  similar	  pressure—or	  “unpleasurable	  tension,”	  as	   it	   is	  described	  later	  in	  Beyond	  the	  
Pleasure	  Principle—which	   it	   is	   the	   task	   of	   the	  mental	   apparatus	   to	   reduce.”80	  The	  gratification	   of	   the	   pleasure	   principle,	   however,	   is	   regularly	   frustrated	   by	   the	  pressures	  of	  society,	  which	  lead	  to	  inner	  psychic	  conflict.	  	  This	  psycho-­‐biological	  theory	  based	  around	  “tension”	  and	  “release”	  rooted	  in	  Freud’s	  libido	  theory	  was	  wholly	  inadequate	  in	  Fromm’s	  view.	  For	  him,	  the	  idea	  of	  	  “man	  as	  an	  animal	   coerced	  by	  his	   instincts	  but	  domesticated	  by	  society,”	  excludes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  72.	  	  	  79	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man,”	  3.	  80	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  73.	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“all	  categories	  of	  spontaneity,	  such	  as	  love,	  tenderness,	  joy	  and	  even	  sexual	  pleasure	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  more	  than	  relief	  from	  tension.”81	  Moreover,	  it	  paints	  the	  individual	  as	  fundamentally	  asocial,	  a	  closed	  system	  dominated	  by	  his/her	  biological	  drives.	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Freud	   did	   not	   recognize	   the	   need	   for	   others.	   As	   he	  would	  state,	  “in	  the	  individual’s	  mental	  life	  someone	  else	  is	  invariably	  involved,	  as	  a	  model,	   as	   an	   object,	   as	   a	   helper,	   as	   an	   opponent;	   and	   so	   from	   the	   very	   first,	  individual	  psychology,	  in	  this	  extended	  but	  entirely	  justifiable	  sense	  of	  the	  words,	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  social	  psychology	  as	  well.”82	  Fromm	  delineates	   two	  principles	   that	  capture	  Freud’s	  understanding	  of	   the	  individual’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  The	  first	  principle	  is	  as	  follows:	  “the	  individual,	   driven	   by	   pressure	   for	   satisfaction	   of	   his	   needs,	   especially	   his	   sexual	  needs,	  must	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  outside	  world,	  which	  serves	  partly	  as	  a	  means	  toward	   the	   satisfaction	   he	   seeks	   and	   partly	   as	   a	   hindrance	   to	   that	   satisfaction.”83	  Fromm	  discusses	  the	  Oedipal	  Complex	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this	  principle.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  the	  male	  child’s	  sexual	  desire	  for	  his	  mother	  is	  frustrated	  by	  the	  threat	  posed	   by	   his	   father,	   forcing	   him	   to	   convert	   his	   hostility	   toward	   his	   father	   into	  submission	  through	   identifying	  with	  him,	  and	  repressing	  his	   impulses	   towards	  his	  mother.	  Hostility,	  submission	  and	  identification	  become	  the	  affective	  products	  that	  mark	  the	  boy’s	  interaction	  with	  the	  outside	  world.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Rainer	  Funk,	  Erich	  Fromm:	  His	  Life	  and	  Ideas :	  An	  Illustrated	  Biography	  (Continuum,	  2000),	  93.	  82	  Sigmund	  Freud,	  “Group	  Psychology	  and	  the	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Ego,”	  in	  Civilization,	  Society	  
and	  Religion:	  Group	  Psychology,	  Civilization	  and	  Its	  Discontents	  and	  Other	  Works,	  ed.	  Albert	  Dickinson	  (Penguin,	  1991),	  95.	  83	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  2.	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Whereas	   in	   the	   first	   principle,	   the	   individual	   reacts	   psychologically	   to	   the	  outside	  world	  which	  fulfills/frustrates	  his	  needs,	  the	  second	  principle	  relates	  to	  the	  
expression	   of	   the	   individual’s	   innate	   sexual	   impulses,	   which	   are	   modified	   by	   the	  external	  world.	  The	  latter	  process,	  known	  as	  Freud’s	  libido	  theory,	  is	  characterized	  by	   stages	   of	   sexual	   development:	   the	   oral,	   anal,	   phallic	   and	   genital	   phases.	   Each	  individual	   is	   biologically	   compelled	   to	   go	   through	   these	   stages	   until	   genitally	  organized	   sexuality,	   what	   Freud	   saw	   as	   normal	   and	   healthy	   adult	   sexuality,	   is	  achieved.	  	  Psychological	  pathology	  obtains,	  for	  Freud,	  when	  external	  circumstances	  stunt	   the	   individual’s	   growth	   by	   fixing	   them	   to	   one	   of	   these	   earlier	   stages	   either	  through	  denial	   or	   over-­‐indulgence.	   Character,	   in	  Freud’s	   account,	   results	   from	   the	  “unchanged	   prolongations	   of	   the	   original	   [childhood]	   instincts,	   or	   sublimations	   of	  those	   instincts,	   or	   reaction-­‐formations	   against	   them.”84	  For	   example,	   a	   character	  trait	   such	  as	   “parsimony”	  would	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	   “sublimation	  of	  pleasure	   in	  withholding	  feces.”85	  Whereas	   Fromm	   saw	   potential	   in	   Freud’s	   first	   psychic	   principle,	   he	   was	  unable	  to	  accept	  his	  second:	  	   We	   believe	   that	   Freud’s	   first	   method	   must	   be	   consistently	   continued	   and	  developed	  into	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  explanation	  for	  all	  psychic	  impulses	  and	  behavior,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  course,	  of	  impulses	  such	  as	  sexuality,	  hunger,	  thirst,	   and	   so	   on,	   which	   require	   no	   psychological	   explanation	   but	   a	  physiological	   one.	   However,	   the	   assumption	   that	   impulses	   like	   parsimony,	  greed,	   orderliness,	   and	   so	   forth	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   direct	   offshoots	   of	  sexual	   strivings,	   more	   correctly,	   of	   the	   pregenital	   libido,	   seems	   to	   us	  untenable.86	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  Freud	  in	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  220.	  	  85	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  14.	  86	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  14.	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Fromm	  argues	   that	   despite	   his	   determination	   in	   applying	  Freud’s	   libido	   theory	   of	  character	  in	  his	  clinical	  practice,	  “the	  efforts	  seemed	  more	  and	  more	  hopeless.”87	  In	  the	  cases	  where	  he	  was	  able	  to	  find,	  for	  example,	  a	  parsimonious	  patient	  who	  also	  exhibited	   a	   disturbance	   in	   childhood	   defecation,	   he	   found	   that	   this	   interpretation	  did	  nothing	  to	  advance	  the	  patient’s	  therapy,	  nor	  was	  it	  adequate	  in	  explaining	  the	  entirety	   of	   the	   patient’s	   personality	   structure.	   In	   many	   cases,	   however,	   no	  connection	   between	   childhood	   libidinous	   stages	   and	   adult	   behaviour	   could	   be	  established	  at	  all.	  	  Not	  only	  is	  Freud’s	  theory	  clinically	  unsubstantiated,	  Fromm	  contends	  that	  it	  also	   fails	   to	  hold	  up	  on	  a	  number	  of	   sociological,	  and	  socio-­‐psychological	  grounds.	  Firstly,	   Fromm	   is	   critical	   of	   the	   bourgeois	   and	   patriarchal	   bias	   that	   undergirds	  Freud’s	  understanding	  of	  human	  nature,	   the	  psyche	  and	   its	  processes.	   	  For	  Freud,	  “‘the	  middle-­‐class	  character’	  was	  essentially	   identical	  with	  human	  nature”	  with	  no	  thought	  as	  to	  “the	  historical,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  social	  principle	  of	  explanation.”88	  For	  example,	   Fromm	   discusses	   how	   Freud’s	   Oedipus	   Complex,	   disproved	  anthropologically	   as	   a	   universal	   psychic	   phenomenon,	   actually	   derives	   from	   the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  middle-­‐class	  family.	  According	  to	  Fromm,	  it	  is	  the	  middle-­‐class	  taboo	   around	   child	   sexuality	   leading	   to	   the	   inhibiting	   of	   sexual	   play	   with	   other	  children;	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   family	   as	   the	   sole	   place	   of	   love	   and	   intimate	   feelings	  that	   directs	   sexual	   feelings	   inward,	   rather	   that	   outwards;	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  incestuous	   feelings	   in	   children	   may	   be	   reactions	   to	   the	   unconscious	   sexual	  invitations	   of	   parents	   suffering	   from	   middle-­‐class	   sexual	   dissatisfaction,	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”14.	  	  88	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  5.	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explicates	   “Oedipus”	   strivings	   in	   children.	   Moreover,	   Fromm	   explains	   the	   child’s	  hostility	   towards	   the	   father	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   his	   patriarchal	   authority,	   rather	   than	  mainly	   the	   result	   of	   sexual	   jealousy.	  While	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   judge	   the	   accuracy	   of	  Fromm’s	  claims,	  what	  is	  compelling	  is	  his	  ability	  to	  root	  psychic	  processes	  –	  in	  this	  example	  love,	  desire,	  and	  hostility	  toward	  one’s	  parents	  –	  in	  one’s	  social	  context,	  an	  important	  corrective	  to	  Freud.	  	  Fromm	  was	  also	  critical	  of	  Freud’s	  psychology	  of	  women.	  As	  he	  writes,	  “that	  woman	  feels	  inferior	  and	  frequently	  would	  prefer	  to	  be	  a	  man	  stands	  to	  reason	  and	  is	   the	   necessary	   result	   of	   her	   position	   in	   society.”	  89	  Given	   the	   long	   history	   of	  patriarchy,	   Fromm	  argues	   that	   “woman”	   has	   been	   hindered	   from	  developing	   “her	  human	  capabilities	  and	  forces,”	  confined	  instead	  to	  the	  interiority	  of	  the	  family,	  and	  	  “developing	   herself	   on	   the	   level	   of	   ‘feelings’	   as	   the	   only	   expression	   of	   her	  humanness.”90	  Freud’s	   treatment	   of	  women	   in	   his	  work	  was	   invariably	   influenced	  by	  the	  low	  status	  accorded	  to	  women	  during	  his	  time,	  a	  status	  that	  he	  in	  many	  ways	  reinforced.91	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”12.	  	  90	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”12.	  	  91	  Early	  psychoanalysis	  had	  a	  complicated	  relationship	  to	  women.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  is	  clearly	  indebted	  to	  women,	  given	  that	  much	  of	  it	  is	  based	  on	  clinical	  work	  with	  female	  clients.	  Freud’s	  work	  with	  women,	  especially	  his	  cases	  on	  “hysteria”	  were	  foundational	  to	  the	  development	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  while	  Carl	  Jung	  admitted	  that	  "it	  was	  essentially	  because	  of	  them	  [the	  women	  patients]	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  strike	  out	  on	  new	  paths	  in	  therapy"	  (Gordon,	  34).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  portrayal	  and	  treatment	  of	  women	  by	  these	  early	  psychoanalysts	  was	  marred	  by	  a	  deep	  sexism,	  as	  have	  been	  discussed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  feminists	  (see	  Luce	  Irigaray	  for	  example).	  	  	  Avery	  F.	  Gordon’s	  book	  Ghostly	  Matters:	  Haunting	  and	  the	  Sociological	  Imagination,	  for	  instance,	  chronicles	  the	  life	  of	  Sabina	  Spielrein,	  a	  patient	  of	  Jung’s	  who	  also	  corresponded	  with	  Freud.	  Spielrein	  would	  write	  about	  the	  death	  drive,	  10	  years	  before	  Freud’s	  published	  his	  account	  of	  it	  in	  Beyond	  the	  Pleasure	  Principle.	  Freud	  dismissed	  her	  paper	  saying	  "her	  destructive	  drive	  is	  not	  much	  to	  my	  liking,	  because	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  personally	  conditioned.	  She	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A	  second	  critique	  given	  by	  Fromm	  is	  centered	  on	  Freud’s	  asocial	  view	  of	  the	  human	   being.	   For	   Freud,	   the	   individual	   is	   defined	   by	   a	   “primal	   narcissism.”	   As	  Fromm	  elaborates:	  Freud	  starts	  with	   the	  point	   that	   the	   individual	  originally	   loves	  only	  himself	  and	  is	  concerned	  only	  with	  himself	  and	  that	  all	  relations	  to	  objects,	  especially	  the	  feeling	  of	  love	  and	  solidarity	  with	  others,	  are	  secondary	  attitudes	  built	  on	  that	   basis,	   which	   can	   readily	   disappear,	   giving	   way	   to	   the	   fundamental	  narcissistic	  attitude.92	  	  	  The	   individual	   only	   needs	   others	   insofar	   as	   these	   others	   fulfill	   his	   libidinal	  needs.	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  Freud’s	  tendency	  to	  view	  the	  individual	  in	  this	  way	  also	  stems	   from	   his	   bourgeois	   bias	   in	  which	   “the	  middle-­‐class	   individual	   represents	   a	  self-­‐secluded	  system,	  revolving	  in	  and	  around	  itself,	  in	  which	  other	  individuals	  and	  all	   things	   are	   estranged	   and	   are	   only	   the	  means	   of	   satisfying	   needs.”93	  As	   Durkin	  further	  elaborates,	  “Such	  a	  view	  of	  man	  as	  relatively	  self-­‐sufficient	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  bourgeois	  view	  of	  the	  self-­‐sufficient	  individual	  as	  the	  ever	  lone	  competitor	  eternally	  seeking	  his	  own	  power	  or	  gain—a	  form	  of	  Hobbesianism	  in	  which	  society	  features	  only	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  gratification	  needs	  of	  the	  individual.”94	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  seems	  abnormally	  ambivalent,"	  only	  to	  publish	  his	  “seminal”	  work	  on	  the	  death	  drive	  a	  decade	  later.	  	  92	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  11.	  	  This	  conflation	  between	  “self-­‐love”	  and	  “narcissism”	  was	  something	  that	  Fromm	  strongly	  opposed.	  In	  Fromm’s	  view	  narcissism	  stemmed	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  self-­‐worth,	  rather	  than	  an	  excess	  of	  it.	  As	  Fromm	  states,	  “Freud	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  narcissistic	  person	  has	  withdrawn	  his	  love	  from	  others	  and	  turned	  it	  toward	  his	  own	  person.	  While	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  statement	  is	  true,	  the	  second	  one	  is	  a	  fallacy.	  He	  neither	  loves	  others	  nor	  himself,”	  
Selfishness	  and	  Self-­‐Love	  (William	  Alanson	  White	  Psychiatric	  Foundation,	  1939),	  16.	  	  93	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  11.	  	  	  94	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  75.	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This	   “Hobbesian”	   pessimism	   in	   Freud’s	   thought	   was	   also	   challenged	   by	  Fromm.	  Freud’s	  belief	  that	  “In	  reality	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	   ‘eradicating’	  evil,”95	  his	   emphasis	   of	   the	  death	  drive	   (Thanatos),	   and	  view	   that	   civilization	  was	  merely	  the	  repression	  of	  instinct	  (i.e.	  sublimation)	  painted	  a	  largely	  unfavourable	  picture	  of	  human	  nature.	  This	  negative	  perspective	  on	  humanity,	  coupled	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  self-­‐contained,	   selfish	   view	   of	   the	   human	   being	   were	   ideas	   to	   which	   Fromm	  was	  deeply	  opposed.	  	  Finally,	   as	   alluded	   to	   previously,	   Fromm	   rejected	   Freud’s	   libido	   theory.	   In	  Fromm’s	  view,	  Freud’s	   system	  grossly	  overemphasized	   the	   role	  of	   sexuality	   in	  his	  understanding	   of	   the	   psyche.	   Like	   many	   theorists,	   Fromm	   surmises	   that	   Freud’s	  focus	   on	   sexuality	   was	   likely	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   his	   middle-­‐class	   patients	   were	  suffering	   from	  the	  severe	  sexual	  repression	  characteristic	  of	   the	  Victorian	  era.	  For	  Fromm,	  while	  the	  sexual	  drive	  may	  exert	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  the	  individual,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  “basic	  force	  which	  motivates	  human	  passions	  and	  desires.”96	  While	  he	   agreed	   with	   Freud’s	   claim	   that	   the	   individual’s	   needs	   are	   either	   frustrated	   or	  fulfilled	  by	  their	  external	  world,	  he	  maintained	  that	  these	  are	  not	  sexual	  needs,	  but	  rather	   needs	   of	   an	   entirely	   different	   order.	   Here	   we	   are	   introduced	   to	   Fromm’s	  humanistic	   framework	   of	   psychoanalysis	   which	   differs	   radically	   from	   Freud	   in	  rooting	   human	   needs	   in	   the	   existential	   situation	   of	   the	   individual,	   rather	   than	   in	  sexual	  drives.	  While	  I	  will	  examine	  Fromm’s	  framework	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  Chapter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Freud	  in	  Durkin,	  63.	  
96	  Erich	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society	  (New	  York:	  Fawcett	  World	  Library,	  [1955]	  1967),	  34.	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6	   in	   my	   discussion	   on	   humanism,	   what	   I	   would	   like	   to	   highlight	   in	   the	   present	  chapter	  is	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  Fromm’s	  theory.	  Fromm’s	   humanistic	   revision	   of	   Freud’s	   psychoanalytic	   theory	   is	   premised	  on	  the	  individual	  as	  a	  social	  being	  whose	  primary	  need	  is	  for	  relatedness.	  As	  Fromm	  argues:	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  man	  is	  a	  social	  animal.	  His	  physical	  constitution	  is	  such	  that	  he	  has	  to	  live	  in	  groups	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  able	  to	  cooperate	  with	  others,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  work	  and	  defense.	  The	  condition	  for	  such	  cooperation	  is	  that	   he	   must	   be	   sane.	   And	   in	   order	   to	   remain	   sane	   –	   that	   is,	   to	   survive	  mentally	   (and,	   in	   an	   indirect	   sense,	   physically)	   –	   man	   must	   be	   related	   to	  others.97	  	  	  	   Distinguishing	   himself	   from	   Freud’s	   individualist	   and	   asocial	   theory	   of	   the	  ego,	   for	  Fromm,	   “psychoanalysis	   interprets	   the	  human	  being	  as	  a	  socialized	  being,	  and	   the	   psychic	   apparatus	   as	   essentially	   developed	   and	   determined	   through	   the	  relationship	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   society.” 98 	  In	   Fromm’s	   view,	   the	   connection	  between	  psychoanalysis	  and	  sociology	  is	  a	  crucial	  one.	  He	  was	  careful	  to	  emphasize,	  however,	   that	   this	   should	  not	  mean	   that	  psychoanalytic	   explanation	  be	   applied	   to	  social	   problems	  where	   economic,	   technical	   or	   political	   facts	   are	   sufficient.	   At	   the	  same	  time,	  sociology	  must	  realize	  that	  the	  abstract	  concept	  of	  “society”	  in	  actuality	  is	  composed	  of	   individual	  human	  beings	  whose	  thoughts,	  emotions,	  and	  behaviour	  are	   of	   sociological	   significance.99	  Fromm’s	   critique	   was	   thus	   aimed	   not	   only	   at	  psychoanalysis	  but	  also	  against	  those	  “sociological	  theories	  which	  explicitly	  wish	  to	  eliminate	  psychological	  problems	  from	  sociology,”	  such	  as	  those	  of	  “Durkheim	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Fromm,	  “On	  My	  Psychoanalytic	  Approach,”	  in	  The	  Revision	  of	  Psychoanalysis	  (Westview	  Press,	  1992),	  4,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  98	  Funk,	  Erich	  Fromm,	  68.	  99	  Funk,	  68.	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his	   school.”100	  Although	   writing	   some	   time	   ago,	   Fromm’s	   critique	   of	   the	   division	  between	   sociology	   and	   psychology	   remains	   pertinent	   to	   our	   current	   moment	   in	  which	   the	   split	   between	   these	  disciplines	   (as	   can	  be	  detected	   in	   social	  movement	  theory)	   still	   persists.101	  This	   dissertation	   attempts	   to	   challenge	   this	   theoretical	  divide	   by	   heeding	   Fromm’s	   counsel	   that	   social	   phenomena	   can	   only	   be	   fully	  understood	  through	  taking	  seriously	  the	  psychic	  dimension	  of	  the	  social.	  	  What	  resulted	  from	  Fromm’s	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  Freud	  was	  a	  psychoanalytic	  approach	   that	   was	   thoroughly	   social.	   In	   particular,	   Fromm	  was	   to	   bring	   together	  Freudian	  analysis	  with	  Marxist	  theory.	  Fromm’s	  admiration	  of	  Marx,	  however,	  was	  not	  without	  critique.	  He	  challenged	  Marx’s	   lack	  of	  appreciation	   for	   the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  psyche	  –	  especially	  those	  unconscious	  “irrational	  needs	  and	  satisfactions”102–	  in	  the	  path	  to	  social	  change:	  	  [Marx]	  did	  not	  recognize	  the	  irrational	  forces	  in	  man	  which	  make	  him	  afraid	  of	  freedom,	  and	  which	  produce	  his	  lust	  for	  power	  and	  his	  destructiveness.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  underlying	  his	  concept	  of	  man	  was	  the	  implicit	  assumption	  of	  man’s	  natural	  goodness,	  which	  would	  assert	  itself	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  crippling	  economic	   shackles	  were	   released.	   The	   famous	   statement	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  Communist	   Manifesto	   that	   the	   workers	   “have	   nothing	   to	   lose	   but	   their	  chains,”	  contains	  a	  profound	  psychological	  error.	  With	  their	  chains	  they	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  29.	  101	  Sociologists,	  for	  example,	  have	  pejoratively	  used	  the	  term	  “psychologism”	  to	  refer	  to	  “the	  attempt	  to	  analyse	  characteristically	  social	  phenomena	  in	  psychological	  terms”	  (David	  Bloor	  
Wittgenstein:	  A	  Social	  Theory	  of	  Knowledge,	  First	  Edition	  edition,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  Univ	  Pr,	  1983:	  6).	  David	  Bloor	  locates	  the	  “classic	  denunciation	  of	  psychologism”	  in	  Durkheim’s	  insistence	  that	  “the	  determining	  cause	  of	  a	  social	  fact	  should	  be	  sought	  among	  the	  social	  facts	  preceding	  it	  and	  not	  among	  the	  states	  of	  the	  individual	  consciousness”	  	  (Bloor,	  
Wittgenstein:	  187).	  “Sociologism,”	  similarly,	  is	  the	  term	  applied	  by	  psychologists	  and	  others	  for	  studies	  that	  “overevaluat[e]…methods	  which	  focus	  on	  group	  phenomena”	  (see	  Richard	  W.	  Moodey,	  “Psychologism,	  Sociologism,	  and	  the	  Madness	  of	  Social	  Science,”	  in	  Perspectives	  
on	  Psychologism,	  ed.	  Mark	  Amadeus	  Notturno	  (BRILL,	  1989),	  263).	  For	  the	  German	  philosophical	  debate	  on	  psychologism	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and	  early	  20th	  century,	  see	  Martin	  Kusch,	  Psychologism:	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Philosophical	  Knowledge	  (Routledge,	  2005).	  	  102	  Fromm	  in	  Durkin,	  63.	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also	  to	  lose	  all	  those	  irrational	  needs	  and	  satisfactions	  which	  were	  originated	  while	   they	  were	  wearing	  the	  chains.	   In	   this	  respect,	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  never	  transcended	  the	  naïve	  optimism	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century.103	  	  Thus,	   in	   Fromm’s	   view,	   this	   theoretical	   marriage	   brought	   a	   much	   needed	  historical-­‐materialist	   analysis	   to	   Freudian	   analytic	   theory,	   while	   simultaneously	  developing	  the	  psychological	  aspect	  in	  Marxist	  thought.104	  Disavowing	  the	  claims	  to	  “objectivity”	   in	   the	   social	   sciences,	  Fromm’s	   theoretical	  work	  was	  openly	  oriented	  toward	  psychological	  and	  societal	  freedom	  (something	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  at	  greater	  length	  when	  exploring	  his	  humanism	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  For	  Fromm,	  his	  candid	  political	  position	  was	  preferable	  to	  the	  hidden	  bias	  of	  Freud,	  who	  he	  labeled	  an	  “apologist	  for	  middle-­‐class	  morals.”105	  Of	  central	  interest	  in	  this	  dissertation	  are	  four	  ideas	  that	  Fromm	  developed:	  social	   character,	   the	   social	   unconscious,	   his	   humanistic	   framework	   of	   existential	  needs,	   and	   his	   theory	   of	   radical	   humanism.	   The	   first	   two	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	  present	  chapter,	  while	  the	  last	  two	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  Fromm’s	   concept	   of	   social	   character	   is	   perhaps	   his	   most	   significant	  theoretical	   achievement.	  Fromm’s	   idea	  of	   character	  grew	  out	  of	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Freud’s	  understanding.	  For	  Freud,	  as	  was	  discussed	  earlier,	  character	  is	  based	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Fromm	  in	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  63.	  104	  In	  Fromm’s	  words,	  his	  work	  was	  “an	  attempt	  to	  concretize	  the	  empirical	  Marxist	  statement	  that	  it	  is	  man’s	  social	  existence	  that	  determines	  consciousness.	  I	  believe	  I	  can	  show	  that	  Freud’s	  discovery	  makes	  full	  sense	  only	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  it	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  Marx,	  and	  that	  Marx’s	  statement	  becomes	  open	  to	  empirical	  study	  only	  if	  one	  uses	  the	  empirical	  method	  of	  studying	  the	  unconscious”	  (letter	  to	  Adam	  Schaff,	  1965,	  in	  Durkin	  103).	  	  Fromm	  was	  not	  the	  first	  to	  bring	  together	  Freudian	  and	  Marxist	  theory,	  but	  rather	  this	  interest	  in	  applying	  a	  psychological	  analysis	  to	  Marxism	  was	  of	  interest	  to	  Karl	  Korsch	  and	  Georg	  Lukás	  in	  the	  late	  1910s	  and	  early	  1920s.	  This	  line	  of	  inquiry	  would	  then	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  by	  Siegfried	  Bernfeld,	  Wilhelm	  Reich,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School	  (For	  more	  on	  this,	  see	  Durkin,	  105).	  	  105	  Durkin,	  6.	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in	   pregenital	   libidinal	   fixations	   that	   result	   from	   disturbances	   in	   childhood	   sexual	  development.	  For	  Fromm,	  these	  libidinal	  character	  associations	  lacked	  an	  important	  explanatory	  dimension	  –	  that	  of	  the	  historical	  social	  context.	  Fromm	  found	  it	  absurd	  that	  a	  trait	  like	  ambition,	  found	  widely	  among	  the	  middle-­‐class,	  would	  be	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  common	  experience	  of	   toilet-­‐training,	  rather	   than	  the	  result	  of	   “the	  whole	   life	  practice	  of	  this	  class.”106	  In	  contrast,	  rather	  than	  based	  in	  instincts,	  Fromm’s	  concept	  of	  character	  is	  a	  “substitution	  for	  absent	  instincts.”107	  In	  his	  view,	  and	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  Freud’s	  understanding,	   human	   beings	   differ	   from	   animals	   precisely	   due	   to	   their	   highly	  developed	  brains	  and	  weak	  instinctual	  system.	  In	  place	  of	  animal	  instincts,	  character	  allows	  the	  human	  being	  to	  act	   “quasi-­‐automatically”	  without	  having	  to	  expend	  too	  much	   energy	   on	   deliberation.	   Individual	   character	   is	   the	   mechanism	   that	   directs	  human	   energy	   “during	   the	   process	   of	   ‘socialization’	   (relatedness	   to	   others)	   and	  ‘assimilation’	  (mode	  of	  acquiring	  things).”108	  	  Just	  as	  we	  have	  individual	  character,	  Fromm	  argued	  that	  we	  can	  also	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  character.	  Moreover,	  just	  as	  individual	  character	  can	  be	  analyzed	  and	  understood,	   Fromm	   believed	   the	   social	   character	   could	   also	   be	   studied	  empirically.109	  Social	   character	   refers	   to	   “the	   matrix	   or	   nucleus	   of	   the	   character	  structure	  of	  most	  members	  of	  a	  group…this	  character	  structure	  develops	  as	  a	  result	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Fromm,	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture,”	  15.	  107	  Fromm,	  “On	  My	  Psychoanalytic	  Approach,”	  4.	  108	  Fromm,	  “On	  My	  Psychoanalytic	  Approach,”4.	  	  109	  Fromm’s	  two	  primary	  attempts	  to	  study	  social	  character	  empirically	  are	  published	  in	  his	  books	  The	  Working	  Class	  in	  Weimar	  Germany:	  A	  Psychological	  and	  Sociological	  Study	  (Berg,	  1984);	  and	  Social	  Character	  in	  a	  Mexican	  Village	  (with	  Michael	  Maccoby).	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of	   the	   basic	   experiences	   and	   mode	   of	   life	   common	   to	   that	   group.”110 	  Fromm	  describes	  the	  function	  of	  social	  character	  is	  as	  follows:	  In	  order	  to	  function,	  each	  society	  needs	  not	  only	  material	  productive	  forces,	  but	   also	   the	   energies	   contained	   in	   the	   productive	   force	   =	   man.	   These	  energies,	  however,	  can	  not	  be	  used	  in	  their	  general	  form,	  but	  only	  in	  specific	  forms,	  namely	  in	  character	  traits	  which	  make	  man	  desire	  to	  do	  what	  he	  has	  to	  do	   in	  his	   social	   function:	   to	   serve,	   to	   rule,	   to	   cooperate,	   to	  make	  war,	   to	  consume,	   to	  work,	  etc.…The	  social	   character	  has	   the	   important	   function	   for	  all	   individuals	   of	   making	   attractive,	   or	   at	   least	   tolerable,	   what	   is	   socially	  necessary,	  and	  to	  create	  the	  basis	  for	  consistent	  behavior	  because	  the	  social	  character	  becomes	  ‘second	  nature,’	  substituting	  for	  the	  lost	  instincts.111	  	   The	  function	  of	  social	  character	  is	  thus	  to	  convert	  general	  human	  energy	  into	  “a	  socially	  useful	  form”	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  society	  through	  supplying	  individuals	  with	   the	   “inner	   compulsion”	   to	   support	   the	   economic	   system.112	  Social	   character	  “mediat[es]	   between	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   structure	   and	   ideology,”	   providing	   a	  conceptual	   bridge	   between	   Marx’s	   concepts	   of	   “economic	   base”	   and	   “ideological	  superstructure.”113	  What	  Fromm’s	  concept	  adds	  to	  Marxist	  thinking	  is	  effectively	  the	  
reason	  why	  even	  after	  changes	  are	  made	  to	  the	  social	  structure,	  psychological	  chains	  persist	  given	  that	  social	  character	  often	  lags	  behind.	  It	  is	  in	  understanding	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	   social	   character	   that	  Fromm	  was	  able	   to	   explain	  why	   individuals	   and	  groups	  often	  behave	  in	  irrational	  ways,	  contrary	  to	  their	  interests.	   	  For	   example,	   much	   of	   Fromm’s	   early	   work	   was	   devoted	   to	   using	   social	  character	   as	   a	  means	  of	   understanding	  how	   fascism	   could	   take	   root	   in	  Europe.	   In	  
Escape	   from	   Freedom,	   Fromm	   set	   out	   to	   “analyze	   those	   dynamic	   factors	   in	   the	  character	   structure	   of	  modern	  man,	  which	  made	   him	  want	   to	   give	   up	   freedom	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Fromm,	  “On	  My	  Psychoanalytic	  Approach,”	  4.	  111	  Fromm,	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man,”	  7.	  112	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  282.	  113	  Erich	  Fromm,	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man,”	  7.	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Fascist	   countries	   and	   which	   so	   widely	   prevail	   in	   millions	   of	   our	   own	   people	   [i.e.	  Americans].”114	  Fromm’s	   theory	   was	   that	   the	   lower	   middle-­‐classes	   in	   Germany,	  which	   he	   understood	   as	   Hitler’s	   base	   of	   support,	   suffered	   from	   an	   authoritarian	  character	  structure	  that	  made	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  fascism.115	  Using	  a	  unique	  method	  of	   historical	   socio-­‐psychoanalysis,	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   this	   social	   character	   was	  formed	   through	   the	   influence	   of	   Calvinism	   and	   Lutheranism,	   which	   primed	   the	  lower	  middle-­‐classes	  with	  sadomasochistic	  character	  strivings	  that	  were	  “activated”	  by	   Nazism.	   Fromm	   considered	   the	   psychic	   impact	   of	   these	   religious	   doctrines,	   in	  addition	   to	   socioeconomic	   changes	   of	   the	   time	   that	   made	   this	   class	  characterologically	   vulnerable	   to	   Nazi	   ideology.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   Fromm’s	  argument	  has	  been	  challenged	  on	  many	  points,	  the	  uniqueness	  and	  central	  message	  of	  his	  analysis	  are	  still	  relevant.116	  As	  he	  writes,	  Only	   a	   psychology	   which	   utilizes	   the	   concept	   of	   unconscious	   forces	   can	  penetrate	  the	  confusing	  rationalizations	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  in	  analyzing	  either	   an	   individual	   or	   a	   culture.	   A	   great	   number	   of	   apparently	   insoluble	  
problems	  disappear	  at	  once	  if	  we	  decide	  to	  give	  up	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  motives	  
by	  which	   people	   believe	   themselves	   to	   be	  motivated	   are	   necessarily	   the	   ones	  
which	  actually	  drive	  them	  to	  act,	  feel,	  and	  think	  as	  they	  do.117	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  4.	  115	  The	  authoritarian	  character	  was	  just	  one	  of	  many	  social	  character	  typologies	  developed	  by	  Fromm.	  While	  a	  full	  discussion	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project,	  I	  will	  review	  Fromm’s	  productive	  character	  orientations	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  For	  a	  more	  complete	  description	  of	  Fromm’s	  theory	  and	  examples	  of	  social	  character,	  see	  Social	  Character	  in	  a	  Mexican	  Village,	  Sane	  
Society,	  Man	  for	  Himself,	  and	  Escape	  from	  Freedom.	  	  116	  For	  a	  good	  critical	  analysis	  of	  Fromm’s	  argument	  in	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  see	  Neil	  McLaughlin’s	  paper,	  “Nazism,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions.”	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  points	  McLaughlin	  makes	  is	  that	  Fromm’s	  ideas	  around	  which	  segments	  of	  the	  German	  population	  supported	  Nazism	  and	  the	  reasons	  behind	  this	  support	  are	  questionable.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  remains	  to	  be	  an	  unresolved	  topic	  with	  different	  thinkers	  offering	  distinct	  positions.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Theodore	  Abel’s	  empirical	  study	  The	  
Nazi	  Movement	  (Routledge,	  [1938]	  2017).	  	  117	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom,	  136,	  emphasis	  added.	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  This	   idea	   that	   human	   behaviour	   is	   motivated	   by	   factors	   that	   are	   outside	   of	   our	  conscious	  grasp	  brings	  us	  to	  his	  second	  concept:	  that	  of	  the	  social	  unconscious.	  Just	  as	  the	  principles	  of	   individual	  character	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  social	  character,	  Fromm	  believed	  the	  social	  unconscious	  functioned	  similarly	  to	  the	   individual	  unconscious.	  As	  he	  describes,	  “By	   ‘social	  unconscious’	  I	  refer	  to	  those	  areas	  of	  repression	  which	  are	  common	  to	  most	  members	  of	  a	  society;	  these	  commonly	  repressed	  elements	  are	  those	  contents	  which	  a	  given	  society	  cannot	  permit	  its	  members	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  if	  the	  society	   with	   its	   specific	   contradictions	   is	   to	   operate	   successfully.” 118 	  Fromm	  develops	   his	   concept	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   both	   Freud	   and	   Marx	   who	   he	   argues	   offer	  explanations	  of	  the	  unconscious	  that	  share	  similarities	  and	  differences.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   Freud’s	   understanding,	   “psychoanalysis	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	  system	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  we	  repress	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  most	  significant	   experiences;	   that	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   unconscious	   reality	   within	  ourselves	  and	  the	  denial	  of	  that	  reality	  in	  our	  consciousness	  often	  leads	  to	  neurosis,	  and	  that	  by	  making	  the	  unconscious	  conscious,	  the	  neurotic	  symptom	  or	  character	  trait	   can	  be	  cured.”119	  According	   to	  Freud,	  most	  of	  what	  we	  know	  about	  ourselves	  and	  others	  is	  based	  in	  self-­‐deception,	  while	  our	  actual	  strivings	  are	  hidden	  from	  our	  awareness.	   The	   mechanism	   that	   facilitates	   our	   self-­‐deception	   is	   rationalization.	  Fromm	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  example:	  a	   political	   leader	   may	   conduct	   a	   policy	   which	   leads	   to	   war.	   He	   may	   be	  motivated	  by	  a	  wish	  for	  his	  own	  glory	  and	  fame,	  yet	  he	  is	  convinced	  that	  his	  actions	   are	   determined	   exclusively	   by	   his	   patriotism	   and	   his	   sense	   of	  responsibility	   to	   his	   country.	   In	   all	   these	   instances	   the	   underlying	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  70.	  119	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  71.	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unconscious	  desire	  is	  so	  well	  rationalized	  by	  a	  moral	  consideration	  that	  the	  desire	   is	   not	   only	   covered	   up,	   but	   also	   aided	   and	   abetted	   by	   the	   very	  rationalization	  the	  person	  has	  invented.	  In	  the	  normal	  course	  of	  his	  life,	  such	  a	   person	   will	   never	   discover	   the	   contradiction	   between	   the	   reality	   of	   his	  desires	  and	  the	  fiction	  of	  his	  rationalizations,	  and	  hence	  he	  will	  go	  on	  acting	  according	  to	  his	  desire.120	  	  	   In	   addition	   to	   rationalization,	   Freud	   identified	   how	   resistance	   also	   plays	   a	  role	  in	  keeping	  our	  true	  motivations	  repressed.	  Continuing	  with	  the	  above	  example,	  Fromm	  states	  the	  following:	  If	  anyone	  would	  tell	  him	  the	  truth,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  mention	  to	  him	  that	  behind	  his	   sanctimonious	   rationalizations	   are	   the	   very	   desires	   which	   he	   bitterly	  disapproves	   of,	   he	   would	   sincerely	   feel	   indignant	   or	   misunderstood	   and	  falsely	   accused.	   This	   passionate	   refusal	   to	   admit	   the	   existence	   of	   what	   is	  repressed	  Freud	  called	  "resistance."	   Its	  strength	   is	  roughly	   in	  proportion	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  repressive	  tendencies.121	  	  Our	   rationalizations	   and	   resistance	   are	   thus	   the	  psychic	   forces	   that	   keep	  our	   true	  aims	  repressed.	  What	  are	  these	  true	  aims	  and	  why	  do	  we	  repress	  them?	  According	  to	  Freud,	  that	  which	  is	  most	  rigorously	  repressed	  is	  sexual	  strivings,	  especially	  the	  incestuous	  ones	  described	  in	  his	  Oedipal	  theory.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  are	  “hostile	  and	  aggressive”	  impulses	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  “primitive”	  side	  of	  man.	  In	  Freud’s	  view,	  we	  repress	  these	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  to	  familial	  and	  societal	  norms.	  As	  Fromm	  reminds	  us,	  “increasing	  civilization,	  to	  Freud,	  means	  increasing	  repression.”122	  	  	   	   	  The	   repression	   of	   an	   impulse	   does	   not	   however	   mean	   that	   the	   impulse	  disappears.	   It	  merely	   indicates	   that	   conscious	   awareness	   of	   the	   impulse	   has	   been	  diminished	  or,	  in	  Fromm’s	  words,	  that	  “unconscious	  forces	  have	  gone	  underground	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  71.	  121	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  72.	  	  122	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  73.	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and	   determine	   man's	   actions	   behind	   his	   back.”123	  In	   the	   case	   of	   someone	   who	   is	  driven	  by	  sadistic	  strivings,	  for	  example,	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  inflict	  pain	  upon	  others	  is	  hidden	  from	  conscious	  view.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  individual	  does	  not	  hurt	  others,	  however.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  rationalize	  their	  treatment	   of	   others	   (as	   duty,	   for	   instance)	   or	   deny	   that	   their	   actions	   are	   causing	  pain,	  then	  the	  hurtful	  treatment	  of	  others	  may	  continue	  unabated.124	  For	   Freud,	   then,	   human	   behaviour	   is	   largely	   controlled	   by	   forces	   that	   are	  obscured	  from	  consciousness.	  The	  illusion	  of	  free	  will	  is	  maintained	  through	  the	  use	  of	  rationalizations,	  which	  convince	  us	  that	  we	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  reason	  or	  our	  moral	   convictions.	  This	   fatalistic	  picture	   can	  be	   interrupted,	   however,	   by	  bringing	  awareness	  to	  our	  unconscious	  strivings.	  This	  awareness,	  which	  for	  Freud	  could	  be	  accomplished	   through	   psychoanalysis,	   allows	   an	   individual	   “to	   transform	   himself	  from	  a	  helpless	  puppet	  moved	  by	  unconscious	  forces	  to	  a	  self	  aware	  and	  free	  man	  who	  determines	  his	  own	  destiny.”125	  Marx	   similarly	   believed	   that	   much	   of	   our	   conscious	   thinking	   is	   rooted	   in	  factors	   of	  which	  we	   are	   unconscious.	  While	   Freud	   argued	   that	   these	   unconscious	  strivings	   are	   rooted	   in	   libidinous	   drives,	   Marx	   posited	   that	   it	   was	   ideology	   that	  alienated	  the	  individual	  from	  her/his	  true	  self.	  As	  Fromm	  discusses:	  Marx,	   like	   Freud,	   believed	   that	   man's	   consciousness	   is	   mostly	   "false	  consciousness."	  Man	  believes	  that	  his	  thoughts	  are	  authentic	  and	  the	  product	  of	  his	  thinking	  activity	  while	  they	  are	  in	  reality	  determined	  by	  the	  objective	  forces	  which	  work	  behind	  his	  back;	   in	  Freud's	  theory	  these	  objective	  forces	  represent	  physiological	  and	  biological	  needs;	  in	  Marx's	  theory	  they	  represent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  72.	  124	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,72.	  	  125	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  79.	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the	  social	  and	  economic	  historical	  forces	  which	  determine	  the	  being	  and	  thus	  indirectly	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  individual.126	  	   Marx	   contended	   that	   an	   individual’s	   consciousness	   is	   “determined	   by	   his	  being,	  his	  being	  by	  his	  practice	  of	  life,	  his	  practice	  of	  life	  by	  his	  mode	  of	  producing	  his	   livelihood,	   that	   is,	  by	  his	  mode	  of	  production	  and	  the	  social	  structure,	  mode	  of	  distribution	   and	   consumption	   resulting	   from	   it.”127	  Marx’s	   view	   is	   thus	   that	   one’s	  social	   existence	   produces	   one’s	   consciousness,	   while	   for	   Freud,	   society	   impacts	  consciousness	  only	  so	  far	  as	  it	  represses	  those	  libidinal	  and	  biological	  urges	  that	  are	  deemed	  unacceptable.	  Fromm	  comments	  that	  from	  this	  difference	  in	  views	  we	  see	  a	  further	   one:	   “Freud	   believed	   that	   man	   can	   overcome	   repression	   without	   social	  changes.	  Marx	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  was	  the	  first	  thinker	  who	  saw	  that	  the	  realization	  of	   the	   universal	   and	   fully	   awakened	   man	   can	   occur	   only	   together	   with	   social	  changes	  which	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  and	  truly	  human	  economic	  and	  social	  organization	  of	  mankind.”	  128	   	  Fromm’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   social	   unconscious	   incorporates	   Freud’s	  concepts	   of	   rationalization	   and	   resistance,	   with	   Marx’s	   emphasis	   on	   how	   human	  consciousness	   is	   determined	   by	   one’s	   social	   existence.	   Fromm	   discusses	   how	  members	  of	  a	  society	  are	  permitted	  awareness	  of	  only	  certain	  things	  based	  on	  the	  society’s	  way	  of	  life	  and	  mode	  of	  being	  (relatedness,	  feeling	  and	  perceiving).	  Social	  consciousness	   is	   comprised	   of	   whatever	   is	   able	   to	   pass	   through	   the	   “socially	  conditioned	   filter”	  of	  each	  society,	  determined	  by	   language,	   logic	  and	  social	   taboo.	  All	  that	  is	  unable	  to	  find	  expression	  in	  a	  society’s	  particular	  language	  and	  system	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  82.	  	  127	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  86.	  	  128	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  86.	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logic,	   and	   all	   that	   is	   deemed	   forbidden	   or	   inappropriate	   according	   to	   its	   taboo	  structure,	  is	  repressed	  into	  the	  social	  unconscious.	  Fromm	  identifies	  social	  taboo	  as	  the	  most	  important	  of	  the	  three	  components	  of	  the	  social	  filter	  given	  that	  “it	   is	  the	  one	  that	  does	  not	  permit	  certain	  feelings	  to	  reach	  consciousness	  and	  tends	  to	  expel	  them	   from	   this	   realm	   if	   they	   have	   reached	   it.”129	  Examples	   of	   such	   feelings,	   as	  offered	  by	  Fromm,	  are	  a	  sense	  of	  revulsion	  over	  killing	  felt	  by	  a	  man	  who	  belongs	  to	  a	   violent	   “primitive	   tribe”;	   or	   a	   sense	   of	   generosity	   toward	   the	   poor	   felt	   by	   a	  shopkeeper	   from	   “our	   civilization.”	   In	   both	   instances,	   the	   repulsion	   towards	  violence	   and	   the	   desire	   to	   give	   are	   immediately	   repressed	   given	   their	  incompatibility	  with	  the	  social	  order	  of	  the	  given	  society.	  What	   necessitates	   social	   repression?	   As	   Fromm	   implies	   with	   the	   above	  examples,	   social	   repression	   serves	   a	   functional	   purpose	   in	  maintaining	   the	   social	  order.	  Fromm	  further	  argues	  that	   if	  people	   in	  unequal	  societies	  were	  aware	  of	   the	  full	   extent	   to	   which	   they	  were	   being	   oppressed,	   this	   awareness	   could	   result	   in	   a	  resentment	   capable	  of	   endangering	   the	   social	  order.130	  Besides	   the	   self-­‐preserving	  function	   of	   social	   repression,	   Fromm	   posits	   that	  we	   also	   repress	   due	   to	   a	   fear	   of	  being	   isolated	   from	  and	  ostracized	  by	  members	  of	  our	  group.	  Given	   that	  our	  need	  for	   others	   is	   our	   strongest	   psychic	   striving,	   Fromm	   contends	   that	   it	   is	   “for	   this	  reason	   the	   individual	  must	   blind	  himself	   from	   seeing	   that	  which	  his	   group	   claims	  does	  not	  exist,	  or	  accept	  as	  truth	  that	  which	  the	  majority	  says	  is	  true,	  even	  if	  his	  own	  eyes	  could	  convince	  him	  that	  it	  is	  false.”131	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  90.	  	  130	  An	  idea	  that	  anticipates	  our	  discussion	  of	  “explosive	  ressentiment”	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  131	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  94.	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Fromm	  shares	  with	  Freud	  and	  Marx	  the	  conviction	  that	  freedom	  (or	  mental	  health)	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  “full	  awakening”	  or	  “de-­‐repression”	  of	  the	  individual.	  In	  Fromm’s	  view,	  Marx’s	  insights	  into	  the	  social	  process	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  awakening.	  He	  cautions	  that	  this	  awakening	  must	  happen	  at	  both	  individual	  and	   social	   levels,	   and	   in	   accordance	   with	   humanistic	   values:	   “If	   uncovering	   the	  unconscious	  means	  arriving	  at	  the	  experience	  of	  one's	  own	  humanity,	  then,	  indeed,	  it	  cannot	  stop	  with	  the	  individual	  but	  must	  proceed	  to	  the	  uncovering	  of	  the	  social	  unconscious.	   This	   implies	   the	   understanding	   of	   social	   dynamics	   and	   the	   critical	  appraisal	  of	  one's	  own	  society	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  universal	  human	  values.”132	  Fromm’s	   combination	   of	   Freudian	   psychoanalytical	   insights	   with	   Marxian	  historical	   material	   analysis	   has	   produced	   an	   especially	   unique	   and	   instructive	  theory	  of	  social	  psychology.	  His	  concept	  of	  social	  character,	  like	  Bourdieu’s	  habitus,	  provides	   a	  means	   of	   understanding	   how	   a	   group	  might	   come	   to	   share	   a	   common	  consciousness	   that	   determines	   their	   thinking	   and	   behaviour,	   and	   how	   this	  consciousness	   is	   socially	   constituted.	   More	   importantly,	   however,	   (and	   unlike	  Bourdieu)	   Fromm	   pairs	   his	   analysis	   of	   social	   character	   gainfully	   with	   that	   of	   the	  social	   unconscious,	   inviting	   us	   to	   consider	   how	   our	   political	   actions,	   as	   a	   group,	  
might	  be	  rooted	   in	  hidden	  psychic	   forces	  that	  we	  have	   largely	  repressed	  through	  the	  
use	  of	  political	  and	  moral	  rationalizations.	  	  Fromm’s	   characterological	   study,	  The	  Working	  Class	   in	  Weimar	  Germany	   is	  instructive	   here.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   study’s	   participants	  declared	   themselves	   as	   politically	   left-­‐wing,	   their	   “radicalism”	   was	   severely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  98.	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challenged	  upon	  analyzing	  the	  responses	  to	  a	  questionnaire	  that	  asked	  about	  their	  beliefs	   on	   a	   number	   of	   subjects.	   This	   suggests	   not	   only	   “profound	   complexity	   to	  political	   commitment”	   but	   also	   reveals	   that	   “in	   spite	   of	   the	   subjective	   honesty,	   an	  individual’s	   statement	   about	   his	   or	   her	   thoughts	   and	   feelings	   cannot	   be	   taken	  literally	   but	   must	   instead	   be	   interpreted	   so	   as	   to	   try	   to	   unearth	   their	   deeper	  psychological	  motivation.”133	  This	  idea	  of	  a	  deeper	  psychological	  motivation,	  for	  Fromm,	  demands	  that	  we	  interrogate	   our	   own	  political	   commitments	   and	   the	   psychic	   strivings	   that	  may	   be	  driving	  them.	  His	  example	  of	  the	  political	  leader	  is	  unsettling	  in	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  our	   “unconscious	   desires”	   maybe	   also	   be	   “so	   well	   rationalized”	   by	   moral	   and	  political	  rhetoric	  that	  we	  may	  also	  fail	  to	  fully	  “discover	  the	  contradiction	  between	  the	  reality	  of	  [our]	  desire	  and	  the	  fiction	  of	  [our]	  rationalizations.”134	  To	  what	  extent	  might	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism,	   like	   Fromm’s	   political	   leader,	   be	   driven	   by	   inner	  strivings	   that	  we	  may	   also	   “sincerely	   feel	   indignant	   or	  misunderstood	   and	   falsely	  accused”	   if	   they	   were	   revealed	   to	   us?	   For	   example,	   how	   might	   we	   feel	   to	   be	  confronted	   by	   our	   “true”	   reasons	   for	   engaging	   in	   practices	   like	   calling-­‐out,	   or	  demanding	   that	   people	   check	   their	   privilege?	   How	   might	   this	   threaten	   the	  rationalizations	  we	  use	  to	  legitimize	  these	  behaviours?	  And	  what	  might	  we	  discover	  under	  these	  rationalizations?	  These	  are	  deeply	  uncomfortable	  questions.	  As	  Fromm	  insists,	  however,	   it	   is	  only	   through	  a	  commitment	   to	  awareness	   that	  one	  can	  undo	  the	   unconscious	   traps	   that	   they	   rationalize	   themselves	   into,	   releasing	   them	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Durkin,	  120	  and	  121.	  	  134	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  72.	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greater	  possibilities	  of	  psychic	  and	  political	  freedom.	  By	  engaging	  in	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  analysis	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  hope	  to	  work	  toward	  realizing	  this	  greater	  aim.	  	  	  	   While	   Fromm’s	   concepts	   are	   certainly	   useful,	   they	   are	   also	   not	   without	  limitations.	  A	  central	  limitation	  of	  Fromm’s	  concepts	  relates	  to	  their	  functionalist	  or	  deterministic	   nature.	   This	   point,	   also	  discussed	  by	  Durkin,	   refers	   to	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  social	  character	  and	  the	  social	  unconscious	  respond	  to	  and	  fulfill	  the	  needs	  of	  a	   society.	   We	   remember	   that	   social	   character	   traits	   are	   those	   that	   allow	   one	   to	  function	   optimally	   in	   their	   social	   role	   in	   support	   of	   the	   wider	   socio-­‐economic	  system.	   Similarly,	   the	   social	   unconscious	   is	   responsible	   for	   repressing	   all	   that	  threatens	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  society.	  Part	  of	   the	   issue	  here,	  of	  course,	   is	   that	  Fromm’s	  concept	  of	  social	  character	  (like	  Bourdieu’s	  habitus)	  was	  not	   intended	  to	  describe	  a	  social	  movement,	   let	  alone	  any	  group	  that	  includes	  members	  of	  different	  classes.	  For	  our	  discussion,	   therefore,	   social	   character,	   in	   its	   strictly	  original	   form,	  has	   limited	   purchase	   due	   to	   its	   inability	   to	   capture	   social	   groups	   that	   exhibit	  significant	  characterological	  aspects	  but	  belong	  to	  different	  class	  groups.	  Moreover,	  understanding	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   social	   character	   applies	   a	  fixity	  and	  determinism	  that	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  fluid	  and	  subversive	  elements	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   movement.	   Similarly	   to	   Gould’s	   revision	   of	   habitus,	   a	   use	   of	  social	  character	  that	  pertains	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  must	  also	  call	  for	  a	  malleability	  missing	   from	   the	   original	   formulation,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   understanding	   of	   social	  character/social	   unconscious	   that	   can	   apply	   to	   groups	   that	   are	   not	   only	   moored	  together	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  social	  class.	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Finally,	   while	   the	   concepts	   of	   social	   character	   and	   the	   social	   unconscious	  provide	  the	  conceptual	  scaffolding	  upon	  which	  to	   investigate	   the	  characterological	  psychic	  elements	  motivating	  some	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  political	  practices,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  aid	  in	  determining	  exactly	  what	  type	  of	  character	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  inhabits.	   Given	   that	   Fromm	   was	   focused	   on	   class-­‐based	   groups,	   his	   character	  typologies	   fail	   to	   grasp	   the	   kind	   of	   socio-­‐political	   psyche	   that	   might	   belong	   to	   a	  social	   justice	  movement.	   Social	  movement	   theory	   is	   also	   limited	   in	   this	   regard,	   as	  protest	   theorists	   still	   struggle	   to	   understand	   how	   emotions	   manifest	   in	  “combinations”	  or	  complexes.135	  	  Some	   thinkers,	   including	   Wendy	   Brown,	   have	   suggested	   that	   identity	  movements	   (including	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism)	   suffer	   from	   the	   psychological	  disposition	  that	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  termed	  ressentiment.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  explores	  this	   possibility	   at	   greater	   length.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research.”	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Chapter	  4	  –	  An	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Feminist	  Ressentiment	  	  
“Dear	  white	  people,	  you	  made	  me	  hate	  myself	  as	  a	  kid,	  so	  now	  I	  hate	  you	  and	  that’s	  my	  
secret	  shame”	  	  –Coco	  says	  to	  Sam	  White,	  Dear	  White	  People	  
	  
“The	  whole	  movement	  is	  about	  pain,	  that’s	  why	  we’re	  out	  on	  these	  streets.	  Because	  of	  
our	  pain.	  You	  don’t	  think	  Martin	  had	  pain?	  You	  don’t	  think	  Malcolm	  had	  pain?”	  	  
-­‐Sam	  White,	  Dear	  White	  People.	  
	  
“Resentment	  is	  like	  drinking	  poison	  and	  then	  hoping	  it	  will	  kill	  your	  enemies.”	  
―	  Nelson	  Mandela	  
	  
	   In	   the	   preceding	   chapters,	   I	   have	   made	   a	   case	   for	   the	   social	   and	   political	  significance	  of	  emotions.	  Drawing	  on	  some	  reflections	  and	  insights	  from	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	   and	   other	   identity	   activists	   and	   scholars,	   I	   have	   identified	   calling-­‐out,	  checking	   privilege,	   spokespersonship	   and	   allyship	   as	   some	   cultural	   practices	   that	  allow	  entry	  into	  the	  characterological	  landscape	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  I	  discussed	  outrage,	   anger,	   suspicion,	   vengefulness,	   envy,	   and	   pleasure	   (in	   belonging)	   as	  emotions	  that	  are	  fundamentally	  linked	  to	  these	  practices	  in	  contemporary	  identity	  movements.	  What	   are	   the	   implications	   of	   these	   emotionally	   charged	   practices	   for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism?	  To	  what	  extent	  might	  they	  foreclose	  an	  emancipatory	  future?	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  addressing	  these	  questions	  through	  investigating	  the	   charge	   of	   ressentiment	   that	   has	   been	   levelled	   by	   feminist	   thinkers	   against	  different	   forms	   of	   feminism	   since	   the	   1990s. 1 	  Specifically,	   I	   explore	   whether	  
ressentiment	   might	   appropriately	   capture	   the	   social	   character	   of	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  These	  thinkers	  include	  Marion	  Tapper	  (1992),	  Anna	  Yeatman	  (1993),	  Joan	  Cocks	  (1991),	  Wendy	  Brown	  (1995),	  Rebecca	  Stringer	  (2003,	  2014),	  and	  Dina	  Georgis	  (2008).	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Ressentiment,	  as	  formulated	  by	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  depicts	  a	  psyche	  mired	  in	  “reproach,	  rancor,	  moralism	  and	  guilt,”2	  emotions	  that,	  at	  least	  at	  first	  glance,	  appear	  to	   bear	   some	   resemblance	   to	   those	   we	   have	   been	   discussing.	   For	   Nietzsche,	  
ressentiment	   can	  only	  be	  a	  reactive	  orientation,	   incapable	  of	  producing	  affirmative	  possibilities	  for	  change.	  It	  is	  a	  psyche	  that	  is	  invested	  in	  its	  own	  pain	  and	  impotence,	  keeping	   it	   bound	   to	   the	   very	   conditions	   it	   purports	   to	   challenge.	   As	   such,	   a	  
ressentimental	  social	  character	  is	  a	  distinctly	  unsettling	  one.	  	  The	   present	   chapter	   is	   comprised	   of	   three	   parts.	   The	   first	   part	   provides	   a	  psychological	   and	   sociological	   description	   of	   ressentiment	   through	   the	  writings	   of	  Nietzsche	  and	  Max	  Scheler.	  This	  inquiry	  into	  the	  intellectual	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ressentiment	  serves	  as	  a	  theoretical	  backdrop	  for	  the	  second	  part,	  which	  examines	  the	   degree	   to	  which	   this	   term	   captures	   practices	  within	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism.	   The	  third	   part	   argues	   that	   although	   ressentiment	   seems	   to	   carry	   some	   explanatory	  power	   in	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   context,	   it	   carries	   with	   it	   two	   significant	  “diagnostic”	   limitations.3	  I	   explore	   these	   limitations,	   enlisting	   the	   help	   of	   Rebecca	  Stringer	  whose	  work	  on	  feminist	  ressentiment	  underscores	  both	   issues	  of	  concern.	  Stringer’s	  analysis	  is	  especially	  interesting	  due	  to	  the	  argument	  she	  makes	  in	  favour	  of	   the	   transformative	   potentiality	   of	   ressentiment.	   I	   conclude	   this	   chapter	   by	  considering	  her	  position	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  case	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  26.	  3	  Following	  Brown	  and	  Stringer,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “diagnostic”	  to	  signal	  my	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  the	  suitability	  of	  ressentiment	  as	  a	  descriptor	  for	  the	  tendencies	  of	  interest	  in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	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(4.1)	  The	  Psychology	  and	  Sociology	  of	  Ressentiment	  	  
Nietzsche	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   full	   significance	   of	   how	   the	   concept	   of	  
ressentiment	  might	   apply	   in	   the	   context	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  examine	  it	  as	  it	  was	  formulated	  by	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  Nietzsche	  develops	  this	  term	  most	  comprehensively	  in	  his	  book,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  
Morals.45	  Comprised	   of	   three	   essays,	   the	  Genealogy	   launches	   an	   investigation	   into	  the	  origin	  of	  morality.	  Nietzsche	  identifies	  two	  sets	  of	  conceptual	  dualities:	  good	  vs.	  bad	  morality	   (characteristic	   of	  what	   he	   calls	   “master	  morality”),	   and	   good	   vs.	   evil	  morality	   (the	   logic	   of	   “slave	   morality”).6	  In	   master	   morality,	   “good”	   is	   the	   self-­‐affirmed	  quality	  of	  the	  nobility:	  “the	  judgment	  ‘good’	  did	  not	  originate	  with	  those	  to	  whom	  goodness	  was	  shown!	  Rather	  it	  was	  ‘the	  good’	  themselves,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  noble,	   powerful,	   high-­‐stationed	   and	   high-­‐minded,	   who	   felt	   and	   established	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Nietzsche	  borrows	  the	  word	  ressentiment	  from	  Eugen	  Dühring,	  although	  altering	  its	  meaning	  to	  suit	  his	  purposes.	  We	  see	  his	  first	  use	  of	  the	  term	  in	  1875	  (twelve	  years	  before	  it	  appears	  in	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals)	  in	  an	  unpublished	  notebook	  containing	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  Dühring’s	  book	  The	  Value	  of	  Life:	  a	  course	  in	  philosophy.	  See	  Rebecca	  Stringer’s	  discussion	  of	  this	  in,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim’”	  (Australian	  National	  University,	  2003),	  296.	  	  	  5	  Ressentiment	  was	  first	  introduced	  to	  philosophy/psychology	  by	  existentialist	  thinker	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  earlier	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  It	  is	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  Nietzsche	  or	  Dühring	  were	  familiar	  with	  Kierkegaard’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  term.	  6	  A	  number	  of	  scholars	  have	  sought	  to	  understand	  Nietzsche’s	  account	  of	  master	  and	  slave	  against	  that	  of	  Hegel’s.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Deleuze	  (1962/2006)	  who	  was	  convinced	  of	  the	  irreconcilability	  of	  Nietzsche	  and	  Hegel	  in	  this	  respect,	  vs.	  Kaufmann	  (1950,	  1965)	  who	  found	  there	  to	  be	  a	  parallel	  between	  the	  two	  accounts.	  	  	  	  For	  an	  interesting	  discussion	  of	  Hegel	  and	  Nietzsche’s	  respective	  understandings	  of	  blackness	  in	  their	  master/slave	  formulations,	  see	  Sander	  L.	  Gilman,	  “The	  Figure	  of	  the	  Black	  in	  the	  Thought	  of	  Hegel	  and	  Nietzsche,”	  The	  German	  Quarterly	  53,	  no.	  2	  (1980):	  141–58.	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themselves	  and	  their	  actions	  as	  good,	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  first	  rank.”7	  In	  this	  moral	  system,	  “bad”	   emerges	   only	   afterword,	   “so	   as	   to	   affirm	   itself	   more	   gratefully	   and	  triumphantly	  –	  its	  negative	  concept	  “low,”	  “common,”	  “bad”	  is	  only	  a	  subsequently-­‐invented	  pale,	  contrasting	  image	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  positive	  basic	  concept.”8	  	  	  Conversely,	   slave	  morality	   (good	   vs.	   evil),	   that	   is,	   Judeo-­‐Christian	  morality,	  develops	   in	   the	   opposite	   manner.	   Slave	   morality	   is	   invigorated	   by	   a	   spirit	   of	  
ressentiment,	  or	  what	  Nietzsche	  describes	  as	  a	  vengeful	  and	  moralizing	  anger.	  The	  introduction	   of	   the	   good	   vs.	   evil	   configuration	  was	   occasioned	   by	  what	  Nietzsche	  calls	   the	   “slave	   revolt	   in	   morality”	   whereby	   the	   “Jews”	   “dared	   to	   invert	   the	  aristocratic	   value-­‐equation	   (good=noble=powerful=beautiful=happy=beloved	   of	  God)	  and	  to	  hang	  on	  to	  this	  inversion	  with	  their	  teeth,	  the	  teeth	  of	  the	  most	  abysmal	  hatred	  (the	  hatred	  of	  impotence),	  saying	  ‘the	  wretched	  alone	  are	  the	  good;	  the	  poor,	  impotent,	   lowly	   alone	   are	   the	   good;	   the	   suffering,	   deprived,	   sick,	   ugly	   alone	   are	  pious,	   alone	   are	   blessed	   by	   God,	   blessedness	   is	   for	   them	   alone	   –	   and	   you,	   the	  powerful	   and	   noble,	   godless	   to	   all	   eternity	   and	   you	   shall	   be	   in	   all	   eternity	   the	  unblessed,	  accused,	  and	  damned!’”9	  	  For	  my	   investigation,	  what	   is	   important	   to	   focus	   in	   on	   is	   the	   psychological	  nature	   of	   these	   distinctions.	   Nietzsche	   describes	   ressentiment	  as	   the	  psychological	  
disposition	  of	  the	  weak	  toward	  the	  strong.	  Unable	  to	  react	  to	  the	  injuries	  inflicted	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Ecce	  Homo	  (Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2010),	  26.	  8	  Nietzsche,	  37.	  9	  Nietzsche,	  34.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  although	  this	  “slave	  revolt	  in	  morality”	  began	  two	  thousand	  years	  ago,	  Nietzsche	  argues	  that	  its	  reverberative	  effects	  continue	  to	  be	  felt.	  Indeed,	  Genealogy	  of	  Morality	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  appeal	  against	  the	  democratization	  of	  Europe	  that	  was	  occurring	  at	  the	  time	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  was	  writing	  –	  a	  process	  that	  he	  strongly	  opposed	  and	  saw	  as	  originating	  in	  slave	  morality.	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the	   strong,	   the	  weak	   recoil	   in	   feelings	  of	   anger,	   vengefulness,	   rancour,	   hatred	  and	  envy.	   The	   inability	   to	   discharge	   these	   emotions	   (either	   through	   “redemption”	   or	  “vengeance”)	   poisons	   the	   weak	   who	   continuously	   and	   often	   joyfully	   re-­‐live	   their	  pain	  and	  injuries.	  As	  Nietzsche	  states,	  	  The	   suffering	  are	  one	  and	  all	   dreadfully	   eager	   and	   inventive	   in	  discovering	  occasions	   for	   painful	   affects;	   they	   enjoy	   being	  mistrustful	   and	   dwelling	   on	  nasty	  deeds	  and	   imaginary	  slights;	   they	  scour	   the	  entrails	  of	   their	  past	  and	  present	   for	   obscure	   and	   questionable	   occurrences	   that	   offer	   them	   the	  opportunity	   to	   revel	   in	   tormenting	   suspicions	   and	   to	   intoxicate	   themselves	  with	  the	  poison	  of	  their	  own	  malice…10	  	  	  For	   Nietzsche,	   ressentiment’s	   most	   creative	   deed	   comes	   in	   the	   rejection	   of	  dominant	  morality	   (master	  morality)	   and	   the	   subsequent	   “perverse”	   inversion	   of	  dominant	   values	   so	   as	   to	   make	   virtues	   out	   of	   the	   impotence	   of	   the	   weak	   (slave	  morality).	   In	   this	   inversion	   of	   values,	   the	   noble	   are	   transformed	   from	   “good”	   to	  scornfully	  and	  irredeemably	  evil	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  slave).	  The	  new	  morality	  that	  is	  produced,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  identity	  of	  those	  who	  produce	  it,	  is	  constituted	  only	  after	   and	   in	  reaction	  to	  what	   they	  have	   reviled	   as	   evil.	  As	  Nietzsche	  describes,	   “in	  order	  to	  arise,	  slave	  morality	  always	  needs	  a	  hostile	  external	  world.	  Physiologically	  speaking,	  it	  needs	  external	  stimuli	  in	  order	  to	  act	  at	  all	  —	  its	  action	  is	  fundamentally	  a	   reaction.”11	  In	   this	   way,	   Nietzsche	   argues	   that	   the	   weak	   define	   themselves	   in	  contradistinction	   to	   the	   qualities	   of	   the	   powerful,	   making	   trophies	   out	   of	   their	  meekness,	  weakness,	  and	  inability	  to	  act.	  It	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	   for	   Nietzsche,	   neither	   the	   weak	   nor	   the	  strong	   in	   fact	   choose	   their	   station.	   The	  weak	   are	   constitutionally	  weak,	   just	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Nietzsche,	  127.	  11	  Nietzsche,	  37,	  emphasis	  added.	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strong	   are	   constitutionally	   strong.12	  In	   an	   order	   in	   which	   transcendence	   is	   thus	  foreclosed,	   there	  can	  only	  be	  management.	  That	   is,	   the	  management	  of	   the	  weak’s	  
ressentiment	   through	   the	   method	   of	   legalism	   and	   the	   figure	   of	   the	   ascetic	   priest.	  Legalism,	  for	  Nietzsche,	  alleviates	  the	  fury	  of	  ressentiment	  by	  reframing	  the	  injury	  as	  being	   against	   the	   law,	   rather	   than	   the	   subject.	   As	   Nietzsche	   explains,	   “…	   it	   treats	  violence	  and	  capricious	  acts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  individuals	  or	  entire	  groups	  as	  offenses	  against	   the	   law,	   as	   rebellion	   against	   the	   supreme	  power	   itself,	   and	   thus	   leads	   the	  feelings	  of	  its	  subjects	  away	  from	  the	  direct	  injury	  caused	  by	  such	  offenses.”13	  In	  this	  way,	  legalism	  redirects	  the	  vengefulness	  of	  ressentiment	  in	  protection	  of	  the	  master	  class.	  As	  Nietzsche	  discusses,	  legalism	  requires	  the	  powerful	  to	  sacrifice	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  power	   in	   gestures	  of	   legal	   redress	   and	   reparation	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	   their	  wider	  rule.	  	  The	   function	   of	   the	   ascetic	   priest	   is	   similarly	   to	   contain	   and	   tame	   the	  
ressentiment	  of	  the	  masses.	  He	  does	  this	  by	  re-­‐directing	  ressentiment	  inwards,	  so	  to	  convince	   the	   herd	   that	   it	   is	   only	   they	   themselves	   who	   are	   to	   blame	   for	   their	  suffering.	   The	   weak	   are	   thus	   inducted	   into	   a	   religious	   framework	   where	   the	  doctrines	   of	   guilt	   and	   sin	   foster	   self-­‐discipline	   and	   hard	   work,	   and	   where	   their	  suffering	   is	   given	  meaning.	   Nietzsche	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   ascetic	   priest	   does	   not	  
heal	  the	  weak,	  indeed	  his	  methods	  only	  make	  them	  sicker	  through	  weakening	  their	  will.	  His	  role	  is	  rather	  to	  anesthetise	  their	  suffering,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  he	  protects	  the	  healthy	  from	  contamination.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Nietzsche,	  45-­‐46.	  	  13	  Nietzsche,	  76.	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Although	   undoubtedly	   provocative,	   Nietzsche’s	   views	   were	   extremely	  influential	   among	   his	   contemporaries.	   One	   such	   contemporary	   was	   German	  sociologist	  Max	  Scheler,	  who	  provides	  an	  especially	  comprehensive	  response	  to	  and	  expansion	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  work	  on	  ressentiment.	  We	  will	  consider	  his	  work	  now.	  	  
	  
Scheler	  	   In	   his	   1913	   book	   entitled	   Ressentiment,	   Scheler	   declares	   that	   “among	   the	  scanty	  discoveries	  which	  have	  been	  made	  in	  recent	  times	  about	  the	  origin	  of	  moral	  judgments,	   Friedrich	  Nietzsche’s	   discovery	   that	   ressentiment	  can	   be	   the	   source	   of	  such	   value	   judgments	   is	   the	   most	   profound.”14 	  Writing	   twenty-­‐six	   years	   after	  Nietzsche	  published	  his	  treatise,	  Scheler	  also	  shares	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  lament	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  “higher	  values”	  (as	  espoused	  by	  the	  nobility)	   in	  exchange	   for	   the	  ressentimental	  morality	  of	   the	  masses.	  For	  Scheler,	  however,	  Nietzsche’s	   thesis	  contains	  a	  central	  fault:	  the	  morality	  of	  the	  masses	  stems	  not	  from	  a	  ressentiment	  rooted	  in	  Christian	  ethics	  but	  rather	  from	  bourgeois	  values	  which,	  Scheler	  argues,	  have	  largely	  replaced	  Christian	  morality	  since	   the	  French	  Revolution.15	  For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  chapter,	  however,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   focus	   on	   Scheler’s	   sociological	   development	   of	   the	   term	  
ressentiment,	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  Christian	  morality.	  	  	  Although	   clearly	   indebted	   to	   Nietzsche,	   Scheler’s	   work	   on	   ressentiment	  provides	   a	   much	   more	   systematic	   description	   of	   the	   concept.	   Scheler	   begins	   by	  explaining	  that	  the	  term	  appears	  in	  its	  original	  French	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  to	  find	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Max	  Scheler,	  Ressentiment	  (Marquette	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  3.	  15	  Scheler	  accuses	  Nietzsche	  of	  confusing	  Christian	  love	  –	  a	  pure	  and	  sublime	  expression	  –	  	  with	  the	  “love	  of	  mankind”	  championed	  by	  bourgeois	  humanism	  –	  an	  inferior	  ideology	  that	  Scheler	  sees	  as	  rooted	  in	  ressentiment.	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adequate	  translation	  in	  German.16	  As	  Scheler	  argues,	  the	  French	  term	  contains	  two	  central	   elements:	   the	   first	   being	   that	   ressentiment	   refers	   not	   only	   to	   the	  remembrance	  of	  past	  injury	  but	  the	  visceral	  reliving	  of	  such	  injury	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one’s	   hostile	   reaction	   deposits	   itself	   deep	   into	   the	   personality	   of	   the	   individual.	  Secondly,	  the	  character	  of	  this	  hostile	  reaction	  is	  one	  of	  rancour,	  which	  Scheler	  later	  pairs	  with	   “revenge,	   hatred,	  malice,	   envy,	   the	   impulse	   to	   detract,	   and	   spite.”17	  For	  Scheler,	  as	  for	  Nietzsche,	  this	  rancour	  must	  also	  be	  coupled	  with	  impotence,	  in	  order	  for	  ressentiment	  to	  ensue.	  Scheler	  notes,	  however,	  that	  ressentimental	  embitterment	  can	  be	  avoided	  with	  any	  discharge	  of	  one’s	  inner	  negative	  feelings.	  As	  he	  explains,	  “if	  an	   ill-­‐treated	   servant	   can	   vent	   his	   spleen	   in	   the	   antechamber,	   he	  will	   remain	   free	  from	   the	   inner	   venom	   of	   ressentiment,	   but	   it	   will	   engulf	   him	   if	   he	   must	   hide	   his	  feelings	  and	  keep	  his	  negative	  and	  hostile	  emotions	  to	  himself.”18	  Let	  us	  keep	  these	  aspects	   of	   visceral	   reliving	   as	  well	   as	   emotional	   discharge	   in	  mind	   as	  we	   come	   to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  ressentiment	  and	  feminism.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  expanding	  upon	  Nietzsche’s	  definition	  of	  ressentiment,	  Scheler	  also	  expounds	  its	  sociological	  nature,	  relating	  it	  to	  social	  inequality.	  As	  he	  discusses,	  “through	   its	   very	   origin,	   ressentiment	   is	   therefore	   chiefly	   confined	   to	   those	   who	  serve	   and	   are	   dominated	   at	   the	   moment,	   who	   fruitlessly	   resent	   the	   sting	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Nietzsche	  translator	  and	  scholar,	  Walter	  Kaufmann	  (2010)	  similarly	  argues	  this	  point.	  Otto	  Delmos	  (1971)	  moreover	  discusses	  how	  although	  the	  English	  word	  “resentment”	  derives	  its	  etymology	  from	  the	  French	  ressentiment,	  it	  fails	  to	  retain	  the	  notion	  of	  “moving	  back,”	  an	  irreducible	  component	  of	  the	  Nietzschean	  formulation.	  	  17	  Scheler,	  Ressentiment,	  4.	  	  18	  Scheler,	  6.	  In	  this	  way,	  Scheler	  discusses	  how	  the	  criminal,	  contrary	  to	  common	  belief,	  is	  actually	  free	  from	  ressentiment	  in	  that	  the	  criminal	  is	  “an	  active	  type”	  who	  is	  able	  to	  release	  negative	  emotion	  in	  committing	  his/her	  crime	  (18).	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authority.”19	  Those	  who	  are	  dominated,	  however,	  must	   still	   imagine	   themselves	   to	  be	  equal	  to	  their	  oppressors	  since,	  “a	  slave	  who	  has	  a	  slavish	  nature	  and	  accepts	  his	  status	  does	  not	  desire	  revenge	  when	  he	  is	  injured	  by	  his	  master.”20	  For	  Scheler,	  this	  imagined	  equality	  is	  a	  product	  of	  modern	  liberal	  society	  in	  which	  all	  individuals	  are	  taught	   that	   they	   are	   equals.	   Thus,	   as	   he	   explains,	   “ressentiment	  must	   therefore	   be	  strongest	   in	   a	   society	   like	   ours,	   where	   approximately	   equal	   rights	   (political	   and	  otherwise)	  or	  formal	  social	  equality,	  publicly	  recognized,	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  wide	  factual	   differences	   in	   power,	   property,	   and	   education.” 21 	  Scheler	   enumerates	  “situations”	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  ressentimental	  due	  to	  such	  structural	  inequalities.	  These	   inequalities	   derive	   from	   hereditary	   factors,	   which	   then	   have	   social	  consequences.	   Unsurprisingly,	   women	   appear	   at	   the	   top	   of	   Scheler’s	   list	   as	   the	  “weaker	  and	  therefore	  the	  more	  vindictive	  sex.”22	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  is	  Scheler’s	   emphasis	   on	   the	   “types	   of	   ressentiment	  which	   are	   grounded	   in	   certain	  typically	   recurrent	   ‘situations’	   and	   whose	   emergence	   is	   therefore	   largely	  independent	  of	   individual	   temperament.”23	  This	  very	   important	   insight,	   echoed	  by	  Wendy	  Brown	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   gives	   some	   sense	   of	   how	   the	   very	   structure	   of	  liberal	  society	  produces	  ressentiment.24	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Scheler,	  6,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  	  20	  Scheler,	  7.	  	  21	  Scheler,	  8.	  22	  Scheler,	  15.	  Nietzsche	  makes	  this	  comparable	  “observation”:	  “The	  sick	  woman	  especially:	  no	  one	  can	  excel	  her	  in	  the	  wiles	  to	  dominate,	  oppress,	  and	  tyrannize.	  The	  sick	  woman	  spares	  nothing,	  living	  or	  dead;	  she	  will	  dig	  up	  the	  most	  deeply	  buried	  things”	  (Nietzsche,	  
Genealogy,	  123).	  23	  Scheler,	  15.	  24	  Scheler,	  8.	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A	  final	  point	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  Scheler’s	  mention	  of	  the	  “pleasure”	  that	  can	  come	  from	  ressentimental	  opposition.	  As	  he	  explains,	  in	  certain	  situations,	  a	  type	  of	  “ressentiment	  criticism”	  can	  erupt	  which	  is	  largely	  void	  of	  positive	  aims	  and	  in	  which	  “improvement	  in	  the	  conditions	  criticized	  cause	  no	  satisfaction	  –	  they	  merely	  cause	  discontent,	   for	   they	   destroy	   the	   growing	   pleasure	   afforded	   by	   invective	   and	  negation.”25	  For	  Scheler,	  such	  a	  position	   is	  characterized	  by	  a	   joy	   in	  criticizing	  and	  an	  aversion	  to	  power.	  This	  point	  recalls	  Nietzsche’s	  contempt	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  those	   who	   suffer	   find	   joy	   in	   their	   pain.	   I	   would	   like	   to	   flag	   this	   point	   for	   later	  consideration	  when	  I	  discuss	  the	  pleasure	  in	  anger	  and	  opposition,	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  belonging	  it	  can	  bring.	  	  In	   summary,	   Scheler	   builds	   on	   Nietzsche’s	   psychological	   analysis	   by	  discussing	   the	  sociological	  dimensions	  of	  ressentiment.	  Both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler	  emphasize	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  worth	  enumerating.	  Firstly,	  as	  they	  theorize	  it,	   ressentiment	   is	   the	   disposition	   of	   the	   weak	   characterized	   by	   anger,	   suspicion,	  bitterness,	   envy,	   hatred,	   vengefulness,	   and	   spite.	   Secondly,	   they	   emphasize	   that	  
ressentiment	   is	   marked	   by	   impotence,	   that	   is,	   an	   inability	   to	   act.	   Thirdly,	   they	  describe	  ressentiment’s	  only	  creative	  deed	  as	  the	  transvaluation	  of	  values,	  whereby	  all	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  strong	  is	  re-­‐evaluated	  as	  bad	  or	  evil,	  while	  the	  ways	  of	  the	  oppressed	  are	  simultaneously	  elevated	  as	  morally	  superior.	  Fourthly,	  they	  stress	  an	   investment	   in	  one’s	  own	  pain,	  which	   includes	  a	  backward	  orientation	   in	  which	  one	   constantly	   conjures	   up	   injuries	   of	   the	   past	   while	   imagining	   assaults	   in	   the	  present.	  Fifthly,	  the	  subject	  of	  ressentiment	  seeks	  to	  blame	  another	  for	  his/her	  pain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Scheler,	  8,	  emphasis	  added.	  
	   109	  
(a	   corollary	  of	  his/her	  weakness),	   and	  more,	   to	  make	   this	  Other	   suffer	   in	  effort	   to	  achieve	  relief.26	  For	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler,	  ressentiment	  is	  thus	  a	  psyche	  that	  desires	  revenge,	   while	   revelling	   in	   the	   pleasure	   of	   recrimination.	   Finally,	   it	   is	   a	   psychic	  disposition	   that	   is	   reactive	   in	   constitution,	   unable	   to	   formulate	   an	   affirmative	  orientation.	  While	  Nietzsche	   largely	  describes	   the	  ressentimental	  personality	  of	   the	  weak,	   Scheler	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	   situations	   that,	   by	   virtue	   of	   a	   contradiction	  between	  formal	  equality	  and	  actual	  inequality,	  are	  prone	  to	  ressentiment.	  	  	  
Ressentiment	   as	   a	   psychological	   and	   sociological	   explanation	   has	   been	  mobilized	  by	  a	  number	  of	  thinkers	  since	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler’s	  time.	  In	  the	  1990’s	  some	  feminist	  theorists	  employed	  the	  concept	  in	  order	  to	  diagnose	  some	  troubling	  tendencies	   that	   they	   observed	   within	   feminism. 27 	  These	   theorizations	   of	  
ressentiment	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  combining	  Nietzsche’s	  largely	  psychological	  approach	  with	   Scheler’s	   sociological	   insights.	   That	   is,	   these	   theorists	   were	   interested	   in	  understanding	   the	   psychological	   character	   of	   feminism	   as	   contextualized	   within	  conditions	   of	   gender	   inequality.	   Unlike	   with	   Nietzsche,	   these	   inquiries	   were	   not	  premised	   on	   the	   immutable	   weakness	   of	   women,	   but	   rather	   they	   recognized	  domination	   as	   social	   and	  political	   in	   nature.	   Given	   the	   feminist	   orientation	   of	   this	  scholarship,	   these	   ressentiment	   theorists	   were	   concerned	   that	   the	   rage,	   rancour,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Scheler,	  127.	  27	  These	  thinkers	  include	  Marion	  Tapper	  (1992),	  Anna	  Yeatman	  (1993),	  Joan	  Cocks	  (1991),	  and	  Wendy	  Brown	  (1995).	  	  	  As	  Stringer	  notes,	  this	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  “rethinking”	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  feminism	  and	  the	  category	  of	  “victim”	  that	  took	  place	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  popular	  press	  and	  in	  academic	  feminism	  (see	  Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  
Neoliberal	  Times.	  Routledge,	  2014.).	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reproach,	   and	   vengefulness	   of	   feminism	   could	   be	   foreclosing	   its	   emancipatory	  future.	  As	  such,	  their	  concerns	  very	  much	  echo	  mine.	  But	  is	  ressentiment	  an	  accurate	  description	   of	   the	   psychic	   character	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism?	   How	   useful	   is	   it	   in	  helping	  to	  explain	  tendencies	  specific	  to	  this	  movement?	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  build	  on	   the	   experiences	   and	   examples	   presented	   in	   the	   foregoing	   chapter	   in	   order	   to	  explore	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  related	  practices	  of	  calling-­‐out,	  checking	  privilege,	  spokespersonship	  and	  allyship	  and	  their	  corresponding	  emotions	  and	  attitudes	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  ressentimental.	  	  
(4.2)	  An	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Feminist	  Ressentiment	  	   In	   Chapter	   2,	   I	   examined	   some	   everyday	   tendencies	   and	   practices	   within	  academic	   and	   activist	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   and	   identity	   movements	   generally.	   In	  particular,	   I	  discussed	  what	  I	  suggest	  to	  be	  common	  cultural	  practices	  (calling-­‐out,	  checking	   privilege,	   spokespersonship	   and	   allyship)	   and	   some	   accompanying	  concepts	  that	  might	  allow	  insight	  into	  the	  social	  character	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  In	  this	   section,	   I	   return	   to	   these	   examples	   in	   order	   to	   re-­‐examine	   them	   against	   the	  concept	  of	  ressentiment	  as	  developed	  by	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler.	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   elements	   that	   characterize	   a	   ressentimental	  disposition.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   strong	   negative	   emotions,	   such	   as	   anger,	  hatred,	  suspicion,	  bitterness,	  envy,	  and	  spite.	   I	  believe	  one	  can	  make	  a	  strong	  case	  for	   the	   existence	   of	   most,	   if	   not	   all,	   of	   these	   emotions	   in	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  movement.	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  make	  an	  over-­‐generalization	  and	  to	  imply	  that	  
all	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  are	  oriented	  by	  these	  feelings.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	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current	  cultural	  climate	  is	  one	  where	  these	  affects	  circulate	  in	  many	  expressions	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  identity	  movements).	  	  From	  my	  own	  experience,	   I	   have	  observed,	   as	  well	   as	  personally	   felt,	   all	   of	  these	  emotions	  in	  my	  engagement	  with	  the	  movement.	  As	  I	  described	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  many	  of	  my	  interactions	  with	  other	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  consisted	  of	  sharing	   in	  expressions	  of	  rage,	  resentfulness,	  and	  even	  hatred.	  These	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  and	  I	  felt	  intense	  anger	  toward	  systems	  of	  oppression	  and	  individuals	  that	  we	  perceived	  as	  embodying	  this	  oppression.	  For	  us,	  there	  were	  also	  strong	  feelings	  of	  suspicion	  and	  mistrust,	  leading	  us	  to	  feel	  safer	  in	  sticking	  together	  as	  opposed	  to	  risking	  ties	  with	  white	  people	  who	  could,	  at	  any	  time,	  show	  their	  true	  (oppressive)	  colours.	  Envy	   is	  perhaps	  a	  more	  difficult	  emotion	   to	   track	  but	  which	   I	  believe	  has	  also	  been	  present	  in	  my	  experience.	  In	  my	  discussions	  with	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  in	  my	   life,	  envy	  could	  perhaps	  be	  detected	  not	   just	   in	   the	   (understandable)	  desire	  for	  the	  entitlements	  of	   those	  who	  held	  privilege	  but	  also	   in	  the	  desire	   for	  the	  very	  
ease	  with	  which	  they	  navigated	  life.	  I	  recall	  many	  moments	  in	  which	  we	  would	  say	  to	  one	  another	  with	  some	  bitterness,	   “how	  nice	   for	  her	   to	  be	  able	   to	  achieve	  such	  and	  such	  so	  easily!”	  	  The	  designation	  “culture	  of	  outrage”	  suggests	  that	  the	  negative	  feelings	  that	  I	  describe	  above	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  wider	  movement.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  practices	  of	   calling-­‐out,	   checking	   privilege,	   spokespersonship,	   and	   allyship	   are	   each	  embedded	  in	  an	  emotional	  economy	  in	  which	  these	  negative	  affects	  plays	  a	  central	  role.	   This,	   of	   course,	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   these	   emotions	   and	   practices	   are	   not	  responses	   to	   real	  oppression.	  They	  most	   certainly	   are.	   Instead,	  what	   is	  of	   interest	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here	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  particular	  emotions	  mobilize	  particular	  practices,	  and	  what	  the	  political	  and	  characterological	  consequences	  of	  this	  might	  be.	  	  A	   second	   aspect	   of	   ressentiment	   is	   impotence,	   or	   an	   inability	   to	   act.	   Anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  as	  an	  activist	  and	  intellectual	  movement,	  certainly	  acts	  in	  a	  number	  of	   ways	   –	   whether	   through	   protests	   and	   demonstrations,	   lobbying	   for	   policy	  changes,	  or	  the	  production	  of	  critical	  academic	  work,	  among	  other	  forms	  of	  action.	  I	  explore	  this	  further	  in	  the	  next	  section	  where	  I	  discuss	  limitations	  of	  ressentiment	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  capture	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  Third,	   there	   is	   the	  ressentimental	   tendency	   to	   transvaluate	  values,	  whereby	  all	   that	   is	  associated	  with	   the	  oppressor	   is	   re-­‐interpreted	  as	  bad	  or	  evil,	  while	   the	  ways	  of	  the	  oppressed	  are	  elevated	  as	  morally	  superior.	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  see	  this	  in	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  and	  other	   identity	  movements	  as	  expressed	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  oppression	  Olympics.	  As	  examined	  previously,	  the	  oppression	  Olympics	  refers	  to	  a	  tendency	  in	  progressive	  movements	  to	  apply	  a	  moral	  righteousness	  to	  those	  who	  are	  oppressed,	  while	   simultaneously	   lowering	   the	  moral	   status	  of	   those	  who	  hold	  privilege.	   In	   this	   inversed	  order,	   the	  more	   intersectional	  oppression	  one	   faces,	   the	  more	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  hold	  a	  moral	  authority,	  spokespersonship,	  and	  cultural	  capital	  over	   others.	   By	   the	   same	   token,	   those	   who	   hold	   the	   most	   structural	   power	   are	  viewed	  with	  the	  most	  mistrust	  and,	  I	  would	  even	  suggest,	  rejection.	  	  	  A	  fourth	  point	  is	  the	  active	  investment	  in	  one’s	  own	  injury.	  For	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler,	   this	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	   backward	   orientation	   where	   one	   is	   frequently	  consumed	   by	   the	   pain	   of	   the	   past	   while	   projecting	   imaginary	   assaults	   into	   the	  present.	  Is	  this	  an	  observable	  tendency	  in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism?	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  I	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do	  believe	  that	  past	  racial	  and	  gendered	  trauma	  still	  lives	  on	  in	  many	  of	  us,	  perhaps	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  acknowledgment	  that	  could	  facilitate	  healing.	  Even	  when	  such	  acknowledgment	  has	  been	  given,	  however,	   such	  as	  with	   the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	   process	   underway	   with	   First	   Nations	   communities	   in	   Canada,	   this	  does	   not	   erase	   the	   continued	   effects	   of	   intergenerational	   trauma.28	  As	   such,	   I	   do	  believe	   that	   the	   past	   understandably	   haunts	   many	   people	   who	   have	   suffered	  historical,	   recent,	   and	   continued	   indignities.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   tendency	   to	  “project”	   the	   past	   onto	   the	   present	   is	   perhaps	   a	   trickier	  matter	   to	   determine.	   To	  what	   extent	   do	   we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	   accurately	   identify	   encounters	   as	  racist/sexist	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  we	  assume	  racism/sexism	  to	  be	  at	  work	  when	  there	   may	   be	   other	   factors	   at	   play?	   This	   is	   admittedly	   an	   uncomfortable	   and	  activating	  question	  to	  consider	  but	  perhaps	  also	  a	  valuable	  one.	  	  A	   fifth	  symptom	  of	  ressentiment	   is	   the	  subject’s	  desire	  to	  blame	  another	   for	  her	   pain	   and	   to	   make	   this	   other	   suffer	   as	   a	   means	   of	   achieving	   both	   relief	   and	  pleasure	  in	  recrimination.	  In	  my	  experience,	  I	  have	  observed	  this	  phenomenon	  most	  in	   classroom	  and	   activist	   environments	   in	  which	   clear	   lines	  were	   drawn	  between	  “the	   oppressed”	   and	   “allies.”	   I	   have	   sensed	   an	   air	   of	   satisfaction	   in	   practices	   of	  silencing	  and	  shaming	  that,	  in	  my	  interpretation,	  seemed	  to	  betray	  a	  strong	  element	  of	  revenge	  –	  a	  certain	  pleasure	  in	  exercising	  the	  same	  power	  over	  the	  other	  that	  one	  is	   commonly	   subjected	   to	   herself.	   	   As	   Assam	   Ahmad	   and	   Andrea	   Smith	   discuss,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  It	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  while	  there	  has	  been	  some	  acknowledgment	  of	  past	  abuses,	  this	  by	  no	  means	  amounts	  to	  a	  challenge	  to	  settler	  colonialism	  that	  might	  afford	  true	  justice.	  As	  Glen	  Coulthard	  argues,	  reconciliatory	  politics	  takes	  on	  a	  deceptive	  “temporal	  character	  as	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  process	  of	  overcoming	  the	  subsequent	  legacy	  of	  past	  abuse,	  not	  the	  abusive	  colonial	  structure	  itself”	  (Red	  Skin,	  White	  Masks	  (University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2014),	  108).	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practices	  like	  calling-­‐out	  and	  confessing	  privilege	  can	  result	  in	  the	  oppressed	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  “perverse	  exercise	  of	  power”	  29	  whereby	  they	  might	  shame	  those	  with	  more	  privilege	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  temporary	  feelings	  of	  superiority	  and,	  in	  Brown’s	  words,	  pleasure	  in	  “making	  the	  perpetrator	  hurt	  as	  the	  sufferer	  does.”30	  	  Finally,	   a	   ressentimental	   disposition	   is	   one	   of	   a	   reactive	   rather	   than	  affirmative	   nature.	   As	   discussed	   earlier,	   some	   central	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   aims	  include	  exposing	  and	  challenging	  current	  oppression,	  demanding	  legal	  redress	  and	  recognition,	   and	   calling	   for	   equality	   and	   inclusion.	  While	   these	   interventions	   and	  demands	   are	   necessary,	   it	   is	   my	   concern	   that	   much	   less	   attention	   is	   dedicated	  toward	  affirmative	  visions	  of	  the	  future.	  The	  abandonment	  of	  an	  affirmative	  political	  vision	  in	  contemporary	  progressive	  movements	  has	  also	  been	  noted	  and	  discussed	  by	  scholars	  such	  as	  bell	  hooks	  and	  Robin	  Kelley,	  as	  well	  as	  activists	  like	  Sandra	  Kim	  –	  all	  of	  whom	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  upcoming	  chapters.	  	  Given	   the	   above	   discussion,	   to	   what	   extent	   is	   Nietzsche’s	   formulation	   of	  
ressentiment	  a	  good	  fit	  for	  describing	  the	  social	  character	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism?	  	  I	  suggest	   that	   a	  number	  of	   resemblances	  can	   indeed	  be	   traced	  between	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	   and	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   emotions,	   attitudes,	   and	   practices.	   These	  resonances	  are	  troubling	  in	  that	  they	  potentially	  signal	  a	  political	  project	  limited	  to	  “facilitate[ing]	   the	   empowerment	   of	   victims	   as	   victims”31	  with	   little	   capacity	   for	  affirmative	   possibilities.	   Before	   discussing	   the	   significance	   of	   these	   ressentimental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Assam	  Ahmad,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture.”	  30	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  27.	  31	  Rebecca	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  286.	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aspects	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   any	   further,	   however,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   register	   two	  important	  shortcomings	  that	  complicate	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  ressentiment.	  
Some	  Limitations	  	   The	   first	   limitation	  pertains	   to	  Nietzsche’s	  neglect	   of	   the	  oppressiveness	  of	  those	  who	  dominate,	  and	  the	  pain	  of	  those	  who	  are	  subordinated	  in	  his	  rendering	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  master	  and	  slave.	  Nietzsche’s	  lack	  of	  attention	  to	  these	  is	  surely	  due	  to	  his	  celebration	  of	  the	  dominant	  and	  contempt	  for	  those	  he	  labels	  as	  “the	  weak”.	  Without	  proper	  appreciation	  of	  the	  violence	  of	  domination	  and	  the	  pain	  it	   inflicts,	   a	   charge	   of	   ressentiment	   not	   only	   re-­‐victimizes	   those	   who	   suffer,	   but	  prevents	  inquiry	  into	  how	  to	  move	  past	  this	  pain	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  undo	  the	  hold	  of	  
ressentiment.	  	  The	   second	   issue	   refers	   to	  Nietzsche’s	  discussion	  of	   impotence	  as	  a	   central	  element	   of	   ressentiment.	  Unlike	   Nietzsche’s	   slave	  who	   is	   unable	   to	   act,	   anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  engage	  in	  many	  forms	  of	  action.	  Indeed,	  we	  write,	  research,	  protest,	  rally,	  organize,	  occupy,	  and	  more.	  The	  recent	  (2016)	  encampment	  outside	  of	  the	  Toronto	  Police	   Headquarters	   by	   a	   group	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   (specifically,	   feminists	  against	  anti-­‐black	  racism)	  representing	  the	  Black	  Lives	  Matter	  movement	  is	  but	  one	  example	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.32	  If	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  scholar	  or	  activist	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  “vent	  her	  spleen”	  as	  Scheler	  discusses,	  does	  that	  mean	  she	  will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  This	  took	  place	  from	  March	  20-­‐April	  4,	  2016	  in	  protest	  of	  a	  number	  of	  police	  shooting	  deaths	  of	  black	  males	  in	  the	  Toronto	  area.	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“remain	   free	   from	   the	   inner	   venom	   of	   ressentiment”? 33 	  Or	   can	   there	   be	   a	  
ressentiment	  that	  includes	  action?	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  above	  limitations,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  scholarship	  of	  Rebecca	  Stringer	  whose	  exploration	  of	   feminist	  ressentiment	   thoughtfully	  engages	  both	   the	  issue	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   bias	   toward	   the	   master	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   active	  
ressentiment.	   Her	   work	   also	   provides	   a	   competing	   interpretation	   of	   feminist	  
ressentiment	   to	   that	  of	  other	   feminist	   theorists	  who	  consider	   this	   term.	  Unlike	  her	  contemporaries,	  Stringer	  argues	  that	  ressentiment	  is	  capable	  of	  leading	  feminists	  to	  emancipatory	   aims.	   This	   section	   ends	   by	   considering	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	   a	  transformative	  ressentiment.	  	  
A	  Bias	  Towards	  the	  Master	  	   There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  representation	  of	  the	  master	  and	  the	  slave	  is	  heavily	  biased	  against	   the	  slave	  and	   in	  support	  of	   the	  master.	   Indeed	  Genealogy	  should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   political	   project	   that	   aims	   to	   denigrate	   the	   slave	   and	  elevate	  the	  master.	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  Nietzsche’s	  position,	  it	  is	  important	  to	   look	   at	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   in	  which	   he	  was	  writing.	   Published	   in	   1887,	  Nietzsche’s	   work	   can	   be	   read	   as	   an	   urgent	   appeal	   against	   the	   current	   of	  democratization	   that	   was	   sweeping	   Europe	   at	   the	   time. 34 Specifically,	   he	   is	  responding	  to	  the	  relatively	  late	  unification	  and	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  German	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Scheler,	  Ressentiment,	  6.	  34	  For	  more	  on	  the	  political	  context	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  was	  writing,	  see	  Don	  Dombowsky,	  
Nietzsche	  and	  Napoleon:	  The	  Dionysian	  Conspiracy	  (University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2014);	  Frank	  Cameron	  and	  Don	  Dombowsky,	  Political	  Writings	  of	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche:	  An	  Edited	  Anthology	  (Springer,	  2008);	  Christian	  Emden,	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  History	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  See	  also	  Rollo	  May’s	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Being	  (W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1994)	  for	  an	  interesting	  discussion	  on	  how	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  influenced	  the	  ideas	  of	  Nietzsche,	  Kierkegaard,	  and	  Freud.	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state	   and	   attendant	   changes	   in	   political	   culture.	   For	   Nietzsche,	   these	   changes	  inaugurated	  a	  levelling	  movement	  that	  threatened	  to	  pervert	  the	  superior	  values	  of	  the	  aristocracy,	  infecting	  the	  “higher	  man”	  with	  the	  inferior	  morality	  of	  the	  masses.	  As	  he	  warns,	  “the	  diminution	  and	  levelling	  of	  European	  man	  constitutes	  our	  greatest	  danger,	  for	  the	  sight	  of	  him	  makes	  us	  weary.	  We	  can	  see	  nothing	  today	  that	  wants	  to	  grow	   greater,	   we	   suspect	   that	   things	  will	   continue	   to	   go	   down,	   down,	   to	   become	  thinner,	   more	   good-­‐natured,	   more	   prudent,	   more	   comfortable,	   more	   mediocre,	  more	   indifferent,	   more	   Chinese,	   more	   Christian	   –	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   man	   is	  getting	  “better”	  all	  the	  time.”35	  The	  purpose	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  Genealogy	  is	  to	  beckon	  his	  readers	  to	  understand	  these	  current	  developments	  as	  originating	  in	  the	  slave	  revolt	  in	  morality	  that	  began	  two	  thousand	  years	  earlier	  and	  which	  continues	  to	  threaten	  human	  prosperity	  by	  elevating	  “slavish	  mediocrity”	  over	  masterful	  power.36	  	  Nietzsche	  makes	  his	  case	  for	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  master	  over	  the	  slave	  in	  three	  primary	  ways:	  firstly,	  in	  naturalizing	  the	  master/slave	  relationship;	  secondly,	  through	  emphasizing	  the	  deceitfulness	  of	  the	  slave;	  and	  lastly,	  through	  engaging	  in	  a	  reverse	  victimology	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  master	  –	  all	  of	  which	   together	  minimize	  both	  the	  severity	  of	   the	  master’s	  oppression	  and	  the	  slave’s	  correspondent	  pain.	   In	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Nietzsche,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Ecce	  Homo,	  44.	  36	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  298.	  	  As	  Stringer	  discusses,	  Nietzsche’s	  rendering	  of	  master	  and	  slave	  morality	  in	  his	  earlier	  text	  
Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  is	  markedly	  more	  fluid.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  here	  that	  he	  describes	  master	  and	  slave	  morality	  as	  “at	  times…occur[ing]	  directly	  alongside	  each	  other	  –	  even	  in	  the	  same	  human	  being,	  within	  a	  single	  soul”	  (in	  Stringer,	  200).	  Stringer	  reconciles	  this	  inconsistency	  between	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  through	  urging	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  text	  that	  is	  performative.	  That	  is,	  Nietzsche	  dramatizes	  his	  prose	  in	  order	  that	  it	  might	  do	  something	  to	  the	  reader	  –	  namely	  awaken	  them	  to	  what	  he	  conceives	  as	  disastrous	  socio-­‐political	  developments.	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section,	  I	  follow	  Stringer	  in	  exploring	  these	  three	  strategies	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  how	  they	  impact	  my	  exploration	  of	  ressentiment	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  For	   Nietzsche	   the	   master’s	   superiority	   over	   the	   slave	   is	   a	   natural	  arrangement.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	   in	  this	  chapter,	  Nietzsche	  stresses	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  slave	  is	  constitutionally	  weak,	  and	  the	  master,	  constitutionally	  strong.	  He	  does	  this	  most	  memorably	  in	  his	  metaphor	  of	  the	  lambs	  and	  birds	  of	  prey,	  which	  I	  quote	  at	  some	  length	  below:	   	  That	  lambs	  dislike	  great	  birds	  of	  prey	  does	  not	  seem	  strange:	  only	  it	  gives	  no	  grounds	  for	  reproaching	  these	  birds	  of	  prey	  for	  bearing	  off	  little	  lambs.	  And	  if	  the	  lambs	  say	  among	  themselves:	  “these	  birds	  of	  prey	  are	  evil;	  and	  whoever	  is	  least	  like	  a	  bird	  of	  prey,	  but	  rather	  its	  opposite,	  a	  lamb	  –	  would	  he	  not	  be	  good?”	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  find	  fault	  with	  this	  institution	  of	  an	  ideal,	  except	  perhaps	  that	  the	  birds	  of	  prey	  might	  view	  this	  a	  little	  ironically	  and	  say:	  “we	  don’t	  dislike	  them	  at	  all,	  these	  good	  little	  lambs;	  we	  even	  love	  them:	  nothing	  is	  more	  tasty	  than	  a	  tender	  lamb.”…To	  demand	  of	  strength	  that	  it	  should	  not	  express	  itself	  as	  strength,	  that	  is	  should	  not	  be	  a	  desire	  to	  overcome,	  a	  desire	  to	   throw	   down,	   a	   desire	   to	   become	   master,	   a	   thirst	   for	   enemies	   and	  resistances	  and	  triumphs,	  is	  just	  as	  absurd	  as	  to	  demand	  of	  weakness	  that	  it	  should	  express	  itself	  as	  strength…”37	  	   We	  see	  in	  the	  above	  passage	  what,	  at	  first	  sight,	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  sympathetic	  gesture	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Nietzsche	  toward	  the	  slave.	  In	  an	  uncharacteristic	  extension	  of	  understanding,	  we	  witness	  Nietzsche	  effectively	  saying:	  ‘it	  is	  understandable	  that	  you	  would	  hate	  those	  who	  prey	  upon	  you	  but	  don’t	  you	  realize,	  they	  have	  no	  choice!’	  Upon	  further	  consideration,	  however,	  this	  ostensibly	  gentle	  posture	  reveals	  itself	  to	  be	  no	  more	  than	  another	  insult	  –	  a	  rhetorical	  strategy	  by	  which	  Nietzsche	  expresses	  the	   unequivocal	   incommensurability	   that	   marks	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  master	   and	   slave.	   To	   frame	   human	   beings	   in	   terms	   of	   “little	   lambs”	   and	   “birds	   of	  prey”	   severs	   them	   from	   one	   another	   as	   though	   they	   are	   creatures	   of	   an	   entirely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  45.	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different	   order. 38 	  Nietzsche’s	   sympathy	   reveals	   itself	   to	   be	   no	   more	   than	   a	  patronizing	  gesture	  that	  denies	  any	  wrongdoing	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  oppressor	  given	  that	   their	   instinct	   to	   injure,	   torture,	   rape,	   and	   kill	   is	   beyond	   their	   choice.	   In	  Nietzsche’s	  vocabulary,	  their	  actions	  express	  their	  will	  to	  power.	  As	  he	  describes,	  Life	   is	   essentially	  appropriation,	   injury,	   overpowering	   of	   what	   is	   alien	   and	  weaker;	  suppression,	  hardness,	  imposition	  of	  one’s	  own	  forms,	  incorporation	  and	  at	  least,	  at	  its	  mildest,	  exploitation…exploitation…belongs	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  what	   lives,	   as	   a	  basic	   organic	   function;	   it	   is	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	  will	   to	  power,	  which	  is	  after	  all	  the	  will	  of	  life.39	  	  	   Indeed,	  Nietzsche’s	  master	  and	  slave	  do	  hail	  from	  an	  entirely	  different	  order.	  He	  describes	  the	  modern	  noble	  as	  descending	  from	  “a	  pack	  of	  blond	  beasts”	  40	  who	  ruthlessly	  and	  forcefully	  imposed	  civilization	  on	  the	  formless	  masses,	  the	  ancestors	  of	  the	  “man	  of	  ressentiment.”	  After	  a	  substantial	  period	  of	  subservient	  obedience,	  in	  which	  resentment	  grew	  but	  remained	  dormant,	  the	  slave	  revolt	  occurred,	  marking	  a	  new	   era	   in	   Nietzsche’s	   genealogy:	   the	   creative	   stage	   of	   ressentiment	   (and	   the	  beginning	  of	  slave	  morality).	   It	   is	   in	  this	  stage	  that	  we	  encounter	  the	  mendacity	  of	  the	  slave	  –	  Nietzsche’s	   second	  strategy	  of	  discrediting	   those	  who	  he	  designates	  as	  immutably	  weak.	  In	  what	  way	  is	  the	  slave	  deceptive?	  According	  to	  Nietzsche,	  we	  see	  the	  slave’s	  deceit	  in	  his	  imagination	  of	  choice,	  which	  he	  applies	  to	  both	  his	  weakness,	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  master.	  As	  Stringer	  notes,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	  immutability	  of	  this	  relationship,	  its	  resistance	  to	  transcendence	  and	  its	  non-­‐reciprocal	  structure	  of	  recognition	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  Hegelian	  master/slave	  dialectic.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  (see	  footnote	  6	  of	  this	  chapter),	  however,	  despite	  some	  evidence	  that	  claims	  that	  Nietzsche	  rejected	  Hegel’s	  model,	  some	  scholars	  argue	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dialectical	  movement	  within	  Nietzsche’s	  conception.	  39	  Nietzsche,	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1966),	  203.	  40	  Despite	  the	  scholarly	  disputes	  around	  the	  exact	  character	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  racial	  beliefs	  and	  his	  influence	  on	  Nazism,	  this	  notorious	  phrase,	  which	  makes	  explicit	  mention	  of	  the	  physiognomic	  differences	  between	  master	  and	  slave,	  clearly	  foreshadows	  the	  racial	  politics	  to	  unfold	  in	  20th	  century	  Germany.	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Slave	  morality’s	  grammar	  of	  causation	  and	  accountability	  separates	  the	  doer	  from	   the	   deed,	   transforming	   the	   beast	   of	   prey	   into	   a	   subject	   of	   free	   will,	  overlaying	  the	  master’s	  expression	  of	  power	  with	  a	  moral	  drama	  in	  which	  the	  master	   is	   cast	   as	   a	   subject	   who	   chooses	   to	   behave	   in	   the	   way	   they	   do,	   a	  subject	   who	   is,	   therefore,	   free	   to	   behave	   otherwise.	   The	   slaves	   invent	   the	  concepts	  of	  blame	  and	   free	  will,	   by	  which	   they	  are	  able	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  beast	  of	  prey	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  other’s	  suffering	  and	  is	  free	  to	  choose	  not	  to	  enact	  violence	  on	  the	  other.41	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  slave’s	  behaviour,	  the	  application	  of	  free	  will	  (‘we	  choose	  to	  be	  this	  way’)	  is	  furthermore	  accompanied	  with	  a	  valuation	  (‘because	  it	  is	  better’).	  This	  move	  accomplishes	  what	  we	  discussed	  previously	  as	   the	  slave’s	   “transvaluation	  of	  values.”	  Nietzsche	  describes	  this	  process	  below:	  Weakness	   is	   being	   lied	   into	   something	  meritorious…and	   impotence	   which	  does	   not	   requite	   into	   ‘goodness	   of	   heart’;	   anxious	   lowliness	   into	   ‘humility’;	  subjection	   to	   those	   one	   hates	   into	   ‘obedience’…The	   inoffensiveness	   of	   the	  weak	  man,	  even	  the	  cowardice	  of	  which	  he	  has	  so	  much,	  his	  lingering	  at	  the	  door,	  his	  being	  ineluctably	  compelled	  to	  wait,	  here	  acquire	  flattering	  names,	  such	  as	  ‘patience,’	  and	  are	  even	  called	  virtue	  itself;	  his	  inability	  for	  revenge	  is	  called	   unwillingness	   to	   revenge,	   perhaps	   even	   forgiveness	   (‘for	   they	   know	  not	  what	  they	  do	  –	  we	  alone	  know	  what	  they	  do!’).	  They	  also	  speak	  of	  ‘loving	  one’s	  enemies’	  –	  and	  sweat	  as	  they	  do	  so.42	  	  	  	  	   What	  inspires	  Nietzsche’s	  ire	  here	  is	  twofold:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  is	  outraged	  by	   the	  manipulative	   and	   deceitful	  means	   through	  which	   the	  weak	   not	   only	   claim	  their	   lowliness,	   depravity,	   impotence	   and	  weakness	   as	   a	   choice	  but	   also	   celebrate	  these	   characteristics.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Nietzsche	   is	   disturbed	   by	   the	   effect	   that	  their	  deceitfulness	  has	  on	  the	  nobility,	  the	  master	  race.	  Here	  we	  encounter	  the	  third	  way	  in	  which	  Nietzsche	  devalues	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  slave,	  standing	  instead	  on	  the	  side	  of	   the	   master.	   As	   Stringer	   puts	   it,	   he	   engages	   a	   reverse	   victimology	   whereby	   he	  mourns	  the	  effects	  of	  slave	  morality	  on	  the	  master.	  Specifically,	  he	  mourns	  the	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  Neoliberal	  Times,	  138.	  42	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals,	  47.	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technology	  with	  which	   the	  slave	  reproaches	   the	  master	   for	  his	  strength,	  his	  will	  to	  
power,	  creating	  in	  him	  a	  sense	  of	  “bad	  conscience”	  or	  guilt.43	  As	  Stringer	  explains,	  	  It	  is	  the	  slaves	  who	  invent	  the	  concepts	  of	  guilt,	  responsibility,	  blame	  and	  ethical	  consideration	  of	  the	  victimized	  other.	  These	  concepts	  (slave	  morality)	  act	  like	  poison	  on	  the	  healthy	  body	  of	  the	  noble,	  signalling	  a	  degenerative	  turn	  in	  the	  course	  of	  human	  history…The	  nobles’	  untrammelled	  will	  to	  power	  is	  crippled	  by	  slave	  morality’s	  transformation	  of	  how	  human	  action	  is	  conceived.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  slave	  morality	  the	  beast	  of	  prey	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  what	  he	  is.	  His	  good	  conscience	  and	  animal	  innocence	  are	  destroyed	  by	  feelings	  of	  shame	  and	  guilt	  as	  he	  succumbs	  to	  the	  ‘ugly	  growth’	  of	  bad	  conscience.44	  	  	   For	  Nietzsche	  then,	  it	  is	  the	  master	  who	  is	  the	  true	  victim	  in	  this	  developing	  drama,	  not	  the	  slave.	  Indeed,	  even	  in	  the	  moments	  in	  which	  he	  does	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  “the	   oppressed”	   or	   “the	   deprived,”	   his	   sympathies	   still	   lie	  with	   the	  master.	   In	   his	  view,	  we	  remember,	  human	  prosperity	  depends	  on	  the	  masterful	  domination	  of	  the	  nobility	  over	  the	  lowly	  masses	  who	  should	  sacrifice	  themselves	  to	  it.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  naturalization	  of	   the	  master/slave	  relationship,	  his	   focus	  on	  the	  slave’s	   deceitful	   imagining	   of	   free	   will	   and	   transvaluation	   of	   values,	   and	   his	  lamenting	  of	  the	  “victimizing”	  effects	  of	  these	  on	  the	  master,	  demonstrate	  an	  abiding	  support	   for	   those	   who	   dominate	   and	   a	   corresponding	   disdain	   for	   those	   who	   are	  dominated.	   For	   this	   reason,	   it	   would	   be	   correct	   to	   interpret	   his	   charge	   of	  
ressentiment	  as	  an	  unquestionably	  disparaging	  one.	  
What	  would	  a	  charge	  of	  ressentiment	  that	  stands	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  oppressed	  
look	   like?	   From	   an	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   perspective,	   it	   is	   unthinkable	   to	   speak	   of	   a	  
reaction	   to	   oppression	   without	   considering	   the	   very	   oppression	   that	   is	   being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  I	  borrow	  the	  term	  “moral	  technology”	  from	  Stringer	  (see	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  
Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim’”).	  44	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  137-­‐138.	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responded	  to.	  How	  might	  the	  current	  exploration	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  ressentiment	  change	   once	   this	   oppression	   is	   considered?	   The	   next	   section	   attempts	   to	   balance	  Nietzsche’s	  bias	   for	   the	  master	  by	   considering	   the	   story	  of	   the	   slave.	   I	   do	   this	  not	  necessarily	  to	  clear	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  from	  the	  charge	  of	  ressentiment	  but	  rather	  to	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  dialogue	  whereby	  we	  might	  grapple	  with	  some	  of	  our	  limiting	  tendencies.	  	  	  
The	  Story	  of	  the	  Slave	  	   As	  Stringer	  warns,	  diagnostic	  uses	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  ressentiment	  are	  susceptible	   to	  victim-­‐blaming,	  whereby	  “the	  diagnostician	  of	  ressentiment	  assumes	  the	   role	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   ascetic	   priest,	   encouraging	   the	   resentful	   towards	  introspective	  self-­‐blame.”45	  If	  we	  recall	  from	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  I	  discussed	  how	  Nietzsche	  furnishes	  the	  ascetic	  priest	  with	  the	  task	  of	  re-­‐directing	  the	  ressentiment	  of	  the	  masses	  inward	  so	  that	  they	  are	  encouraged	  to	  blame	  themselves	  for	  their	  own	  disempowerment.	  As	  Stringer	  suggests,	  accounts	  of	  feminist	  ressentiment	  that	  fail	  to	  take	   Nietzsche’s	   bias	   against	   the	   slave	   into	   consideration	   risk	   engaging	   in	  “resubordinative	   self-­‐blame,”	   rather	   than	   “productive	   reflexivity.”46 	  In	   order	   to	  undertake	   an	   exercise	   in	   productive	   reflexivity,	   in	   which	   the	   ressentimental	  tendencies	  of	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  are	  examined,	   this	   investigation	  must	  be	  placed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  slave’s	  experience	  of	  oppression	  –	  that	  is,	  our	  experience	  as	  women	  of	  colour.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  Neoliberal	  Times,	  113.	  46	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  386.	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As	  identified	  in	  the	  preceding	  section,	  Nietzsche’s	  inherent	  prejudice	  against	  the	   slave	   prevents	   him	   from	   empathizing	   with	   the	   slave’s	   plight	   and	   seeing	  
ressentiment	   in	  anything	  but	  a	  reproachful	   light.	  To	  give	  voice	   to	   the	  pain	  of	   those	  who	   suffer,	   however,	   takes	   us	   deeper	   into	   the	   psyche	   of	   ressentiment.	   Indeed,	   I	  suggest	   that	   it	   is	   the	   pain	   of	   oppression	   that	   forms	   the	   primary	   emotional	  substratum,	  upon	  which	  ressentiment	  grows	  as	  a	  secondary	  affective	  configuration.	  Uncovering	  this	  pain	   can	   thus	   lead	   to	   a	   fuller	  understanding	  of	   the	   ressentimental	  practices	   –	   the	   calling-­‐out,	   spokespersonship,	   allyship,	   checking	   privilege	   –	   that	  were	  identified	  earlier.	  How	  do	  we	  begin	  to	  capture	  the	  pain	  of	  racism	  and	  sexism?47	  The	   pain	   that	  many	   of	   us	   know	   so	   intimately	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists?	   Indeed,	   the	  pain	  that	  most	  likely	  made	  us	  turn	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  	  	  Understanding	   the	  nature	   of	   pain	  has	   not	   been	   an	   easy	   task	   for	   scholars.48	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  works	  on	  pain,	  Elaine	  Scarry’s	  The	  Body	  in	  Pain,	  argues	  for	  the	  inexpressibility	  of	  physical	  suffering.	  As	  Scarry	  claims,	  	  Whatever	  pain	  achieves,	  it	  achieves	  in	  part	  through	  its	  unsharability,	  and	  it	  ensures	  this	  unsharability	  through	  its	  resistance	  to	  language…	  Physical	  pain	  does	   not	   simply	   resist	   language	   but	   actively	   destroys	   it,	   bringing	   about	   an	  immediate	  reversion	  to	  a	  state	  anterior	  to	  language,	  to	  the	  sounds	  and	  cries	  a	  human	  being	  makes	  before	  language	  is	  learned.49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  While	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  psychic	  harms	  of	  racialization	  in	  this	  section,	  there	  are	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  studies	  interested	  in	  identifying	  racism’s	  impact	  on	  the	  body.	  Indeed,	  these	  investigations	  have	  shown	  that	  racist	  encounters	  “cumulatively…act	  like	  sort	  of	  low-­‐grade	  microtraumas	  that	  can	  then	  end	  up	  hurting	  you	  and	  your	  biology.	  It’s	  not	  just	  having	  your	  feelings	  hurt.	  It’s	  having	  your	  biology	  hurt	  as	  well,”	  quote	  from	  Dr.	  Roberto	  Montenegro	  in	  Rae	  Ellen	  Bichell,	  “Scientists	  Start	  To	  Tease	  Out	  The	  Subtler	  Ways	  Racism	  Hurts	  Health,”	  
NPR,	  November	  11,	  2017.	  48	  This	  section	  by	  no	  means	  offers	  an	  exhaustive	  summation	  of	  critical	  perspectives	  on	  pain	  in	  contemporary	  scholarship.	  	  49	  Elaine	  Scarry,	  The	  Body	  in	  Pain:	  The	  Making	  and	  Unmaking	  of	  the	  World	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  4.	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For	   Scarry,	   physical	   pain	   is	   an	   immutably	   interior	   experience,	   which	   can	   only	   be	  known	   by	   the	   one	   who	   suffers.	   To	   know	   someone	   else’s	   pain	   is	   invariably	   a	  knowledge	  that	  is	  marred	  with	  doubt,	  as	  one	  can	  never	  truly	  grasp	  what	  the	  other	  feels.	  	   Veena	  Das	  counters	  Scarry’s	  contention	  by	  making	  a	  case	  for	  the	  “alternative	  forms	   of	   language	   and	  meditation	   that	   we	   can	   rely	   upon	   in	   order	   to	   understand	  pain.”50	  Looking	  at	  the	  violence	  of	  partition	  in	  India	  that	  resulted	  in	  100,000	  women	  being	  abducted	  and	  raped,	  Das	  asks	  “how	  one	  should	  inhabit	  such	  a	  world	  that	  has	  been	  made	   strange	   through	   the	   desolating	   experience	   of	   violence	   and	   loss.”51	  She	  analyzes	  women’s	  incantations	  of	  lament	  and	  rituals	  of	  mourning	  as	  ways	  in	  which	  certain	   types	   of	   pain	   can	   be	   expressed,	   while	   other	   forms	   of	   pain	   –	   such	   as	   that	  associated	   with	   sexual	   violence	   –	   are	   introjected	   by	   the	   victim	   to	   be	   housed	   in	  silence	  within	  them.	  Unlike	  Scarry	  who	  emphasizes	  the	   isolation	  that	  accompanies	  pain,	  Das	  traces	  the	  relational	  and	  social	  aspects	  of	  it:	  In	  this	  movement	  between	  bodies,	   the	  sentence	  "I	  am	  in	  pain"	  becomes	  the	  conduit	   through	   which	   I	   may	   move	   out	   of	   an	   inexpressible	   privacy	   and	  suffocation	   of	   my	   pain.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   I	   am	   understood.	  Wittgenstein	  uses	  the	  route	  of	  a	  philosophical	  grammar	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  indicative	  statement,	  although	  it	  may	  have	  the	  formal	  appearance	  of	  one.	  It	   is	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   language	   game.	   Pain,	   in	   this	   rendering,	   is	   not	   that	  inexpressible	  something	  that	  destroys	  communication	  or	  marks	  an	  exit	  from	  one's	   existence	   in	   language.	   Instead,	   it	   makes	   a	   claim	   asking	   for	  acknowledgment,	  which	  may	   be	   given	   or	   denied.	   In	   either	   case,	   it	   is	   not	   a	  referential	  statement	  that	  is	  simply	  pointing	  to	  an	  inner	  object.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Amali	  Ibrahim,	  “The	  (In)Communicability	  of	  Pain:	  Some	  Issues	  from	  the	  Anthropology	  of	  Violence,”	  The	  Reading	  Group,	  December	  28,	  2006,	  5.	  	  51	  Veena	  Das,	  “Language	  and	  Body-­‐	  Transactions	  in	  the	  Construction	  of	  Pain,”	  Daedalus	  125,	  no.	  1	  (Winter	  1996):	  67.	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Das,	   along	   with	   Arthur	   Kleinman	   and	   Margaret	   Lock	   “sugges[t]	   that	   we	  should	   move	   away	   from	   looking	   at	   pain	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   experienced	   by	   the	  individual	   to	   looking	   at	   the	   social	   dimensions	   of	   pain,	   or	   how	   pain	   can	   be	  experienced	   by	   a	   collectivity.”52	  For	   my	   purposes,	   this	   idea	   of	   collective	   pain,	   or	  what	  these	  authors	  term	  “social	  suffering”	  better	  captures	  the	  experiences	  of	  racial	  and	  gendered	  forms	  of	  oppression	  that	  this	  dissertation	  explores.	  This	  allows	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  pain	  that	  recognizes	  “that	  pain	  is	  not	  just	  a	  sensation	  that	  merely	  resides	  in	   the	   individual	   body	   but	   it	   is	   also	   a	   condition	   that	   has	   been	   produced	   by	  overarching	   structures	   of	   power	   in	   the	   society.”53	  While	   physical	   violence	   is	  most	  certainly	   one	   aspect	   of	   such	   oppression,	   Das	   and	   Scarry’s	   analyses	   do	   not	  adequately	  offer	  us	  a	  means	  of	  conceptualizing	  the	  “‘soft	  knife’	  of	  routine	  processes	  of	  ordinary	  oppression.”54	  	   Amali	  Ibrahim	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  recognizing	  forms	  of	  pain	  beyond	  physical	  violence,	  including	  emotional	  suffering.	  He	  examines	  Lisa	  Green’s	  ethnography	  on	  Mayan	  widows	  whose	  husbands	  were	  murdered	  by	  Guatemalan	  military	  forces	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  in	  a	  campaign	  to	  obliterate	  left-­‐wing	  insurgents,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  discussing	  how	  the	  fear	  experienced	  by	  these	  widows	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  type	  of	  social	  suffering.	  Specifically,	  he	  calls	  attention	  to	  how	  their	  psychological	  distress	  damages	  their	  “ontological	  security”	  by	  “creat[ing]	  a	  situation	  where	  one	  cannot	  trust	  oneself,	  one’s	  own	  judgments	  and	  one’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Amali	  Ibrahim,	  “The	  (In)Communicability	  of	  Pain:	  Some	  Issues	  from	  the	  Anthropology	  of	  Violence,”	  8.	  53	  Amali	  Ibrahim,	  9.	  54	  Kleinman	  et	  al.	  in	  Amali	  Ibrahim,	  8.	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surroundings.”55	  While	  the	  Mayan	  case	  is	  certainly	  not	  one	  of	  “ordinary	  oppression,”	  UK-­‐based	  psychotherapist	  Guilaine	  Kinouani	  applies	  the	  concept	  of	  ontological	  (in)security	  to	  experiences	  of	  racialization.	  Using	  R.D.	  Laing’s	  work,	  she	  argues	  that,	  “racism	  implies	  the	  systematic	  negation	  of	  the	  other	  coupled	  with	  a	  wilful	  effort	  to	  deny	  them	  every	  attribute	  of	  humanity	  including,	  the	  fundamental	  capacity	  to	  know	  reality	  and	  indeed	  trust	  the	  reality	  as	  they	  apprehend	  it.”56	  White	  denial	  of	  this	  racism,	  in	  turn,	  “can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  depriving	  people	  of	  colour	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  know	  themselves	  and	  to	  integrate	  all	  aspects	  of	  their	  self,	  as	  we	  are	  socialised	  into	  cutting	  ourselves	  off	  from	  our	  phenomenological	  reality.”57	  For	  many	  of	  us,	  it	  was	  the	  work	  of	  Frantz	  Fanon	  that	  first	  exposed	  us	  to	  what	  it	  might	  look	  like	  to	  articulate	  the	  deeply	  fragmenting	  and	  ontologically	  destabilizing	  effects	  of	  racialization.	  As	  he	  famously	  narrates	  in	  Black	  Skin,	  White	  Masks:	  	  "Look,	  a	  Negro!"	  It	  was	  an	  external	  stimulus	  that	  flicked	  over	  me	  as	  I	  passed	  by.	  I	  made	  a	  tight	  smile.	  "Look,	  a	  Negro!"	  It	  was	  true.	  It	  amused	  me.	  "Look,	  a	  Negro!"	   The	   circle	   was	   drawing	   a	   bit	   tighter.	   I	   made	   no	   secret	   of	   my	  amusement.	  "Mama,	  see	  the	  Negro!	  I'm	  frightened!"	  Frightened!	  Frightened!	  Now	   they	  were	   beginning	   to	   be	   afraid	   of	  me.	   I	  made	  up	  my	  mind	   to	   laugh	  myself	  to	  tears,	  but	  laughter	  had	  become	  impossible.	  I	  could	  no	  longer	  laugh,	  because	   I	   already	   knew	   that	   there	   were	   legends,	   stories,	   history…	   Then,	  assailed	  at	  various	  points,	  the	  corporeal	  schema	  crumbled,	  its	  place	  taken	  by	  an	  epidermal	   schema…Nausea…	   I	  was	   responsible	  at	   the	   same	   time	   for	  my	  body,	   for	   my	   race,	   for	   my	   ancestors.	   I	   subjected	   myself	   to	   an	   objective	  examination,	   I	   discovered	   my	   blackness,	   my	   ethnic	   characteristics;	   I	   was	  battered	   down	   by	   tom-­‐toms,	   cannibalism,	   intellectual	   deficiency,	   fetishism,	  racial	  defects,	  slave-­‐ships,	  and	  above	  all	  else,	  above	  all:	  "Sho'	  good	  eatin'."	  On	  that	  day,	  completely	  dislocated,	  unable	  to	  be	  abroad	  with	  the	  other,	  the	  white	  man,	   who	   unmercifully	   imprisoned	   me,	   I	   took	   myself	   far	   from	   my	   own	  presence,	  far	  indeed,	  and	  made	  myself	  an	  object.	  What	  else	  could	  it	  be	  for	  me	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	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  Guilaine	  Kinouani,	  “White	  Denial,	  Black	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but	  an	  amputation,	  an	  excision,	  a	  hemorrhage	  that	  spattered	  my	  whole	  body	  with	   black	   blood?	   …	   Where	   shall	   I	   hide?	   "Look	   at	   the	   n****r!	   …	   Mama,	   a	  Negro!	  …	  Hell,	  he's	  getting	  mad	  …	  Take	  no	  notice,	  sir,	  he	  does	  not	  know	  you	  are	  as	   civilized	  as	  we…"	  My	  body	  was	  given	   to	  me	  sprawled	  out,	  distorted,	  recolored,	  clad	  in	  mourning	  in	  that	  white	  winter	  day.	  The	  Negro	  is	  an	  animal,	  the	  Negro	  is	  bad,	  the	  Negro	  is	  mean,	  the	  Negro	  is	  ugly;	  look,	  a	  n****r,	  it's	  cold,	  the	  n****r	  is	  shivering,	  the	  n****r	  is	  shivering	  because	  he	  is	  cold,	  the	  little	  boy	  is	   trembling	  because	  he	   is	   afraid	   of	   the	  n****r,	   the	  n****r	   is	   shivering	  with	  cold,	   that	   cold	   that	   goes	   through	   your	   bones,	   the	   handsome	   little	   boy	   is	  trembling	  because	  he	  thinks	  that	  the	  n****r	  is	  quivering	  with	  rage,	  the	  little	  white	  boy	  throws	  himself	  into	  his	  mother's	  arms:	  Mama,	  the	  n****r's	  going	  to	  eat	  me	  up…58	  	  	  Fanon’s	   haunting	   account	   cogently	   traces	   the	   phenomenological	   movement	   from	  subject	  to	  object.	  He	  recalls	  how	  it	  feels	  to	  become	  an	  object,	  a	  mere	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  pointed	   at	   by	   a	   (white)	   child	   on	   the	   train.	   In	   this	   passage,	  we	   encounter	   Fanon’s	  ontological	   crumbling.	   His	   initial	   amusement	   implies	   a	   subject,	   a	   sense	   of	  personhood	   capable	   of	   reacting	   to	   the	   world.	   His	   ability	   to	   laugh	   is	   soon	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  gaze	  that	  “assails”	  his	  corporeal	  integrity,	  replacing	  it	  with	   the	   fact	   of	   his	   blackness.	  He	   feels	   himself	   disintegrate,	   breaking	   apart	   into	  competing	   selves	   as	   his	   individuality	   is	   both	   radically	   erased	   and	   replaced	   by	  dehumanizing	  racial	  stereotypes.	  Unable	  to	  recover	  himself,	  he	  disassociates,	  taking	  refuge	  in	  an	  amputated	  existence.	  	  I	   suggest	   that	   Fanon’s	   narrative	   is	   not	   just	   powerful	   due	   to	   his	   skill	   in	  capturing	   and	   giving	   words	   to	   the	   psychic	   violence	   of	   his	   experience	   but	   also	  because	  of	  his	  ability	   to	  capture	  how	  many	  people	  of	   colour	  also	   feel	   in	   racialized	  encounters.	  In	  being	  pointed	  to	  and	  called	  a	  “Negro!”	  Fanon	  witnesses	  what	  it	  feels	  like	  to	  be	  named	  by	  the	  dominant	  Other	  and	  the	  hurtful	  and	  dehumanizing	  effects	  of	  this	  naming.	  Indeed	  to	  be	  called	  a	  “Negro”	  or	  “black	  girl”	  or	  “brown	  girl”	  carries	  with	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it	   stubborn	   and	   all-­‐encompassing	   images,	   histories,	   and	   ideas	   –	   all	   of	   which	   are	  coded	  as	  “different,”	  “strange,”	  “backward,”	  “ugly,”	  and	  almost	  uniformly	  bad.	  To	  be	  a	   person	   of	   colour	   in	   a	   racialized	   society	   is	   an	   experience	   of	   humiliation.	   An	  experience	  that	  is	  rife	  with	  many	  reminders	  of	  one’s	  inherent	  inferiority,	  immutable	  difference,	  and	  undesirability.	  It	  is	  an	  experience	  in	  which	  one’s	  individual	  qualities	  and	  personality	   are	   routinely	   erased	   in	   favour	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   degrading	  beliefs	  that	  come	  to	  be	  projected	  onto	  one’s	  body	  –	  a	  deeply	  painful	  experience	  that	  Fanon	  describes	  with	  profound	  acuity.	  	  On	   a	   different	   train,	   some	   years	   later,	   Audre	   Lorde	   offers	   us	   another	   vivid	  depiction	  of	  racism:	  The	  AA	  subway	  train	  to	  Harlem.	  I	  clutch	  my	  mother’s	  sleeve,	  her	  arms	  full	  of	  shopping	  bags,	  christmas-­‐heavy.	  The	  wet	  smell	  of	  winter	  clothes,	  the	  train’s	  lurching.	  My	  mother	  spots	  an	  almost	  empty	  seat,	  pushes	  my	  little	  snowsuited	  body	  down.	  On	  one	  side	  of	  me	  a	  man	  reading	  a	  paper.	  On	  the	  other,	  a	  woman	  in	  a	  fur	  hat	  staring	  at	  me.	  Her	  mouth	  twitches	  as	  she	  stares	  and	  then	  her	  gaze	  drops	  down,	  pulling	  mine	  with	  it.	  Her	  leather-­‐gloved	  hand	  plucks	  at	  the	  line	  where	  my	   new	   blue	   snowpants	   and	   her	   sleek	   fur	   coat	  meet.	   She	   jerks	   her	  coat	  close	  to	  her.	  	  I	  look.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  whatever	  terrible	  thing	  she	  is	  seeing	  on	  the	  seat	  between	  us	  –	  probably	  a	  roach.	  But	  she	  has	  communicated	  her	  horror	  to	  me.	  It	  must	  be	   something	   very	   bad	   from	   the	   way	   she’s	   looking,	   so	   I	   pull	   my	   snowsuit	  closer	  to	  me	  away	  from	  it,	   too.	  When	  I	   look	  up	  the	  woman	  is	  still	  staring	  at	  me,	   her	   nose	   holes	   and	   eyes	   huge.	   And	   suddenly	   I	   realise	   there	   is	   nothing	  crawling	  up	  the	  seat	  between	  us;	  it	  is	  me	  she	  doesn’t	  want	  her	  coat	  to	  touch.	  The	  fur	  brushes	  my	  face	  as	  she	  stands	  with	  a	  shudder	  and	  holds	  on	  to	  a	  strap	  in	  the	  speeding	  train.	  	  Born	  and	  bred	  a	  New	  York	  City	  child,	   I	  quickly	  slide	  over	  to	  make	  room	  for	  my	  mother	  to	  sit	  down.	  No	  word	  has	  been	  spoken.	  I’m	  afraid	  to	  say	  anything	  to	  my	  mother	  because	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  I	  have	  done.	  I	  look	  at	  the	  side	  of	  my	  snow	  pants	  secretly.	  Is	  there	  something	  on	  them?	  Something’s	  going	  on	  here	  I	  do	  not	  understand,	  but	   I	  will	  never	   forget	   it.	  Her	  eyes.	  The	   flared	  nostrils.	  The	  hate.59	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	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   Similar	  to	  Fanon’s	  narrative,	  Lorde	  invites	  us	  into	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  racialization	  as	  we	  see	  it,	  in	  this	  case,	  inflected	  with	  class	  contempt.	  We	  follow	  her	  as	  she	  recalls	  her	  confusion	  as	  a	  small	  child,	  slowly	  realizing	  that	  the	  loathsome	  gaze	  of	  the	  white	  woman	  next	  to	  her	  is	  aimed	  at	  her.	  Indeed,	  she	  discovers	  that	  this	  “very	  bad”	  thing	  that	  has	  evoked	  this	  woman’s	  horror	  is	  not	  a	  roach	  between	  the	  seats,	  or	  something	  on	  her	  snowsuit	  but	  she,	  herself.	  Lorde	  leaves	  us	  with	  the	  double	  image	  of	  her	  shame,	  as	  she	  sits	   in	  confusion	  over	  what	  she	  “has	  done,”	  and	   the	  woman’s	  look	  of	  hatred	  that	  still	  haunts	  her	  so	  many	  years	  later.	  	  As	  in	  Fanon’s	  account,	  Lorde’s	  recollection	  emphasizes	  the	  power	  of	  the	  gaze.	  The	   women’s	   disdain	   and	   disgust	   are	   palpable	   to	   the	   little	   girl,	   who	   clearly	  comprehends	  that	  the	  woman	  is	  responding	  to	  something	  horrible.	  The	  moment	  in	  which	   she	   realizes	   that	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   her	   that	   is	   this	   hateful	   thing	   is	   marked	   with	  confusion	   and	   shame.	   To	   be	   the	   object	   of	   disgust	   and	   hatred	   is	   a	   confusing	   and	  shameful	   thing	   for	   those	   of	   us	   who	   have	   felt	   it.	   Lorde’s	   encounter	   is	   even	   more	  resonant	  due	  to	  the	  unspoken	  nature	  of	  the	  racism.	  It	  is	  more	  common	  than	  not	  to	  be	  in	  situations	  where	  racism	  and	  sexism	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  oppressions)	  are	  conveyed	  in	   silent	   ways	   that	   nonetheless	   are	   immediately	   perceptible	   to	   those	   who	  experience	   them.	   These	   messages	   invariably	   communicate	   that:	   You	   don’t	   belong	  
here.	  You	  are	  not	  as	  good	  as	  we	  are.	  	  A	  final	  story,	  Nellie	  Wong’s	  poem	  “When	  I	  Was	  Growing	  Up,”	  echoes	  many	  of	  these	  themes	  and	  how	  they	  become	  internalized	  in	  the	  psyche:	  	  I	  know	  now	  that	  once	  I	  longed	  to	  be	  white.	  How?	  you	  ask.	  
	   130	  
Let	  me	  tell	  you	  the	  ways.	  	   when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  people	  told	  me	  I	  was	  dark	  and	  I	  believed	  my	  own	  darkness	  in	  the	  mirror,	  in	  my	  soul,	  my	  own	  narrow	  vision	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  my	  sisters	  with	  fair	  skin	  got	  praised	  for	  their	  beauty,	  and	  in	  the	  dark	  I	  fell	  further,	  crushed	  between	  high	  walls	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  read	  magazines	  and	  saw	  movies,	  blonde	  movie	  stars,	  white	  skin,	  sensuous	  lips	  and	  to	  be	  elevated,	  to	  become	  a	  woman,	  a	  desirable	  woman,	  I	  began	  to	  wear	  imaginary	  pale	  skin	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  was	  proud	  of	  my	  English,	  my	  grammar,	  my	  spelling	  fitting	  into	  the	  group	  of	  smart	  children	  smart	  Chinese	  children,	  fitting	  in,	  belonging	  (getting	  in	  line)	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up	  and	  went	  to	  high	  school,	  I	  discovered	  the	  rich	  white	  girls,	  a	  few	  yellow	  girls,	  their	  imported	  cotton	  dresses,	  their	  cashmere	  sweaters,	  their	  curly	  hair	  and	  I	  thought	  that	  I	  too	  should	  have	  what	  these	  lucky	  girls	  had	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  hungered	  for	  American	  food,	  American	  styles,	  coded:	  white	  and	  even	  to	  me,	  a	  child	  born	  of	  Chinese	  parents,	  being	  Chinese	  was	  feeling	  foreign,	  was	  limiting,	  was	  un-­‐American	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up	  and	  a	  white	  man	  wanted	  to	  take	  me	  out,	  I	  thought	  I	  was	  special,	  an	  exotic	  gardenia,	  anxious	  to	  fit	  the	  stereotype	  of	  an	  oriental	  chick	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  felt	  ashamed	  of	  some	  yellow	  men,	  their	  small	  bones,	  their	  frail	  bodies,	  their	  spitting	  on	  the	  streets,	  their	  coughing,	  their	  lying	  in	  sunless	  rooms,	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shooting	  themselves	  in	  the	  arms	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  people	  would	  ask	  if	  I	  were	  Filipino,	  Polynesian,	  Portuguese.	  They	  named	  all	  colors	  except	  white,	  the	  shell	  of	  my	  soul,	  but	  not	  my	  dark,	  rough	  skin	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  felt	  dirty.	  I	  thought	  that	  god	  made	  white	  people	  clean	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  I	  bathed,	  I	  could	  not	  change,	  I	  could	  not	  shed	  my	  skin	  in	  the	  gray	  water	  	  when	  I	  was	  growing	  up,	  I	  swore	  I	  would	  run	  away	  to	  purple	  mountains,	  houses	  by	  the	  sea	  with	  nothing	  over	  my	  head,	  with	  space	  to	  breathe,	  uncongested	  with	  yellow	  people	  in	  an	  area	  called	  Chinatown,	  in	  an	  area	  I	  later	  learned	  was	  a	  ghetto,	  one	  of	  many	  hearts	  of	  Asian	  America	  	  I	  know	  now	  that	  once	  I	  longed	  to	  be	  white.	  How	  many	  more	  ways?	  you	  ask.	  Haven't	  I	  told	  you	  enough?60	  	   Wong’s	  poem	  is	  able	  to	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  persistent	  and	  recurrent	  features	  of	   the	   lived	  experience	  of	   racialized,	   gendered,	   and	   classed	  oppression.	  We	   follow	  Wong	  as	   she	   is	   first	   informed	  of	  her	   “darkness”	  –	   a	   category	   that	   clearly	  excludes	  beauty.	   She	   comes	   to	   internalize	   this	  discovery,	   believing	  her	  darkness	   to	  be	  who	  she	   truly	   is	   (“in	   the	   mirror,	   in	   my	   soul,	   my	   own	   narrow	   vision”).	   Despite	   this	  imprisonment	   of	   race,	   Wong	   desperately	   attempts	   to	   transcend	   its	   unwelcomed	  imposition,	   seeking	   instruction	   in	   magazines	   on	   how	   to	   become	   “a	   woman,	   a	  desirable	  woman.”	  She	  is	  unable	  to	  escape	  her	  “darkness,”	  however,	  no	  matter	  how	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Nellie	  Wong,	  “When	  I	  Was	  Growing	  Up,”	  in	  This	  Bridge	  Called	  My	  Back,	  Fourth	  Edition:	  
Writings	  by	  Radical	  Women	  of	  Color,	  ed.	  Cherríe	  Moraga	  and	  Gloria	  Anzaldúa	  (SUNY	  Press,	  2015),	  5–6.	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much	  she	  bathes,	  fantasizes	  of	  being	  white,	  or	  perfects	  her	  English.	  Her	  experience	  is	  one	  of	  perpetual	  longing.	  That	  is,	  a	  longing	  for	  the	  imported	  clothes	  and	  curly	  hair	  of	   her	   richer	   classmates,	   a	   longing	   for	  American	   food	   and	   styles,	   and	  ultimately	   a	  longing	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  world	  she	   is	   immutably	  barred	  from	  as	  a	  Chinese-­‐American	  girl.	  Regardless	  of	  this,	  Wong	  is	  still	  desperate	  to	  fit	  in,	  even	  if	  it	  means	  conforming	  to	  a	  fetishized	  stereotype	  of	  the	  “oriental	  chick”	  in	  exchange	  for	  limited	  acceptance.	  Her	  poem	  is	  also	  marked	  by	  a	  deep	  shame	  –	  at	  the	  “dirtiness”	  of	  her	  skin,	  at	  the	  sight	  of	   “some	   yellow	   men”	   shooting	   up	   in	   dark	   rooms.	   In	   the	   final	   few	   passages	   we	  encounter	  Wong’s	   fantasy	   of	   escape,	   sensing	   that	   underlying	  her	  dream	  of	   fleeing	  her	  crowded	  and	  impoverished	  Chinatown	  neighbourhood,	  is	  a	  wish	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	  her	  racialized	  and	  gendered	  experience	  as	  well.	  	  Wong’s	  account,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  Fanon	  and	  Lorde	  intensely	  capture	  the	  pain	  that	  many	  of	  us	  know	  intimately	  as	  women	  of	  colour.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  few	  especially	  salient	  points	  of	  convergence	  in	  their	  accounts.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  deep	  feeling	  of	  exclusion.	  The	  authors	  of	  all	   three	  stories	  very	  strongly	  feel	  that	  they	  do	  not	   belong.	   Their	   “otherness”	   or	   “strangeness”	   is	   moreover	   something	   that	   they	  cannot	  transcend,	  no	  matter	  their	  efforts.	  	  Secondly,	  this	  difference	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  inferiority.	  This	  inferiority	  is	  first	   imposed	  externally,	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  dehumanizing	  stereotypes	  and	  beliefs,	  which	   are	   then	   internalized	   emotionally.	   As	   we	   see	   in	   Lorde’s	   account,	   her	   early	  encounter	  with	  the	  white	  woman	  on	  the	  train	  teaches	  her	  that	  she	  is	  contemptible,	  something	   that	   she	   later	   “accepts”	   as	   true.	  Wong	   similarly	  writes	   of	   how	   she	   gets	  called	  dark,	  and	  then	  later	  starts	  believing	  in	  her	  darkness.	  The	  black	  man,	  as	  Fanon	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recounts,	  is	  mean,	  bad,	  and	  ugly,	  next	  to	  the	  handsome	  little	  boy	  who	  cowers	  in	  his	  presence.	   It	   is	   Fanon’s	   internalization	   of	   these	   beliefs	   that	   leads	   to	   his	  fragmentation.	  	  The	   fragmentation,	   self-­‐objectification,	   and	   self-­‐loathing	   of	   racialization	   are	  the	   third	   point	   I	   raise.	   The	   hatred,	   fear,	   exclusion,	   invisibility/hyper-­‐visibility	   and	  mockery	   that	  one	   feels	  at	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  dominant	  group	  radically	  disturb	  one’s	  ability	   to	   form	   a	   consistent	   and	   affirmative	   subjectivity.	   These	   assaults	   can	   be	  explicit	   and	   violent,	   or	   silent	   and	   subtle.	   No	   matter	   their	   form,	   they	   invariably	  damage	  the	  psychic	  health	  of	  the	  recipient	  who	  is	  repeatedly	  told:	  you	  are	  not	  good	  
enough	   and	   that	   you	   don’t	   belong	   here.	   These	   feelings	   often	   then	   result	   in	   a	  pervading	  sense	  of	  shame	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  deep	  unworthiness.	  	  Fourthly,	   the	   experience	   of	   racialization	   is	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   one’s	  experience	   of	   gender	   and	   class.	   Fanon’s	   experience	   in	   the	   train	   is	   that	   of	   a	  professional	   black	   man,	   just	   as	   Lorde	   and	   Wong’s	   experiences	   are	   that	   of	   poor	  women	   (or	   child	   in	   Lorde’s	   case)	   of	   colour.	  We	  might	  make	   a	   further	   distinction	  between	   the	   type	   of	   racial	   category	   that	   is	   imposed	   on	   one	   seeing	   as	   a	   Chinese	  woman	  undoubtedly	  experiences	  race	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  than	  a	  black	  woman	  in	  North	  America.	  What	  I	  would	  like	  to	  emphasize,	  however,	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  overarching	  messages	  remain	  the	  same.	  These	  messages	  tell	  women	  of	  colour	  from	  a	   very	   young	  age	   that	  we	  are	   inherently	  unworthy,	   unwanted,	   and	  deeply	   flawed.	  The	   profound	   psychic	   pain	   of	   these	   messages	   is	   further	   compounded	   by	  corresponding	  rates	  of	  physical	  and	  emotional	  forms	  of	  violence,	  social	  and	  cultural	  exclusion,	  and	  economic	  deprivation.	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Finally,	   Das’	   thesis	   on	   the	   communicability	   of	   pain	   is	   upheld	   by	   these	   very	  writings	  offered	  by	  Fanon,	  Lorde,	  and	  Wong,	  which	  demonstrate	  how	  language	  can	  be	   used	   to	   express	   suffering.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   mark	   that	   the	   type	   of	   suffering	  articulated	  in	  these	  passages	  is	  emotional	  in	  nature	  and	  not	  physical.	  Still,	   Ibrahim	  stresses	   how	   diverse	   textual	   and	   visual	   representations	   can	   allow	   victims	   of	  emotional	   and	   physical	   social	   suffering	   to	   express	   their	   pain.	   This	   dissertation	  argues	  that	  this	  pain	  also	  finds	  its	  expressibility	  in	  the	  rage,	  hatred,	  moral	  reproach,	  and	   vengefulness	   of	   ressentiment.	   It	   is	   this	   pain	   that	   must	   be	   acknowledged	   and	  honoured	   while	   engaging	   in	   a	   self-­‐reflexive	   critique	   of	   certain	   ressentimental	  tendencies	  and	  practices	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  argue	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	   it	   is	   in	   facing	  and	   feeling	   this	  pain	   that	  we	  might	   avoid	  getting	   “stuck”	   in	  
ressentiment.	  	  Nietzsche’s	   insistence	   on	  oppression	   as	   a	   natural	   expression	  of	   the	  master,	  rather	  than	  a	  calculating	  capacity	  to	  objectify,	  deprive,	  and	  harm;	  and	  his	  refusal	  to	  see	  the	  violent	  impact	  of	  this	  oppression	  on	  the	  slave	  as	  a	  human	  suffering	  (rather	  than	  a	  suffering	  tethered	  to	  weakness)	  marks,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Das,	  a	  failing	  not	  “of	  the	   intellect	   but	   [a]	   failing	   of	   the	   spirit,”61	  and	   indeed,	   is	   something	   that	  must	   be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  when	  using	  his	  concept	  of	  ressentiment.	  	  
An	  Active	  Ressentiment?	  	   In	   the	   last	   section,	   I	   discussed	   the	  way	   in	  which	  Nietzsche’s	   preference	   for	  the	   master	   and	   disdain	   for	   the	   slave	   poses	   a	   serious	   limitation	   to	   the	   use	   of	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Das,	  “Language	  and	  body,”	  67.	  Das,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  referring	  to	  Nietzsche	  here	  specifically,	  but	  to	  anyone	  who	  denies	  the	  pain	  of	  the	  other.	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concept	   in	   engaging	   in	   a	   sympathetic	   self-­‐critique	   of	   certain	   tendencies	   and	  practices	   that	   display	   ressentimental	   characteristics	   within	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism.	  This	   section	   looks	  at	  a	   second	  key	   limit,	  one	   that	   concerns	   the	  appropriateness	  of	  
ressentiment	   in	   its	   application	   to	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism.	   This	   limit	   concerns	   action,	  that	  is,	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  strong	  tradition	  in	  engaging	  in	  active	  resistance,	  revolt,	  protest,	  radical	  scholarship,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  agentic	  behaviour.	  This	  indisputable	  aspect	   of	   the	   movement	   challenges	   charges	   of	   ressentiment	  made	   by	   Brown	   and	  other	   scholars,	   seeing	   as	   ressentiment	   as	   envisioned	  by	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler	   is	   a	  fundamentally	   impotent	  psychological	  disposition.	  While	  Brown	  and	  others	  do	  not	  attend	   to	   this	   contradiction,	   Rebecca	   Stringer	   does.	   Indeed,	   Stringer	   offers	   a	   re-­‐reading	  of	  Nietzsche	  that	  incorporates	  action	  into	  his	  schema.	  Moreover,	  she	  argues	  that	  not	  only	   is	  action	  possible	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  ressentiment	  but	  that	   in	  the	  feminist	   context,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   emancipatory.	   This	   subsection	   focuses	   on	   the	  question	   of	   action	   within	   ressentiment	   while	   the	   next	   looks	   at	   its	   potential	  usefulness	  for	  emancipatory	  aims.	  Let	   us	   recall	   that	   a	   central	   characteristic	   of	   the	   slave	   is	   his	   fundamental	  impotence	  outside	  of	  his	  transvaluation	  of	  values.	  We,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  regularly	  and	  as	  we	  have	  observed,	  often	  forcefully,	  speak	  our	  truths	  and	  
act	   in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	   Indeed,	  calling-­‐out	   is	  a	   form	  of	  action,	  as	   is	  protesting	  at	  rallies,	  and	  engaging	  in	  feminist	  scholarship,	  among	  many	  other	  forms.	  In	  Scheler’s	  formulation	  of	  ressentiment,	  the	  mere	  shaking	  of	  the	  slave’s	  fist	  would	  constitute	  the	  action	   necessary	   to	   discharge	   his	   resentful	   feelings.	   Does	   this	   signal	   the	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inapplicability	  of	  ressentiment	   to	   the	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  context	  or	  might	   there	  be	  another	  way	  to	  account	  for	  its	  active	  nature?	  	  Stringer’s	   work	   attempts	   to	   not	   only	   discuss	   this	   contradiction	   but	   also	  resolve	   it	   by	   reading	  action	   into	   ressentiment.	  She	   accomplishes	   this	   by	   locating	   a	  third	   stage	   in	   Nietzsche’s	   formulation	   of	   the	   concept.	   	   As	   Stringer	   argues,	  
ressentiment	   can	   be	   formulated	   as	  moving	   through	   three	   distinct	  moments.62	  The	  first	  has	  been	   termed	   the	   “noncreative”	  or	   “brute”	   stage	  and	  refers	   to	   the	  starting	  condition	  in	  which	  the	  slave	  is	  “maximally	  repressed.”63	  	  The	  second	  is	  the	  “creative”	  stage,	   or	   the	  moment	   in	  which	   the	   slave	   says	   “no”	   and	   actively	   inverts	   dominant	  values,	  marking	  the	  beginnings	  of	  slave	  morality.	  The	  third	  stage,	  argues	  Stringer,	  is	  the	   one	   in	   which	   emancipatory	   action	   is	   possible.	   As	   she	   posits,	   this	   third	   stage	  refers	  to	  the	  explosive	  moment	  in	  ressentiment,	  whereby	  the	  slave	  revolts	  against	  the	  master.	   For	   Stringer,	   Nietzsche	   only	   acknowledges	   this	   stage	   implicitly	   in	   his	  discussion	   of	   the	   two	   strategies	   by	  which	   ressentiment	   can	   be	   contained	   so	   as	   to	  protect	  the	  social	  order.	  As	  she	  reasons:	  	  That	  creative	  ressentiment	  has	  an	  explosive	  quality	  and	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  sociopolitical	  order	  within	  which	  it	  appears	  is	  clear	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  account	  of	   this	   threat	   (anarchy)	  but	  also	   from	   the	   time	  he	  spends	  detailing	   the	   two	  primary	  strategies	  the	  powerful	  employ	  to	  diffuse	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  slaves	  who	  contest	  their	  social	  constitution	  as	  slaves.64	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Stringer	  follows	  Ridley	  and	  Deleuze	  in	  making	  this	  distinction.	  See	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  
Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  Neoliberal	  Times,	  132.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  her	  book,	  Stringer	  goes	  further	  to	  posit	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  fourth	  phase	  that	  entails	  “a	  refusal	  of	  asceticism	  that	  assumes	  the	  form	  of	  ‘reclaiming’	  slave	  morality	  and	  undertakes	  the	  work	  of	  disarticulating	  its	  ‘best	  ideas’	  from	  their	  ascetic	  double”	  (155).	  63	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  141.	  	  64	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  148.	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We	  recall	  from	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  two	  tactics	  of	  managing	  
ressentiment	   consist	   of	   legalism	   and	   the	   ascetic	   priest	   –	   both	   geared	   toward	   the	  
redirection	  of	  ressentiment.	  Nietzsche	  describes	   legalism	  as	  a	  mechanism	  by	  which	  those	  who	  dominate	  can	  quell	  the	  ressentiment	  of	  the	  masses.	  This	  is	  accomplished:	  	  	  …partly	   by	   taking	   the	   object	   of	   ressentiment	   out	   of	   the	   hands	   of	   revenge,	  partly	  by	  substituting	  for	  revenge	  the	  struggle	  against	  the	  enemies	  of	  peace	  and	  order,	  partly	  by	  devising	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  imposing	  settlements,	  partly	  by	  elevating	  certain	  equivalences	  for	  injuries	  into	  norms	  to	  which	  from	  then	  on	  ressentiment	  is	  once	  and	  for	  all	  directed.65	  	  	  Legalism	  thus	  provides	   the	  powerful	  with	  an	  effective	  means	  of	   redirecting	  the	  rancorous	   feelings	  of	   the	  weak	  by	   furnishing	   them	  with	  an	   institution	  through	  which	  their	  injuries	  might	  be	  addressed.	  Stringer	  notes	  that	  feminist	  reformism,	  that	  is,	   feminist	   efforts	   to	   seek	   redress	   through	   the	   law,	   operates	   in	   precisely	   this	  manner.	   These	   efforts	   have	   resulted	   in	   changes	   in	   legislation	   around	   sexual	  violence,	   employment	   equity,	   reproductive	   rights,	   and	   many	   others.	   	   In	   such	  instances,	   however,	   “law	   reform	   is	   no	   substitute	   for	   substantive	   socio-­‐political	  change,	   and	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   extending	   the	   power	   of	   law	   to	   divert,	   contain	   and	  recuperate	   radical	   political	   projects	   and	   energies.” 66Legalism,	   thus,	   ultimately	  functions	  as	  a	  re-­‐subordinative	  device	  that	  prevents,	  or	  at	   least	  postpones,	  a	  more	  radical	  reckoning	  with	  power.	  For	  Stringer,	  Nietzsche’s	  framing	  of	  legalism	  in	  such	  a	  manner	   gestures	   towards	   his	   acknowledgment	   that	   such	   an	   active	   reckoning	   is	  indeed	  possible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Nietzsche,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Ecce	  Homo,	  75.	  66	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  150-­‐151.	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Nietzche’s	   second	   strategy	   for	   the	   containment	   of	   ressentiment	   provides	  Stringer	  with	   further	  evidence	   for	   its	   explosive	  and	  active	  potentiality:	   the	  ascetic	  priest.	   The	   ascetic	   priest	   can	   be	   described	   as	   a	   “liminal”	   figure	   that	   straddles	   the	  boundary	  between	   the	  weak	  and	   the	  strong.	  67	  Despite	  his	  ability	   to	   feign	  strength	  and	   dominate	   over	   the	   weak,	   the	   ascetic	   priest,	   whose	   role	   it	   is	   to	   contain	   and	  redirect	  the	  ressentiment	  of	  the	  masses,	  is	  also	  infected	  with	  the	  very	  disease	  that	  he	  treats.	   Nietzsche	   describes	   the	   priest	   as	   performing	   a	   number	   of	   tasks,	   which	  simultaneously	  protect	  the	  weak	  from	  the	  wiles	  of	  the	  strong	  while	  also	  preventing	  the	   weak	   from	   infecting	   the	   strong	   with	   their	   weakness.	   Like	   with	   legalism,	  however,	  the	  most	  important	  task	  of	  the	  priest	  is	  the	  rerouting	  of	  ressentiment.	  He	  redirects	   the	   ressentimental	   feelings	   of	   the	   weak	   squarely	   back	   on	   themselves	  stating,	  “you	  alone	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  yourself!”68	  	  As	  Nietzsche	   describes,	   the	   priest	   does	   this	   through	   “such	   paradoxical	   and	  paralogical	   concepts	   as	   ‘guilt,’	   ‘sin,’	   ‘sinfulness,’	   ‘depravity,’	   [and]	   ‘damnation’”	   in	  order	  to	  “render	  the	  sick	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  harmless,	  to	  work	  the	  self-­‐destruction	  of	  the	  incurable,	  to	  direct	  the	  ressentiment	  of	  the	  less	  severely	  inflicted	  sternly	  back	  upon	   themselves	  –	  and	   in	   this	  way	  exploit	   the	  bad	   instincts	  of	  all	   sufferers	   for	   the	  purpose	   of	   self-­‐discipline,	   self-­‐surveillance,	   and	   self-­‐overcoming.” 69 	  As	   can	   be	  gathered	  from	  this	  description,	  Nietzsche	  has	  no	  trust	  in	  the	  ascetic	  priest’s	  ability	  to	  offer	  a	  true	  cure	  to	  the	  suffering	  of	   the	  weak.	  The	  most	  he	  can	  do	   is	  anesthetise	  their	  pain,	  and	  for	  this,	  Nietzsche	  commends	  Christianity	  as	  “a	  great	  treasure	  house	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  151.	  68	  Nietzsche,	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Ecce	  Homo,	  128.	  69	  Nietzsche,	  128.	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of	  ingenious	  means	  of	  consolation.”70	  Indeed	  for	  Nietzsche,	  the	  function	  of	  all	  world	  religions	  is	  to	  combat	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  masses.	  	  Nietzsche	   lists	   a	   number	   of	   methods	   in	   which	   the	   ascetic	   priest	   employs	  religion	  as	  a	  means	  of	  offering	  consolation,	   including	  1)	  deadening	  desire	   through	  reducing	   the	   feeling	   of	   life	   (religious	   escapism);	   2)	   mechanical	   activity	   (“the	  blessings	   of	   work”)71;	   3)	   petty	   pleasure	   (especially	   love	   of	   one’s	   neighbour);	   4)	  congregation	   (communal	   feelings	   of	   power);	   and	   5)	   “orgies	   of	   feeling”	  (overwhelming	  one’s	  pain	  with	   the	  evocation	  of	  a	  stronger	  emotion).72	  As	  Stringer	  describes,	   this	   “range	  of	   labours	   the	  priest	   performs	   through	   this	   interweaving	  of	  suffering,	  guilt	  and	  sin…are	  designed	  to	  dispel	  the	  slave’s	  ‘discontent	  with	  his	  lot’	  by	  encouraging	  them	  towards	  obedience	  rewarded	  with	  redemption	  in	  the	  afterlife.”73	  According	   to	   Stringer,	   it	   is	   in	   this	  way	   that	   the	   priest	   redirects	   the	   slave’s	   energy	  away	  from	  the	  “explosive	  threat	  of	  ressentiment.”74	  How	  convincing	   is	  Stringer’s	  argument	  regarding	   the	  existence	  of	   this	   third	  and	  explosive	  stage	  of	  ressentiment?	  A	  stage	  in	  which	  the	  slave	  might	  act	  against	  the	  master?	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Stringer’s	   question	   is	   certainly	   compelling:	   why	   does	  Nietzsche	  expend	  so	  much	  energy	  expounding	  methods	  by	  which	  ressentiment	  can	  be	  contained	  if	  it	  poses	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  powerful	  (with	  whom	  he	  aligns	  himself)?	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  envision	  the	  slave	  as	  a	  
threat	  –	  a	  point	  that	  he	  does	  not	  conceal.	  Indeed,	  perhaps	  the	  central	  purpose	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Nietzsche,	  130.	  71	  Nietzsche,	  134.	  	  72	  Nietzsche	  expounds	  these	  methods	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  his	  Genealogy,	  131-­‐139.	  73	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  152.	  74	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  152.	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Genealogy	   is	   to	   awaken	  his	   contemporaries	  precisely	   to	   this	   threat.	   I	  would	  argue	  that	   it	   is	   the	  nature	  of	   this	   threat	   that	   is	   actually	   being	   contested	   here.	   Nietzsche	  clearly	  decries	  the	  imposition	  of	  slave	  morality,	  seeing	  it	  as	  posing	  an	  imminent	  and	  serious	  danger	  to	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  the	  noble.	  He	  certainly	  fears	  the	  slave	  might	  “infect”	  and	  “emasculate”	  the	  master	  with	  his	  inverted	  world	  of	  values	  that	  celebrate	  weakness	   while	   reprimanding	   strength.	   As	   he	   laments,	   “undoubtedly	   if	   they	  succeeded	  in	  poisoning	  the	  consciences	  of	  the	  fortunate	  with	  their	  own	  misery,	  with	  all	  misery,	  so	  that	  one	  day	  the	  fortunate	  began	  to	  be	  ashamed	  of	  their	  good	  fortune	  and	  perhaps	  said	  to	  one	  another:	  ‘it	  is	  disgraceful	  to	  be	  fortunate:	  there	  is	  too	  much	  
misery!”75	  It	   is	   this	   “poisoning	   of	   the	   consciences”	   that	   Nietzsche	   refers	   to	   as	   the	  “ultimate,	   subtlest,	   sublimest	   triumph	   of	   revenge.”76	  For	   him,	   it	   is	   a	   triumph	   that	  follows	   a	   slow	   attrition	   of	   the	   master	   by	   the	   slave,	   whose	   “inexhaustible	   and	  insatiable…outbursts	   against	   the	   fortunate	   and	   happy”	   and	   “masquerades	   of	  revenge	  and	  pretexts	   for	   revenge”	   finally	  wear	   the	  master	  down,	  undermining	  his	  trust	  in	  life,	  in	  humanity	  and	  in	  himself.77	  	  There	  are	  a	  few	  things	  to	  note	  here.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  Nietzsche	  does	  fear	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  “reckoning”	  in	  which	  the	  weak	  will	  overtake	  the	  strong.	  He	  describes	  this,	   however,	   as	   a	  moral	   reckoning.	   In	   fact	   he	   locates	   the	   first	   instance	   of	   this	  struggle	  in	  the	  slave	  revolt	  two	  thousand	  years	  earlier.	  His	  present	  fear	  concerns	  the	  spread	  and	  contagion	  of	  these	  values,	  and	  worldview	  as	  he	  sees	  them	  slowly	  seeping	  into	  the	  moral,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  fabric	  of	  European	  society.	  The	  second	  thing	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Nietzsche,	  124,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  76	  Nietzsche,	  124.	  77	  Nietzsche,	  124,	  122.	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note	  is	  that	  this	  moral	  reckoning	  does	  include	  practices	  that	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  action.	  Indeed,	  as	  we	  see	  above,	  Nietzsche	  refers	  to	  the	  “inexhaustible	  and	  insatiable	  outbursts”	  of	  the	  slave	  against	  the	  master.	  What	  can	  furthermore	  be	  discerned	  from	  his	  description	  of	  Legalism	  is	  that	  the	  masses	  must	  protest/lobby/make	  demands	  in	  order	   for	   the	   institution	   to	   serve	   its	   mediating	   function.	   Somewhat	   of	   a	  contradiction	  can	  thus	  be	  located	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  account.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  refers	  to	  the	  man	  of	  ressentiment	  as	  he	  who	  “understands	  how	  to	  keep	  silent,	  how	  not	  to	  forget,	   how	   to	   be	   provisionally	   self-­‐deprecating	   and	   humble.” 78 	  The	   man	   of	  
ressentiment	  is	  distinctly	  “poor,	  impotent	  [and]	  lowly.”79	  And	  yet,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	   is	   also	   capable	   of	   limitless	   outbursts,	   reproachful	   moralizing,	   and	   seeking	  remediation	  through	  the	  Law.	  	  As	   Stringer	   emphasizes,	   the	   subject	   of	   ressentiment	   also	   nurtures	   an	  “explosive”	   quality.	   How	   does	   Nietzsche	   describe	   this?	   In	   a	   reference	   to	   “priestly	  aristocracies,”	  he	  mentions	  their	  “unhealthy”	  ascetic	  habits	  which	  “turn	  them	  away	  from	   action	   and	   alternate	   between	   brooding	   and	   emotional	   explosions.” 80 	  In	  another	  reference,	  Nietzsche	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ascetic	  priest:	  “he	  fights	  with	  cunning	   and	   severity	   and	   in	   secret	   against	   anarchy	   and	   ever-­‐threatening	  disintegration	   within	   the	   herd,	   in	   which	   the	   most	   dangerous	   of	   all	   explosives,	  
ressentiment,	   is	   constantly	  accumulating.	  So	   to	  detonate	   this	  explosive	   that	   it	  does	  not	  blow	  up	  herd	  and	  herdsman	  is	  his	  essential	  art,	  as	  it	  is	  his	  supreme	  utility.”81	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Nietzsche,	  38.	  	  79	  Nietzsche,	  34.	  80	  Nietzsche,	  32.	  81	  Nietzsche,	  126-­‐127.	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What	   can	   be	   made	   of	   these	   accounts?	   What	   exactly	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   this	  explosive	   capacity?	   In	   the	   first	   instance	   it	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   emotional	  explosiveness	   framed	   in	   opposition	   to	   action.	   In	   the	   second,	   Nietzsche	   describes	  
ressentiment	   as	   a	   constantly	   accruing	   explosive	   energy	   that	   threatens	   to	   wreak	  anarchy	  within	   the	   herd	   –	   so	   as	   to	   “blow	   up”	   both	   the	   herd	   (the	   ressentimental	  masses)	  and	  the	  herdsman	  (the	  ascetic	  priest).	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  here	  to	  the	  master	  class,	  we	  might	  infer	  that	  anarchy	  and	  disintegration	  in	  the	  herd	  and	  the	   annihilation	   of	   the	   priest	   would	   undoubtedly	   affect	   the	   nobility	   –	   especially	  given	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ascetic	  priest	  is	  to	  separate	  the	  herd	  from	  the	  master	  class.	  The	   question	   still	   remains	   as	   to	  what	   form	   this	   explosion	  might	   take	   and	   exactly	  how	   it	   would	   threaten	   the	   masses.	   It	   is	   Stringer’s	   assertion	   that	   this	   explosive	  quality	   translates	   into	  an	   “actual	   reckoning”	  which	   leads	   to	  an	   “unruly	  break	  with	  obedience	  and	  act[s]	  as	  the	  potential	  source	  of	  the	  slave’s	  power	  in	  the	  world.”82	  For	  Stringer,	  “by	  recasting	  enslavement	  as	  a	  preventable	  wrong	  rather	  than	  a	  necessary	  sacrifice,	  [the]	  slave	  revolt	  opens	  social	  being	  to	  contingency,	  enabling	  the	  slave	  to	  imagine	  becoming	  something	  other	  than	  a	  slave.”83	  I	  agree	  with	  Stringer	  that	  ressentiment	  offers	  the	  necessary	  moral	  scaffolding	  upon	  which	  the	  slave	  can	  realize	  his	  ontological	  contingency,	  and	  it	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	   contingency	   that	   he	  may	   agitate	   for	   change.	   I	  would	   like	   to	   suggest	   however,	  that	   his	   agitations	   are	   severely	   circumscribed	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   his	   ressentimental	  disposition	  –	  so	  much	  so	  that	  Nietzsche	  repudiates	  their	  active	  dimension.	  That	   is,	  given	  the	  reactive	  character	  of	  ressentiment,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Nietzsche	  recognizes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  330.	  83	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  Neoliberal	  Times,	  142.	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the	  slave’s	  ability	  to	  speak	  and	  act	  in	  the	  world	  (remember,	  his	  silence	  and	  humility	  are	   only	  provisional)	   but	   denies	   their	   affirmative,	   productive,	   and	   creative	  nature,	  thus	  rejecting	   them	  as	  constituting	   true	   action.	  Thus,	  my	  view	  here	   is	   that	  while	  a	  third	  active	   stage	   can	   be	   read	   into	   ressentiment,	   I	   doubt	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   this	  stage	   possesses	   the	   explosive	   and	   transformative	   potentiality	   that	   Stringer	  attributes.	  I	  explore	  this	  further	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
A	  Transformative	  Ressentiment?	  	   As	   noted	   previously,	   Stringer	   not	   only	   reads	   action	   into	   ressentiment	   but	  
transformative	  potentiality.	  She	  does	  this	  by	  identifying	  a	  third	  and	  explosive	  stage	  in	   which	   the	   realization	   that	   “self	   and	   world	   could	   be	   otherwise…open[s]	   up	   the	  very	   possibility	   of	   identificatory	   resignification,	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   becoming	  something	   other	   than	  what	   one	   is	   considered.”84	  In	   realizing	   the	   free	  will	   of	   both	  himself	   and	   the	   master,	   the	   slave	   is	   presented	   with	   the	   prospect	   of	   “assuming	  political	   agency	   and	   claiming	   power	   in	   the	   world.”85	  For	   Stringer,	   ressentiment	   is	  thus	   positively	   interpreted	   “as	   an	   effect	   of	   domination	   that	   becomes	   a	   source	   of	  collective	  strength,	  creativity	  and,	  as	  such,	  a	  potent	  weapon	  against	  domination.”86	  Feminism,	  Stringer	  contends,	  has	  already	  entered	  this	  third	  and	  explosive	  stage.	  She	  admits	  that	  ressentiment	  does	  include	  the	  possibility	  of	  self-­‐subversion	  but	  she	  sees	  these	   self-­‐subversive	   tendencies	   as	   instances	   where	   the	   explosive	   element	   of	  
ressentiment	  has	  been	  diverted	  or	   contained.	  Stringer	   indeed	  regards	  ressentiment	  as	   somewhat	   of	   a	   “revolutionary	   spirit,”	   arguing	   that	   it	   is	   thus	   not	   “a	   matter	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  146.	  85	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  146.	  86	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	  133.	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moving	  feminism	  beyond	  ressentiment,	  but	  rather	  of	  retaining	  or	  regaining	  feminist	  
ressentiment’s	  explosive	  –	  that	  is,	   fierce,	   intelligently	  impertinent,	  uncompromising	  and	  plastically	  creative	  dimension.”87	  This	  is	  a	  dimension,	  she	  contends,	  that	  was	  at	  its	  peak	  during	  the	  women’s	  movement	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  but	  which	  has	  since	  been	  largely	  contained	  by	  political	  reformism.	  Stringer	  entrusts	  that	  the	  “cleverness”	  that	  Nietzsche	   accords	   to	   the	   slave	  will	   provide	   feminists	  with	   the	   self-­‐reflection	   they	  need	  to	  protect	  their	  political	  agenda	  from	  the	  lures	  of	  reformism	  that	  threaten	  their	  emancipatory	   aims.88	  In	   her	   final	   statement,	   Stringer	   constructs	   ressentiment	  as	   a	  necessary	   vehicle	   that	  will	   ultimately	   deliver	   feminists	   not	   only	   from	   the	   need	   of	  
ressentiment,	  but	  of	  feminism	  itself.89	  Stringer’s	   analysis	   offers	   a	   hopeful	   and	   redemptive	   analysis	   of	   the	  
ressentimental	  tendencies	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  Her	  work	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  questions,	  such	  as:	  Could	  it	  be	  that	  the	  practices	  of	  calling-­‐out,	  checking	  privilege,	  spokespersonship,	  allyship	  and	  the	  ressentimental	  emotions	  and	  logics	  that	  animate	  them,	  might	  fuel	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  revolution	  rather	  than	  thwart	  it?	  Could	  it	  be	  that	   anger,	   rage,	   suspicion,	   hatred,	   resentment	   and	   the	   desire	   to	   avenge	   are	   the	  exact	   ingredients	   that	   are	   needed	   to	   create	   transformative	   social	   change?	   In	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  354.	  In	  her	  later	  publication,	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  Victims:	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  Victim	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Times,	  Stringer	  would	  state	  that,	  “While	  the	  interpretation	  of	  feminism	  and	  ressentiment	  I	  have	  provided	  here	  departs	  from	  those	  articulated	  in	  existing	  theorizations	  of	  feminism	  and	  
ressentiment,	  I	  do	  ultimately	  agree	  that	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  move	  ‘beyond	  ressentiment’.	  However,	  I	  see	  this	  in	  the	  sociological	  sense	  of	  moving	  beyond	  socio-­‐political	  and	  economic	  arrangements	  that	  institute	  conditions	  of	  gaping	  inequality.	  Such	  a	  movement	  necessarily	  involves	  critiquing	  and	  countering	  the	  forms	  of	  discursive	  asceticism	  that	  attempt	  to	  rebaptize	  these	  conditions	  as	  the	  final	  shape	  of	  human	  freedom”	  (155).	  	  88	  Nietzche	  discusses	  the	  cleverness	  of	  the	  slave	  on	  page	  38	  of	  Genealogy.	  	  89	  In	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim.’”	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section	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   answer	   to	   these	  questions	   is	   both	  yes	   and	  no.	   I	   start	   by	  discussing	  some	  points	  of	  convergence	  with	  Stringer’s	  view	  before	  registering	  some	  concerns.	  	  Stringer’s	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  ressentiment	  continues	  the	  story	  of	  the	  slave	  that	  I	  began	  developing	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter.	  She	  chronicles	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	   slave’s	   suffering	   is	   inducted	   into	   a	   moral	   economy	   through	   which	   he	  understands	   his	   inferiority	   as	   contingent,	   rather	   than	   absolute.	   It	   is	   through	  developing	   this	   analysis	   that	   the	   slave	   is	   able	   to	   move	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   action	  against	  the	  master.	  That	  is,	   in	  realizing	  that	  the	  master/slave	  arrangement	  is	  not	  a	  
natural	  expression	  of	  power,	   the	  slave	  realizes,	   in	  Stringer’s	  words,	   that	   the	  socio-­‐political	   order	   is	   open	   to	   contingency.	   In	   (Western)	   feminism,	   this	  moment	   often	  came	   about	   through	   the	   practice	   of	   consciousness	   raising	   (C-­‐R)	   –	   a	   method	  developed	  by	  feminists	  during	  the	  women’s	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s.	  C-­‐R	  encourages	  women	   to	   come	   together	   and	   share	   their	   experiences	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  understanding	   how	   their	   particularistic	   suffering	   stems	   from	   socio-­‐political	  
oppression.	  As	  Sandra	  Bartky	  explains	  below,	   the	  resulting	  consciousness	   is	  one	  of	  both	  victimization	  (in	  realizing	  one’s	  oppression)	  and	  strength	  (in	  discovering	  one’s	  personal	  and	  collective	  power):	  	  Feminist	  consciousness	  is	  a	  consciousness	  of	  victimization	   ...	   to	  come	  to	  see	  oneself	  as	  a	  victim,	  to	  have	  such	  an	  altered	  perception	  of	  oneself	  and	  of	  one's	  society	   is	  not	   to	  see	   things	   in	   the	  same	  old	  way	  while	  merely	   judging	   them	  differently	  ...	  [t]he	  consciousness	  of	  victimization	  is	  a	  divided	  consciousness.	  To	  see	  myself	  as	  a	  victim	  is	  to	  know	  that	  I	  have	  already	  sustained	  injury,	  that	  I	   live	   exposed	   to	   injury,	   that	   I	   have	   been	   at	   worst	   humiliated,	   at	   best	  diminished	   in	  my	   being.	   But	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   feminist	   consciousness	   is	   a	  joyous	  consciousness	  of	  one's	  own	  power,	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  unprecedented	  personal	   growth	   and	   the	   release	   of	   energy	   long	   suppressed.	   Thus,	   feminist	  consciousness	   is	  both	   a	   consciousness	   of	  weakness	   and	   a	   consciousness	   of	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strength.	  But	  this	  division	  in	  the	  way	  we	  apprehend	  ourselves	  has	  a	  positive	  effect,	   for	   it	   leads	   to	   the	   search	   both	   for	   ways	   of	   overcoming	   those	  weaknesses	   in	   ourselves	  which	   support	   the	   system	  and	   for	   direct	   forms	  of	  struggle	  against	  the	  system	  itself.90	  	   The	  realization	  of	  one’s	  victimization	  is	  a	  startling	  experience	  –	  as	  I	  discussed	  in	  my	  self-­‐reflexive	  account.	  For	  women	  of	  colour,	  it	  is	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  we	  may	  learn	   that	   the	   rejection,	   inferiority,	   self-­‐loathing	   and	   shame	   that	   we	   know	   so	  intimately	  are	  not	  due	  to	  our	  intrinsic	  unworthiness	  but	  are	  rather	  expressive	  of	  a	  gendered/racial	   order	   that	   systematically	   devalues	  who	  we	   are	   and	  what	  we	   are	  able	   to	   contribute.	   For	   many	   of	   us,	   this	   discovery	   is	   met	   with	   intense	   anger.	   As	  Karen	  Mueller	   and	  Margie	  Whittaker	   Leidig	  write,	   this	   anger	   is	   often	   encouraged	  and	  even	  cultivated	  by	  C-­‐R	  groups:	  	  The	  Women’s	  Movement	   as	   a	   whole,	   both	   in	   its	   literature	   and	   its	   support	  groups,	   encourages	   the	   expression	   of	   women’s	   anger.	   The	   underlying	  message	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   its	   articles,	   research,	   stories	   is	   to	   encourage	  women	   to	  become	  aware	  of	  what	  has	  been	  done	   to	  women	  by	   institutions,	  ceremonies,	  patterns	  of	  thinking,	  and	  the	  domination	  of	  men,	  in	  general.	  The	  effect	   of	   this	   literature,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	  most	   consciousness-­‐raising	  (C-­‐R)	  groups	  is	  to	  produce	  anger	  in	  women	  because	  they	  realize	  the	  immensity	   of	   the	   conditioning	   system,	   its	   subtlety,	   and	   the	   universality	   of	  women’s	  experiences	  in	  this	  system.91	  	  	   Why	  might	  anti-­‐oppressionist	  struggles	  endeavour	  to	  produce	  anger?	  As	  the	  2014	  documentary,	  “She’s	  Beautiful	  When	  She’s	  Angry”	  vividly	  illustrates,	  anger	  acts	  as	   a	   crucial	   mobilizing	   force	   when	   facing	   oppressive	   institutions,	   beliefs	   and	  practices.	   The	   film,	   which	   chronicles	   the	   progression	   of	   the	   Women’s	   Liberation	  Movement	  from	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  present,	  features	  a	  number	  of	  angry	  protests,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Sandra	  Bartky,	  quoted	  in	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  134.	  91	  Karen	  Mueller	  and	  Margie	  Whittaker	  Leidig,	  “Women’s	  Anger	  and	  Feminist	  Therapy,”	  
Frontiers:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Women	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  3	  (1976):	  23–30.	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impassioned	   speeches	   that	   repudiate	   patriarchy,	   as	   well	   as	   racism,	   and	  heterosexism.	  As	  one	  feminist	  states	  in	  the	  film,	  "Maybe	  the	  anger	  was	  what	  carried	  us	  through	  and	  made	  us	  fearless.”92	  Although	   the	   above	   accounts	  make	   reference	   to	   the	  women’s	  movement	  of	  the	   1960s,	   and	   although	   consciousness-­‐raising	   no	   longer	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   same	  form	   as	   it	   did	   in	   the	   past,93	  anger	   remains	   a	   powerful	   force,	   both	   in	   the	   political	  awareness	  stage	  of	  feminism,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  politically	  active	  stage.	  Indeed,	  anger	  for	  feminists	  has	  also	  been	  praised	   for	   its	   transformative	  potentiality.	  As	  Audre	  Lorde	  discusses:	  	  Every	  woman	  has	  a	  well-­‐stocked	  arsenal	  of	  anger	  potentially	  useful	  against	  those	  oppressions,	  personal	  and	  institutional,	  which	  brought	  that	  anger	  into	  being.	   Focused	   with	   precision	   it	   can	   become	   a	   powerful	   source	   of	   energy	  serving	  progress	  and	  change.	  And	  when	   I	  speak	  of	  change,	   I	  do	  not	  mean	  a	  simple	   switch	   of	   positions	   or	   a	   temporary	   lessening	   of	   tensions,	   nor	   the	  ability	  to	  smile	  or	  feel	  good.	  I	  am	  speaking	  of	  a	  basic	  and	  radical	  alteration	  in	  those	  assumptions	  underlining	  our	  lives.94	  	  Thus,	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   emotions	   like	   anger	   can	   play	   an	  important	   role	   in	   instigating	   energy	   for	   social	   change.	  Anger	   as	   a	   shared	   emotion	  against	   an	   enemy,	   can	   also	   be	   the	   basis	   for	   reciprocal	   feelings	   of	   solidarity.	   As	  feminist	  social	  psychologist	  Carol	  Tavris	  posits:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Mary	  Dore,	  She’s	  Beautiful	  When	  She’s	  Angry,	  Documentary,	  2014.	  93	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  large	  part	  of	  consciousness-­‐raising	  takes	  place	  today	  in	  the	  university	  classroom.	  Indeed,	  for	  myself	  and	  many	  feminists	  of	  my	  generation	  –	  as	  discussed	  previously	  –	  it	  was	  our	  first	  year	  Women’s	  Studies	  classes	  that	  gave	  us	  the	  language	  and	  concepts	  with	  which	  to	  understand	  and	  speak	  about	  our	  experiences	  of	  oppression.	  94	  Audre	  Lorde,	  “The	  Uses	  of	  Anger:	  Women	  Responding	  to	  Racism”	  (National	  Women’s	  Studies	  Association	  Conference,	  Storrs,	  Connecticut,	  June	  1981).	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Rage,	  I	  believe,	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  a	  social	  movement.	  It	  unifies	  disparate	  members	  of	  a	  group	  against	  a	  common	  enemy;	  the	  group	  becomes	  defined	  by	  its	  anger.	  95	  	   This	  solidarity	  against	  a	  common	  enemy	  is	  not	  only	  politically	  advantageous	  but	  also,	  I	  suggest,	  offers	  members	  a	  wider	  sense	  of	  belonging	  that	  compensates	  for	  the	  societal	  exclusion	  that	  accompanies	  their	  oppression.	  Shared	  anger	  and	  rage	  can	  thus	   be	   pleasurable	   due	   to	   the	   feelings	   of	   inclusivity	   that	   they	   engender	   among	  individuals	   who	   share	   similar	   experiences	   of	   oppression	   –	   something	   that	   social	  movement	  theorists	  of	  emotion	  have	  also	  noted.96	  While	   anger	   may	   contain	   the	   potentiality	   to	   inspire	   political	   action	   and	  foment	   solidarity	  between	  members,	   the	   form	   that	   the	   anger	   takes,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  
type	   of	   political	   action	   and	   solidarity	   that	   it	   enables	   is	   largely	   determined	   by	   the	  
social	  character	  that	  it	  is	  informed	  by.	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  a	  ressentimental	  character	  mobilize	  feminist	  anger	  toward	  the	  goal	  of	  social	  and	  political	   transformation?	  We	  see	   that	   on	   Stringer’s	   view,	   it	   is	   ressentiment	   that	   produces	   not	   only	   the	  consciousness	  that	  is	  required	  for	  action	  but	  the	  creativity,	  courage,	  and	  cleverness	  with	   which	   to	   challenge	   domination	   and	   achieve	   emancipatory	   change.	   I	   believe	  Stringer	   is	   correct	   in	   identifying	   ressentiment’s	   ability	   to	   prepare	   the	   slave	   for	  transformative	  political	   action.	  Given	   the	  nature	  of	  ressentiment,	   however,	   I	   doubt	  the	   degree	   to	   which	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   the	   affirmative,	   visionary,	   and	   emancipatory	  action	  imputed	  by	  Stringer.	  	  In	  order	   to	  explain	   this	  view	   further,	   I	  would	   like	   to	  highlight	  a	   few	  points.	  The	  first	  concerns	  this	  nature	  of	  ressentiment	   that	  I	  refer	  to.	  Let	  us	  remember	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Carol	  Tavris,	  Anger:	  The	  Misunderstood	  Emotion	  (Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1989),	  272.	  96	  See	  Jasper,	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest”;	  Goodwin,	  Jasper,	  and	  Polletta,	  Passionate	  Politics.	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both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler	  refer	  to	  ressentiment’s	  “embittering”	  and	  “poisoning”	  of	  the	   personality.97	  It	   is	   a	   psyche	   that	   is	   effectively	   stuck	   in	   its	   feelings	   of	   hatred,	  bitterness,	  spite,	  anger,	  and	  suspicion.	  As	  Nietzsche	  describes,	  to	  be	  ressentimental	  is	  to	  hold	  grudges,	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  “get	  over”	  one’s	  psychological	  pain.98	  He	  compares	  the	   begrudging	   nature	   of	   the	   man	   of	   ressentiment	  with	   that	   of	   the	   noble	   in	   the	  following	  passage:	  
Ressentiment	   itself,	   if	   it	   should	   appear	   in	   the	  noble	  man,	   consummates	   and	  exhausts	   itself	   in	   an	   immediate	   reaction,	   and	   therefore	  does	  not	  poison:	   on	  the	   other	   hand,	   it	   fails	   to	   appear	   at	   all	   on	   countless	   occasions	   on	  which	   it	  inevitably	  appears	  in	  the	  weak	  and	  impotent….Such	  a	  man	  shakes	  off	  with	  a	  
single	  shrug	  many	  vermin	  that	  eat	  deep	  into	  others.99	  	   In	   comparison	   to	   the	   noble	   man	   described	   above,	   Nietzsche	   describes	   the	  
ressentimental	  weak	  as	  “dreadfully	  eager	  and	  inventive	  in	  discovering	  occasions	  for	  painful	   affects;	   they	   enjoy	   being	   mistrustful	   and	   dwelling	   on	   nasty	   deeds	   and	  imaginary	  slights;	  they	  scour	  the	  entrails	  of	  their	  past	  and	  present	  for	  obscure	  and	  questionable	   occurrences	   that	   offer	   them	   the	   opportunity	   to	   revel	   in	   tormenting	  suspicions	  and	  to	  intoxicate	  themselves	  with	  the	  poison	  of	  their	  own	  malice…”100	  As	  Nietzsche	  argues,	  the	  ressentimental	  psyche	  is	  one	  that	   is	  attached	  to	  its	  own	  pain,	  continually	  reinscribing	  this	  pain	  in	  both	  the	  past	  and	  the	  present.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  this	  suffering	  that	  affords	  the	  man	  of	  ressentiment	  the	  moral	  legitimacy	  upon	  which	  he	  is	  dependent.	  Moreover,	   ressentimental	   attachment	   to	   pain	   creates	   a	   certain	   type	   of	  “enjoyment,”	   what	   Scheler	   refers	   to	   as	   a	   “growing	   pleasure	   afforded	   by	   invective	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  See	  p	  20,	  36,	  and	  127	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  Genealogy;	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  p	  4	  and	  6	  in	  Scheler’s	  Ressentiment	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  some	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  98	  Nietzsche,	  Genealogy,	  129.	  	  99	  Nietzsche,	  39.	  100	  Nietzsche,	  127.	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and	  negation.”101	  The	  pleasure	  that	  arises	  in	  shared	  emotions	  of	  rage	  and	  anger,	  and	  the	  reciprocal	  feelings	  of	  belonging	  it	  creates,	  however,	  grows	  into	  a	  dependence	  on	  criticism	  and	  reproach	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  moral	  satisfaction.	  	  My	   second	   and	   related	  point	   is	   to	   emphasize	   ressentiment	  as	   an	   inherently	  
reactive	  disposition.	   Stringer	   describes	   how	   this	   reactive	   element	   operates	   in	   the	  second	  or	  “creative”	  stage	  as	  follows:	  Only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  initial	  negation	  of	  the	  master	  can	  the	  slave	  achieve	  an	  affirmative	  sense	  of	  self:	   ‘He	   is	  evil	   therefore	   I	  am	  good.’	  This	  places	   the	  slave’s	   affirmation	   of	   self	   as	   an	   immanent	   perversion	   of	   –	   rather	   than	   a	  transcendent	  alternative	  to	  –	  master	  morality,	  a	  reversal	  of	  its	  terms,	  which,	  as	   a	   reversal,	   remains	   dependent	   on	   those	   terms.	   The	   slave	   achieves	   self-­‐affirmation	   and	  breaks	  with	   self-­‐loathing,	   but	   only	   by	   shifting	   the	   terms	   of	  their	  dependence	  on	  the	  master,	  not	  by	  eliminating	  this	  dependence.	  In	  short,	  the	   slave	   achieves	   an	   immanent	   form	   of	   emancipation	   rather	   than	  emancipation	  as	  such.102	  	   If	  ressentiment	  in	  its	  creative	  stage	  can	  only	  be	  reactive	  in	  nature,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  a	  disposition	  that	  finds	  itself	  “stuck”	  in	  its	  negative	  affects,	  then	  how	  can	  it	  be	  trusted	  to	   produce	   anything	   outside	   of	   the	   very	   suffering	   that	   it	   is	   attached	   to?	   To	   the	  contrary,	   wouldn’t	   the	   very	   affects	   that	  motivate	   the	   action	   be	   deeply	   embedded	  
within	  the	  action?	  So	  that	  a	  bitter	  psyche	  might	  likely	  produce	  a	  bitter	  deed?	  Indeed,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  in	  light	  of	  the	  reactivity	  of	  ressentimental	  action	  that	  Nietzsche	  did	  not	  consider	  it	  to	  be	  action	  at	  all.	  In	  his	  view,	  after	  all,	  action	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  will	  
to	  power	  –	  a	  proud	  and	  affirmative	  demonstration	  of	  dominance	  and	  freedom.	  	  For	  my	  third	  point,	  I	  come	  back	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  pain.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  it	  is	  my	  belief	   that	  ressentiment	   can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	   secondary	  affective	   structure	  that	   effectively	   “sits”	   atop	   the	  more	   raw	   affects	   of	   rejection,	   exclusion,	   inferiority,	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  8.	  102	  Stringer,	  Knowing	  Victims,	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and	   shame.	   The	   ressentimental	   emotions	   of	   anger,	   hatred,	   spite,	  malice,	   suspicion	  and	   vengefulness	   lend	   the	   psyche	   a	   type	   of	   opacity	   that	   provides	   a	   protective	  distance	  from	  these	  more	  tender	  and	  vulnerable	  emotions.	  Nietzsche	  discusses	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  “overwhelming”	  and	  “deadening”	  effect:	  For	  every	  sufferer	  instinctively	  seeks	  a	  cause	  for	  his	  suffering;	  more	  exactly,	  an	  agent;	  still	  more	  specifically,	  a	  guilty	  agent	  who	  is	  susceptible	  to	  suffering	  –	   in	   short,	   some	   living	   thing	   upon	   which	   he	   can	   vent	   his	   affects:	   for	   the	  venting	   of	   his	   affects	   represents	   the	   greatest	   attempt	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	  suffering	   to	   win	   relief,	   anesthesia–	   the	   narcotic	   he	   cannot	   help	   desiring	   to	  deaden	   pain	   of	   any	   kind.	  	   This	   alone,	   I	   surmise,	   constitutes	   the	   actual	  physiological	   cause	   of	  ressentiment,	   vengefulness,	   and	   the	   like:	   a	   desire	   to	  
deaden	  pain	  by	  means	  of	  affects.	  This	  cause	  is	  usually	  sought,	  quite	  wrongly	  in	  my	   view,	   in	   defensive	   retaliation,	   a	   mere	   reactive	   protective	   measure,	   a	  ‘reflex	  movement’	  set	  off	  by	  sudden	  injury	  or	  peril,	  such	  as	  even	  a	  beheaded	  frog	   still	   makes	   to	   shake	   off	   a	   corrosive	   acid.	   But	   the	   difference	   is	  fundamental:	   in	   the	  one	  case,	   the	  desire	   is	   to	  prevent	  any	   further	   injury,	   in	  the	  other	  it	   is	  to	  deaden,	  by	  means	  of	  a	  more	  violent	  emotion	  of	  any	  kind,	  a	  tormenting,	  secret	  pain	  that	  is	  becoming	  unendurable,	  and	  to	  drive	  it	  out	  of	  consciousness	   at	   least	   for	   the	   moment:	   for	   that	   one	   requires	   an	   affect,	   as	  savage	  an	  affect	  as	  possible,	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  excite	  that,	  any	  pretext	  at	  all.103	  	  Some	   important	   insights	   can	   be	   gleaned	   here	   as	   to	   how	   the	   “violent	  emotions”	  of	  ressentiment	  might	  deaden	   the	   “tormenting,	   secret	  pain”	  of	   rejection,	  exclusion,	   inferiority,	   and	   shame	   “that	   is	   becoming	   unendurable.”	   Surely	   it	   is	   not	  difficult	  to	  understand	  how	  an	  oppressed	  person	  might	  choose	  to	  live	  in	  the	  anger	  of	  racism	  and	  sexism,	  rather	  than	  the	  raw	  hurt	  and	  shame	  of	  them.	  	  	  The	   topic	   of	   anger	   leads	   me	   to	   my	   fourth	   point:	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   effort	  should	  be	  made	  in	  separating	  the	  emotions	  within	  ressentiment	  from	  the	  emotional	  reactive	  body	  that	  we	  call	  ressentiment.	  Doing	  this	  reveals	  that	  emotions	  like	  anger	  or	  rage	  do	  not	  belong	   to	  ressentiment.	  Nor	   is	  ressentiment	  simply	  the	  sum	  of	  all	   its	  emotional	   parts.	   Rather,	   as	   I	   have	   discussed	   at	   some	   length,	   ressentiment	   can	   be	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thought	   of	   as	   a	   complex	   social	   character	   prone	   to	   certain	   mental	   and	   emotional	  formations.	   With	   this	   being	   said,	   one	   can	   surely	   appreciate	   the	   profound	  consciousness	  awakening	  and	  politically	  mobilizing	  role	  of	  emotions	  like	  anger	  and	  rage	  without	  advocating	  for	  a	  politics	  of	  ressentiment.	   Indeed,	  some	  feminists	  have	  been	  careful	  in	  separating	  their	  calls	  for	  anger	  from	  incitements	  to	  what	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  more	  ressentimental	  appeals	  to	  action.	  As	  Maya	  Angelou	  instructs:	  
You	  should	  be	  angry.	  You	  must	  not	  be	  bitter.	  Bitterness	  is	  like	  cancer.	  It	  eats	  upon	  the	  host.	   It	  doesn’t	  do	  anything	  to	  the	  object	  of	   its	  displeasure.	  So	  use	  that	  anger.	  You	  write	  it.	  You	  paint	  it.	  You	  dance	  it.	  You	  march	  it.	  You	  vote	  it.	  You	  do	  everything	  about	  it.	  You	  talk	  it.	  Never	  stop	  talking	  it.104	  Melina	   Bixler	   similarly	   provides	   a	   discerning	   account	   of	   anger	   in	   reference	   to	  feminism:	  Anger	   is	   the	  appropriate	   reaction	   to	  oppression,	  be	   it	   sexism,	   racism,	  classism,	  etc.	  Anger	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  not	  an	  internal	  feeling	  but	  an	  abstract	  conception	  that	  includes	  sensation	  and	  the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  It	   is	  an	  affect	  that	  moves	  between	  bodies.	  Anger	  won‘t	  destroy	  us.	  Demise	  will	  come	  from	  failing	  to	  hear,	  translate,	  process,	  and	  sculpt	  anger	  into	  something	  new.105	  	   Both	  Angelou	  and	  Bixler	  emphasize	  the	  useful	  as	  well	  as	  harmful	  implications	  of	  anger.	   Angelou’s	   warning	   against	   bitterness	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   devour	   its	   host	   is	  resonant	  with	  Nietzsche	   and	   Scheler’s	   descriptions	   of	   the	   toxicity	   of	   ressentiment.	  Bixler’s	   account	   also	   differentiates	   between	   anger	   as	   a	   fluid	   affect	   and	   healthy	  response	   to	   oppression,	   and	   the	   type	   of	   anger	   that	   becomes	   intractable.	   It	   is	   this	  latter	   type	   of	   anger,	   the	   anger	   that	   fails	   to	   hear,	   process,	   and	   transcend	   that	   she	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states	  will	  lead	  to	  our	  “demise.”	  It	  thus	  appears	  that	  some	  of	  the	  emotions	  that	  are	  attributed	  to	  ressentiment	  might	  play	  an	  intrinsic	  role	  in	  emancipatory	  struggle,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  actually	  crystalize	  into	  ressentiment	  itself.	  	  My	   last	   point	   pertains	   to	  what	   exactly	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	  might	   do	  with	   our	  pain	   so	   as	   to	   arrest	   the	   development	   of	   these	   emotions	   before	   they	   turn	  
ressentimental.	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   is	   that	   we	   must,	   in	  Nietzsche’s	   terminology,	  digest	   our	  pain,	   in	  order	   to	  emerge	   from	   it.	  This	   involves	  
feeling	  our	  pain	  in	  its	  fullness	  so	  that	  we	  might	  heal	  from	  it,	  rather	  than	  armouring	  ourselves	  with	  the	  psychic	  encasement	  of	  ressentiment.	  	  In	   her	   article	   “Moving	   Past	   Ressentiment:	   War	   and	   the	   State	   of	   Feminist	  Freedom,”	  Dina	  Georgis	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument.	  She	   laments	   that	   feminism	  has	  failed	   to	   teach	   us	   how	  we	  might	  mourn	   our	   pain,	   and	   in	   doing,	   has	   prevented	   us	  from	   moving	   past	   ressentiment.	   Using	   the	   work	   of	   Anne	   Anlin	   Cheng,	   Georgis	  considers	   the	   “psychic	   and	   social	   cost”	   of	   moving	   from	   grief,	   “the	   melancholic	  response	   from	   suffering	   injury	   such	   as	   discrimination,	   exclusion	   and	  dehumanization,”	   to	   grievance,	   “the	   act	   of	   speaking	   out	   against	   injury.”106	  Georgis	  discusses	   how	   grievance	   and	   resistance	   have	   often	   led	   to	   punitive	   or	   reparative	  action	  that	  buries	  grief	  rather	  than	  allows	  one	  to	  get	  acquainted	  with	  it.	  For	  Georgis,	  it	   is	   this	   grief	   that	   underlies	   our	   political	   identities,	   and	   it	   is	   this	   grief	   that	   we	  habitually	  ignore,	  keeping	  us	  locked	  in	  cycles	  of	  revenge	  and	  hatred.	  She	  notes	  that	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  within	   feminist	  politics	  as	  much	  as	   in	  state	  responses	   to	   terrorist	  attacks	   such	   as	   9/11.	   Georgis	   invites	   us	   to	   consider	   “what	   we	   can	   learn	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Dina	  Georgis,	  “Moving	  Past	  Ressentiment:	  War	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Feminist	  Freedom,”	  
TOPIA:	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Studies,	  no.	  20	  (September	  1,	  2008):	  118.	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resisting	   our	   compulsion	   to	   act	   out	  melancholically	   from	   injury	   and	   from	   being	  prepared,	  instead,	  to	  be	  touched	  by	  injury.”107	  So	  how	  might	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  “touch”	  our	  grief	  and	  what	  might	  this	  accomplish?	  Georgis	  suggests	  that	  this	  involves	  a	  process	  of	  mourning:	  For	  me,	  this	  is	  the	  work	  of	  mourning:	  giving	  up	  our	  defenses	  implies	  we	  can	  learn	   how	   to	   live	   with	   loss.	   Over	   the	   years	   we	   have	   seen	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  change	  made	  through	  battles.	  So	  perhaps	  it	  is	  now	  time	  to	  abandon	  ourselves	  to	  loss	  and	  mourn	  what	  in	  the	  past	  may	  have	  felt	  too	  dangerous.	  For	  Butler,	  mourning	  means	  that	  we	  are	  ready	  to	  allow	  ourselves,	  not	  to	  change,	  but	  to	  be	   changed	   by	   loss….While	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   I	   am	   suggesting	   that	   social	  change	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  being	  changed,	  my	  concern	  is	  that	  if	  we	  do	  not	  open	  ourselves	  up	   to	  being	  changed,	  we	  may	  not	  achieve	  meaningful	   social	  change.108	  	   Touching	   our	   pain	   and	  mourning	   our	   grief	   for	   Georgis	   thus	   involves	   a	   de-­‐armouring	   and	   a	   moving	   toward	   that	   which	   once	   felt	   too	   dangerous.	   Georgis	  discusses	  the	  “transformative	  effects	  of	   loss”	   that	  become	  available	  once	  we	  “open	  ourselves	  up	   to	  being	  changed”	  –	  an	  opening	   that	  Georgis	  believes	   is	  necessary	   to	  achieving	   transformative	   social	   change.	   So	   how	   might	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   move	  towards	  this	  opening	  and	  de-­‐armouring?	  Georgis	  provides	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  new	  philosophical	  framework	  based	  in	  recognizing	  the	  universality	  of	  suffering	  and	  loss,	  and	  our	  vulnerability	  to	  being	  hurt	  by	  one	  another.	  This,	  according	  to	  Georgis,	  could	  furnish	   us	   with	   a	   commonality	   that	   could	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   new	   humanism.	  Georgis’	   discussion	   on	   healing	   and	   exploration	   of	   a	   revisionary	   humanism	   is	   of	  especial	  significance	  to	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  dissertation	  and	  will	  be	  revisited	  then.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Georgis,	  119.	  108	  Georgis,	  123.	  For	  Butler’s	  work	  on	  loss,	  mourning,	  and	  melancholia,	  see	  The	  Psychic	  Life	  
of	  Power:	  Theories	  in	  Subjection	  (Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1997b);	  Precarious	  Life:	  The	  
Powers	  of	  Mourning	  and	  Violence	  (Verso,	  2006);	  and	  Undoing	  Gender	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2004).	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For	  now,	  however,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  provide	  some	  concluding	  remarks	  to	  sum	  up	  my	  discussion	  on	  ressentiment.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  mobilized	  the	  Nietzschean	  concept	  of	  ressentiment	  as	  a	  
social	   character	   that	   gives	   some	   insight	   into	   the	   psyche	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism.	   I	  have	  noted	  some	  similarities	  between	  certain	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  practices	  and	  the	  emotions	   and	   logics	   that	   underpin	   them,	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   ressentiment	   as	  developed	  by	  Nietzsche	  and	  Scheler.	  As	  I	  have	  argued,	  in	  order	  for	  this	  discussion	  of	  
ressentiment	   to	   be	   self-­‐reflexive	   in	   nature,	   as	   opposed	   to	   self-­‐lacerative,	   we	  must	  take	  into	  account	  our	  experiences	  of	  exclusion,	  humiliation,	  self-­‐hatred,	  and	  shame	  as	  women	  of	   colour.	   It	   is	   through	  distilling	   this	  under	   layer	  of	   ressentiment	   that	   a	  tendency	   toward	   ressentimental	   action	   (if	   we	   are	   to	   defy	   Nietzsche	   in	   calling	   it	  
action)	   is	   entirely	   understandable	   given	   its	   protective	   function.	   In	   terms	   of	   its	  transformative	  potentiality,	  however,	  I	  disagree	  with	  Stringer	  due	  to	  the	  inherently	  
reactive	  and	   self-­‐subversive	  nature	  of	  ressentiment.	   I	   am	  doubtful	  as	   to	  how	  such	  a	  psyche	   can	   betray	   its	   own	   character	   to	   engender	   creative,	   productive,	   and	  affirmative	   possibilities	   for	   social	   change.	   Rather,	   I	   believe	   that	   we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  must	  continually	  watch	  that	  our	  necessary	  and	  mobilizing	  expressions	  of	  anger	  and	  rage	  do	  not	  succumb	  to	  the	  sticky	  affective	  web	  of	  ressentiment.	  I	  believe	  this	  can	  only	  be	  done	  through	  attending	  to	  the	  raw	  feelings	  of	  pain	  and	  finding	  ways	  to	  heal	  and	  work	  through	  them,	  rather	  than	  sealing	  them	  under	  the	  protective	  layer	  of	   ressentiment.	   I	   continue	   this	   exploration	   into	   how	   we	   might,	   in	   the	   words	   of	  Georgis,	   “touch	   our	   injury”	   as	   well	   as	   move	   toward	   a	   more	   emancipatory	  psychological	  and	  political	  orientation	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  Before	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moving	  on	  to	  how	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  might	  “go	  beyond”	  ressentiment,	  however,	  I	  would	   like	   to	   add	   another,	   and	   somewhat	   more	   troubling,	   layer	   to	   the	   current	  analysis:	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  may	  not	  only	  be	  ressentimental	  in	  terms	   of	   character	   but	   also	   structurally	   beholden	   to	   ressentiment	   due	   to	   the	   very	  nature	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  political	  formation	  and	  articulation.	  For	  this,	  I	  turn	  to	   Wendy	   Brown’s	   work,	   which	   I	   examine,	   in	   close	   detail	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	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Chapter	  5	  –	  The	  Problem	  with	  Identity	  	  
	  
“Beneath	   the	   current	   black-­‐female-­‐student-­‐chicano-­‐homosexual-­‐old-­‐young-­‐
handicapped,	  etc.,	  etc.,	  ad	  nauseum,	  "struggles"	  lies	  a	  simple	  truth:	  there	  is	  no	  coherent	  
opposition	  to	  the	  present	  administrative	  apparatus.”	  
-­‐Adolph	  Reed,	  “Black	  Particularity	  Reconsidered.”	  
	  
“…questions	   of	   identity	   are	   always	   questions	   about	   representation.	   They	   are	   always	  
questions	  about	  the	   invention,	  not	  simply	  the	  discovery	  of	   tradition.	  They	  are	  always	  
exercises	   in	   selective	   memory	   and	   they	   almost	   always	   involve	   the	   silencing	   of	  
something	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  something	  else	  to	  speak.”	  
-­‐Stuart	  Hall,	  “Negotiating	  Caribbean	  Identities.”	  
	  
	   In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  employed	  ressentiment	  both	  diagnostically	  and	  analytically	  as	  a	  means	  of	  excavating	  the	  social	  character	  that	  underlies	  certain	  practices	  and	  ways	  of	  thinking	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  It	  has	  been	  my	  concern	  that	  these	  behaviours	  are	  expressive	  of	  a	  character	  that	  is	  steeped	  in	  a	  negative	  emotionality	  that	  may	  reinscribe	  our	  suffering	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  rather	  than	  emancipate	  us	  from	  it.	  As	  thinkers	  like	  Erich	  Fromm	  have	  shown,	  the	  psychological	  characteristics	  of	  an	  individual	  or	  a	  group	  have	  a	  demonstrable	  impact	  on	  the	  type	  of	  political	  and	  social	  action	  they	  take.	  The	  ressentimental	  aspects	  that	  I	  have	  identified	  within	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  are	  thus	  a	  troubling	  discovery	  worthy	  of	  careful	  self-­‐reflection.	  As	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  we	  must	  ask	  ourselves	  the	  honest	  question	  of	  exactly	  what	  are	  we	  fighting	  for?	  While	  there	  may	  be	  several	  answers	  to	  this	  question,	  the	  present	  inquiry	  is	  concerned	  with	  whether	  the	  aim	  of	  freedom	  is	  among	  our	  objectives.	  And	  if	  freedom	  is	  of	  importance	  to	  us,	  then	  to	  what	  extent	  have	  we	  become	  caught	  in	  a	  toxic	  cycle	  of	  anger,	  hatred,	  vengeance	  and	  despair	  that	  is	  draining	  us	  of	  the	  vital	  energy	  we	  need	  to	  pursue	  a	  project	  of	  self-­‐determination	  that	  involves	  imagining	  and	  creating	  a	  different	  world?	  Moreover,	  if	  we	  do	  admit	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that	  ressentiment	  does	  figure	  into	  our	  politics,	  how	  might	  we	  free	  ourselves	  from	  its	  venomous	  grasp?	  A	   reasonable	   place	   to	   start	  might	   be	   to	   brainstorm	  different	   practices	   that	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  could	  implement	  in	  our	  struggle.	  As	  I	  have	  suggested,	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  do	  this	  through	  “touching”	  our	  pain	  and	  discovering	  ways	  to	  heal	  it,	  rather	  than	  react	  from	  it.	  Before	  exploring	  how	  this	  might	  be	  done,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  attend	   to	  Wendy	  Brown’s	   claim	   that	   identity	  politics	   is	   structurally	   attached	   to	   its	  pain.	   Indeed,	   she	   argues	   that	   such	  movements	   configure	   identities	   based	   on	   their	  suffering	  that	  then	  require	  past	  and	  present	  pain	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  political	  salience.	   Brown’s	   concern	   is	   that	   this	   ressentimental	  attachment	   to	   pain	   prevents	  identity-­‐based	   movements	   from	   achieving	   a	   futurity	   beyond	   injury.	   One	   of	   the	  intentions	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   explore	  how	   the	   character	   and	   attendant	  practices	  examined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapters	   might	   be	   more	   generally	   rooted	   in,	   and	  expressive	  of,	   identity-­‐based	  politics.	   	  That	   is,	   to	  what	  extent	   is	   the	  ressentimental	  character	  discussed	  previously	  endemic	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  given	  the	  structural	  nature	  of	  identity-­‐based	  politics?	  	  I	   address	   this	   question	   through	   firstly	   providing	   a	   contextual	   sketch	   of	  identity	  politics	   in	   terms	  of	  how	   it	  emerged	   from	  New	  Left	   struggles	  of	   the	  1960s	  and	  70s.	   Secondly,	   I	   explore	   some	   critiques	  made	  by	   different	   factions	   of	   the	   Left	  against	  identity	  politics.	  Specifically,	  I	  look	  at	  charges	  around	  identity’s	  attachment	  to	   injury,	   essentialism,	   and	   relationship	   to	   power	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   interpellative	  imposition	  of	  identity	  categories,	  and	  complicity	  with	  legalism	  and	  capitalism.	  I	  then	  examine	   some	   responses	   from	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   and	   other	   proponents	   of	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politicized	   identity.	   I	   conclude	  by	  arguing	   that	  while	   it	  may	  not	  be	  accurate	   to	  say	  that	  all	   identity-­‐based	   struggles	   are	   ressentimental,	   identity	  politics	   certainly	  does	  have	   a	   concerning	   structural	   compatibility	   with	   ressentimental	   thinking	   and	  behaviour.	  	  
(5.1)	  Identity	  Politics	  	   This	  section	  gives	  a	  brief	   introduction	  to	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  as	  they	  have	  developed	  in	  the	  North	  American	  context.	  Identity	  politics1	  can	  be	  defined	  as:	  a	   wide	   range	   of	   political	   activity	   and	   theorizing	   founded	   in	   the	   shared	  experiences	   of	   injustice	   of	   members	   of	   certain	   social	   groups.	   Rather	   than	  organizing	  solely	  around	  belief	  systems,	  programmatic	  manifestos,	  or	  party	  affiliation,	   identity	   political	   formations	   typically	   aim	   to	   secure	   the	   political	  freedom	   of	   a	   specific	   constituency	   marginalized	   within	   its	   larger	   context.	  Members	  of	  that	  constituency	  assert	  or	  reclaim	  ways	  of	  understanding	  their	  distinctiveness	   that	   challenge	   dominant	   oppressive	   characterizations,	   with	  the	  goal	  of	  greater	  self-­‐determination.2	  	   Identity-­‐based	   movements	   include	   those	   that	   organize	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  shared	  experience	  of	  race,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  (dis)ability,	  ethnicity,	  religion	  or	   language	  identity.	  These	  movements	  are	  often	  aware	  of	  how	  different	   identities	  intersect	   and	   interlock,	   producing	   different	   experiences	   among	   members	   of	   one	  identity	  affiliation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  we,	  as	  feminists,	  rarely	  refer	  to	  our	  movements	  as	  “identity	  politics.”	  The	  term	  is	  one	  that	  has	  been	  imposed	  on	  us	  from	  the	  outside	  and	  which	  carries	  somewhat	  pejorative	  connotations.	  	  As	  Zandria	  Robinson	  writes,	  “It	  suggests	  that	  people	  actively	  choose	  to	  be	  aligned	  with	  minority	  groups/identities	  rather	  than	  the	  reality	  that	  they	  are	  organized	  into	  them	  by	  structures	  of	  oppression	  —	  sexism,	  racism,	  heterosexism,	  cissexism,	  	  ableism,	  capitalism,	  imperialism,”(Vanessa	  Williams,	  “Analysis	  |	  An	  Identity	  Crisis	  for	  Identity	  Politics,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  July	  27,	  2017).	  	  When	  it	  is	  used	  by	  us,	  however,	  it	  is	  often	  when	  in	  conversation	  with	  our	  opponents.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  tradition	  that	  I	  use	  the	  term	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  in	  this	  dissertation	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  2	  Cressida	  Heyes,	  “Identity	  Politics,”	  in	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta,	  Spring	  2018	  Edition.	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Identity-­‐based	  struggles	  emerged	  from	  the	  New	  Left	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.3	  The	  New	  Left,	   in	  turn,	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  “skepticism	  about	  the	   prevailing	   top-­‐down	   communist	   orthodoxy	   –	   a	   mode	   of	   politics	   that	   had	  dominated	  Old	  Left	  praxis.”4	  The	  New	  Left’s	  break	  from	  the	  Old	  Left	  was	  marked	  not	  only	   by	   its	   disillusionment	   with	   Soviet	   Communism,	   but	   also	   a	   challenge	   against	  “worker”	   as	   a	   universalist	   category,	   and	   its	   commitment	   to	   “open[ing]	   up	   new	  spaces	   in	   politics	   –	   to	   get	   issues	   and	   ideas	   previously	   ignored	   on	   the	   political	  agenda,	   and	   to	   win	   cultural	   and	   political	   acceptance	   of	   the	   methods	   used	   to	  propagate	   their	  message.”5	  It	  was	  during	   this	   time	  that	   the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement,	  the	   Black	   Power	  Movement,	   the	  Women’s	  Movement,	   the	   Gay/Lesbian	   Liberation	  Movement	   and	   the	   Anti-­‐Vietnam	  movement	   rose	   to	   prominence.	   As	   Grant	   Farred	  describes,	  it	  was	  the	  struggles	  of	  this	  era	  –	  for	  the	  first	  time	  organized	  around	  issues	  of	  race,	  gender,	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  –	  that	  would	  furnish	  identity	  politics	  with	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  to	  structure	  its	  politics:	  The	  diversity	  of	  political	  activity	  in	  the	  1960s	  demonstrated	  to	  its	  1970s	  and	  1980s	   successors	   how	   to	   mobilize	   marginalized	   constituencies,	   how	   to	  ‘politicize’	   culture,	   and	   how	   to	   deploy	   ‘difference’	   as	   an	   ideological	   tool	   in	  racially	   hegemonic	   societies.	   Having	   rejected	   the	   Old	   Left’s	   narrow	  conception	  of	  politics,	   the	  New	  Left	   expanded	   it	   to	   include	  –	  and	  provide	  a	  precedent	   and	  a	  platform	   for	   –	  modes	  of	   oppositionality	   that	  would,	   in	   the	  1980s,	  be	  construed	  as	  struggles	  over	  representation	  and	  identity.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  “New	  Left”	  was	  a	  term	  popularized	  by	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	  in	  his	  open	  letter,	  “Letter	  to	  the	  New	  Left”	  published	  in	  New	  Left	  Review,	  No.	  5,	  September-­‐October	  1960.	  4	  Grant	  Farred,	  “Endgame	  Identity?	  Mapping	  the	  New	  Left	  Roots	  of	  Identity	  Politics,”	  New	  
Literary	  History	  31,	  no.	  4	  (2000):	  628.	  	  5	  Paul	  Byrne	  in	  Farred,	  629.	  	  6	  Farred,	  630.	  See	  Farred	  (2000)	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  Left’s	  political	  evolution	  from	  Old	  left	  traditionalism	  to	  the	  New	  Left	  movements	  of	  the	  1960s/70s	  to	  present-­‐day	  identity	  politics.	  See	  also	  Todd	  Gitlin’s	  Twilight	  of	  Common	  Dreams	  (1995)	  for	  his	  take	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Left.	  For	  a	  more	  macro	  historical	  perspective,	  see	  Immanuel	  Wallerstein’s	  World-­‐systems	  Analysis:	  An	  Introduction	  (2004),	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   An	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  New	  Left	  and	  identity	  politics,	  however,	  revolved	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  class.	  Emerging	  out	  of	  the	  Old	  Left	  paradigm,	  the	  New	  Left	   movements	   remained	   tied	   to	   a	   critique	   of	   class,	   albeit	   unhinged	   from	   the	  orthodoxy	  of	   their	  predecessors.	  The	   large-­‐scale	   retreat	  of	   the	  working	  class	   from	  the	   New	   Left	   in	   response	   to	   appeals	   by	   the	   Thatcher/Reagan	   New	   Right	   to	   their	  bourgeois	   aspirations	   and	  patriotism,	   coupled	  with	   the	  New	  Right’s	  decimation	  of	  the	   welfare	   state	   and	   reversal	   of	   many	   of	   the	   victories	   of	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	  would	  lead	  to	  “crisis”	  for	  the	  Left.	  This	  crisis,	  marked	  by	  a	  number	  of	  ideological	  and	  political	  tensions	  led	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  New	  Left	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  “identity	  politics”	   marked	   by	   a	   “profound	   black,	   female,	   and	   gay	   wariness	   of	   class	   as	   an	  organizational	  instrument.”7	  	  While	  the	  birth	  of	   identity	  politics	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  historical	  processes	  described	   above,	   its	   inaugural	   moment	   has	   been	   linked	   to	   the	   publication	   of	   the	  Combahee	   River	   Collective’s	  manifesto	   in	   1978.8	  The	   Collective	  was	   comprised	   of	  black	  lesbian	  feminists	  who	  gathered	  in	  Boston	  between	  1974	  and	  1980	  to	  develop	  a	   political	   theory	   and	   practice	   of	   black	   feminism	   that	   recognized	   interlocking	  systems	  of	  oppression	  and	  addressed	  their	  needs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  white	  feminism	  did	  not.	   During	   this	   time,	   the	   group	   released	   a	   statement	   in	  which	   they	   declared	   the	  political	  importance	  of	  identity:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  which	  looks	  at	  the	  development	  of	  anti-­‐systemic	  movements	  from	  1848	  onwards	  within	  the	  context	  of	  his	  world	  systems	  theory.	  	  	  7	  Farred,	  636.	  8	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement	  (1978/1986).	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This	   focusing	   upon	   our	   own	   oppression	   is	   embodied	   in	   the	   concept	   of	  identity	   politics.	   We	   believe	   that	   the	   most	   profound	   and	   potentially	   most	  radical	  politics	  come	  directly	  out	  of	  our	  own	  identity,	  as	  opposed	  to	  working	  to	   end	   somebody	   else's	   oppression.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Black	   women	   this	   is	   a	  particularly	  repugnant,	  dangerous,	   threatening,	  and	  therefore	  revolutionary	  concept	  because	  it	  is	  obvious	  from	  looking	  at	  all	  the	  political	  movements	  that	  have	  preceded	  us	  that	  anyone	  is	  more	  worthy	  of	  liberation	  than	  ourselves.9	  	   Indeed,	   the	   Combahee	   River	   Collective	   has	   been	   credited	   with	   coining	   the	  term	   “identity	   politics”	   although	   their	   political	   vision	   is	   arguably	   different	   from	  identity-­‐based	  movements	  today.10	  	  Philosophically,	  Wendy	  Brown	  argues	  that	   liberalism’s	  promise	  of	  universal	  recognition	  and	   justice,	  and	  concurrent	   failure	   to	  deliver	  on	   this	  promise	   forms	  “a	  key	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  contemporary	  identity	  politics.”11	  As	  Brown	  states,	  	  In	  this	  story,	  the	  always	  imminent	  but	  increasingly	  politically	  manifest	  failure	  of	   liberal	   universalism	   to	   be	   universal—the	   transparent	   fiction	   of	   state	  universality—combines	  with	   the	   increasing	   individuation	   of	   social	   subjects	  through	  capitalist	  disinterments	  and	  disciplinary	  productions.	  Together,	  they	  breed	   the	   emergence	   of	   politicized	   identity	   rooted	   in	   disciplinary	  productions	   but	   oriented	   by	   liberal	   discourse	   toward	   protest	   against	  exclusion	  from	  a	  discursive	  formation	  of	  universal	  justice.12	  	   As	  the	  next	  few	  sections	  will	  show,	  Brown’s	  critique	  of	  identity	  politics	  is	  not	  only	  tied	  to	  its	  emergence	  from	  the	  myths	  of	  liberalism,	  but	  also	  its	  complicity	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement	  (1978/1986).	  10	  A	  principle	  difference	  is	  the	  group’s	  explicit	  concern	  with	  class	  oppression	  and	  capitalism	  –	  a	  concern	  that	  current	  identity	  groups	  have	  been	  critiqued	  for	  ignoring.	  Rather,	  the	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement	  pronounced	  its	  members	  as	  socialist,	  stating	  that	  they	  “realize	  that	  the	  liberation	  of	  all	  oppressed	  peoples	  necessitates	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  political-­‐economic	  systems	  of	  capitalism	  and	  imperialism	  as	  well	  as	  patriarchy.”	  Combahee	  River	  Collective,	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement	  (1978/1986).	  11	  Heyes,	  “Identity	  Politics.”	  12	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  58.	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disciplinary	  naming,	  legalism,	  and	  capitalism.	  First,	  though,	  I	  examine	  her	  argument	  around	  politicized	  identity’s	  “wounded	  attachments.”	  
Injurious	  Attachments	  	   In	  what	  ways	  might	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  be	  attached	  to	  our	  pain?	  In	  the	   last	   chapter	   I	   discussed	   the	   considerable	   psychic	   and	   spiritual	   damage	   that	   is	  done	  to	  us	  through	  our	  everyday	  experiences	  in	  a	  world	  hostile	  to	  women	  of	  colour.	  I	  suggested	  that	  ressentiment	  becomes	  the	  shielding	  emotional	  layer	  that	  protects	  us	  from	  the	  pain	  of	  these	  raw	  emotions	  of	  unworthiness,	  shame,	  and	  inferiority.	  I	  then	  explored	  how	  we	  might	   touch	   this	  underlying	  pain	   in	  order	   to	  move	  beyond	  both	  our	   ressentimental	   character	   and	   its	   expression	   in	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   politics.	  Wendy	   Brown’s	   influential	   piece,	   “Wounded	   Attachments”	   complicates	   this	  discussion,	  however,	  by	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  something	  specific	  to	  identity-­‐based	  politics	   that	   prevent	   it	   from	   relinquishing	   its	   pain.	   Rather,	   Brown	   argues	   that	  politicized	  identity	  is	  attached	  to	  its	  suffering	  in	  a	  way	  that	  might	  be	  understood	  as	  
structural	  to	  identity	  politics.	  As	  Brown	  explains:	  In	   its	   emergence	   as	   a	   protest	   against	   marginalization	   or	   subordination,	  politicized	  identity	  thus	  becomes	  attached	  to	  its	  own	  exclusion	  both	  because	  it	  is	  premised	  on	  this	  exclusion	  for	  its	  very	  existence	  as	  identity	  and	  because	  the	   formation	   of	   identity	   at	   the	   site	   of	   exclusion,	   as	   exclusion	   augments	   or	  ‘alters	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   suffering’	   entailed	   in	   subordination	   or	  marginalization	  by	  finding	  a	  site	  of	  blame	  for	  it.	  But	  in	  so	  doing,	  it	  installs	  its	  pain	  over	  its	  unredeemed	  history	  in	  the	  very	  foundation	  of	  its	  political	  claim,	  in	  its	  demand	  for	  recognition	  as	  identity.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  73-­‐74.	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Politicized	   identities	   such	   as	   “women	   of	   colour,”	   “feminists,”	   and	   “queer	  folks”	   do	   not	   emerge	   naturally,	   or	   affirmatively,	   but	   rather	   in	   protest	   against	  oppression	   and	   exclusion.	   That	   is,	   we	   are	   “women	   of	   colour”	   because	  we	   are	  not	  white	  women,	   nor	  white	  men,	   and	   do	   not	   get	   to	   participate	   in	  whiteness.	  We	   are	  “feminists,”	  because	  we	  are	  not	  men,	  and	  do	  not	  get	  to	  partake	  in	  patriarchal	  power.	  We	   are	   “queer	   folks”	   because	   we	   are	   not	   heterosexual	   and	   do	   not	   benefit	   from	  heteronormativity.	  For	  Brown,	  becoming	  in	  identity	  politics	  is	  thus	  born	  out	  of	  our	  exclusion	   and	   our	   politics	   are	   based	   in	   our	   protest	   against	   this	   exclusion.	   This	  marginalization	  and	  its	  attendant	  pain	  and	  suffering	  becomes	  who	  we	  are,	  so	  that	  I	  know	  myself	  as	  a	  woman	  of	  colour	  because	  I	  have	  suffered	  and	  suffer	  as	  a	  woman	  of	  colour.	   Similarly,	   I	   understand	   my	   fellow	   women	   of	   colour	   as	   those	   who	   have	  suffered	   and	   suffer	   like	   me.	   Our	   specific	   suffering	   confers	   both	   our	   individual	  political	  identities,	  and	  is	  that	  which	  ties	  us	  together	  politically.	  Politicized	   identity’s	   ressentimental	  moment,	   for	   Brown,	   is	   in	   its	   “finding	   a	  site	  of	  blame”	  for	  its	  suffering	  and	  “installing”	  its	  pain	  over	  its	  “unredeemed	  history	  in	   the	   very	   foundation	   of	   its	   political	   claim,	   in	   its	   demand	   for	   recognition	   as	  identity.”14	  And	   so	   it	   seems	   that	   identity	   politics	   as	   a	   political	   expression	   that	  requires	   its	   suffering	   as	   requisite	   to	   its	   identity,	   is	   structurally	   vulnerable	   to	  
ressentiment.	   Brown	   elaborates	   on	   this,	   describing	   its	   implications	   for	   politicized	  identity’s	  emancipatory	  aims:	  Insofar	  as	  what	  Nietzsche	  calls	  slave	  morality	  produces	  identity	  in	  reaction	  to	  power,	   insofar	   as	   identity	   rooted	   in	   this	   reaction	   achieves	   its	   moral	  superiority	   by	   reproaching	   power	   and	   action	   themselves	   as	   evil,	   identity	  structured	  by	  this	  ethos	  becomes	  deeply	  invested	  in	  its	  own	  impotence,	  even	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  Brown,	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while	   it	  seeks	  to	  assuage	  the	  pain	  of	   its	  powerlessness	   through	   its	  vengeful	  moralizing,	  through	  its	  wide	  distribution	  of	  suffering,	  through	  its	  reproach	  of	  power	  as	  such.	  Politicized	  identity,	  premised	  on	  exclusion	  and	  fuelled	  by	  the	  humiliation	  and	  suffering	  imposed	  by	  its	  historically	  structured	  impotence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  discourse	  of	  sovereign	  individuals,	  is…more	  likely	  to	  punish	  and	  reproach	  –	  “punishment	  is	  what	  revenge	  calls	   itself;	  with	  a	  hypocritical	  lie	   it	   creates	   a	   good	   conscience	   for	   itself”	   –	   than	   to	   find	   venues	   of	   self-­‐affirming	  action.15	  	  There	  are	  two	  points	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  register	  here.	  Firstly,	  I	  suggest	  that	  Brown	  adds	  a	  further	  dimension	  to	  my	  investigation	  of	  ressentiment	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	   Ressentiment	   as	   a	   social	   character	   with	   political	   expressions	   such	   as	  “calling-­‐out”,	  “checking	  privilege,”	  “spokespersonship,”	  and	  “allyship”	  is	  now	  seen	  as	  endemic	   to	   identity-­‐based	  politics	   itself,	  not	   just	  a	  peculiar	  perversion	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  emancipatory	  movement.	  That	  is,	  Brown	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  how	  a	  political	  expression	  that	  requires	  an	   injured	  identity,	   in	  a	  context	  of	  “historically	  structured	  impotence”	  becomes	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  ressentimental	  psyche,	  a	  psyche	  that	  is	   mired	   in	   its	   own	   suffering	   which	   leads	   it	   on	   a	   path	   of	   vengeful	   moralizing.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  ressentimental	  practices	  that	  I	  outlined	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  not	  just	  the	  expressions	  of	  mismanaged	  pain,	  but	  rather	  a	  pain	  that	  is	  
actively	  harvested	  for	  political	  purposes.	  As	  Brown,	  writes	  “politicized	  identity	  thus	  enunciates	  itself,	  makes	  claims	  for	  itself,	  only	  by	  entrenching,	  restating,	  dramatizing,	  and	  inscribing	  its	  pain	  in	  politics;	  it	  can	  hold	  out	  no	  future	  –	  for	  itself	  or	  others	  –	  that	  triumphs	  over	  this	  pain.”16	  The	  second	  point	   is	   related	   to	   this	   lack	  of	   futurity	   that	  Brown	   forecasts	   for	  identity	   politics,	   given	   its	   investment	   in	   its	   own	   pain	   and	   tendency	   toward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Brown,	  70.	  16	  Brown,	  74.	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“punishing	   and	   reproaching”	   rather	   than	   “self-­‐affirming	   action.”	  As	  Brown	  argues,	  identity	  politics	  as	  a	  ressentimental	  politics	  that	  defines	  itself	  in	  opposition	  to	  power	  comes	   to	   “reproac[h]	   power	   and	   action	   as	   themselves	   evil”	   so	   as	   to	   not	   only	  embrace	   powerlessness	   but	   also	   to	   re-­‐value	   it	   as	   morally	   superior	   (Nietzsche’s	  transvaluation	   of	   values).	   Brown	   believes	   this	   posture	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   politicized	  identity’s	   political	   actions	   which	   often	   focus	   on	   achieving	   recognition	   of	   injury	  through	  legal	  recourse	  which	  not	  only	  frames	  the	  historically	  oppressive	  state	  as	  the	  “neutral	  arbiter”	  of	   justice	  but	  also	  codifies	   identity	   in	  ways	   that	  can	  be	  mobilized	  for	  disciplinary	  control.	   I	  unpack	   these	  charges	   further	   in	   the	  section	  on	  Legalism.	  For	   now,	   however,	   I	   discuss	   perhaps	   the	   most	   common	   critique	   made	   against	  identity	  politics:	  essentialism.	  
Confronting	  Essentialism	  	   The	   argument	   of	   essentialism	   is	   as	   follows:	   in	   mobilizing	   a	   politicized	  identity	   –	   such	   as	   “black”	   or	   “woman”	   or	   “queer”	   –	   this	   identity	   obtains	   a	   kind	   of	  reified	  quality	  that	  not	  only	  obfuscates	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  these	  qualities	  but	  also	  commits	  members	  to	  a	  false	  homogeneity	  and	  fixity.	  In	  an	  especially	  cogent	  articulation	  of	  this	  critique,	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	   the	   controversy	   around	   Rachel	   Dolezal.	   Dolezal,	   a	   former	   leader	   of	   the	  NAACP,	  attained	  notoriety	  in	  June	  of	  2015	  when	  she	  was	  “outted”	  as	  a	  white	  woman	  masquerading	   as	   black.	   Reed	   argues	   that	   the	   commotion	   caused	   by	   her	   exposure	  illustrates	   a	   profound	  paradox	   that	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   identity	   politics.	  He	  writes	  that:	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…	   this	   affair	   has	   exposed	   identitarianism’s	   irrational	   underbelly.	   The	  fundamental	   contradiction	   that	   has	   impelled	   the	   debate	   and	   required	   the	  flight	   into	  often	   idiotic	   sophistry	   is	   that	   racial	   identitarians	  assume,	   even	   if	  they	   give	   catechistic	   lip	   service	   …to	   the	   catchphrase	   that	   "race	   is	   a	   social	  construction,"	  that	  race	  is	  a	  thing,	  an	  essence	  that	  lives	  within	  us.	  If	  pushed,	  they	  will	  offer	  any	  of	  a	  range	  of	  more	  or	   less	  mystical,	   formulaic,	  breezy,	  or	  neo-­‐Lamarckian	  faux	  explanations	  of	  how	  it	  can	  be	  both	  an	  essential	  ground	  of	  our	  being	  and	  a	   social	   construct,	   and	  most	  people	  are	  willing	  not	   to	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  justificatory	  patter.	  Nevertheless,	  for	  identitarians…	  we	  aren’t,	   for	   instance,	   black	   because	   we	   do	   black	   things;	   that	   seems	   to	   have	  been	   Dolezal’s	   mistaken	   wish.	   We	   do	   black	   things	   because	   we	   are	   black.	  Doing	  black	   things	  does	  not	  make	  us	  black;	   being	  black	  makes	  us	  do	  black	  things.	   That	   is	   how	   it’s	   possible	   to	   talk	   about	   having	   lost	   or	   needing	   to	  retrieve	  one’s	  culture	  or	  define	  "cultural	  appropriation"	  as	  the	  equivalent,	  if	  not	  the	  prosaic	  reality,	  of	  a	  property	  crime.	  That,	  indeed,	  is	  also	  the	  essence	  of	  essentialism.17	  	   Reed	   is	  critical	  of	   the	   logic	  of	   identity	  politics	   that,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  grants	  the	   social	   construction	   of	   identity	  while	   simultaneously	   propounding	   its	   realness.	  What	  are	  the	  dangers	  of	  essentialism?	  	  Firstly,	   there	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   assumed	   homogeneity.	   In	   suggesting	   that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  “blackness”	  or	  “woman,”	  a	  certain	  universality	  is	  assumed	  to	  inhere	  within	  a	  group	  of	  people	  that	  in	  actuality	  does	  not	  exist.	  Of	  course,	  this	  can	  be	  especially	  harmful	  when	  these	  supposedly	  universal	  traits	  correspond	  only	  to	  those	  with	   the	   most	   power	   within	   a	   group.	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   loudest	   charges	   of	  essentialism	   has	   come	   from	   third	   wave	   feminists	   who	   argue	   that	   second	   wave	  feminism	  was	  premised	  on	  a	  construction	  of	  “woman”	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  women	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  women	  of	  colour,	  queer	  women,	  and	  poor	   women. 18 	  Essentialism	   typically	   works	   to	   homogenize	   the	   experiences,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “From	  Jenner	  to	  Dolezal.”	  	  18	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  black	  feminists	  such	  as	  bell	  hooks,	  Patricia	  Hill	  Collins,	  and	  Kimberlé	  Crenshaw	  were	  some	  of	  the	  most	  outspoken	  critics	  of	  this,	  leading	  to	  the	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personalities,	  and	  perspectives	  of	  oppressed	  groups	  in	  ways	  that	  render	  us	  “all	  the	  same”	   while	   dominant	   groups	   (whites	   and	   men,	   for	   example)	   enjoy	   multiple	  possibilities	  for	  expression	  and	  self-­‐making.	  Essentialism	  is	  often	  expressed	  through	  stereotypical	   assumptions	   (“Women	   are	   emotional,”	   “Black	   men	   are	   violent”)	   in	  ways	   that	   significantly	   flatten	   such	   identities	   in	   discriminatory	   and	  dehumanizing	  ways.	  	   The	   second	   key	   danger	   of	   essentialism	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   socially	  constructed	   categories	   become	   the	   grounds	   for	   oppression.	   Indeed,	   a	   slew	   of	  historical	   oppressions	   from	   the	   domination	   of	   women	   to	   European	   practices	   of	  slavery	   to	   the	   colonization	   of	   Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   been	   justified	   using	  essentialist	   arguments.	   The	   most	   common	   expression	   of	   this	   type	   of	   thinking	  identifies	  a	  biological	  root	  to	  what	  binds	  a	  certain	  group	  together	  and	  makes	  them	  
different.	  This	  difference	  is	  always	  read	  as	  inferior	  and	  the	  biological	  nature	  of	  this	  inferiority	  makes	  it	  immutable.	  In	  this	  way,	  women’s	  oppression	  has	  been	  explained	  due	   to	   our	   “weaker”	   nature	   that	   ties	   us	   to	   the	   body,	   the	   family,	   and	   childrearing	  justifying	  everything	  from	  our	  exclusion	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  to	  violence	  against	  us.	  Black	   Africans	   and	   Indigenous	   peoples	   were	   seen	   as	   biologically	   “primitive”	   and	  “childlike,”	  justifying	  practices	  of	  slavery	  and	  colonization.	  Biological	  essentialism	  in	  each	   of	   these	   cases	   renders	   another	   group	   as	   “Other”	   –	   irrevocably	   different	   and	  inferior.	   In	   this	   way,	   groups	   of	   people	   have	   been	   excluded	   from	   “humanity”	   as	  perceived	   through	   a	   Western	   masculinist	   lens.	   In	   recent	   times	   biological	  essentialism	  has	  graduated	  to	  cultural	  essentialism	  through	  which	  cultural/religious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  intersectionality	  in	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  multiple	  identities	  (and	  corresponding	  oppressions)	  that	  we	  occupy	  at	  once.	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identities	   such	   as	   “Muslims”	   can	   be	   viewed	   simultaneously	   as	   “all	   the	   same”	   and	  inherently	  “violent”	  and	  “backward.”	  Indeed,	   the	   argument	   is	   that	   identity-­‐based	   movements,	   which	   have	   done	  much	  work	  to	  expose	  and	  oppose	  these	  two	  harmful	  forms	  of	  essentialism,	  engage	  in	  their	  own	  essentialism	  when	  they	  invoke	  identity	  politically.	  Politicized	  identity’s	  problem	   is	   that	   it	   cannot	   avoid	   essentialist	   appeals	   to	   identity	   in	   articulating	   its	  claims.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  identity	  politics	  is	  a	  desire	  for	  recognition	  as	  identity	  (i.e.	  as	  black,	  as	  woman,	  as	  queer	  etc.),	  and	  making	  claims	  for	  redress/inclusion	  on	  the	  basis	   that	   one’s	   identity	   group	   has	   been	   wrongfully	   denied	   access	   or	   unjustly	  treated	  because	  of	   their	   identity.	  While	  some	  feminists	  have	  attempted	  to	  sidestep	  this	   issue	   by	   making	   a	   case	   for	   “strategic	   essentialism,”	   critics	   of	   essentialism	  remain	  sceptical.19	  As	  Brown	  argues,	  politicized	   identity	   “fixes	   the	   identities	  of	   the	  injured	   and	   the	   injuring	   as	   social	   positions,	   and	   codifies	   as	   well	   the	  meanings	   of	  their	  actions	  against	  all	  possibilities	  of	  indeterminancy,	  ambiguity,	  and	  struggle	  for	  resignification	   or	   repositioning.”20 	  Similarly,	   Nancy	   Fraser	   argues	   that	   identity	  politics	   “often…impose[s]	   a	   single,	   drastically	   simplified	   group	   identity,	   which	  denies	   the	  complexity	  of	  people’s	   lives,	   the	  multiplicity	  of	   their	   identifications	  and	  the	  cross-­‐pulls	  of	  their	  various	  affiliations.”21	  Keeping	   with	   Reed’s	   focus	   on	   black	   identity,	   how	   might	   his	   critique	   be	  applied	   to	   the	   current	  Black	  Lives	  Matter	   (BLM)	  movement?	  BLM	  members	  make	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  term	  is	  most	  commonly	  attributed	  to	  Gayatri	  Spivak.	  Some	  years	  later,	  Spivak	  herself	  would	  retract	  the	  term	  given	  its	  problematic	  usage.	  See	  In	  Other	  Worlds:	  Essays	  in	  Cultural	  
Politics	  (Routledge,	  2006);	  and	  Other	  Asias	  (BLackwell	  Pub.,	  2008).	  20	  Brown,	  27.	  	  21	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  “Recognition	  without	  Ethics?,”	  Theory,	  Culture	  &	  Society	  18,	  no.	  2–3	  (June	  1,	  2001):	  24.	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the	  cogent	  argument	  that	  they,	  as	  black	  people,	  experience	  unwarranted	  amounts	  of	  police	   brutality	   because	   they	   are	   black	   people.	   But	   in	   articulating	   their	   claim	   as	  
black	  people,	   they	  are	  saying	  that	  black	  people	  exist	  and	  that	  blackness	  is	  real.	  How	  else	   could	   they	   not	   only	   speak	   as	   black	   people	   but	   advocate	   on	   behalf	   of	   black	  people?	  The	  problem	  that	  thus	  arises,	  is	  that	  in	  the	  moment	  that	  one	  speaks	  of	  (or	  as)	  “black	  people”	  one	  makes	  certain	  assumptions	  about	  the	   likeness	  of	  the	  group,	  as	  well	  as	  assumes	  that	  blackness	  is	  composed	  of	  a	  tangible	  essence.	  In	  the	  Dolezal	  case,	   this	   “essence”	   is	   articulated	   in	   terms	   of	   biology.	  Dolezal’s	   parents	   are	  white,	  and	  therefore	  she	  cannot	  be	  black.	  What	  Reed	   is	  challenging	  here	   is	   the	  continued	  salience	  of	  discourses	  around	  race	  and	  sanguinity	  –	  the	  very	  discourses	  that	  birthed	  disciplinary	  policies	  like	  the	  “one	  drop	  rule”	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  traumatic	  history	  of	  racial	  blood	  politics	  that	  Black	  Lives	  Matters	  uses	  the	  language	  of	  “black	  identified”	  at	  their	  rallies,	  such	  as	  when	  leaders	  encourage	  “black	  identified	  members”	  to	  come	  to	  the	  front	  and	  for	  their	  “non-­‐black	  identified	  allies”	  to	   stand	   behind	   them.	   But,	   as	  we	   know,	   self-­‐identification	   has	   its	   limits.	   Dolezal’s	  statement,	   for	   example,	   in	   which	   she	   states:	   “I	   identify	   as	   black,”	   has	   been	   the	  subject	  of	  much	  rage	  and	  ridicule.22	  For	  Reed,	  the	  reason	  why	  Dolezal’s	  self-­‐naming	  is	  so	  offensive	  relates	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  spokespersonship.	  As	   I	  described	   in	  Chapter	  2,	  spokespersonship	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  oppressed	  peoples	  should	  be	  the	  only	  people	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  oppression,	  and	  more,	  that	  they	  should	  lead	  their	  struggles	  for	  emancipation.	  Sociologist	  and	  prominent	  identity	  critic	  Todd	  Gitlin	  echoes	  Reed’s	  assessment:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See	  Rachel	  Dolezal,	  In	  Full	  Color:	  Finding	  My	  Place	  in	  a	  Black	  and	  White	  World	  (Dallas,	  TX:	  BenBella	  Books,	  2017).	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Sometimes	  what	   is	   sought	   is	   a	   license	   to	   pursue	   a	  monoculture.	   	   Only	   the	  members	   can	   (or	   should)	   learn	   the	   language	   of	   the	   club.	   Only	   African	  Americans	   should	   get	   jobs	   teaching	   African-­‐American	   studies;	   conversely,	  African	   Americans	   should	   get	   jobs	   teaching	   only	   African-­‐American	   studies.	  	  Men,	  likewise,	  have	  no	  place	  in	  women's	  studies.	  	  As	  the	  T-­‐shirt	  slogan	  had	  it:	  "It's	  a	  Black	  Thing,	  You	  Wouldn't	  Understand."	  As	  Sister	  Souljab	  rapped:	  "If	  my	   world's	   black	   and	   yours	   is	   white/How	   the	   hell	   could	   we	   think	   alike."	  Essentialists,	  when	  they	  secede	  from	  the	  commons,	  dismantle	  it.23	  
Identity	  as	  Imposition	  	   Another	  problem	  with	  identity	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  reiterates	  and	  reifies	  imposed	  categories	  of	  being.	  It	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  to	  what	  extent	  is	  who	  we	  claim	  ourselves	   to	  be	  determined	   from	  without	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   is	   it	   self-­‐consciously	  chosen?	   For	   Brown,	   identity	   is	   the	   co-­‐optation	   and	   politicization	   of	   the	   very	  categories	   once	   used	   to	  mark	   difference	   and	   inferiority:	   “just	   when	   polite	   liberal	  (not	   to	  mention	   correct	   leftist)	   discourse	   ceased	   speaking	   of	   us	   as	   dykes,	   faggots,	  colored	  girls,	  or	  natives,	  we	  began	  speaking	  of	  ourselves	  in	  this	  way.”24	  This	  has	  led	  Brown	   to	  ask:	   “what	  kind	  of	  political	   recognition	  can	   identity-­‐based	  claims	  seek	  –	  and	   what	   kind	   can	   they	   be	   counted	   on	   to	   want	   –	   that	   will	   not	   resubordinate	   a	  subject	   itself	   historically	   subjugated	   through	   identity,	   through	   categories	   such	   as	  race	   or	   gender	   that	   emerged	   and	   circulated	   as	   terms	   of	   power	   to	   enact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Todd	  Gitlin,	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Common	  Dreams:	  Why	  America	  Is	  Wracked	  by	  Culture	  Wars	  (Metropolitan	  Books,	  1995).	  24	  Brown,	  53.	  	  Todd	  Gitlin	  makes	  a	  similar	  point,	  describing	  what	  Nietzsche	  would	  identify	  as	  a	  transvaluation	  of	  values:	  “Hasn't	  history	  already	  done	  its	  detestable	  and	  irreversible	  work,	  stamping	  inferiority	  on	  dark-­‐skinned	  peoples,	  enslaving	  them	  in	  the	  name	  of	  that	  classification?	  	  Without	  doubt,	  the	  group	  identities	  that	  have	  lasted	  longest	  and	  cut	  deepest	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  persecution	  has	  engraved.	  	  Once	  engraved,	  they	  stay	  engraved	  –	  that	  has	  been	  the	  reality.…	  	  Often	  the	  persecuted	  revolt	  by	  converting	  the	  mark	  of	  their	  subordination	  into	  a	  badge	  of	  pride”	  (in	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Common	  Dreams).	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subordination?”25	  Brown	  describes	  how	  this	  process	  takes	  place	  through	  discussing	  an	  ordinance	  that	  was	  pushed	  into	  law	  by	  different	  identity-­‐based	  groups	  in	  order	  to	   prohibit	   discrimination	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   “sexual	   orientation,	   transexuality,	   age,	  height,	  weight,	  personal	   appearance,	  physical	   appearance,	  physical	   characteristics,	  race,	  color,	  creed,	  religion,	  national	  origin,	  ancestry,	  disability,	  marital	  status,	  sex,	  or	  gender”26	  in	   employment	   and	   housing.	   For	   Brown	   this	   is	   a	   perfect	   example	   of	  politicized	  identity’s	  complicity	  with	  liberal	  universalism	  and	  disciplinary	  power	  in	  its	   own	   resubordination,	   even	   as	   these	   dual	   powers	   respond	   to	   its	   demands.	   As	  Brown	  explains:	  This	   ordinance…aims	   to	   count	   every	   difference	   as	   no	   difference,	   as	   part	   of	  the	  seamless	  whole,	  but	  also	  to	  count	  every	  potentially	  subversive	  rejection	  of	  culturally	  enforced	  norms	  as	   themselves	  normal,	  as	  normalizable,	  and	  as	  normativizable	   through	   law.	   Indeed,	   through	   the	   definitional,	   procedural,	  and	  remedies	  sections	  of	  this	  ordinance	  (e.g.,	   ‘sexual	  orientation	  shall	  mean	  known	  or	  assumed	  homosexuality,	  heterosexuality,	   or	  bisexuality’)	  persons	  are	  reduced	  to	  observable	  social	  attributes	  and	  practices	  defined	  empirically,	  positivistically,	   as	   if	   their	   existence	   were	   intrinsic	   and	   factual,	   rather	   than	  effects	  of	  discursive	  and	  institutional	  power,	  and	  these	  positivist	  definitions	  of	   persons	   as	   their	   attributes	   and	   practices	   are	   written	   into	   law,	   ensuring	  that	   persons	   describable	   according	   to	   them	   will	   now	   become	   regulated	  through	  them.	  27	  	   According	   to	   Brown,	   it	   is	   precisely	   politicized	   identity’s	   simultaneous	  shaping	   by,	   and	   responding	   to	   the	   powers	   of	   liberalism	   and	   disciplinarity,	   that	  makes	   identity-­‐based	  movements	   structurally	   vulnerable	   to	   re-­‐subordination.	   Her	  example	   illustrates	   how	   in	   seeking	   legal	   recognition,	   even	   radical	   identities	  must	  bend	   to	   the	   logics	   of	   liberalism	   which	   depoliticize	   them	   through	   normalization,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Brown,	  55.	  26	  Brown,	  65.	  27	  Brown,	  66.	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classification,	   and	   featuring	   them	   side	   by	   side	   as	   equalizable	   “diversities,”	   rather	  than	  effects	  of	  racism,	  sexism,	  homophobia	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  power.	  	  We	  see	  here	   again	   the	   essentializing	   consequences	   of	   politicized	   identity	   but	   more,	   how	  identity	   comes	   to	   be	   organized	   through	   disciplinary	   power	   for	   regulation	   and	  control.	  Following	  Foucault,	  Brown	  describes	  disciplinary	  productions	  as	  “work[ing]	  to	   conjure	   and	   regulate	   subjects	   through	   classificatory	   schemes,	   naming	   and	  normalizing	   social	   behaviors	   as	   social	   positions…” 28 	  Politicized	   identity’s	  relationship	   with	   disciplinary	   power	   is	   thus	   twofold	   –	   in	   the	   first	   moment,	   it	  politicizes	   the	   very	   categories	   of	   disciplinary	   oppression	   as	   identity	   (“black,”	  “brown,”	   “women,”	   “queer”).	   In	   demanding	   justice	   on	   behalf	   of	   these	   categories	  (now	   co-­‐opted	   as	   identities),	   these	   identities	   are	   neutralized	   by	   liberalism	   that	  greets	  them	  as	  “lifestyles”	  and	  “special	  interests”	  that	  can	  be	  digested	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “seamless	   whole.”	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   only	   though	   this	   depoliticization	   that	   “an	   African	  American,	  an	  obese	  woman,	  and	  a	  white	  middle-­‐class	  youth	  festooned	  with	  tattoos,	  a	   pierced	   tongue,	   and	   fuchsia	   hair”	   can	   be	   “render[ed]	   as	   juridical	   equivalents.”29	  Through	   inscribing	   them	   in	   the	   law,	   as	   with	   Brown’s	   ordinance,	   these	   identities	  become	  essentialized	  as	  not	  only	  “real”	  and	  “fixed”	  but	  also	  empirically	  defined	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  regulatory	  control.	  Like	  Brown,	   Judith	  Butler	   is	  also	   interested	  in	  tracking	  the	  co-­‐emergence	  of	  power	   and	   identity.	   Butler	   draws	   on	   Louis	   Althusser,	   Michel	   Foucault,	   and	  psychoanalytical	   insights	   to	   illustrate	   the	   entanglement	   of	   oppressive	   power	  with	  subject-­‐making.	   She	   argues	   that	   the	   process	   of	   subjection,	   is	   “the	   process	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Brown,	  58.	  	  29	  Brown,	  66.	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becoming	   subordinated	   by	   power	   and	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	   a	   subject.”30	  In	  Althusser’s	  language	  of	  interpellation,	  “a	  subject	  is	  hailed,	  the	  subject	  turns	  around,	  and	   the	   subject	   then	   accepts	   the	   terms	  by	  which	  he	   or	   she	   is	   hailed.”31	  Foucault’s	  “discursive	   production	   of	   the	   subject”	   echoes	   Althusser’s	   insight	   that	   the	   subject	  invariably	  emerges	  at	  the	  site	  of	  subordination.	  For	  Butler,	  this	  generates	  a	  paradox	  in	  which	   the	   subject	  depends	  on	   the	  very	   subordination	  and	   social	   categories	   (i.e.	  
identity	  categories)	  that	  represent	  this	  subordination.	  As	  she	  discusses:	  Bound	   to	   seek	   recognition	   of	   its	   own	   existence	   in	   categories,	   terms,	   and	  names	  that	  are	  not	  of	   its	  own	  making,	   the	  subject	  seeks	   the	  sign	  of	   its	  own	  existence	   outside	   itself,	   in	   a	   discourse	   that	   is	   at	   once	   dominant	   and	  indifferent.	  Social	  categories	  signify	  subordination	  and	  existence	  at	  once.	   In	  other	  words,	  within	  subjection	  the	  price	  of	  existence	  is	  subordination.32	  	  Butler	   adds	   to	   Brown’s	   discussion	   on	   identity’s	   attachment	   to	   pain	   by	  insisting	  that	  this	  site	  of	  subordination	  is	  the	  place	  from	  which	  social	  being	  is	  born.	  Echoing	   Nietzsche,	   Butler	   considers	   this	   a	   case	   in	   which	   the	   subject	   prefers	   a	  subordinated	  social	  existence	  to	  no	  existence	  at	  all.	  What	  does	  this	  mean,	  however,	  for	   the	   political	   possibilities	   premised	   on	   these	   subordinated	   social	   categories	  mobilized	  and	  politicized	  as	  identity?	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  it	  follows	  to	  consider	   the	   “ambivalence”	   that	  Butler	   locates	  at	   the	   site	  of	   subject-­‐formation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  “regulatory	  power”	  produces	  the	  subject	  and	   organizes	   him/her	   in	   terms	   of	   social	   categories	   that	   at	   once	   render	   social	  existence	   even	  while	   they	   subordinate.	   Butler	   takes	   from	   Nietzsche	   in	   explaining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Judith	  Butler,	  Excitable	  Speech:	  A	  Politics	  of	  the	  Performative	  (Psychology	  Press,	  1997),	  2.	  31	  Butler,	  The	  Psychic	  Life	  of	  Power,	  106.	  32	  Butler,	  20.	  
	   175	  
how	   this	   existence	   is	   an	   existence	   of	   self-­‐negation,	   whereby	   the	   subject	   turns	   on	  him/herself	  (as	  in	  slave	  morality).	  As	  she	  explains:	  Only	   by	   persisting	   in	   alterity	   does	   one	   persist	   in	   one's	   "own"	   being.	  Vulnerable	   to	   terms	   that	   one	   never	   made,	   one	   persists	   always,	   to	   some	  degree,	   through	   categories,	   names,	   terms,	   and	   classifications	   that	   mark	   a	  primary	   and	   inaugurative	   alienation	   in	   sociality.	   If	   such	   terms	   institute	   a	  primary	  subordination	  or,	  indeed,	  a	  primary	  violence,	  then	  a	  subject	  emerges	  against	  itself	  in	  order,	  paradoxically,	  to	  be	  for	  itself.33	  	  Butler’s	   passage	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Brown’s	   formulation	   of	   how	   identity	  categories	  premised	  on	  exclusion	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  very	  exclusion	  and	  alterity	  to	  exist	   in	   a	   social	  world	   that	   otherwise	   refuses	   to	   recognize	   the	   subjects	  who	   covet	  them.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   Butler	   discusses	   the	   possibility	   of	   political	  autonomy	   that	   arises	   as	   an	   unintended	   “excess”	   of	   this	   process	   of	   subjectivation.	  Indeed,	   without	   the	   subject	   formation	   occasioned	   by	   subordination,	   autonomy	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  given	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  subject	  for	  there	  to	  be	  autonomy.	  This	   autonomy,	   although	   “complicit”	  with	   the	  disciplinary	  power	   that	  produces	   it,	  “may	  do	  more	  than	  reiterate	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  subordination.”34	  As	  Butler	  further	  explains:	  I	  would	   suggest	   that	   no	   historical	   or	   logical	   conclusions	   follow	   necessarily	  from	  this	  primary	  complicity	  with	  subordination,	  but	  that	  some	  possibilities	  tentatively	  do.	  That	  agency	  is	  implicated	  in	  subordination	  is	  not	  the	  sign	  of	  a	  fatal	  self-­‐contradiction	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  subject	  and,	  hence,	  further	  proof	  of	  its	   pernicious	   or	   obsolete	   character.	   But	   neither	   does	   it	   restore	   a	   pristine	  notion	   of	   the	   subject,	   derived	   from	   some	   classical	   liberal-­‐humanist	  formulation,	  whose	   agency	   is	   always	   and	   only	   opposed	   to	   power.	   The	   first	  view	   characterizes	   politically	   sanctimonious	   forms	   of	   fatalism;	   the	   second,	  naive	   forms	   of	   political	   optimism.	   I	   hope	   to	   steer	   clear	   of	   both	   these	  alternatives.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Butler,	  28.	  34	  Butler,	  30.	  	  35	  Butler,	  17.	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   For	  Butler,	   then,	   there	   is	   no	   deterministic	   trajectory	   to	   be	   traced	  here:	   the	  power	  wielded	  by	  subjects	  need	  not	  reflect	  the	  power	  that	  birthed	  them	  into	  social	  being.	  Moreover,	  as	  Brown	  also	  notes,	  the	  categories	  that	  mark	  their	  emergence	  are	  necessarily	   imposed	   from	   the	   outside.	   We	   grasp	   them,	   nonetheless,	   due	   to	   the	  ontological	  possibilities	  –	  that	  is,	  possibilities	  for	  subject	  formation	  –	  that	  they	  offer.	  	  Given	   this	   story	   of	   politicized	   identity’s	   emergence,	   the	   question	   arises	   as	   to	  whether	  identity-­‐based	  movements,	  as	  we	  see	  them	  today,	  offer	  the	  non-­‐reiterative	  political	   autonomy	   that	   Butler	   promises	   as	   a	   possibility?	   For	   Brown,	   and	   other	  critics	  of	  identity,	  the	  answer	  appears	  to	  be	  no.	  
Collusion	  With	  Dominant	  Power	  	  	   Thus	  far	  I	  have	  examined	  three	  problems	  with	  identity	  as	  argued	  by	  Wendy	  Brown	  and	  others:	  its	  attachment	  to	  injury,	  its	  tendency	  toward	  essentialism,	  and	  its	  interpellative	  imposition.	  Identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  also	  been	  challenged	  by	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  for	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  not	  only	  fail	  to	  challenge	  state	  and	  capitalist	  domination,	  but	  actively	  reinstate	  it.	  That	  is,	  opponents	  of	  identity	  politics	  argue	   that	   feminism,	   anti-­‐racism,	   queer	   politics	   and	   other	   such	   social	  movements	  engage	  in	  a	  political	  program	  of	  seeking	  legal	  recognition	  and	  economic	  reformism	  rather	  than	  emancipation	  from	  these	  systems	  of	  oppressive	  governance.	  As	  with	  the	  other	   critiques	   of	   identity	   in	   this	   chapter,	   scholars	   argue	   that	   identity’s	   uncritical	  statism	   and	   capitalist	   enmeshment	   is	   a	   structural	  element	   of	   its	  mode	   of	   political	  articulation.	  This	  section	  will	  look	  at	  both	  these	  challenges	  before	  considering	  some	  responses	  from	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	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Appeals	  to	  Legalism	  	  	   Identity-­‐based	   politics	   have	   also	   been	   dubbed	   the	   “politics	   of	   recognition”	  due	   to	   their	   strivings	   for	   legal	   recognition	   and	   redress.	   Created	   by	   disciplinary	  power	   and	   then	   erased	   by	   liberal	   universalism,	   Brown	   argues	   that	   politicized	  identity	  strives	  to	  inscribe	  its	  difference	  as	  politically	  significant	  in	  legal	  registers.	  As	  she	   argues	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   anti-­‐discrimination	   ordinance	   discussed	   earlier,	   this	  demand	   for	   legal	   recognition	   is	   concerning	   in	   that	   it	   frames	   the	   state	  as	   though	   it	  were	   the	   “neutral	   arbiter	   of	   injury.”	   Brown	   argues	   that	   politicized	   identity’s	  tendency	   to	   “pursue	   legal	   redress”	   for	   social	   injury	   related	   to	   racism,	   sexism	   and	  homophobia,	  and	  to	  “establish	  these	  as	  morally	  heinous	  in	  the	  law”	  is	  expressive	  of	  its	  ressentimental	  desire.	  As	  she	  contends,	  This	   effort	   also	   casts	   the	   law	   in	   particular	   and	   the	   state	  more	   generally	   as	  neutral	  arbiters	  of	  injury	  rather	  than	  as	  themselves	  invested	  with	  the	  power	  to	  injure.	  Thus,	  the	  effort	  to	  ‘outlaw’	  social	  injury	  powerfully	  legitimizes	  law	  and	   the	   state	   as	   appropriate	   protectors	   against	   injury	   and	   casts	   injured	  individuals	   as	   needing	   such	   protection	   by	   such	   protectors.	   Finally,	   in	   its	  economy	   of	   perpetrator	   and	   victim,	   this	   project	   seeks	   not	   power	   or	  emancipation	   for	   the	   injured	   or	   the	   subordinated,	   but	   the	   revenge	   of	  punishment,	  making	  the	  perpetrator	  hurt	  as	  the	  sufferer	  does.36	  	  For	  Brown,	   then,	  politicized	   identity’s	  desire	   for	   legal	   justice	  entraps	   it	   in	  a	  
ressentimental	  cycle	  of	  installing	  its	  injury	  in	  the	  law,	  and	  avenging	  its	  pain	  through	  the	   legal	  punishment	  of	  others,	   all	   the	  while	   reinforcing	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	   law.	  This	  not	  only	  creates	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  oppressed	  peoples	  are	  poised	  to	   look	  to	  the	   law	  and	  the	  state	  for	  protection	  but	  also	  where	  the	  categories	  of	  “perpetrator”	  and	  “victim”	  get	  entrenched	  in	  the	  law.	  In	  Nietzsche’s	  view,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Brown,	  27.	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last	  chapter,	  legal	  redress,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  means	  to	  emancipation,	  is	  a	  method	  by	  which	   the	   strong	   lend	   the	   weak	   a	   bit	   of	   their	   power	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   their	  overall	  hegemony.	  Politicized	   identity’s	   appeal	   to	   legalism	   is	   also	   about	   attaining	   recognition.	  Theorists	   of	   recognition	   often	   cite	   Hegel’s	   well-­‐known	   master/slave	   dialectic	   as	  initiating	   a	   shift	   in	   how	   the	   self	   is	   conceptualized.	   Reflecting	   on	   Hegel’s	   insights,	  Linda	  Martin	  Alcoff	  explains	  that:	  	  an	   individual	   can	   only…become	   a	   subject	   and	   a	   moral	   agent	   after	   social	  absorption	   and	   recognition	   from	   the	   Other….The	   classical	   liberal	  core/periphery	   model	   of	   the	   self	   is	   displaced	   by	   a	   fundamentally	   holistic	  model	   in	   which	   the	   self	   can	   only	   come	   into	   being	   –	   can	   only	   achieve	   the	  capacity	   for	   self-­‐reflection	   and	   agency	   –	   given	   certain	   external	   relations.	  Consciousness	   itself	   becomes	   an	   emergent	   entity	   of	   a	   social	   and	   historical	  process	   rather	   than	   a	   kind	   of	   pre-­‐social	   thinking	   substance	   that	   could	  conceivably	  exist	  entirely	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  locus	  of	  agency,	  in	  particular,	  is	  not	  simply	   internal	   to	   the	   self.	   Moreover,	   one’s	   social	   identity	   as	   slave	   or	   as	  master	  is	  the	  product	  of	  social	  interaction	  and	  social	  institutions	  rather	  than	  determined	  by	   intrinsic	   features,	   and	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  possibility	   of	   radical	  transformation.37	  	   The	  work	  of	  contemporary	  recognition	  theorists	  like	  Charles	  Taylor	  and	  Axel	  Honneth	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  Hegelian	  thesis	  on	  intersubjectivity.	  Unlike	  Butler	  who	  takes	   a	   post-­‐structural	   approach	   to	   understanding	   subjectivity	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  formed	  through	  and	  within	  discursive	  power,	  Taylor	  and	  Honneth	  are	   interested	   in	   our	   need	   for	   recognition	   and	   the	   dangers	   of	   misrecognition.38	  Indeed,	   Taylor	   identifies	   recognition	   as	   a	   “vital	   human	   need,”	   whereas	  misrecognition	   can	   “inflict	   a	   grievous	  wound,	   saddling	   its	   victims	  with	   a	   crippling	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Linda	  Martin	  Alcoff,	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  Identity	  Politics?,”	  2000,	  http://www.alcoff.com/content/afraidid.html.	  38	  This,	  however,	  is	  not	  to	  equate	  the	  two	  in	  how	  they	  conceptualize	  recognition.	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self-­‐hatred.”39	  Honneth	  agrees	  with	  Taylor’s	  characterization	  of	  recognition,	  arguing	  that	   its	   denial	   “provides	   the	   motivational	   and	   justificatory	   basis	   for	   social	  struggles.”40	  Thus,	   for	   Taylor	   and	   Honneth,	   the	   denial	   of	   recognition	   for	   women,	  people	  of	  colour,	  queer	  folks	  and	  other	  oppressed	  groups	  explains	  the	  development	  and	  persistence	  of	  identity-­‐based	  politics	  today.41	  Nancy	   Fraser	   is	   another	   leading	   contemporary	   theorist	   of	   the	   politics	   of	  recognition.	   She	   argues	   that	   the	   politics	   of	   recognition	   is	   not	   an	   issue	   of	  intersubjectivity	  or	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  ethical	  issue	  of	  “self-­‐realization”42	  but	  rather,	  a	  matter	  of	  justice.	  That	  is,	  she	  believes	  it	  is	  a	  moral	  issue	  where	  in	  which	  the	  social	  status	  of	   a	  person,	   specifically,	   their	   ability	   to	  participate	   in	   society	   at	  parity	  with	  others,	  is	  compromised	  by	  institutional	  practices	  (e.g.	  racial	  profiling	  by	  the	  police)	  based	  on	  harmful	  cultural	  beliefs.	  The	  injury	  is	  thus	  one	  of	  social	  status	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  actively	  partake	  in	  the	  social,	  and	  the	  claim	  for	  recognition	  is	  a	  political	  one	  that	  is	  freed	   from	   the	   “vicissitudes”	   of	   the	   psyche.43	  For	   Fraser,	   it	  matters	   little	  what	   the	  psychological	   effects	   are	   given	   the	   difficulty	   she	   sees	   in	   proving	   or	   making	  generalizations	   about	   matters	   of	   the	   psyche.	   Rather	   she	   advocates	   for	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Charles	  Taylor,	  Multiculturalism:	  (Expanded	  Paperback	  Edition)	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  26.	  40	  	  Paddy	  McQueen,	  “Social	  and	  Political	  Recognition,”	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  accessed	  February	  20,	  2018.	  41	  McQueen.	  	  42	  Nancy	  Fraser	  and	  Axel	  Honneth,	  Redistribution	  Or	  Recognition?:	  A	  Political-­‐Philosophical	  
Exchange	  (Verso,	  2003).	  43	  In	  contrast	  to	  Fraser’s	  view,	  the	  master/slave	  dialectic	  has	  also	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  psychoanalytic	  thinkers	  who	  stress	  the	  deeply	  psychological	  aspects	  of	  domination/subordination.	  For	  one	  example,	  see	  Jessica	  Benjamin’s	  excellent	  book,	  The	  
Bonds	  of	  Love:	  Psychoanalysis,	  Feminism,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Domination	  (Pantheon	  Books,	  1988).	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grievances	   to	   be	   mounted	   upon	   the	   indisputable	   fact	   of	   social	   exclusion,	   and	   to	  mobilize	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  recognition	  and	  redistribution.	  The	   critique	   against	   recognition	   –	   whether	   based	   on	   Taylor,	   Honneth	   or	  Fraser’s	   conception	   –	   is	   premised,	   in	   Brown’s	   argument,	   on	   the	   dependence	   it	  creates	  on	   legal	   structures,	  which	   are	  not	   only	   legitimized	   in	   the	  process	  but	   also	  neutralized	   of	   their	   own	   capacities	   to	   harm.	   The	   struggle	   for	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	  might	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  here.	  According	  to	  this	  critique,	  in	  appealing	  to	  the	  law	  to	  grant	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	   rights,	   the	   law	   is	   necessarily	   recognized	   as	   an	   authority	  with	  the	  legitimate	  power	  with	  which	  to	  grant	  privileges.	  The	  law	  is	  also	  depended	  upon	   to	   fairly	   adjudicate	   between	   same-­‐sex	   claims	   and	   those	   of	   opposing	   groups	  hostile	  to	  these	  aims.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  fear	  is	  that	  identity	  groups	  might	  exhibit	  a	  type	  of	   historical	   blindness,	   forgetting	   the	   role	   the	   state	   has	   played	   in	   administering	  oppression	  precisely	  through	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  law.	  An	  instrument	  of	  domination	  is	  converted	  into	  a	  benevolent	  protector,	  while	  the	  oppressed	  are	  fixed	  in	  their	  role	  as	   victims.	   This	   type	   of	   state	   paternalism	   is	   dangerous	   not	   only	   for	   emancipatory	  movements	  in	  that	  it	  encourages	  a	  political	  scheme	  of	  concessionary	  successes	  over	  wholesale	  structural	  change,	  but	  also	   in	   the	  ways	   that	   it	   structures	   claims.	  That	   is,	  appeals	   for	   legal	   recognition	   and	   legal	   redress	   are	   limited	   to	   demands	   that	   only	  allow	  for	  an	  approximation	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  never	  a	  transcending	  of	  it.	  To	  continue	  with	  the	  example	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  while	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  injunction	  against	  gay/lesbian	   marriage	   undoubtedly	   corrects	   a	   legal	   injustice,	   it	   does	   nothing	   to	  challenge	  marriage	  as	  an	  institution	  –	  an	  institution	  itself	  rooted	  in	  oppression	  and	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inequality.	   Rather,	   marriage	   as	   a	   hegemonic	   structure	   and	   practice	   is	   legitimized	  and	  even	  valorized.	  Glen	   Coulthard	   makes	   a	   similar	   	   argument	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   politics	   of	  recognition	   in	  the	  context	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  Canadian	  State	  and	  Indigenous	  peoples.	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   politics	   of	   recognition	   and	   reconciliation,	   as	   they	  currently	  stand,	  work	  to	  disempower	  Indigenous	  peoples.	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  terms	  of	  both	   these	  political	  projects	  set	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  colonizing	  state,	  but	   they	  work	   to	  further	   the	   colonization	   of	   Indigenous	   people	   who,	   by	   entering	   into	  agreement/negotiation	  by	  the	  state,	  become	  interpellated	  as	  subjects	  of	  the	  state.	  44	  As	  Brown	  thus	  argues,	  a	  politicized	  identity	  that	  makes	  demands	  based	  on	  its	  exclusion	  must	  articulate	  that	  which	  it	  is	  excluded	  from.	  This	  requires	  an	  ideal	  that	  is	  necessarily	   internal	   to	   the	   oppressive	   system	   against	   which	   identity-­‐based	  movements	   are	   ostensibly	   opposed.	   For	   Brown,	   appealing	   to	   this	   ideal	   not	   only	  leads	   politicized	   identity	   to	   assume	   a	   conciliatory	   posture	   toward	   state	   and	   legal	  power,	   but	   also	   implicates	   it	   in	   capitalist	  power.	  The	   next	   section	   explores	   this	   in	  more	  detail.	  
Capitalist	  Enmeshment	  	   As	   was	   discussed	   earlier	   in	   the	   chapter,	   Farred	   describes	   how	   the	   rise	   of	  identity	   politics	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   “wariness	   of	   class	   as	   an	   organizational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  See	  Glen	  Coulthard,	  Red	  Skin,	  White	  Masks	  (University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2014).	  This	  is	  admittedly	  an	  abbreviated	  summary	  of	  Coulthard’s	  argument,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  exceedingly	  limited	  engagement	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  recognition	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  Indigenous	  struggles.	  While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  question	  of	  identity	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  indigeneity	  would	  complicate	  the	  present	  discussion.	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instrument.”45	  Wallerstein	  similarly	  discusses	  how	  the	  “explosion”	  of	  issues	  of	  race	  and	  sex	  on	  the	  social	  scene	  resulted	  in	  the	  recession	  of	  labour/economic	  issues	  from	  the	   time	   of	   the	   1968	   revolutions	   onwards.46	  This	   has	   led	   critics	   to	   argue	   that	  identity	   politics	   has	   not	   only	   abandoned	   a	   class	   analysis	   but	   is	   complicit	   with	  capitalist	  power.	  	  Recognizing	   the	   commonly	  made	   argument	   that	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  were	  born	  out	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  class-­‐politics,	  Brown	  contends	  the	  following:	  Without	  adjudicating	   the	  precise	   relationship	  between	   the	  breakup	  of	   class	  politics	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  other	  sites	  of	  political	  identification,	  I	  want	  to	  refigure	   this	   claim	   by	   suggesting	   that	   what	   we	   have	   come	   to	   call	   identity	  politics	  is	  partly	  dependent	  upon	  the	  demise	  of	  a	  critique	  of	  capitalism	  and	  of	  bourgeois	   cultural	   and	   economic	   values.	   In	   a	   reading	   that	   links	   the	   new	  identity	   claims	   to	   a	   certain	   relegitimation	   of	   capitalism,	   identity	   politics	  concerned	  with	  race,	  sexuality,	  and	  gender	  will	  appear	  not	  as	  a	  supplement	  to	   class	   politics,	   not	   as	   an	   expansion	   of	   left	   categories	   of	   oppression	   and	  emancipation,	  not	  as	  an	  enriching	  augmentation	  of	  progressive	  formulations	  of	   power	   and	   persons	   –	   all	   of	   which	   they	   also	   are	   –	   but	   as	   tethered	   to	   a	  formulation	  of	   justice	   that	   reinscribes	  a	  bourgeois	   (masculinist)	   ideal	  as	   its	  measure.47	  	   Brown’s	  claim	  needs	  some	  unpacking.	  She	   traces	   the	  emergence	  of	   identity	  politics	   as	   dependent	   on	   the	   abandonment	   of	   capitalism	   and	   capitalist	   values	   as	  objects	   of	   critique.	   This	   dependence	   arises	   with	   politicized	   identity’s	   need	   for	   an	  ideal	   internal	   to	   capitalism.	   That	   is,	   a	   bourgeois	   and	   masculinist	   ideal	   that	  “renaturalizes”	  capitalism	  and	  its	  offerings	  as	  “good,”	  “desirable,”	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Farred,	  636.	  46	  Wallerstein,	  85.	  47	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury,	  59.	  Nancy	  Fraser	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  regarding	  politicized	  identity’s	  abandonment	  of	  class	  critique.	  As	  she	  states:	  “questions	  of	  recognition	  are	  serving	  less	  to	  supplement,	  complicate	  and	  enrich	  redistributive	  struggles	  than	  to	  marginalize,	  eclipse	  and	  displace	  them”	  in	  “Rethinking	  Recognition,”	  New	  Left	  Review,	  II,	  no.	  3	  (2000):	  107–20.	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those	   who	   are	   excluded	   from	   it,	   “enviable.”	   For	   Brown	   it	   is	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	  “phantasmic	   middle-­‐class”	   premised	   on	   “an	   imagined	   idyllic,	   unfettered,	   and	  uncorrupted	  historical	  moment	  (implicitly	  located	  around	  1955).”48	  It	  is	  this	  vision	  that	  becomes	  the	  referent	  against	  which	  “nonclass	  identities	  refer	  for	  proof	  of	  their	  exclusion	  or	  injury,”	  whether	  they	  be	  queer	  people	  fighting	  for	  marriage	  rights,	  child	  custody	  or	  employment	  security;	  single	  mothers	  struggling	  to	  care	  for	  their	  children	  while	   being	   employed;	   or	   people	   of	   colour	   facing	   discrimination	   in	   employment,	  housing,	   and	   health	   care,	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   the	   recipients	   of	   unprovoked	  harassment.49	  As	  Brown	  argues:	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  these	  privations	  are	  trivial	  but	  that	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  white	  masculine	  middle-­‐class	   ideal,	  politicized	   identities	  would	   forfeit	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  their	  claims	  to	  injury	  and	  exclusion,	  their	  claims	  to	  the	  political	  significance	  of	  their	  difference.	  If	  they	  thus	  require	  this	  ideal	  for	  the	  potency	  and	  poignancy	  of	  their	  political	  claims,	  we	  might	  ask	  to	  what	  extent	  a	  critique	  of	   capitalism	   is	   foreclosed	   by	   the	   current	   configuration	   of	   oppositional	  politics,	   and	   not	   simply	   by	   the	   ‘loss	   of	   the	   socialist	   alternative’	   or	   the	  ostensible	  ‘triumph	  of	  liberalism’	  in	  the	  global	  order.	  	   Brown’s	  argument,	  thus,	   is	  that	  in	  order	  for	  politicized	  identity	  to	  articulate	  its	  exclusion	  on	  a	  political	  register,	   it	  must	  express	  what	   it	   is	  being	  excluded	   from.	  Insofar	  as	  what	  we	  are	  being	  excluded	  from	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  middle-­‐class	  ideal	  (ie:	  “educational	   and	   vocational	   opportunity,	   upward	   mobility,	   relative	   protection	  against	   arbitrary	   violence,	   and	   reward	   in	   proportion	   to	   effort”50),	   capitalism	   will	  largely	   be	   protected	   from	   critique.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   things	   desired	   by	   identity	  movements	  are	  precisely	  the	  promises	  of	  capitalism	  (and	  liberalism),	  and	  are	  framed	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  Brown,	  61.	  49	  Brown,	  61.	  50	  Brown,	  60.	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as	  desirable	  and	  indeed	  neutral,	  rather	  than	  the	  product	  of	  a	  bourgeois	  masculinist	  ideology.	  For	  Brown,	  identity	  politics	  can	  thus	  “be	  partly	  configured	  by	  a	  peculiarly	  disguised	  form	  of	  class	  resentment,	  a	  resentment	  that	   is	  displaced	  onto	  discourses	  of	  injustice	  other	  than	  class,	  but	  a	  resentment,	  like	  all	  resentments,	  that	  retains	  the	  real	  or	  imagined	  holdings	  of	  its	  reviled	  subject	  as	  objects	  of	  desire.”51	  On	  her	  view,	  then,	   politicized	   identities,	   in	   their	   quest	   for	  bourgeois	  norms	   (“social	   acceptance,	  legal	   protection,	   and	   relative	   material	   comfort”52)	   are	   endemically	   repelled	   from	  challenging	  class	  power	  and	  norms	  because	  they	  buy	  into	  them.	  This	  causes	  them	  to	  heap	  all	  blame	  for	   their	  suffering	  on	  other	  “markers	  of	  social	  difference”	  (i.e.	   race,	  gender,	   and	   sexuality)	   when	   in	   actuality,	   it	   is	   the	   injurious	   physical	   and	   psychic	  effects	  of	  capitalism	  that	  should	  be	  faulted.	  Brown	  lists	  a	  number	  of	  these	  effects	  as	  “alienation,	   commodification,	   exploitation,	   displacement,	   [and]	   disintegration	   of	  sustaining	  albeit	  contradictory	  social	  forms	  such	  as	  families	  and	  neighborhoods.”53	  All	   of	   these,	   when	   normalized	   and	   depoliticized,	   produce	   a	   suffering	   that	   gets	  wrongly	   added	   to	   the	   suffering	   that	   is	   “attributable	   to	   the	   explicitly	   politicized	  marking.”54	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument	  to	  Brown’s.	  In	  his	  view:	  Race	   politics	   is	   not	   an	   alternative	   to	   class	   politics;	   it	   is	   a	   class	   politics,	   the	  politics	   of	   the	   left-­‐wing	   of	   neoliberalism.	   It	   is	   the	   expression	   and	   active	  agency	   of	   a	   political	   order	   and	   moral	   economy	   in	   which	   capitalist	   market	  forces	  are	  treated	  as	  unassailable	  in	  nature.	  An	  integral	  element	  of	  that	  moral	  economy	  is	  displacement	  of	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  invidious	  outcomes	  produced	  by	   capitalist	   class	   power	   onto	   equally	   naturalized	   categories	   of	   ascriptive	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  Brown,	  60.	  52	  Brown,	  60.	  53	  Brown,	  60.	  54	  Brown,	  60.	  Rosemary	  Hennessey	  also	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  her	  book,	  Profit	  and	  Pleasure:	  
Sexual	  Identities	  in	  Late	  Capitalism	  (Psychology	  Press,	  2000).	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identity	  that	  sort	  us	   into	  groups	  supposedly	  defined	  by	  what	  we	  essentially	  are	  rather	  than	  what	  we	  do.55	  	   Reed	  figures	  race	  politics	  (and	  all	  identity-­‐based	  movements)	  as	  class	  politics	  in	   a	   social	   order	   where	   the	   “unassailability”	   of	   capitalism	   renders	   the	   capitalist	  order	   normal	   and	   incontestable.	   According	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   this	   “moral	   economy,”	  Reed	  argues	   that	   although	  90%	  of	   resources	  might	  be	  under	   the	   control	  of	  1%	  of	  society,	   this	   arrangement	   would	   nonetheless	   appear	   just	   to	   the	   proponents	   of	  identity	   politics	   as	   long	   as	   the	   1%	  was	   divided	   in	   a	  manner	   proportionate	   to	   the	  populations	  of	  different	   identity	  groups	   (so	   for	  example,	   if	  half	  of	   the	  1%	  went	   to	  women,	   12%	  went	   to	   blacks	   etc.).56	  What	   Reed	   is	   attempting	   to	   show	   is	   that	   for	  identity-­‐based	  movements,	  the	  issue	  of	  justice	  hinges	  not	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  live	  in	  an	  economic	  system	  premised	  on	  inequality	  and	  exploitation,	  but	  rather	  that	  we	  (as	  women,	  as	  people	  of	  colour,	  as	  LGBTQ	  people)	  are	  not	  receiving	  our	  fair	  share	  of	  the	  spoils.	  Sociologist	  Todd	  Gitlin	  is	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  outspoken	  and	  well-­‐known	  critics	   of	   identity	   politics	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   failure	   to	   contend	   with	   the	   forces	   of	  capitalism.	   Indeed,	   Reed	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	   identify	   him	   as	   “both	   fairly	   and	   as	  caricature,	  the	  symbol	  of	  a	  ‘class-­‐first’	  line.”57	  Gitlin	  has	  come	  to	  earn	  this	  reputation	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  number	  of	  publications	  (primarily	  in	  the	  1990s)	  that	  expose	  what	  he	  sees	   as	   significant	   limitations	   in	   identity-­‐based	  movements	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   they	  impact	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Left.	  Broadly,	  Gitlin	  makes	  two	  key	  points.	  The	  first	  pertains	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “From	  Jenner	  to	  Dolezal.”	  56	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “The	  Limits	  of	  Anti-­‐Racism,”	  Left	  Business	  Observer	  121	  (September	  2009).	  57	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “The	  Limits	  of	  Anti-­‐Racism."	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to	  how	  the	  symbolic	  gains	  of	  identity,	  especially	  in	  the	  university,	  have	  replaced	  any	  serious	  reckoning	  with	  the	  increasing	  ravages	  of	  capitalism	  outside	  of	  the	  academy.	  Gitlin’s	   book	   Twilight	   of	   Common	   Dreams	   is	   replete	   with	   examples	   of	   what	   he	  describes	   as	   emotionally	   charged	   battles	   over	   admissions,	   hiring	   practices,	  appropriate	   speech,	   and	   curriculum	  omissions	  by	   identity-­‐based	   groups	   (feminist,	  anti-­‐racist,	   and	   queer	   students).	   Gitlin	   argues	   that	   identity-­‐based	   struggles	  “flourish”	   in	  universities	  given	  that	  they	  are	  “far	  more	  winnable”	  there	  than	   in	  the	  larger	   world.	   This	   is	   due,	   in	   part,	   to	   the	   defeat	   of	   the	   New	   Left	   which	   led	   to	   the	  “partisans	  of	  identity	  politics	  bec[oming]	  preoccupied	  with	  what	  they	  might	  control	  in	   their	   immediate	   surroundings	   –	   language	   and	   imagery.” 58 	  For	   Gitlin,	   the	  consequences	   of	   this	   are	   politically	   damaging	   given	   that	   they	   fail	   to	   address	   the	  more	  pressing	  issues	  of	  economic	  inequality.	  As	  he	  argues:	  the	  politics	  of	   identity	   is	   silent	  on	   the	  deepest	   sources	  of	   social	  misery:	   the	  devastation	  of	  cities,	  the	  draining	  of	  resources	  away	  from	  the	  public	  and	  into	  the	  private	   hands	   of	   the	   few.	   	   It	   does	   not	   organize	   to	   reduce	   the	   sickening	  inequality	  between	  rich	  and	  poor.	  	  Instead,	  in	  effect,	  it	  struggles	  to	  change	  the	  color	  of	  inequality.59	  	   Gitlin’s	  second	  point	  relates	  to	  identity’s	  fragmenting	  of	  the	  Left	  –	  a	  concern	  shared	  by	  a	  number	  of	  Leftist	  thinkers	  who	  also	  lament	  the	  demise	  of	  class	  politics	  in	  the	  movement.60	  Gitlin	  alternates	  between	  a	  sympathetic	  and	  disparaging	  stance	  in	  discussing	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  Left’s	  disintegration	  into	  identity	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  Gitlin,	  The	  Twilight	  of	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  60	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  also	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  Michael	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groupings.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  recognizes	  current	  exponents	  of	  identity	  politics	  in	  the	  university	  as	  heirs	  of	   the	  dissolution	  of	  New	  Left	  universalism,	   conceding	   that	  “this	  generation	  had	  no	  direct	  memory	  of	  a	  unified	  Left…their	  experience	  of	  active	  politics	  was	   segmented,	   not	   unified.”61	  Gitlin	   is	   also	   somewhat	   sympathetic	   to	   the	  sense	  of	  belonging	  and	  pleasure	  that	  come	  with	  identity,	  especially	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  rootedness	  and	  anxiety	  of	  our	  current	  moment.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  Gitlin	  is	  unequivocal	  in	  his	  contention	  that	  the	  cultural	  boundaries	  and	  in-­‐group	  mentality	  of	  identity-­‐based	  politics	  obstruct	  the	  Left	  from	  achieving	  the	  common	  ground	  needed	  to	  effect	  serious	  political	  change.	  As	  he	  states:	  A	   Left	   that	   was	   serious	   about	   winning	   political	   power	   and	   reducing	   the	  inequality	  of	  wealth	   and	   income	  would	   stop	   lambasting	   all	  white	  men,	   and	  would	   take	   it	   as	   elementary	   to	   reduce	   frictions	   among	   white	   men,	   blacks,	  white	  women,	  and	  Hispanics.	  	  Could	  it	  be	  more	  obvious	  that	  the	  Left	  and	  the	  Democrats	   alike	   are	   helpless	   unless	   they	   offer	   all	   these	   constituencies	  something	  they	  benefit	  from	  in	  common?62	  	   Gitlin	   calls	   for	   a	   “political	   system	   of	   mutual	   reliance	   and	   common	   moral	  obligations”	   that	   does	   not	   forfeit	   political	   citizenship	   for	   cultural	   identity.	   In	   his	  view,	  our	  task	  is	  one	  of	  “building	  bridges,”	  rather	  than	  emphasizing	  and	  protecting	  our	  differences.	  	  Brown,	   Reed,	   and	   Gitlin	   are	   only	   a	   few	   of	   the	  many	   thinkers	   that	   critique	  identity	  politics	  for	  failing	  to	  challenge	  capitalism,	  and	  indeed	  aspiring	  towards	  it.63	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Moreover,	   these	   thinkers	  often	  also	   challenge	   identity	  politics	   for	   fragmenting	   the	  Left,	  and	  emphasizing	  group	  interests	  over	  universal	  commonalities.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	   this	   chapter,	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  attracted	  significant	   criticism.	   I	  have	   discussed	   some	   of	   the	   most	   dominant	   challenges:	   attachment	   to	   injury,	  essentialism,	  and	  complicity	  with	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  appropriation	  of	   identity,	   legalism,	  and	  capitalism.	  The	  proponents	  of	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  not	  been	  silent	  in	  response	  to	  these	  challenges.	  Indeed,	  a	  number	  of	  exponents	  of	  the	  movement	  have	  defended	  their	  style	  of	  political	  engagement.	  The	  next	  section	  gives	  some	  of	  these	  responses.	  	  
(5.2)	  In	  Defense	  of	  Identity-­‐based	  Politics	  	  	   Given	   the	   sustained	   attack	   on	   identity	   in	   the	   academy	   since	   the	   1990s,	   a	  number	  of	  defenses	  have	  emerged	  from	  proponents	  of	  the	  movement.	  This	  section	  offers	   a	   selective	   representation	   of	   some	   of	   the	   most	   dominant	   responses	   as	  provided	  by	  Carrie	  Bramen	  and	  Linda	  Maria	  Alcoff.	  	  	  Carrie	   Bramen	   launches	   an	   incendiary	   attack	   against	   critics	   of	   identity	  politics	  including	  Wendy	  Brown,	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  and	  Todd	  Gitlin	  in	  her	  article	  “Why	  the	   Academic	   Left	   Hates	   Identity	   Politics.”64	  She	   identifies	   these	   critics	   as	   “left	  traditionalists”	  who	   bemoan	   the	   elision	   of	   class	   in	   identity-­‐based	  movements	   and	  who	  argue	  that	  such	  movements	  fragment	  the	  Left	  “into	  distinct,	  mutually	  exclusive	  groups	  without	   a	   common	   ground	   so	   that	   potential	   alliances	   are	   thwarted	   in	   the	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name	  of	  special	  interests.”65	  For	  left	  traditionalists,	  identity	  politics	  is	  “bad”	  politics,	  to	  be	  differentiated	  from	  the	  “good”	  and	  more	  pressing	  politics	  of	  class.	  	  Bramen	   challenges	   these	   critics	   on	   three	   grounds.	   Firstly,	   she	   argues	   that	  Leftist	  opponents	  of	  identity	  politics	  are	  almost	  uniformly	  reticent	  in	  terms	  of	  who	  they	   are	   talking	   about	   in	   their	   critiques	   of	   identity.	   As	   Bramen	   states,	   “the	   most	  striking	   feature	   in	   the	   criticism	   of	   identity	   politics	   is	   the	   absence	   of	   names	   and	  examples.”66	  She	   charges	  Wendy	  Brown,	   for	   example,	   for	   giving	  Nietzsche	   “all	   the	  best	  lines	  [in	  States	  of	  Injury]	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  people	  of	  colour	  who	  rarely	  appear	  except	  in	  an	  occasional	  footnote	  (and	  then	  only	  those	  scholars	  who	  agree	  with	  the	  author).”67	  Later	   in	   the	   article,	   Bramen	   reasons	   that	   this	   refusal	   to	   name	   names	  might	   be	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   term	   “identity	   politics,”	   for	   the	   traditional	   Left,	  largely	   operates	   as	   a	   euphemism	   for	   people	   of	   colour,	   even	  while	   it	   formally	   also	  represents	   the	   political	   struggles	   of	  women,	   queer	   folks,	   and	   other	   ethnic	   groups.	  Focusing	  again	  on	  Brown,	  Bramen	  argues	  that,	  “rhetorically	  speaking,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  criticize	   abstract	   terms	   like	   ‘politicized	   identity’	   or	   simply	   ‘identity’	   rather	   than	  ‘black	  people’	  or	  ‘minority	  scholars.’”68	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  discomfort	  around	  race,	  leads	  to	  Bramen’s	  second	  point.	  Bramen	   contends	   that	   the	  white	   liberal	   Left	   is	   terrified	   of	   the	   anger	   of	   racialized	  peoples,	  and	  especially	  the	  anger	  of	  black	  people.	  As	  she	  discusses,	  “an	  angry	  black	  student	   speaking	   out	   in	   class,	   for	   instance,	   may	   be	   accused	   of	   ‘silencing’	   white	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students	   by	   using	   the	   authority	   of	   her	   experience	   as	   a	   racialized	   subject.”69	  In	  speaking	   from	   a	   place	   of	   authority,	   moreover,	   Bramen	   argues	   that	   this	   student	  might	   be	   accused	   of	   engaging	   in	   “essentialist	   exclusion”	   in	   which	   the	   charge	   of	  essentialism	  operates	  as	  means	  of	  dismissing	  the	  anger	  of	  people	  of	  colour	  against	  racism,	  and	  protecting	  white	  people	  from	  the	  potential	  “emotional	  consequences	  of	  such	   confrontations.”70	  As	   Bramen	   explains,	   “Accusations	   of	   essentialism	   function,	  in	  part,	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  evasion,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ignore	  and	  deflect	  ‘minority’	  anger	  and	  to	  stay	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  safely	  familiar.”71	  Bramen	  also	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  in	  depicting	  people	  of	  colour	  as	  angry,	  “a	  disturbing	  racial	  allegory”	  arises	  which	  “links	  people	  of	  colour	  with	  emotionalism,	  blinding	  attachment	  and	  excessive	  behaviour	  –perhaps	   rage?	   –	   in	   contrast	   to	   a	   race	   neutral	   (read	   Anglo-­‐American)	  cosmopolitanism,	  which	  would	  be	  more	  rational	  and	  objective.”72	  Bramen’s	  third	  challenge	  to	  Leftist	  critics	  of	  identity	  politics	  centers	  on	  their	  dismissal	   of	   racial	   victimage.	   She	   identifies	   a	   “pull	   yourself	   up	   by	   the	   bootstraps”	  narrative	   in	   circulation	   in	   both	   Leftist	   and	   conservative	   rhetoric.	   Bramen	   quotes	  Cornell	  West	   in	   saying	   that	   “‘While	   black	   people	   have	   never	   been	   simply	   victims,	  wallowing	  in	  self-­‐pity	  and	  begging	  for	  white	  giveaways,	  they	  have	  been–	  and	  are	  –	  victimized.”73	  Bramen	  discusses	  a	  number	  of	  post-­‐identity	  and	  cosmopolitan	  models	  that	  have	  been	  suggested	  by	  Leftist	  scholars	  as	  denying	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  race	  still	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matters.	   As	   she	   argues,	   “post-­‐ethnicity	   cannot	   address	   the	   fact	   that	   bodies	   still	  signify	  according	  to	  racial	  categories…”74	  While	  Bramen	  does	  concede	  some	  limitations	  of	  identity	  politics,	  namely	  “in	  prescribing	   modes	   of	   behaviour	   that	   pressure	   individuals	   to	   conform	   to	   certain	  standards	   of	   authenticity,”	   she	   quotes	   Grant	   Farred	   in	   arguing	   that	   identity	   has	  “empowered	   more	   than	   disenfranchised.” 75 	  Positive	   aspects	   of	   identity-­‐based	  politics	   for	   Bramen	   include	   the	   community	   building	   produced	   by	   strategic	   self-­‐essentializing,	   as	   well	   as	   “the	   right	   to	   self-­‐definition	   as	   a	   public	   act	   that	   has	  politicized	  minorities’	   sense	   of	   themselves	   and	   has	   given	   these	   groups	   a	   sense	   of	  agency	  that	  was	  fought	  for	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  fought	  for	  in	  daily	  struggles	  against	  discrimination,	   poverty	   and	   brutality.” 76 Bramen,	   moreover,	   emphasizes	   the	  institutional	   policies	   and	   structures	   that	   activists	   from	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  successfully	  challenged,	  leading	  to	  real	  material	  gains	  for	  minority	  groups.	  She	  provides	  the	  examples	  of	   the	  1999	  UC	  Berkeley	  hunger	  strike	   in	  protest	  of	  drastic	  budget	   cuts	   to	   its	   Ethnic	   Studies	   Program,	   and	   Jesse	   Jackson’s	   Rainbow/PUSH	  organization	  against	  racist	  marketing	  and	  hiring	  practices	  at	  Toyota.	  Both,	  Bramen	  contends,	   resulted	   in	   victories	   that	   demonstrate	   the	   real-­‐life	   effects	   of	   identity	  politics.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  above	  productive	  features	  of	  identity-­‐based	  movements,	  Bramen	   discusses	   the	   “dissident	   subcultures”	   that	   identity	   politics	   has	   created	  political	  space	  for.	  She	  describes	  these	  subcultures	  as	  semi-­‐autonomous	  groups	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Bramen,	  6.	  75	  Bramen,	  8.	  	  76	  Bramen,	  7.	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trouble	   the	   distinction	   between	   separatism	   and	   integration	   by	   engaging	  with	   the	  dominant	   culture	   at	   times,	   and	   at	   other	   times,	   maintaining	   a	   type	   of	   dissident	  autonomy.	  Bramen	  mobilizes	  West’s	   concept	  of	   “subcultures	  of	   criticism”	  as	   those	  which	   “position	   themselves	   within	   the	   dominant	   culture,	   ‘while	   clearly	   being	  aligned	   with	   [marginalized]	   groups	   who	   vow	   to	   keep	   alive	   potent	   traditions	   of	  critique	   and	   resistance.’”77	  Bramen	   argues	   that	   “this	   understanding	   of	   subcultures	  gives	   ‘minority’	   intellectuals	   the	   chance	   to	   lay	   claim	   to	   the	   local,	   national	   and	  international	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  maintaining	  a	  critical	  space	  of	  separation.”78	  Linda	  Martin	  Alcoff	  also	  provides	  a	  defense	  for	  identity	  politics.	  In	  her	  article	  entitled	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  Identity	  Politics,”	  Alcoff	  offers	  a	  philosophical	  engagement	  with	   identity	   in	   which	   she	   considers	   and	   responds	   to	   some	   dominant	   critiques.	  Alcoff’s	  main	   contention	   is	   that	  while	   there	   are	   problematic	  ways	   in	  which	   some	  take	   up	   identity,	   these	   “political	   ills	   and	   theoretical	   mistakes”	   have	   unfairly	   and	  unrepresentatively	   tarnished	   the	   entire	   identity-­‐based	   movement.	   These	   political	  and	   theoretical	   errors	   include	   homogenizing	   group	   characteristics,	   engaging	   in	   a	  politics	  of	  radical	  separatism,	  and	  making	  essentialist	  arguments	  and	  assumptions.	  While	   these	  practices	  exist,	  Alcoff	   claims	   that	   they	  do	  not	   represent	   the	   ideas	  and	  commitments	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   those	   who	   base	   their	   politics	   in	   identity.	   Most	  proponents	   of	   identity,	   in	   Alcoff’s	   view,	   have	   no	   dispute	  with	   the	   fact	   of	   internal	  heterogeneity	  within	   identity	   groups,	   the	   fact	   that	   identity	   categories	   are	   socially	  constructed	  or	  that	  experience	  is	  interpretive	  and	  mediated.	  Yet,	  as	  she	  shows,	  “we	  also	  want	  to	  claim	  that	  identities	  refer	  outward	  to	  objective	  and	  causally	  significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	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  78	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features	  of	  the	  world,	  that	  they	  are	  thus	  non-­‐arbitrary,	  and	  that	  experience	  provides	  both	   an	   epistemic	   and	   political	   basis	   for	   understanding.”79	  She	   argues	   for	   a	   post-­‐positivist	  realism	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  ontological	  pluralism	  and	  makes	  a	  case	  for	  our	   ability	   to	   know	   the	   world	   through	   our	   experience,	   without	   committing	   to	   a	  positivist	  project	  of	  finding	  an	  uncontaminated	  ‘truth.’	  	  In	  terms	  of	  how	  this	  relates	  to	   identity,	   Alcoff	   writes	   that	   “social	   identities	   are	   often	   carried	   on	   the	   body,	  materially	  inscribed,	  perceived	  at	  a	  glance	  by	  well-­‐disciplined	  perceptual	  practices,	  and	  thus	  hardly	  the	  mere	  epiphenomena	  of	  discourse.”80	  For	  Alcoff,	  then,	  identities	  are	  certainly	  real,	  but	  this	  realness	  need	  not	  mean	  that	  members	  of	  an	  identity	  group	  are	  indistinguishable	  or	  share	  an	  essential	  core.	  As	  she	  contends:	  This	   is	   not	   the	   ordinary	   language	   understanding	   of	   identity,	   of	   course,	   in	  which	   it	   is	   common	   to	   talk	   about	   national	   identity	   or	   ethnic	   identity	   even	  while	   one	   assumes	   that	   there	   are	   differences	   between	   the	   individuals	  who	  might	  share	  such	  an	  identity	  as	  well	  as	  similarities	  that	  such	  individuals	  may	  share	   with	   those	   in	   another	   identity	   group.	   Identity	   is	   conceived	   as	  something	  common	  to	  a	  group,	  but	  what	  this	  something	   is	  can	  be	  variously	  spelled	   out:	   for	   example,	   it	   might	   be	   something	   that	   is	   socially	   based	   and	  historical	  rather	  than	  stable	  and	  inherent…The	  worry	  that	  identity	  entails	  an	  ahistorical	  essentialism	  or	  that	  it	  posits	  an	  absolute	  sameness	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	   the	   sort	   of	   worry	  Wittgenstein	   said	   philosophers	   develop	   when	   we	   let	  language	   go	   on	   holiday.	   It	   is	   based	   on	   a	   conflation	   of	   contextually	   based	  meanings	  and	  standards.	  81	  	   In	   addition	   to	   challenging	   critiques	   related	   to	   essentialism	   and	   epistemic	  privilege,	   Alcoff	   also	   takes	   up	   the	   charge	   of	   identity	   as	   interpellative	   imposition.	  Alcoff	  challenges	  both	  Brown	  and	  Butler	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  inability	  to	  see	  past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Linda	  Martin	  Alcoff,	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  Identity	  Politics?”	  80	  Linda	  Martin	  Alcoff	  (web	  version,	  page	  number	  not	  available).	  81	  Alcoff.	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the	   “negative	   valence”	   that	   they	   give	   “to	   identity,	   as	   rooted	   in	   domination	   and	  always	  alien	  to	  the	  self.”82	  For	  Alcoff,	   identity	   is	  more	  than	  a	  coercive	   labeling.	  She	  cites	   Robert	   Gooding-­‐Williams’	   formulation	   of	   black	   identity	   to	   help	   explicate	   her	  point:	   Gooding-­‐Williams	  argues	  that	  “being	  racially	  classified	  as	  black	  is	  a	  necessary	  but	   not	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   of	   being	   a	   black	   person.”	   The	   third	   person	  interpellation,	   the	   public	   identity,	   must	   be	   designated	   black;	   one	   cannot	  simply	  negate	   the	  modes	  and	  norms	  of	  description	   in	  one’s	   social	  world	  or	  reinvent	   new	   ones	   at	   will.	   But	   Gooding-­‐Williams	   does	   not	   give	   this	   public	  inscription	  the	  last	  word.	  He	  argues	  that	  “One	  becomes	  a	  black	  person	  only	  if	  (1)	  one	  begins	  to	  identify	  (to	  classify)	  oneself	  as	  black	  and	  (2)	  one	  begins	  to	  make	  choices,	   to	   formulate	  plans,	   to	  express	  concerns,	  etc.,	   in	   light	  of	  one’s	  identification	  of	   oneself	   as	   black.”	  This	   definition	  highlights	   the	   individuals’	  negotiation	   and	   their	   subjectivity.	   That	   is,	   black	   identity	   involves	   both	   a	  public	  self	  and	   lived	  experience,	  which	  means	  that	   it	   is	  produced	  out	  of	   the	  modes	   of	   description	   made	   possible	   in	   a	   given	   culture	   but	   it	   is	   also	  dependent	  upon	  any	  given	  individual’s	  active	  self-­‐understanding.83	  	   Alcoff,	   here,	   is	   not	   denying	   the	   interpellative	  process	   that	  Butler	   describes,	  nor	  the	  classificatory	  scheme	  of	  disciplinary	  power	  emphasized	  by	  Brown.	  What	  she	  is	  saying	  is	  that	  this	  is	  only	  the	  initial	  step	  in	  developing	  a	  racial	  identity.	  What	  must	  follow	  the	   injurious	  naming	   from	  the	  outside	  must	  be	  an	   inner	  becoming	  based	   in	  choice,	   agency,	   and	  negotiation.84	  Using	   the	  work	  of	  Manuel	  Castells,	  Alcoff	   argues	  that	   identity	   is	   a	   “generative	   source	  of	  meaning,	  necessarily	   collective	   rather	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Alcoff.	  	  83	  Alcoff.	  See	  Stuart	  Hall	  “Negotiating	  Caribbean	  Identity”	  (1995)	  too	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  interpellation	  and	  self-­‐recognition	  in	  relation	  to	  identity.	  See	  also	  Paul	  Gilroy’s	  Black	  
Atlantic	  (and	  his	  section	  in	  Ain’t	  No	  Black	  in	  the	  Union	  Jack),	  Michael	  Omi	  and	  Howard	  Winant’s	  Racial	  Formation	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  John	  L.	  Comaroff's	  “Ethnicity,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Revolution,”	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  
Difference:	  Ethnic	  Premises	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Power	  (1996).	  84	  It	  is	  unclear	  how	  Alcoff	  or	  Gooding-­‐Williams	  might	  apply	  these	  criteria	  to	  Rachel	  Dolezal.	  We	  might	  assume,	  however,	  that	  Reed	  would	  find	  it	  acceptable,	  given	  his	  tacit	  support	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  blackness	  as	  premised	  on	  “doing	  black	  things”	  (see	  Adolph	  Reed	  Jr.,	  “From	  Jenner	  to	  Dolezal.”).	  	  
	   195	  
wholly	  individual,	  and	  useful	  not	  only	  as	  a	  source	  of	  agency	  but	  also	  as	  a	  meaningful	  narrative.”85	  Thus,	   for	   Alcoff,	   identity	   is	   a	   generative	   appropriation	   and	   re-­‐working	   of	  often	  imposed	  social	  categories.	  She	  argues	  that	  a	  post-­‐positivist	  realist	  approach	  to	  identity	   politics	   is	   one	   in	   which	   “real”	   is	   employed	   to	   challenge	   the	   view	   that	  interpellative	   social	   naming	   is	   always	   just	   imposed	   on	   subjects	   from	   the	   outside.	  Rather,	   as	   she	   explains,	   “to	   self-­‐identify	   even	   by	   a	   racial	   or	   sexed	   designation	   is	  again	   not	   merely	   to	   accept	   the	   sad	   fact	   of	   oppression	   but	   to	   understand	   one’s	  relationship	  to	  a	  historical	  community,	   to	  recognize	  one’s	  objective	  social	   location,	  and	  to	  assert	  one’s	  own	  power	  to	  negotiate	   the	  meaning	  and	   implications	  of	  one’s	  identity.”	  86	  	  Bramen	   and	   Alcoff	   together	   respond	   to	   many	   of	   the	   objections	   raised	   by	  those	  who	  take	  a	  critical	  stance	  against	  identity-­‐based	  movements.	  Bramen	  attacks	  Leftist	   critics	   for	   their	   silencing	   of	   marginalized	   groups;	   their	   dismissal	   of	   racial	  anger;	   and	   their	   refusal	   to	   acknowledge	   racial	   victimage.	   She	   defends	   identity	  politics	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  strategies	  for	  community	  building,	  reclaiming	  rights	  to	  self-­‐definition,	   challenge	   of	   institutional	   policies	   and	   related	   material	   gains;	   and	  defense	   of	   dissident	   subcultures	   that	   straddle	   the	   boundary	   between	   dominant	  society	   and	   political	   autonomy.	   Alcoff,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   rejects	   many	   of	   the	  charges	   laid	  by	  critics	   from	  the	  outset,	   arguing	   that	   they	  refer	   to	  anomalies	   in	   the	  movement,	  rather	  than	  dominant	  expressions.	  She	  claims	  that	  most	  common	  sense	  understandings	  of	   identity	   are	  not	   essentializing,	   nor	   strictly	   intepellative.	  Rather,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Alcoff.	  86	  Alcoff.	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Alcoff	  contends	  that	  identity	  is	  a	  fluid	  and	  generative	  process	  of	  creative	  negotiation	  and	   agentic	   meaning-­‐making.	   For	   both	   scholars,	   identity-­‐based	   struggles,	   despite	  their	  imperfections,	  offer	  its	  members	  a	  productive	  form	  of	  political	  engagement.	  To	  conclude	  this	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  their	  assertions	  along	  with	  those	  of	  their	  critics,	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  I	  laid	  out	  at	  the	  start	  of	  our	  discussion.	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   outlined	   some	   of	   the	   major	   Leftist	   criticisms	   of	   identity	  politics	   in	   order	   to	   explore	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   ressentimental	   character	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  are	  inevitable	  outgrowths	  of	  this	  type	  of	  politics.	  I	  have	  also	  given	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  dominant	  responses	  from	  exponents	  of	  identity,	  as	  presented	  by	  Bramen	  and	  Alcoff.	  What	  is	  to	  be	  made	  of	  this	  battle	  that	  is	  still	  being	  waged	  across	  university	  campuses	  and	  activist	  platforms?	  Is	  it	  true	  that	  identity	   politics	   is	   stuck	   in	   a	   ressentimental,	   essentialist	   game	   that	   (whether	  unwittingly	  or	  opportunistically)	  is	  complicit	  with	  dominant	  power?	  Do	  proponents	  of	   identity	   politics	   engage	   in	   a	   divisive	   type	   of	   politicking	  which	   prefers	   to	   fix	   its	  sights	  on	  symbolic	  and	  linguistic	  recognitions	  over	  the	  more	  radical	  political	  aims	  of	  the	   Left?	   Or	   are	   the	   supporters	   of	   identity	   valid	   in	   claiming	   that	   their	   mode	   of	  political	  engagement	  attends	  to	  their	  pain,	  their	  experiences,	  and	  their	  interests	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  wider	  Left	  refuses	  to?	  And	  further,	  are	  they	  justified	  in	  celebrating	  the	  productive	  elements	  of	  identity	  and	  the	  achievements	  that	  derive	  from	  them?	  As	  an	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist,	   and	   thus	   a	   ‘participant’	   of	   identity	   politics	   myself,	   I	   have	   a	  complicated	  response	  to	  these	  questions.	  	  Both	  the	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	   identity	  make	  important	  points.	  The	  proponents	   are	   absolutely	   right	   in	   arguing	   that	   the	   pain	   of	   oppressed	   peoples	   is	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denied	  and	  silenced	  both	  in	  the	  wider	  Leftist	  movement	  and	  in	  society	  at	  large.	  The	  everyday	   victimage	   of	   physical,	   psychic,	   and	   spiritual	   injury	   is	   often	   minimized,	  doubted,	  mocked,	  or	  erased	  altogether.	  Proponents	  are	  also	  correct	  in	  emphasizing	  the	   communities	   that	   we	   form	   through	   our	   politics,	   which	   provide	   us	   with	  generative	   self-­‐identities	   and	   collectives	   of	   understanding	   and	   support.	   Both	  Bramen	  and	  Alcoff	  highlight	  these	  points	  cogently.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  –	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  –	  	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	  self-­‐critically	  with	  our	  detractors,	  we	  might	  concede	  that	  they	  also	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  valid	  points.	  Brown	  is	  correct	  in	  asking:	  if	  it	  is	  our	  pain	   that	   ties	  us	   together,	   then	  do	  we	  not	  need	   this	  pain	   in	  order	   to	  cohere	  politically?	  There	  is	  also	  the	  very	  important	  question	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  identity	  politics	  engages	  in	  legal	  reformism	  and	  seeks	  capitalistic	  gains,	  rather	  than	  desires	  to	   overthrow	   the	   current	   economic	   system	   itself.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   challenge	  of	  divisiveness	   and	   separatism	   that	   is	   often	   pinned	   on	   identity.	   While	   our	   group	  identities	  have	  brought	  us	  a	  meaningful	  in-­‐group	  solidarity,	  to	  what	  extent	  has	  this	  come	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   a	   vision	   of	   commonality?	   Indeed,	   even	  Bramen	   admits	   to	   this	  issue	   towards	   the	  end	  of	  her	  article,	   suggesting	   that	  we	  need	   to	  move	   towards	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism.	  I	   believe	   that	   Bramen’s	   concession	   is	   representative	   of	   a	   wider,	   although	  often	  unspoken	  consciousness	  among	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists	  –	   that	   is,	   an	  ambivalent	  consciousness	   which,	   while	   invested	   in	   the	   project	   of	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism,	   is	  simultaneously	  cognisant	  of	  its	  limitations.	  The	  question	  that	  thus	  emerges	  is	  what	  is	   it	   about	   identity	   politics	   that	   secures	   the	  investment/commitment/loyalty/participation	  of	  its	  members	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  latent	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realization	   that	   our	   political	   actions	   and	   tendencies	   might	   run	   contrary	   to	   our	  greater	   interests?	  As	  I	  have	  discussed,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  benefits	  that	   identity	  offers	  us,	  including	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging,	  solidarity,	  a	  shared	  purpose,	  and	  a	  means	  by	   which	   we	   might	   fight	   against	   injustice.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter,	   I	   examine	   –	  through	   the	  work	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  –	  how	  despite	   the	  problems	   I	  have	  explored	   in	  regards	   to	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   movement,	   its	   ability	   to	   satisfy	   some	   central	  human	  needs,	  such	  as	  relatedness,	   identity,	  and	  rootedness,	  can	  partly	  explain	  our	  attachment	  to	  it.	  	  Before	   moving	   to	   the	   next	   chapter,	   however,	   I	   return	   explicitly	   to	   the	  question	   that	   I	   introduced	  at	   the	   start	   of	   this	   chapter	   that	   seeks	   to	  determine	   the	  relationship	   between	   ressentimental	   practices	   and	   identity	   politics.	   In	   exploring	  both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate	   in	   this	   chapter,	   I	   suggest	   that	   identity	   politics	   is	   most	  definitely	  prone	  to	  ressentiment.	  While	  this	  development	  might	  not	  be	  inevitable,	   it	  is	   the	  collision	  of	   identity’s	  prefigured	  matrix	  of	  belonging	  and	  exclusion,	   together	  with	   the	   unresolved	   pain	   of	   racial/gendered	   injury	   in	   a	   context	   of	   continued	  injustice,	   that	   make	   ressentiment	   a	   probable	   outcome.	   The	   structure	   of	   identity	  politics	  offers	  a	  fertile	  breeding	  ground	  for	  ressentimental	  thinking	  and	  practices	  to	  grow.	   And	   thus,	   while	   not	   all	   proponents	   of	   identity	   politics	   are	   ressentimental,	   I	  argue	   that	   many	   of	   loudest	   voices	   in	   the	   movement	   today	   betray	   a	   character	   of	  
ressentiment	  as	  explored	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  This	  again	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  might	   contact	   and	  move	   through	   our	   undigested	  pain	   before	   it	   grows	   into	   a	   ressentiment	   that	   can	   flourish	   in	   the	   complementary	  environment	  of	  identity	  politics.	  Chapter	  7	  will	  seek	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  as	  part	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of	  the	  chapter’s	  wider	  aim	  to	  explore	  a	  practice	  that	  might	  allow	  us	  to	  contact	  and	  move	  through	  our	  pain,	  rather	  than	  react	   from	  it.	  This	  still	   leaves	  unanswered	  the	  dilemma	   as	   how	   to	   overcome	   the	   divisiveness	   of	   identity	   politics,	   along	   with	   its	  uncritical	  investments	  in	  legal	  redress	  and	  capitalist	  attainment.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  turn	  to	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  theory	  of	  radical	  humanism	  as	  a	  means	  of	  addressing	  some	  of	  these	  shortcomings.	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Chapter	   6	   –	   Towards	   an	   Anti-­‐Racist	   Humanism:	   Lessons	  
from	  Erich	  Fromm	  	  
“Love	  has	  never	  been	  a	  popular	  movement.	  And	  no	  one’s	  every	  wanted,	  really,	  to	  be	  
free.	  The	  world	  is	  held	  together,	  really	  it	  is	  held	  together,	  by	  the	  love	  and	  passion	  of	  a	  
very	  few	  people.”	  
-­‐James	  Baldwin,	  The	  Price	  of	  the	  Ticket	  
	  
“When	  we	  look	  at	  modern	  man,	  we	  have	  to	  face	  the	  fact…that	  modern	  man	  suffers	  
from	  a	  kind	  of	  poverty	  of	  spirit,	  which	  stands	  in	  glaring	  contrast	  to	  this	  scientific	  and	  
technological	  abundance;	  We’ve	  learned	  to	  fly	  the	  air	  like	  birds,	  we’ve	  learned	  to	  swim	  
the	  seas	  like	  fish,	  and	  yet	  we	  haven’t	  learned	  to	  walk	  the	  Earth	  as	  brothers	  and	  
sisters…”	  	  -­‐Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.,	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  acceptance	  speech,	  1964	  	   In	   Chapter	   3	   I	   discussed	   some	   of	   Erich	   Fromm’s	   theoretical	   contributions,	  especially	  his	  ideas	  of	  social	  character	  and	  the	  social	  unconscious.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	   look	   at	   Fromm’s	   concept	   of	   humanism.	   As	  was	   discussed	   previously,	   identity	  politics	  has	  been	  critiqued	  for	  its	  divisiveness	  and	  tendency	  to	  rally	  around	  shared	  differences	   rather	   than	  recognizing	  commonalities.	   It	  has	  also	  been	  challenged	   for	  its	  attachment	  to	  its	  injury	  and	  investment	  in	  the	  status	  quo,	  which	  prevent	  it	  from	  building	   affirmative	   and	   emancipatory	   possibilities	   for	   the	   future.	   This	   has	   led	  Leftist	   critics	   and	   even	   some	   supporters	   of	   identity	   to	   call	   for	   a	   return	   to	   a	  universalist	  ethic	   that	  might	  counter	  or	   temper	  some	  of	   the	  harmful	  divisions	  and	  attachments	  that	  impede	  identity-­‐based	  movements.1	  I	  believe	  Fromm’s	  humanistic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Brown,	  for	  example,	  states	  the	  following	  in	  an	  interview	  when	  asked	  about	  her	  thoughts	  on	  humanism:	  “I	  would	  have	  answered	  this	  question	  very	  differently	  five	  years	  ago.	  I	  would	  have	  gone	  straight	  for	  the	  critique	  of	  humanism.	  I	  would	  answer	  differently	  now.	  What	  happened	  for	  me	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  critiques	  of	  humanism	  that	  many	  of	  us	  have	  now	  been	  steeped	  in	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  decades	  is	  finding	  ways	  of	  defundamentalizing	  and	  de-­‐essentializing	  both	  every	  political	  concept	  and	  the	  ‘human	  being’	  or	  the	  human	  subject	  itself,	  while	  still	  permitting	  ourselves	  attachments	  to	  political	  projects	  that	  require	  at	  certain	  times	  provisional	  descriptions	  of	  certain	  things	  as	  dominating	  or	  more	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framework	   can	   offer	   a	   helpful	   launching	   point	   from	   which	   to	   engage	   with	   these	  ideas	   around	   commonality,	   universalism,	   and	   freedom,	   potentially	   providing	   the	  beginning	  steps	  in	  constructing	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism.	  Although	  Fromm	  is	  known	  for	  his	  application	  of	  psychoanalysis	   to	  the	  social	  context,	  according	  to	  Durkin,	  his	  “thinking,	  including	  the	  psychoanalytic	  framework	  he	  generally	  employed	  as	  central	  to	  it,	  is	  constituted	  by	  a	  prior	  and	  deeper	  humanism	  that	  characterizes	  his	  corpus	  as	  
a	  whole.”2	  	  I	  begin	  this	  chapter	  by	  providing	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  Fromm’s	  biographical	  and	  intellectual	  evolution	  so	  as	   to	  provide	  some	  context	   in	   terms	  of	  his	   influences	  and	  give	  some	  sense	  of	  his	  major	  works.	  Next,	   I	   engage	  Fromm’s	   theory	  of	  humanism,	  which	   I	   examine	   in	   two	  parts.	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   his	   humanistic	   psychoanalytical	  framework	   which	   lays	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   human	   beings	   are	  connected.	   I	   then	   discuss	   Fromm’s	   idea	   of	   radical	   humanism,	   which	   centers	   on	  achieving	   negative	   as	   well	   as	   positive	   freedom.	   Fromm	   characterizes	   this	   latter	  freedom	  as	  an	  affirmative	  and	  humanizing	  force	   in	  both	  one’s	   inner	  and	  outer	   life.	  Finally,	  I	  examine	  the	  usefulness	  of	  Fromm’s	  humanism	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	   limitations,	  which	   I	  address	   through	  the	  work	  of	   James	  Baldwin.	   I	  argue	  that	  Baldwin	  –	  a	  contemporary	  of	  Fromm’s	  –	  offers	  a	  critical	   intervention	  in	  his	   insistence	   on	   the	   dehumanizing	   effects	   of	   racism	   for	   both	   dominant	   and	  oppressed	   groups,	   and	   the	   need	   to	   attend	   to	   this	   issue	   of	   race	   if	   there	   is	   to	   be	   a	  shared	  humanistic	  future.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  emancipatory.”	  See	  Wendy	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  “Learning	  to	  Love	  Again	  -­‐	  An	  Interview	  With	  Wendy	  Brown,”	  Contretemps	  6	  (January	  2006),	  27.	  	  	  2	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  2.	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(6.1)	  Erich	  Fromm:	  biographical	  and	  intellectual	  evolution	  	   Before	  delving	  into	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  ideas	  as	  they	  pertain	  to	  my	  investigation,	  it	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   give	   some	   attention	   to	   Fromm’s	   biographical	   and	   intellectual	  development.	  Although	  Fromm	  has	   in	  the	   last	   few	  decades	  become	  somewhat	  of	  a	  “forgotten	  intellectual,”	  he	  enjoyed	  many	  years	  of	  fame	  in	  both	  academic	  circles	  and	  as	   a	   public	   scholar.3	  His	   accessible	   writing	   style	   and	   focus	   on	   pressing	   societal	  trends	  influenced	  his	  popularity,	   leading	  to	  book	  sales	  over	  the	  100	  million	  mark.4	  	  As	  a	  writer,	  Fromm	  is	  impressive	  for	  both	  the	  range	  of	  topics	  he	  examines	  and	  the	  coherence	   he	   maintains	   throughout	   his	   works.	   Two	   central	   unifying	   features	  underlie	   Fromm’s	   work:	   the	   connection	   he	   makes	   between	   the	   psyche	   and	   the	  social;	   and	   his	   philosophy	   of	   humanism.5	  The	   present	   chapter	   will	   offer	   a	   brief	  sketch	  of	  Fromm’s	  personal	  and	  intellectual	  evolution	  as	  a	  radical	  humanist	  thinker	  through	   examining	   his	   major	   influences	   and	   works, 6 	  before	   delving	   into	   his	  humanistic	  philosophy	  and	  framework.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  McLaughlin’s	  article	  “How	  to	  Become	  a	  Forgotten	  Intellectual:	  Intellectual	  Movements	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,”	  (Sociological	  Forum	  13,	  no.	  2	  (June	  1,	  1998):	  215–46)	  for	  an	  interesting	  account	  of	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  disappearance	  from	  the	  public	  intellectual	  scene.	  	  	  With	  this	  being	  said,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  renewed	  interest	  in	  his	  work	  in	  recent	  years,	  with	  scholars	  from	  diverse	  fields	  finding	  new	  resonances	  in	  his	  insights.	  See	  for	  example:	  Braune	  (2014),	  Durkin	  (2014),	  Miri,	  Lake	  &	  Kress	  (2014),	  Friedman	  (2013),	  Funk	  (2009),	  Thomson	  (2009),	  Wilde	  (2004).	  4	  Mauricio	  Cortina,	  “The	  Greatness	  and	  Limitations	  of	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Humanism,”	  
Contemporary	  Psychoanalysis	  51,	  no.	  3	  (July	  3,	  2015):	  388–422.	  5	  Kieran	  Durkin	  (2014),	  and	  Mauricio	  Cortina	  (2015)	  also	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  humanism	  can	  be	  traced	  throughout	  his	  work.	  	  6	  For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  Fromm’s	  life,	  see	  Funk's,	  Erich	  Fromm:	  His	  Life	  and	  
Ideas;	  and	  Daniel	  Burston's,	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Erich	  Fromm	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991).	  In	  more	  recent	  years,	  a	  somewhat	  controversial	  biography	  has	  been	  published	  by	  Lawrence	  J.	  Friedman	  entitled	  The	  Lives	  of	  Erich	  Fromm:	  Love's	  Prophet.	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2013.)	  The	  proprietor	  of	  Fromm’s	  estate,	  Rainer	  Funk,	  maintains	  that	  this	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Influences	  	   While	   Fromm’s	   thought	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   deriving	   from	   three	   primary	  sources	   –	   Judaism,	   Freudianism,	   and	   Marxism	   –	   closer	   examination	   reveals	   a	  number	  of	  additional	  influences	  that	  made	  a	  marked	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  his	   ideas,	   including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to:	  the	  sociology	  of	  Max	  and	  Alfred	  Weber;	  the	  psychoanalytic	  methods	  of	  Georg	  Groddeck	  and	  Sándor	  Ferenczi;	  the	  interpersonal	  psychology	   of	   Karen	   Horney	   and	   Harry	   Stack	   Sullivan;	   the	   existential	   thought	   of	  Kierkegaard,	  Nietzsche,	  and	  Jaspers;	  and	  the	  spiritual	  insights	  of	  religious	  mysticism	  and	  Zen	  Buddhism.7	  Fromm	  was	  raised	  in	  an	  Orthodox	  Jewish	  family	   in	  Frankfurt	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	   twentieth	   century.	   He	   received	   advanced	   training	   in	   Jewish	   scripture	   and	  philosophy,	  under	  the	  instruction	  of	  his	  great	  uncle	  and	  two	  rabbis	  who	  would	  make	  a	   deep	   impression	   on	   the	   young	   Fromm.8	  Durkin	   discusses	   three	   main	   ways	   in	  which	   Fromm’s	   Judaic	   education	   influenced	   his	   concept	   of	   humanism.	   Firstly,	  Fromm’s	  understanding	  of	  universalism,	  or	  the	  unity	  of	  all	  of	  humanity,	  is	  rooted	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  book	  contains	  a	  number	  of	  erroneous,	  misleading,	  and	  sensational	  statements	  about	  Fromm	  and	  his	  life	  (Funk,	  lecture,	  Tubingen	  Germany,	  Sept	  2016).	  	  Interestingly,	  Fromm	  was	  largely	  opposed	  to	  having	  a	  biography	  of	  his	  life	  written	  although	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  unclear	  (Funk,	  lecture,	  Tubingen	  Germany,	  Sept	  2016).	  He	  does,	  however	  share	  some	  biographical	  details	  (somewhat	  uncharacteristically)	  in	  Beyond	  the	  
Chains	  of	  Illusion:	  my	  encounter	  with	  Marx	  and	  Freud,	  originally	  published	  in	  1962.	  	  7	  Some	  other	  thinkers	  not	  mentioned	  here	  but	  who	  have	  been	  quite	  impactful	  on	  Fromm’s	  thinking	  include:	  Spinoza,	  the	  Greek	  philosophers,	  Enlightenment	  humanists,	  and	  the	  cultural	  anthropology	  of	  Margaret	  Mead,	  Johann	  Jakob	  Bachofen	  and	  others.	  8	  The	  first	  of	  these	  two	  rabbis	  was	  Nahemia	  Nobel	  who	  Fromm	  met	  at	  the	  age	  of	  16	  in	  Frankfurt.	  Nobel,	  who	  studied	  under	  the	  philosopher	  Hermann	  Cohen,	  introduced	  Fromm	  to	  Hasidic	  mysticism	  and	  Enlightenment	  philosophy.	  	  Fromm	  met	  the	  second	  rabbi,	  Dr.	  Salman	  B.	  Rabinkov,	  in	  Heidelberg	  where	  they	  studied	  together	  almost	  daily	  for	  6	  years.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  Judaism	  on	  Fromm’s	  thinking,	  see	  Funk	  (2000),	  Durkin	  (2014),	  and	  Braune	  (2014).	  	  
	   204	  
the	  Old	  Testament,	  which	  he	  credits	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  historical	  articulations	  of	  the	  idea.	  	   Secondly,	   Fromm’s	   understanding	   of	   human	   freedom	   and	   potentiality	   is	  based	  in	  his	  humanistic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Creation	  Story	  of	  the	  Old	  Testament.	  In	  Fromm’s	  rendering,	  the	  disobedience	  of	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  in	  eating	  from	  the	  forbidden	  tree	   marks	   the	   beginning	   of	   human	   history,	   and	   more,	   of	   human	   freedom.9	  	   As	  Durkin	  explains,	   “Adam’s	  eating	  of	   the	   forbidden	   fruit	  stands	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	  a	  dialectical	  process	   in	  which	  man	  comes	   to	  experience	  himself	   as	  a	   stranger	   in	   the	  world,	   estranged	   from	   himself	   and	   from	   nature,	   but	   who,	   through	   this	   very	  estrangement,	  and	  through	  the	  subsequent	  development	  of	  his	  love	  and	  reason,	  can	  again	  become	  one	  with	  himself,	  with	  his	  fellow	  man,	  and	  with	  nature,	  returning	  to	  Paradise	  but	  on	  a	  new	  level	  of	  human	  individuation	  and	  independence.”10	  Fromm’s	  interpretation	   of	   the	   Creation	   Story	   is	   connected	   to	   his	   wider	   belief	   in	   prophetic	  messianism.	  For	  Fromm,	  however,	  the	  “messiah”	  is	  not	  a	  prophet	  sent	  to	  humanity	  by	  God’s	  grace,	  but	  rather	  a	  symbol	  for	  the	  individual’s	  own	  capacity	  for	  full	  human	  realization;	  a	  potentiality	  that	  is	  only	  achieved	  through	  human	  effort	  and	  action.	  As	  Durkin	   argues,	   “Fromm’s	   understanding	   of	   prophetic	   messianism…forms	   an	  absolutely	  central	  pillar	  of	  his	  thought,	  providing,	  in	  either	  explicit	  or	  implied	  tone,	  the	  underlying	  basis	  to	  the	  utopian	  thread	  that	  runs	  throughout	  his	  work.”11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  here	  Fromm’s	  essays	  published	  under	  the	  title,	  On	  Disobedience	  (1981).	  10	  Durkin,	  45.	  As	  Durkin	  notes,	  Fromm’s	  interpretation	  here	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  some	  as	  an	  inaccurate	  representation	  of	  Judaic	  thought.	  	  11	  Durkin,	  46.	  For	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  Fromm’s	  prophetic	  messianism,	  see	  Joan	  Braune’s	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Revolutionary	  Hope:	  Prophetic	  Messianism	  as	  a	  Critical	  Theory	  of	  the	  
Future,	  (Sense	  Publishers,	  2014).	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Thirdly,	  and	  relatedly,	  Durkin	  discusses	  Fromm’s	  central	  humanistic	  tenet	  of	  “radical	  autonomy,”	  or	  “idea	  that	  man	  must	  ‘develop	  his	  own	  powers’	  and	  reach	  the	  goal	   of	   complete	   independence,	   ‘penetrating	   through	   fictions	   and	   illusions	   to	   full	  awareness	  of	  reality,’	  as	  rooted	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  Judaism.12	  Fromm	  found	  this	  idea	  in	  both	  Hasidic	  mysticism	  and	  in	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  Old	  Testament.	  He	  locates	  a	  prime	  instance	   of	   this	   principle	   in	   the	   biblical	   story	   of	   Sodom	   and	   Gomorrah	   where	  Abraham	   challenges	   God	   over	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   two	   kingdoms.	   Fromm	  interprets	  Abraham’s	  courageous	  behaviour	  as	  that	  of	  an	  equal	  to	  God,	  rather	  than	  a	  “meek	  supplicant.”	  For	  Fromm,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  human	  being	  is	  to	  rise	  to	  equality	  with	  God	  by	   liberating	   oneself	   from	   illusions	   and	   “shackles	   that	   bind	  us	   to	   the	   past,	   to	  nature,	   to	   the	   clan,	   and	   to	   idols	   in	   general.”13	  Although	  Fromm	  read	   these	  biblical	  ideas	   on	   human	   autonomy,	   and	   liberation	   in	   his	   early	   years,	   he	  would	   find	   great	  resonance	   in	   the	   works	   of	   Freud	   and	   Marx	   (among	   others)	   in	   relation	   to	   these	  concepts,	  and	  would	  write	  about	  them,	  along	  with	  universalism,	  human	  potentiality	  and	  freedom,	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  life.	  Indeed,	  even	  after	  Fromm	  renounced	  Orthodox	  Judaism	  in	  his	  mid-­‐20s,	  his	  Judaic	  education	  would	  influence	  his	  radical	  humanistic	  ideas	  for	  years	  to	  come.14	  	  Fromm	   studied	   sociology	   under	   the	   supervision	   of	   Alfred	   Weber	   in	  Heidelberg	   in	   the	   1920s.	  Weber	   impressed	   upon	   Fromm	   the	   inextricability	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Durkin,	  50.	  13	  Durkin,	  51.	  	  14	  As	  Douglas	  Kellner	  notes,	  “Although	  he	  later	  distanced	  himself	  from	  Judaism,	  it	  is	  reported	  that	  Fromm	  never	  tired	  of	  singing	  Hasidic	  songs	  or	  studying	  scripture.”	  (“Erich	  Fromm,	  Judaism	  and	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,”	  Illuminations:	  The	  Critical	  Theory	  Project,	  accessed	  February	  28,	  2018.	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individual	   from	   collective	   life. 15 	  Weber’s	   impact	   on	   Fromm	   would	   continue	  throughout	  his	  life,	  as	  expressed	  in	  a	  letter	  written	  in	  1975:	  	  I	   had	   only	   one	  non-­‐Jewish	   teacher	  whom	   I	   really	   admired	   and	  who	  deeply	  influenced	   me	   and	   that	   was	   Alfred	   Weber,	   the	   brother	   of	   Max,	   also	   a	  sociologist	  but	  in	  contrast	  to	  Max,	  a	  humanist	  not	  a	  nationalist,16	  and	  a	  man	  of	  outstanding	  courage	  and	  integrity…the	  only	  one	  of	  my	  university	  teachers	  whom	  I	  considered	  a	  real	  teacher	  and	  a	  master.17	  	  Fromm’s	  doctoral	  research	  was	  a	  psychosocial	  investigation	  of	  the	  diasporic	  Jewish	  community	   and	   their	   unification	   through	   Jewish	   law	  –	   a	   study	   that	   impressed	  his	  supervisor	  and	  earned	  him	  second-­‐best	  grades.18	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  during	  Fromm’s	  time	  in	  Heidelberg	  he	  was	  also	  introduced	  to	  existential	   philosophy.19	  Fromm	  studied	  under	   the	   existential	   thinker	  Karl	   Jaspers	  who	  was	   a	   professor	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Heidelberg	   during	   Fromm’s	   tenure	   as	   a	  student	   there.20	  While	   it	   is	   unclear	   as	   to	  what	   Fromm	   took	   from	   Jasper’s	   thought,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Lawrence	  J.	  Friedman,	  The	  Lives	  of	  Erich	  Fromm:	  Love’s	  Prophet	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  13.	  16	  Despite	  Fromm’s	  disparaging	  of	  Max	  Weber,	  we	  see	  Weber’s	  undeniable	  influence	  in	  Fromm’s	  work	  including	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  Protestantism	  in	  Escape	  from	  Freedom	  (McLaughlin	  1996),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  his	  ideal	  type	  social	  character	  formations	  (Cortina	  2015).	  	  17	  Written	  to	  Lewis	  Mumford,	  April	  29,	  1975	  in	  Funk	  2000,	  p	  52.	  18	  Alfred	  Weber	  encouraged	  Fromm	  to	  seek	  an	  academic	  position	  but	  Fromm	  felt	  that	  such	  a	  career	  would	  “restrain”	  him,	  especially	  given	  his	  emerging	  interests	  in	  psychoanalysis	  (Friedman,	  15).	  	  19	  While	  some	  consider	  Fromm	  to	  be	  an	  existential	  psychoanalyst,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Fromm	  thought	  of	  himself	  as	  such	  given	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  school:	  “the	  ‘existential’	  psychoanalysts	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  problems	  of	  human	  goals	  –	  and	  some	  are.	  Others	  understand	  little,	  and	  simply	  use	  a	  philosophical	  jargon	  taken	  from	  Husserl,	  Heidegger	  or	  Sartre	  as	  a	  gimmick	  ,	  without	  really	  penetrating	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  patient’s	  personality”	  (The	  
Art	  of	  Being,	  p	  66-­‐67,	  also	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  p	  15).	  It	  is	  unclear	  if	  Fromm	  is	  speaking	  about	  the	  existential	  psychoanalyst	  Rollo	  May	  here,	  given	  their	  contentious	  relationship	  (Friedman,	  2014).	  20	  Jaspers	  also	  served	  as	  doctoral	  supervisor	  to	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  who	  moved	  from	  Marburg	  to	  Heidelberg	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  the	  secrecy	  around	  her	  affair	  with	  Heidegger	  (see	  Richard	  Wolin,	  Heidegger’s	  Children:	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Karl	  Löwith,	  Hans	  Jonas,	  and	  Herbert	  
Marcuse	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2003)).	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there	   are	  notable	   resonances	  between	   their	  philosophies,	   including	   their	   focus	  on	  human	   transcendence	   and	   freedom;	   their	   emphasis	   on	   human	   relatedness	   and	  connection;	   their	   appreciation	   for	   the	   insights	   of	   different	   spiritual	   traditions	  (including	   the	   Christian	   mysticism	   of	   Meister	   Eckhart	   and	   Eastern	   thought,	  especially	   Buddhism);	   and	   their	   humanism.21	  Given	   the	   influence	   of	   Kierkegaard	  and	  Nietzsche	  on	  Jaspers’	   thinking,	   it	   is	  also	  certain	  that	  Fromm	  would	  have	  come	  across	   these	   two	   philosophers	   in	   the	   lectures	   he	   gave.	   In	   Escape	   from	   Freedom,	  Fromm	  discusses	   both	   Kierkegaard	   and	  Nietzsche	   as	   “visionary	   thinkers”	   in	   their	  ability	  to	  anticipate	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  our	  modern	  age:	  	  Kierkegaard	  describes	  the	  helpless	  individual	  torn	  and	  tormented	  by	  doubts,	  overwhelmed	   by	   the	   feeling	   of	   aloneness	   and	   insignificance.	   Nietzsche	  visualizes	  the	  approaching	  nihilism	  which	  was	  to	  become	  manifest	  in	  Nazism	  and	   paints	   a	   picture	   of	   a	   ‘superman’	   as	   the	   negation	   of	   the	   insignificant,	  directionless	  individual	  he	  saw	  in	  reality.22	  	  	  	   Fromm’s	  relationship	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  thought	  is	  especially	   interesting	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  As	  evident	  from	  his	  philosophy	  as	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Walter	  Kaufmann,	  Existentialism	  From	  Dostoevsky	  To	  Sartre	  (Pickle	  Partners	  Publishing,	  2016).	  Despite	  these	  resonances,	  Burston	  (1991)	  claims	  that	  Jaspers	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  Fromm’s	  thinking	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Fromm	  does	  not	  mention	  him	  in	  his	  published	  works.	  We	  know,	  however,	  that	  Fromm	  did	  not	  always	  refer	  to	  those	  who	  influenced	  his	  thinking	  –	  for	  example	  the	  Jewish	  philosopher,	  Hermann	  Cohen	  who	  Fromm	  mentions	  sparsely	  despite	  his	  central	  influence	  on	  his	  thinking	  (Durkin	  2014).	  We	  also	  see	  that	  Fromm	  at	  least	  accepted	  Jaspers’	  concept	  of	  the	  “axial	  age”	  which	  he	  references	  in	  a	  footnote	  in	  You	  Shall	  be	  as	  Gods	  (1966,	  p	  20).	  Of	  course	  Jaspers	  was	  not	  the	  only	  existential	  thinker	  who	  was	  also	  a	  humanist.	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre	  also	  classified	  himself	  in	  similar	  terms	  (see	  Existentialism	  is	  a	  Humanism,	  based	  off	  of	  his	  well-­‐known	  1945	  lecture).	  In	  Fromm’s	  view,	  however,	  Sartre’s	  “claim	  that	  there	  are	  no	  objective	  values	  valid	  for	  all	  men,”	  and	  his	  “concept	  of	  freedom	  which	  amount	  to	  egotistic	  arbitrariness,”	  mean	  that	  he	  and	  his	  exponents	  forfeit	  “the	  most	  important	  achievement…	  of	  the	  humanist	  tradition”	  (The	  Heart	  
of	  Man,	  15).	  	  22	  Escape	  from	  Freedom,	  154.	  Interestingly,	  Freud	  also	  held	  Nietzsche	  in	  high	  regard,	  stating	  that	  “Nietzsche	  had	  a	  more	  penetrating	  knowledge	  of	  himself	  than	  any	  other	  man	  who	  ever	  lived	  or	  was	  ever	  likely	  to	  live,”	  in	  May,	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Being,	  144.	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4,	  Nietzsche	  is	  a	  firmly	  anti-­‐humanist	  thinker.	  What	  was	  it	  about	  his	  philosophy	  that	  attracted	  Fromm?	  Fromm	  claims	   that	  many	   interpretations	  of	  Nietzsche’s	   thought	  fail	   to	   capture	   the	   essence	   of	   his	   ideas.	   Besides	   his	   visionary	   insight,	   Fromm	  was	  drawn	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  individual	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  means	  to	  anything	  outside	  of	  his/her	  own	  development	  or	  happiness.23	  In	  Man	  For	  Himself,	  while	   discussing	   his	   humanistic	   ethics	   (and	   the	   distinction	   between	   self-­‐love	   and	  love,	  in	  particular),	  Fromm	  states	  Nietzsche’s	  view	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  For	  Nietzsche,	  the	  quest	  for	  love	  is	  typical	  of	  slaves	  unable	  to	  fight	  for	  what	  they	  want	  and	  who	  therefore	  try	  to	  get	  it	  through	  love.	  Altruism	  and	  love	  for	  mankind	   thus	   have	   become	   signs	   of	   degeneration.	   For	   Nietzsche	   it	   is	   the	  essence	   of	   a	   good	   and	   healthy	   aristocracy	   that	   it	   is	   ready	   to	   sacrifice	  countless	  people	  for	  its	  interests	  without	  having	  a	  guilty	  conscience.	  Society	  should	  be	  a	   ‘foundation	  and	  scaffolding	  by	  means	  of	  which	  a	  select	  class	  of	  beings	   may	   be	   able	   to	   elevate	   themselves	   to	   their	   higher	   duties,	   and	   in	  general	  to	  a	  higher	  existence.’”24	  	   Interestingly,	   Fromm	   is	   not	   deterred	   by	   Nietzsche’s	   beliefs	   despite	   their	  apparent	  contradiction	  to	  his	  own.	  Rather,	  he	  exonerates	  Nietzsche	  by	  arguing	  that	  his	   tendency	   for	   “overstatement”	   owes	   to	   the	   reactive	   quality	   that	   animates	   his	  work.	   Fromm	   claims	   that	   there	   were	   insecurities	   and	   anxieties	   in	   Nietzsche’s	  personality	   that	   attracted	   him	   to	   this	   image	   of	   “the	   strong	   man”	   as	   a	   reaction	  formation.25	  Finally,	  Fromm	  cites	  the	  influence	  of	  evolution	  theory,	  and	  specifically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Fromm	  identifies	  Nietzsche	  as	  one	  such	  thinker	  who	  forwarded	  this	  view,	  along	  with	  the	  philosophers	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  as	  well	  as	  Feuerbach,	  Marx,	  and	  Stirner	  (Escape	  from	  
Freedom,	  p	  143).	  	  24	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Man	  for	  Himself:	  An	  Inquiry	  Into	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Ethics	  (Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1990),	  129.	  25	  True	  to	  his	  psychoanalytical	  training,	  Fromm	  had	  a	  keen	  eye	  for	  penetrating	  the	  unconscious	  elements	  that	  were	  likely	  driving	  Nietzsche’s	  work.	  We	  know,	  for	  example,	  that	  Nietzsche	  suffered	  from	  a	  number	  of	  health	  problems	  throughout	  his	  life	  that	  rendered	  his	  body	  quite	  weak.	  We	  also	  know	  that	  he	  failed	  romantically,	  turned	  down	  by	  his	  love	  interest	  
	   209	  
the	  “survival	  of	  the	  fittest”	  on	  Nietzsche	  as	  providing	  some	  explanation	  for	  his	  views.	  	  Indeed,	  Fromm	  is	  able	  to	  see	  past	  the	  provocative	  elements	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  thought	  in	  order	   to	   interpret	   his	   injunction	   against	   the	   love	   for	   others	   as	   an	   attack	   against	  altruism	   that	   is	   rooted	   in	   weakness	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   self-­‐love,	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   love	  based	  in	  strength,	  generosity,	  and	  self-­‐worth.	  As	  Fromm	  argues,	  	  The	  essence	  of	  [Nietzsche’s]	  view	  is	  this:	  love	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  abundance;	  its	  premise	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  individual	  who	  can	  give.	  Love	  is	  affirmation	  and	   productiveness,	   “it	   seeketh	   to	   create	   what	   is	   loved!”	   To	   love	   another	  person	  is	  only	  a	  virtue	  if	  it	  springs	  from	  this	  inner	  strength,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  vice	  if	  it	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  basic	  inability	  to	  be	  oneself.”	  	  	  Thus,	   it	   is	   through	   such	   an	   interpretation	   that	   Fromm	   is	   able	   to	   reconcile	   the	  incendiary	   ideas	   of	   Nietzsche	   with	   his	   own,	   applying	   a	   humanistic	   veneer	   to	  Nietzsche’s	  staunchly	  anti-­‐humanist	  position.	  Also	   while	   in	   Heidelberg,	   Fromm	   grew	   close	   to	   psychiatrist	   Frieda	  Reichmann	  who	  he	  would	  marry	   in	   1926.	   It	  was	   through	  Reichmann	   that	   Fromm	  learned	   about	   psychoanalysis.	   Although	   Fromm	  would	   initially	   be	   a	   proponent	   of	  orthodox	   Freudianism,	   his	   ideas	   quickly	   evolved	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   Georg	  Groddeck 26 	  and	   Sándor	   Ferenczi. 27 	  Unlike	   Freud	   who	   emphasized	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Lou	  Andreas-­‐Salomé.	  It	  is	  thus	  reasonable	  to	  suspect,	  as	  Fromm	  did,	  that	  Nietzsche’s	  overemphasis	  on	  masculine	  virility	  in	  his	  writings	  was	  indeed	  compensatory.	  	  26	  Georg	  Groddeck	  (1866-­‐1934)	  was	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Marienhöhe	  Sanitorium	  in	  Baden	  Baden,	  Germany.	  Trained	  as	  an	  MD,	  Groddeck	  offered	  his	  patients	  a	  unique	  regimen	  of	  therapeutic	  massages	  and	  psychoanalysis.	  Groddeck’s	  key	  insight	  was	  that	  physical	  illness	  and	  one’s	  psychic	  strivings	  are	  deeply	  connected	  -­‐	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  future	  psychosomatic	  therapies.	  (For	  more	  on	  Groddeck’s	  approach,	  see	  his	  selected	  psychoanalytical	  writings	  in	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Illness:	  Selected	  Psychoanalytic	  Writings	  (International	  Universities	  Press,	  1977)).	  In	  a	  1956	  letter,	  Fromm	  would	  recount	  his	  impression	  of	  Groddeck	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  	   When	  I	  think	  of	  all	  the	  analysts	  in	  Germany	  I	  knew,	  he	  was,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  the	  only	  one	  with	  truth,	  originality,	  courage	  and	  extraordinary	  kindness.	  He	  penetrated	  the	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psychoanalyst’s	   distance	   from	   his/her	   patient,	   Groddeck	   and	   Ferenczi’s	   approach	  focused	   on	   the	   human	   relationship	   between	   the	   analyst	   and	   analysand	   –	   an	  approach	  that	  Fromm	  would	  use	  in	  his	  own	  clinical	  practice.	  	  It	  was	  at	  Groddeck’s	  sanatorium	  that	  Fromm	  made	  the	  acquaintance	  of	  Karen	  Horney,	  with	  whom	  he	  would	  be	  romantically	  and	  professionally	  linked	  for	  most	  of	  the	   1930s,	   after	   the	   dissolution	   of	   his	   first	   marriage.	   Fromm	   shared	   Horney’s	  critique	   of	   Freud’s	   Oedipal	   theory	   and	   his	   overall	   patriarchal	   bias.	   Horney	   and	  Fromm	  would	  together	  apply	  cultural	  anthropological	  insights	  to	  maternal/paternal	  social	  structures	  in	  their	  studies	  on	  the	  psyche.28	  Fromm’s	  interest	  from	  early	  in	  his	  career	  was	  in	  making	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  social	  and	  the	  psychological.	  Indeed,	  most	   of	   his	   work	   would	   hinge	   on	   the	   investigation	   of	   the	   social	   unconscious,	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  unconscious	  of	  his	  patient,	  and	  yet	  never	  hurt.	  Even	  if	  I	  was	  never	  his	  student	  in	  any	  technical	  sense,	  his	  teaching	  influenced	  me	  more	  than	  that	  of	  other	  teachers	  I	  had	  (in	  Funk	  2000,	  62).	  	  	  Interestingly,	  in	  1931	  when	  Fromm	  fell	  ill	  with	  a	  bout	  of	  tuberculosis	  and	  needed	  to	  relocate	  to	  Switzerland,	  Groddeck	  encouraged	  him	  to	  see	  his	  illness	  as	  his	  body’s	  expression	  of	  his	  mental	  wish	  to	  separate	  from	  his	  wife,	  Frieda	  Reichmann	  who	  he	  would	  indeed	  separate	  from	  a	  few	  years	  later.	  	  	  27	  Sándor	  Ferenczi	  (1873-­‐1933)	  was	  a	  Hungarian	  psychoanalyst	  belonging	  to	  Freud’s	  inner	  circle	  but	  who	  would	  ultimately	  become	  dissatisfied	  with	  orthodox	  Freudian	  methods.	  Fromm	  characterized	  the	  differences	  between	  him	  and	  Freud	  as	  “the	  difference	  between	  a	  humane,	  kind	  attitude	  which	  wholeheartedly	  promotes	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  patient,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  patricentric-­‐authoritarian,	  basically	  misanthropic	  ‘tolerance’”	  (in	  Funk,	  112).	  Strongly	  influenced	  by	  Groddeck,	  Ferenczi	  would	  increasingly	  move	  away	  from	  Freud’s	  therapeutic	  approach	  and	  toward	  a	  more	  humane	  one	  that	  would	  make	  a	  strong	  impression	  on	  Fromm.	  For	  more	  on	  Ferenczi’s	  approach,	  see	  The	  Clinical	  Diary	  of	  Sándor	  Ferenczi	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  	  28	  Specifically,	  they	  were	  interested	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Johann	  Jakob	  Bachofen,	  Adolf	  Bastian,	  and	  Lewis	  H.	  Morgan.	  See	  Love,	  Sexuality,	  and	  Matriarchy:	  About	  Gender	  (Fromm	  International	  Publishing	  Corporation,	  1999)	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  Fromm’s	  essays	  on	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  as	  influenced	  by	  these	  writers.	  See	  also	  Douglas	  Kellner’s	  essay,	  “Erich	  Fromm,	  Feminism,	  and	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,”	  (1991)	  for	  a	  critical	  analysis	  on	  Fromm’s	  view	  of	  gender	  relations.	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concept	   discussed	   at	   length	   in	   Chapter	   3.	   Distinguishing	   himself	   from	   Freud’s	  individualist	  and	  asocial	  theory	  of	  the	  ego,	  Fromm’s	  “psychoanalysis	  interprets	  the	  human	   being	   as	   a	   socialized	   being,	   and	   the	   psychic	   apparatus	   as	   essentially	  developed	  and	  determined	  through	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  society”.29	  The	   emphasis	   on	   the	   social	   in	   Fromm’s	  work	  was	   especially	   influenced	   by	  Marxist	   theory.	   In	   Fromm’s	   view,	   Marx	   was	   the	   first	   to	   make	   the	   important	  discovery	   that	   the	   individual’s	   “awakening”	   must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   change	   in	  social	  and	  economic	  relations.30	  Fromm	  was	  particularly	  attracted	  to	  Marx’s	  earlier	  works	  in	  which	  he	  located	  the	  most	  “articulate	  expression”	  of	  his	  philosophy.	  31	  For	  Fromm,	  Marx	  was	  an	  important	  existential	  and	  humanist	  thinker,	  whose	  work:	  “like	  much	   of	   existentialist	   thinking,	   represents	   a	   protest	   against	   man's	   alienation,	   his	  loss	   of	   himself	   and	   his	   transformation	   into	   a	   thing;	   it	   is	   a	   movement	   against	   the	  dehumanization	  and	  automatization	  of	  man	  inherent	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Western	  industrialism.	   It	   is	   ruthlessly	   critical	   of	   all	   ‘answers’	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   human	  existence	   which	   try	   to	   present	   solutions	   by	   negating	   or	   camouflaging	   the	  dichotomies	   inherent	   in	   man's	   existence.” 32 	  Fromm	   distinguishes	   Marx’s	  existentialism	  from	  that	  of	  Kierkegaard’s	  by	  the	  materiality	  that	  foregrounds	  Marx’s	  analysis.	   For	   Marx,	   the	   human	   being	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   member	   of	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Funk,	  Erich	  Fromm,	  68.	  	  30	  Fromm,	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion,	  86.	  31	  Fromm’s	  book	  Marx’s	  Concept	  of	  Man	  (1961)	  would	  include	  some	  of	  these	  early	  writings	  by	  Marx,	  translated	  in	  English	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  	  32	  Erich	  Fromm,	  Marx’s	  Concept	  of	  Man	  (F.	  Ungar,	  1961),	  v.	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society	   and	   social	   class	   –	   a	   crucial	   contextualization	   missing	   from	   existential	  philosophy.33	  	  	  Fromm’s	   interest	   in	  wedding	  psychoanalysis	   to	  Marxist	   social	   theory	   led	   to	  his	  invitation	  to	  join	  the	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Research	  (aka	  the	  Frankfurt	  School)	  in	  1930.34	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   period	   in	  which	   Fromm	  was	   associated	  with	   the	  Frankfurt	  School	  was	  marked	  by	  frequent	  bouts	  of	  illness,	  he	  nonetheless	  remained	  quite	   productive.	   It	   was	   during	   this	   time	   that	   he	   developed	   his	   concept	   of	   the	  
authoritarian	   character	   (discussed	   briefly	   in	   Chapter	   3),	   which	   would	   hold	   the	  interest	   of	   the	   mainly	   Jewish	   émigrés	   of	   the	   Frankfurt	   school	   for	   many	   years	   to	  come.35	  Having	  fled	  Nazi	  Germany,	  these	  other	  members	  were	  also	  striving	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  fascism	  and	  authoritarianism	  of	  1930s	  Europe.	  	  As	   Fromm’s	   ideas	   further	   developed,	   however,	   members	   of	   the	   Institute	  would	  become	   less	  accepting,	  eventually	   leading	   to	  his	  break	   from	  the	   Institute	   in	  1939.	   In	   brief,	   Fromm’s	   departure	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   largely	   rooted	   in	   his	  revision	   of	   Freud’s	   basic	   theories	   which	   were	   rejected	   by	   Institute	   director	   Max	  Horkheimer,	   Herbert	   Marcuse,	   and	   Theodor	   Adorno	   –	   a	   newer	   member	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Fromm’s	  critique	  of	  existential	  philosophy’s	  inadequate	  materiality	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  Kierkegaard.	  Indeed,	  he	  was	  perhaps	  most	  contemptuous	  when	  it	  came	  to	  Sartre.	  As	  he	  writes	  in	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man	  (1964),	  “Sartre…who	  claims	  to	  represent	  Marxist	  thought	  and	  to	  be	  the	  philosopher	  of	  the	  future…is	  nevertheless	  an	  exponent	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  society	  of	  
anomie	  and	  selfishness	  which	  he	  criticizes	  and	  wants	  to	  change”	  (p	  15).	  See	  also	  Fromm’s	  footnote	  in	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Human	  Destructiveness	  (1973)	  for	  another	  instance	  in	  which	  Fromm	  attacks	  Sartre’s	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  Marx’s	  historical	  materialism	  (1973,	  p	  262).	  	  	  34	  Although	  Fromm	  made	  important	  contributions	  to	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,	  his	  presence	  as	  an	  early	  member	  has	  been	  erased	  by	  many	  accounts.	  For	  some	  texts	  on	  the	  Frankfurt	  School	  that	  do	  mention	  Fromm,	  each	  with	  differing	  appraisals	  of	  his	  contributions,	  see	  Martin	  Jay	  	  (1973)	  Douglas	  Kellner	  (1989),	  Stephen	  Bronner	  (1994),	  Rolf	  Wiggershaus	  (1995),	  and	  most	  recently,	  Stuart	  Jeffries	  (2016).	  	  	  35	  See	  The	  Authoritarian	  Personality	  published	  in	  1950	  by	  Adorno	  et	  al.	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Institute	   who	   was	   especially	   hostile	   to	   Fromm’s	   approach.	   This	   led	   to	   public	  sparring	   between	   Fromm	   and	   his	   former	   colleagues	   in	   which	   the	   latter	   accused	  Fromm	   of	   conformist	   revisionism	   based	   on	   his	   rejection	   of	   Freud’s	   libido	   theory	  which	  they	  saw	  as	  a	  capitulation	  to	  reified	  or	  “identity”	  thinking.	  Identity	  thinking	  is	  contrasted	  with	  non-­‐identity	  thought,	  which	  is	  a	  philosophy	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  concepts	  do	  not	  exhaust	  the	  objects	  which	  they	  describe.	  For	  theorists	  like	  Adorno,	  who	   was	   perhaps	   the	   most	   staunch	   proponent	   of	   this	   philosophy,	   it	   was	   in	   the	  remainder	  or	  in	  that	  which	  is	  negated,	  that	  emancipation	  lies.	  For	  the	  thinkers	  of	  the	  Institute,	   Freud’s	   libido	   theory	   offered	   that	   very	   space	   which	   was	   outside	   of	  capitalist	   ideology.36	  In	   denouncing	   libido	   theory,	   Fromm	  was	   thus	   dismissing	   the	  emancipatory	   potential	   of	   psychoanalysis	   in	   favour	   of	   what	   they	   perceived	   as	  “commonplace	  psychology.”37	  Moreover,	  Fromm’s	  suggestions	  for	  social	  change	  and	  call	  for	  a	  “New	  Man”	  and	  “New	  Society”	  were	  considered	  “naïve,”	  “utopian”,	  as	  well	  as	  conformist	  by	  his	  ex-­‐colleagues.38	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	  Marcuse,	  the	  radical	  aspect	  of	  Freud’s	  work	  was	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  polymorphous	  sexuality.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  spontaneous	  and	  non-­‐alienated	  capacity	  that	  Marcuse	  located	  the	  potentiality	  for	  liberation	  (see	  Eros	  and	  Civilization	  for	  further	  explanation	  of	  Marcuse’s	  thought,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  critique	  of	  Fromm).	  In	  denying	  Freud’s	  instinct	  theory,	  Fromm	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  abandoning	  this	  potentiality	  for	  what	  could	  only	  be	  a	  repressive	  alternative.	  Fromm’s	  response	  to	  Marcuse’s	  position	  was	  scathing:	  “Marcuse's	  revolutionary	  rhetoric	  obscures	  the	  irrational	  and	  anti	  revolutionary	  character	  of	  his	  attitude….he	  is	  attracted	  by	  infantile	  regression	  perversions	  and	  –	  as	  I	  see	  it	  –	  in	  a	  more	  hidden	  way	  by	  destruction	  and	  hate”	  (p	  31,	  The	  Crisis	  of	  Psychoanalysis:	  Essays	  on	  Freud,	  Marx	  and	  Social	  Psychology).	  	  	  For	  a	  published	  record	  of	  the	  intellectual	  dispute	  between	  Fromm	  and	  Marcuse,	  see	  their	  famous	  correspondence	  between	  the	  summer	  of	  1955	  and	  the	  winter	  of	  1956	  in	  Dissent	  magazine.	  	  	  37	  Funk,	  Erich	  Fromm,	  99.	  38	  Durkin,	  167.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  dispute	  between	  Fromm	  and	  his	  former	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,	  see	  Durkin’s	  excellent	  summary	  in	  The	  Radical	  
Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm.	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In	  what	  way	  did	  Fromm’s	   theories	  specifically	  challenge	  orthodox	  Freudian	  analysis?	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  Fromm	  was	  critical	  of	  Freud’s	  mechanistic	  and	  libidinal	  emphasis.	  Fromm	  criticized	  Freud’s	  assumption	  that	  the	  human	  being	  was	   dominated	   by	   his/her	   instincts	   which	   were	   frustrated	   by	   society/culture.	  Fromm	   offers	   a	   different	   theory,	   which	   while	   acknowledging	   biological	   drives	  (hunger,	  sleep,	  sex	  etc.),	  stresses	  the	  “historical	  psychic	  impulses,	  developed	  in	  the	  social	  process.”39	  	  The	  human	  being’s	  needs	  are	   thus	  not	  understood	  by	   looking	  at	  his/her	  physiology	  only	  but	  rather	  the	  whole	  “life	  process.”40	  Finally,	  for	  Fromm,	  the	  psyche	   of	   an	   individual	   cannot	   be	   understood	   apart	   from	   looking	   at	   the	  mode	   of	  production	   of	   a	   society	   and	   its	   role	   in	   shaping	   both	   the	   individual	   and	   social	  character.	  	  	  Fromm’s	   reformulation,	   presented	   in	   1937	   in	   an	   article	   rejected	   by	  Horkheimer,	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  his	  further	  work.	  Rainer	  Funk	  describes	  this	  reformulation	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  This	   new	   approach	   enabled	   new	   insights	   into	   the	   passionate	   strivings	   of	  human	   beings.	   Since	   action	   is	   no	   longer	   determined	   by	   instinct	   but	   by	  economic	   and	   societal	   imperatives,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   why,	   in	   authoritarian	  systems,	  sadism	  and	  masochism	  are	  dominant	  drives.	  Fromm	  demonstrated	  the	   fertility	  and	  modernity	  of	  his	   approach,	  not	  only	  with	  his	   research	   into	  the	  authoritarian	  character,	  but	  also	  with	  his	  later	  studies	  into	  the	  ‘marketing	  character’	   and	   the	   necrophilic	   orientation.	   The	   current	   omnipresent	   desire	  always	  to	  be	  a	  success,	  or	  the	  widespread	  tendency	  to	  calculate	  everything	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  dead	  thing	  cannot	  be	  explained,	  fatalistically,	  as	  a	  predetermined	  outcome	  of	  inherent	  instincts,	  developed	  during	  early	  childhood,	  rather	  as	  an	  internalization	   of	   an	   economy	   and	   society	   oriented	   toward	   marketing	   or	  toward	  the	  reification	  of	  everything.41	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Funk,	  95.	  40	  Funk,	  95.	  	  41	  Funk,	  96-­‐97.	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Fromm	   would	   find	   a	   new	   home	   for	   his	   ideas	   among	   thinkers	   like	   Karen	  Horney	   and	   Harry	   Stack	   Sullivan	   whose	   theory	   of	   interpersonal	   relationships	  emphasized	   the	   relatedness	   and	   social	   nature	   of	   human	   beings.42	  In	   addition	   to	  Horney	   and	   Sullivan,	   Fromm’s	   work	   would	   find	   resonance	   with	   psychoanalysts	  Frieda	  Fromm-­‐Reichmann	  (his	  ex-­‐wife)43,	  and	  Clara	  Thompson,	  both	  of	  whom	  were	  also	   influenced	   by	   the	   work	   of	   Groddeck	   and	   Ferenczi.	   Following	   these	   latter	  practitioners,	   this	   new	   generation	   of	   therapists	   would	   agree	   that	   “observation	   of	  patients	  does	  not	  imply	  objective	  distance,	  rather	  it	  involves	  taking	  part	  on	  a	  human	  level.”44	  Together,	  they	  would	  establish	  the	  William	  Alanson	  White	  Institute	  in	  1943	  –	  an	  institution	  based	  on	  seeing	  the	  human	  being	  as	  primarily	  a	  social	  being.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  influences	  thus	  far	  mentioned,	  Fromm	  was	  also	  profoundly	  impacted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  spiritual	  traditions	  outside	  of	  Judaism.	  He	  was	  especially	  drawn	  to	  the	  Christian	  mysticism	  of	  Meister	  Eckhart45	  and	  Jakob	  Böhme;	  the	  Islamic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  While	  sharing	  many	  similarities	  with	  Sullivan	  and	  Horney,	  Fromm	  resisted	  the	  “neo-­‐Freudian”	  label	  that	  was	  often	  applied	  to	  all	  three	  thinkers.	  Not	  only	  did	  Fromm	  feel	  himself	  to	  share	  a	  greater	  affinity	  to	  Freud	  than	  Sullivan	  and	  Horney,	  but	  he	  was	  also	  critical	  of	  a	  cultural	  psychology	  that	  did	  not	  recognize	  the	  influence	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  structures	  upon	  the	  individual’s	  psyche	  (see	  Durkin	  2015	  and	  Cortina	  2015).	  	  43	  Reichmann	  was	  a	  talented	  psychoanalyst	  in	  her	  own	  right,	  known	  for	  her	  groundbreaking	  work	  on	  treating	  patients	  with	  psychosis.	  She	  rose	  to	  fame	  when	  a	  former	  patient	  of	  hers,	  Joanne	  Greenburg,	  wrote	  an	  autobiographical	  novel,	  I	  Never	  Promised	  you	  a	  Rose	  Garden	  (1964),	  about	  Greenburg’s	  recovery	  from	  schizophrenia	  under	  her	  care.	  	  	  44	  Funk,	  108.	  Although	  Fromm	  planned	  to	  publish	  a	  four	  volume	  series	  on	  his	  psychoanalytic	  technique,	  it	  is	  unfortunate	  that	  this	  project	  did	  not	  come	  to	  fruition	  (Friedman	  2013).	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  Fromm’s	  decline	  on	  the	  intellectual	  scene	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  never	  established	  an	  institutional	  base	  or	  trained	  analytic	  students	  in	  his	  specific	  approach	  outside	  of	  Mexico	  (see	  McLaughlin	  1998;	  and	  Cortina	  2015).	  	  45	  As	  one	  of	  Fromm’s	  contemporaries	  remarked,	  Fromm’s	  reading	  of	  Meister	  Eckhart	  favoured	  an	  agnostic	  interpretation,	  rather	  than	  a	  Christian	  theological	  one.	  See	  Dietmar	  Mieth,	  “Meister	  Eckhart:	  Leidenschaft	  des	  Denkens,	  Spiritualitaet	  und	  Lebenskunst,”	  in	  
Meister	  Eckhart	  aus	  theologischer	  Sicht,	  ed.	  Christine	  Büchner	  (W.	  Kohlhammer	  Verlag,	  2007).	  
	   216	  
Sufism	   of	   Rumi;	   and	   the	   Buddhism	   of	   the	   Zen	   monk	   Daisetz	   T.	   Suzuki	   and	  Theravadan	  monk	  Nyanaponika	  Mahathera.46	  Fromm	  was	   interested	   in	   identifying	  and	   secularizing	   common	   aspects	   among	   the	   teachings	   of	   different	   “Masters	   of	  Living.”47	  As	  he	  states,	  “the	  human	  reality,	  for	  instance,	  underlying	  the	  teachings	  of	  Buddha,	  Isaiah,	  Christ,	  Socrates,	  or	  Spinoza	  is	  essentially	  the	  same.	  It	  is	  determined	  by	   the	   striving	   for	   love,	   truth,	   and	   justice.”48	  For	   Fromm,	   these	   thinkers	   and	   the	  traditions	  they	  belonged	  to,	  offered	  important	  answers	  to	  the	  perennial	  existential	  questions	  that	  animated	  his	  humanistic	  philosophy.	  	  While	  the	  influences	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  are	  diverse	  and	  varied	  they	  are	  united	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   humanistic	   aspects	   that	   Fromm	   was	   able	   to	   find	   in	   each.	  Indeed,	   Freidman	   has	   noted	   the	   different	   humanistic	   communities	   that	   Fromm	  gravitated	   towards	   over	   the	   course	   of	   his	   life	   –	   all	   of	   which	   deeply	   impacted	   his	  theory	   of	   humanism. 49 	  Fromm’s	   strength	   is	   in	   his	   willingness	   to	   incorporate	  disparate	   and	   non-­‐traditional	   elements	   into	   his	   theory,	   furnishing	   it	   with	   a	  dynamism	  and	  an	   impressive	  multidisciplinarity.	  On	  the	  flip	  side,	  his	  eschewing	  of	  orthodoxy	   and	   his	   unconventional	   interpretations	   have	   resulted	   in	   his	   being	   cast	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Funk,	  2000.	  	  47	  Fromm,	  The	  Art	  of	  Being,	  9.	  	  48	  Fromm,	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Religion,	  62.	  	  	  In	  Burston’s	  view,	  Fromm’s	  appeal	  to	  these	  religious	  figures	  is	  a	  weakness	  in	  his	  analysis.	  As	  he	  states,	  “to	  cite	  religious	  preceptors	  or	  ‘Masters	  of	  Living’	  as	  issuing	  convergent	  testimony	  in	  one’s	  favor	  as	  Fromm	  did,	  lends	  an	  argument	  superficial	  plausibility	  at	  best.	  It	  amounts	  simply	  to	  another	  appeal	  to	  authority	  or	  consensus”	  (1991,	  87).	  I	  disagree	  with	  Burston	  that	  Fromm’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  similarities	  between	  different	  traditions	  is	  a	  contrived	  attempt	  to	  sway	  his	  reader	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  authority.	  Rather,	  the	  convergences	  between	  different	  religious	  traditions	  have	  been	  convincingly	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  thinkers	  (including	  the	  popularized	  works	  of	  the	  “perennial	  philosophers”	  Joseph	  Campbell,	  Aldous	  Huxley,	  and	  Huston	  Smith),	  and	  Fromm’s	  bringing	  this	  to	  light	  is	  consistent	  with	  his	  general	  focus	  on	  locating	  universal	  principles	  that	  pertain	  to	  the	  human	  situation.	  	  49	  Friedman,	  The	  Lives	  of	  Erich	  Fromm,	  xxxiii.	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out,	   so	   to	   speak,	   by	   many	   established	   disciplines,	   including	   traditional	   Judaic	  philosophy,	   psychoanalysis,	   and	   Marxism.	   Furthermore,	   Fromm’s	   approach	   has	  been	  criticized	   for	   its	  many	  generalizations	  and	  oversimplifications.50	  What	  can	  be	  said	  for	  sure	  is	  that	  Fromm’s	  many	  influences	  across	  diverse	  epistemic	  fields	  –	  from	  Judaism	   to	   psychoanalysis	   to	   sociology	   to	   existentialism	   to	   Marxism	   to	   spiritual	  mysticism	  –	  have	  resulted	   in	  a	   truly	  original	  humanistic	  approach	  that	   is	  reflected	  throughout	  Fromm’s	  expansive	  corpus.	  	  
Major	  Works51	  	   It	  was	  after	  Fromm	  left	  the	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Research	  that	  he	  would	  rise	  to	  fame	  with	   his	   1941	   publication,	  Escape	  From	  Freedom.52	  In	   it,	   Fromm	   gives	   a	   full	  account	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  character,	  which	  he	  had	  been	  developing	  for	   some	   years.	   Between	  1941	   and	  1949,	   Fromm	   lectured	   extensively	   at	   the	  New	  School	   for	   Social	   Research	   (NY),	   Bennington	   College	   (Vermont),	   and	   as	   a	   visiting	  scholar	   at	   Yale	   University.	   From	   these	   lectures	   would	   come	   his	   books	   Man	   for	  
Himself	   (based	  off	  his	  New	  School	   lectures,	  published	   in	  1947),	  and	  Psychoanalysis	  
and	   Religion	   (based	   off	   his	   Yale	   lectures,	   published	   in	   1950).	   The	   first	   of	   these	  outlines	   his	   humanistic	   ethics,	   while	   the	   second,	   conceived	   as	   a	   continuation	   of	  
Escape	   from	   Freedom,	   discusses	   the	   contentious	   relationship	   between	  psychoanalysis	  and	  theology.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Durkin,	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm.	  	  51	  This	  list	  of	  works	  is	  not	  exhaustive.	  See	  Funk	  (2000)	  for	  an	  index	  of	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  writings,	  including	  those	  published	  after	  his	  death.	  52	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Escape	  from	  Freedom	  was	  Fromm’s	  second	  monograph,	  preceded	  by	  his	  first	  book,	  The	  Dogma	  of	  Christ	  (1930),	  written	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Theodor	  Reik’s	  psycho-­‐religious	  work,	  Dogma	  and	  Compulsion.	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In	   1950,	   Fromm	   moved	   to	   Mexico,	   where	   he	   established	   the	   Mexican	  Psychoanalytic	   Society	   and	   training	   institute.53	  For	   the	   next	   many	   years,	   Fromm	  taught	  at	  this	  institute	  while	  making	  trips	  to	  the	  United	  States	  each	  spring	  to	  lecture.	  In	  1955,	  Fromm	  published	  The	  Sane	  Society	  which	  proposed	  a	  humanistic	  socialism,	  and	   in	   1956,	   he	   released	   one	   of	   his	  most	   popular	   books,	  The	  Art	   of	   Loving.	   Funk	  describes	  the	  core	  idea	  of	  this	  latter	  book	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  “To	  be	  able	  to	  love	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  being	  loved	  or	  being	  in	  love,	  rather	  the	  realization	  of	  potential	  inherent	  within	  each	   individual:	  being	  able	   to	  connect	   lovingly	  with	   the	   inner	  and	  outer	  realities.”54	  	  In	   1957,	   a	   week-­‐long	   seminar	   in	   Mexico	   taught	   alongside	   the	   Zen	   monk	  Daisetz	   T.	   Suzuki	   would	   result	   in	   the	   book	   Zen	   Buddhism	   and	   Psychoanalysis	  (published	  in	  1960).	  Buddhism	  appealed	  to	  Fromm’s	  “interes[t]	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  oneness	   with	   the	   object	   of	   perception…"55	  Fromm	   also	   discusses	   this	   idea	   of	  oneness	   in	   his	   book	   You	   Shall	   be	   as	   Gods	   (1966)	   in	   which	   he	   calls	   for	   a	   radical	  
humanism.	  As	  he	  writes,	  “the	  most	  fundamental	  idea	  of	  humanism	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Fromm’s	  move	  to	  Mexico	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  health	  concerns	  of	  his	  second	  wife,	  Henny	  Gurland.	  Gurland,	  also	  a	  German	  émigré,	  had	  trekked	  alongside	  Frankfurt	  School	  member	  Walter	  Benjamin	  (among	  others)	  between	  Nazi	  occupied	  France	  and	  Spain,	  before	  making	  her	  way	  to	  safety	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (Funk,	  2000).	  It	  was	  to	  Gurland	  that	  Benjamin	  gave	  his	  final	  two	  letters	  (including	  one	  addressed	  to	  Adorno)	  before	  his	  suicide	  in	  1940.	  Some	  years	  later,	  in	  1952,	  Gurland	  herself	  would	  commit	  suicide	  after	  having	  suffered	  the	  painful	  effects	  of	  rheumatoid	  arthritis	  for	  four	  years	  (see	  Noa	  Limon’s	  article	  “Chronicling	  Walter	  Benjamin’s	  Final	  Hours”	  in	  Haaretz	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  account).	  54	  Funk,	  138.	  This	  book,	  published	  a	  few	  years	  after	  his	  third	  and	  final	  marriage	  to	  Annis	  Freeman,	  was	  inspired	  by	  their	  relationship	  (Funk	  2000).	  	  55	  Funk,	  133.	  Although	  Fromm’s	  book	  on	  Buddhism	  was	  published	  later	  in	  his	  life,	  his	  interest	  in	  the	  spiritual	  tradition	  started	  in	  his	  earlier	  days	  in	  Heidelberg.	  While	  he	  did	  not	  identify	  as	  a	  Buddhist,	  Fromm	  was	  “deeply	  impressed	  by	  the	  core	  of	  Buddhist	  teaching”	  as	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  co-­‐authored	  book,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  references	  to	  Buddhism	  throughout	  his	  work	  (The	  Art	  of	  Being,	  52).	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of	  humanity	   is	   contained	   in	  each	  man,	  and	   that	  man	  develops	  his	  humanity	   in	   the	  historical	  process”.56	  Between	   1959	   and	   1962,	   Fromm	   published	   a	   work	   on	   Freud	   entitled	  
Sigmund	   Freud’s	   Mission	   (1959),	   a	   book	   on	   Marx	   entitled	  Marx’s	   Concept	   of	   Man	  (1961),	   and	   Beyond	   the	   Chains	   of	   Illusion	   (1962),	   a	   book	   that	   looked	   at	   his	  “encounter	  with	  Marx	  and	  Freud,”	  as	  was	   the	  subtitle	  of	   the	  volume.	  These	  works	  clarified	  Fromm’s	  relationship	  to	  both	  thinkers,	  as	  well	  as	  laid	  out	  the	  limitations	  of	  their	  thinking.	  	  
The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  published	  in	  1964,	  continued	  many	  of	  the	  themes	  Fromm	  had	  raised	  in	  his	  previous	  books.	  Specifically,	  he	  focuses	  on	  human	  destructiveness	  and	   evil	   through	   the	   concepts	   of	   group	  narcissism	  and	  necrophilia,	   looking	   at	   the	  cases	  of	  both	  Hitler	  and	  Stalin.	  	  From	   1966	   onward,	   after	   his	   first	   heart	   attack,	   Fromm’s	   health	   began	   to	  decline.	   Even	   still,	   he	   would	   publish	   four	   more	   books	   before	   his	   death.	   The	  
Revolution	  of	  Hope	   (1968)	  was	   inspired	  by	  his	   activism	  against	  nuclear	   armament	  during	   the	   1960s.57	  Two	   years	   later,	   Fromm	   would	   publish	   Social	   Character	   in	   a	  
Mexican	  Village:	  A	  Sociopsychoanalytic	  Study	   (mentioned	   in	  Chapter	  3).	  This	   study,	  co-­‐conducted	   by	   Michael	   Maccoby	   was	   a	   unique	   socio-­‐psychological	   empirical	  project	  on	  the	  character	  structure	  of	  a	  Mexican	  village	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Morelos.	  In	  it,	  Fromm	   sought	   to	   finally	   establish	   an	   empirical	   basis	   for	   his	   theory	   of	   social	  character.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Funk,	  134.	  57	  Unlike	  most	  members	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School,	  Fromm	  engaged	  in	  many	  years	  of	  political	  activism.	  In	  1957,	  he	  cofounded	  the	  American	  peace	  movement	  SANE	  (“National	  Committee	  for	  a	  Sane	  Nuclear	  Policy”)	  and	  would	  continue	  his	  activist	  efforts	  throughout	  the	  1960s.	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In	   1973,	   Fromm	   released	   his	   expansive	   study	   on	   aggression,	   entitled	   The	  
Anatomy	   of	   Human	   Destructiveness.	   This	   impressive	   volume	   investigated	  anthropological,	   neuroscientific,	   and	   evolutionary	   theories	   on	   human	   aggression,	  ultimately	   arguing	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   explanation	   based	   in	   Fromm’s	   existential	  humanist	   psychology.58 	  Fromm’s	   attention	   would	   turn	   back	   to	   his	   critique	   of	  consumer	   culture	   in	   his	   final	   book,	  To	  Have	  or	  To	  Be	   (1976),	  which	   analyzed	   two	  types	   of	   existence	   that	   can	   be	   summarized	   as	   “the	   one	   in	   which	   the	   world	   is	  perceived	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  object	  of	  having	  and	  the	  other	  in	  which	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  act	  of	   living	   itself,	  of	  productive	  work,	  of	   the	  unfolding	  of	  human	  capacities	  and	   in	  which	  the	  sense	  of	  identity	  is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  formula	  ‘I	  am	  what	  I	  have’	  but	  ‘I	  am	  what	  I	  do.’”	  59	  	  Shortly	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  To	  Have	  or	  To	  Be,	  Fromm	  suffered	  a	  second,	  third,	  and	  then	  fourth	  and	  fatal	  heart	  attack,	  leading	  to	  his	  death	  on	  March	  18,	  1980,	  five	   days	   before	   his	   80th	   birthday.	   The	   executor	   of	   his	   estate,	   the	   psychoanalyst	  Rainer	  Funk,	  has	  published	  a	  number	  of	  Fromm’s	  works	  posthumously,	  striving	  to	  keep	  his	  legacy	  alive.	  As	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  this	  section,	  Fromm’s	  topics	  of	  analysis	  span	  a	  large	   array	   of	   themes,	   including	   psychoanalysis,	   authoritarianism,	   human	  destructiveness	  and	  aggression,	  religion,	  consumerism,	  alienation,	   love,	  ethics,	  and	  Marxism.	  Despite	  this	  range	  of	  interests,	  Fromm’s	  body	  of	  work	  nonetheless	  evinces	  a	   cohesiveness	   that	   can	   be	   traced	   throughout.	   Specifically,	   Fromm’s	   humanistic	  perspective	   and	   ethic	   are	   maintained	   across	   his	   corpus,	   no	   matter	   the	   topic	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Cortina,	  2015.	  59	  Funk,	  156.	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analysis.	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  next	  section	  to	  examine	  his	  philosophy	  of	  humanism	  in	  closer	  detail.	  
(6.2)	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Humanist	  Theory	  	   As	   can	   clearly	   be	   seen	   from	   the	   last	   section,	   Fromm’s	   theory	   of	   humanism	  was	  formed	  through	  his	  encounter	  with	  many	  influences,	  as	  well	  as	  developed	  over	  the	   course	   of	   many	   publications.	   How	   might	   his	   humanistic	   philosophy	   be	  characterized?	   This	   section	   will	   explore	   Fromm’s	   theory	   in	   three	   parts.	   Firstly,	   I	  discuss	  Fromm’s	  humanistic	  framework	  of	  psychoanalysis	  as	  it	  contains	  the	  basis	  of	  his	   understanding	   of	   how	   human	   beings	   are	   connected.	   Secondly,	   I	   examine	  Fromm’s	  philosophy	  of	  radical	  humanism	  as	  presented	  in	  his	  many	  works.	  Finally,	  I	  review	  his	  theory	  of	  humanism	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  applications	  and	  limitations	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  
Humanistic	  Psychoanalysis	  	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   Fromm’s	   theory	   of	   humanism,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	  explore	   his	   perspective	   on	   what	   unites	   us	   as	   human	   beings.	   This	   is	   found	   in	   his	  humanistic	   psychoanalytical	   framework,	   most	   extensively	   discussed	   in	   The	   Sane	  
Society,	   and	   refined	   in	   Anatomy	   of	   Human	   Destructiveness.	   Fromm’s	   framework	  argues	  that	  human	  nature	  can	  be	  understood	  upon	  inspection	  of	  our	  shared	  human	  existential	  situation.	  This	  existential	  situation	  is	  one	  that	  he	  describes	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  paradox	  between	  being	   a	  part	   of	   nature,	   and	   simultaneously	   transcending	  nature.	  He	   contends	   that	   unlike	   animals	   who	   are	   dominated	   by	   their	   instincts,	   and	   for	  whom	   life	   is	   not	   “a	   problem,”	   human	   beings	   are	   equipped	   with	   a	   largely	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indeterminate	   instinctual	   structure,	   making	   them	   among	   the	   most	   helpless	   of	  animals.	  Unique	   to	   the	  human	  species	   is	  not	  only	  our	  weak	   instinctual	  system	  but	  also	  our	  expanded	  intelligence.	  Here	  Fromm	  speaks	  especially	  of	  our	  self-­‐awareness	  or	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  human	  being	  to	  not	  only	  “know	  objects	  but	  [to]	  know	  that	  he	  knows.”60	  Fromm	  presents	  our	  existential	  situation	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  Self-­‐awareness,	   reason	   and	   imagination	   disrupt	   the	   ‘harmony,’	   which	  characterizes	   animal	   existence.	   Their	   emergence	   has	   made	   man	   into	   an	  anomaly,	   into	   the	   freak	  of	   the	  universe.	  He	   is	  part	  of	  nature,	   subject	   to	  her	  physical	   laws	   and	   unable	   to	   change	   them,	   yet	   he	   transcends	   the	   rest	   of	  nature.	  He	  is	  set	  apart	  while	  being	  a	  part;	  he	  is	  homeless,	  yet	  chained	  to	  the	  home	  he	  shares	  with	  all	  creatures.	  Cast	  into	  this	  world	  at	  an	  accidental	  place	  and	  time,	  he	  is	  forced	  out	  of	  it,	  again	  accidentally.	  Being	  aware	  of	  himself,	  he	  realizes	  his	  powerlessness	  and	  the	  limitations	  of	  his	  existence.	  He	  visualizes	  his	  own	  end:	  death.61	  	   Fromm	  uses	   the	   biblical	   imagery	   of	   the	   Creation	   Story	   discussed	   earlier	   to	  depict	   the	  human	  situation.	  When	  Adam	  and	  Eve	  eat	   the	   forbidden	   fruit,	   they	   find	  themselves	  cast	  out	  from	  heaven,	  which,	  for	  Fromm,	  is	  analogous	  to	  being	  cast	  out	  from	  nature.62	  The	   fruit	   has	   awakened	   them	   to	   knowledge,	   to	   self-­‐awareness.	   For	  the	   first	   time,	   they	   realize	   their	   separateness	   as	   this	   self-­‐awareness	   disturbs	   the	  natural	   harmony	   and	   unity	   that	   previously	   marked	   their	   existence	   (and	   which	  characterizes	  animal	  existence).	  Fromm	  sees	  the	  usefulness	  of	  this	  story	  not	  only	  in	  terms	   of	   symbolic	   rendering	   of	   the	   history	   of	   human	   beings	   –	   from	   prehistoric	  oneness	   with	   nature	   to	   the	   modern	   human	   being	   –	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Erich	  Fromm,	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Human	  Destructiveness	  (Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1973),	  225.	  61	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  30.	  	  Also	  see	  The	  Anatomy,	  225.	  62	  This	  could	  be	  likened	  to	  the	  existentialist	  notion	  of	  abandonment	  (see	  Sartre,	  
Existentialism	  is	  a	  Humanism).	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individuation	   process	   of	   each	   individual	   human	   being	   who	   must	   graduate	   from	  motherly	  enmeshment	  to	  individuated	  subjecthood.	  His	  view	  of	  human	  existence	  is	  rooted	  in	  this	  tension	  between	  the	  desire	  to	  fuse	  into	  nature/mother/the	  group,	  and	  the	   desire	   to	   realize	   oneself	   –	   to	   grow,	   individuate,	   and	   grasp	   one’s	   own	  potentiality. 63 	  As	   Fromm	   describes,	   “We	   are	   never	   free	   from	   two	   conflicting	  tendencies:	  one	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  womb,	  from	  the	  animal	  form	  of	  existence	  into	  a	  more	  human	  existence,	   from	  bondage	  to	  freedom;	  another,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  womb,	  to	  nature,	   to	  certainty	  and	  security.”64	  This	   tension,	  coupled	  with	   the	  separateness	  (loneliness)	  of	   one’s	   situation,	   the	   self-­‐awareness	  of	   one’s	  bodily	   fragility,	   and	   the	  inevitability	   of	   one’s	   death	   are	   for	   Fromm,	   universal	   elements	   of	   the	   human	  condition.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  basis	  that	  Fromm	  offers	  a	  list	  of	  shared	  needs	  that	  he	  presents	  as	  solutions	  to	  our	  existential	  predicament.	  He	  proposes	  these	  needs	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  Freud’s	  system,	  which	  argues	  that	  our	  human	  strivings	  are	  rooted	  in	  our	  libidinal	  structure.	  The	  first	  need	  he	  discusses,	  the	  need	  for	  relatedness,	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  essential	   of	   all	   human	   requirements.	   As	   social	   beings,	   our	   connection	   to	   others	   is	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	   overcome	   the	   anxiety	   of	   our	   separation.	   Indeed,	   Fromm	  argues	  that	  relatedness	  to	  others	  is	  required	  for	  sanity	  to	  obtain.	  As	  he	  states,	  “this	  need	  is	  behind	  all	  phenomena	  which	  constitute	  the	  whole	  gamut	  of	  intimate	  human	  relations,	  of	  all	  passions	  which	  are	  called	  love	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  word.”65	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  This	  tension,	  of	  course,	  has	  been	  captured	  by	  a	  number	  of	  thinkers,	  including	  existentialists	  (such	  as	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir	  and	  Sartre),	  psychoanalysts	  (with	  Freud	  being	  the	  most	  obvious),	  as	  well	  as	  sociologists	  (for	  example,	  Emile	  Durkheim	  and	  Georg	  Simmel).	  	  64	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  33.	  	  65	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  36.	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How	  do	  human	  beings	  attempt	  to	  satisfy	  their	  need	  for	  relatedness?	  This	  need,	  like	  all	  needs,	  can	  be	  satisfied	  in	  either	  a	  “productive”	  or	  “unproductive”	  manner.66	  For	  Fromm,	  a	  productive	   solution	   is	   that	  which	   is	   life	   affirming,	   conducive	   to	   joy,	   and	  ensures	  the	  optimal	  functioning	  of	  the	  individual.	  The	  unproductive	  solution,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  wasteful	  of	  human	  energy	  and	  destructive.67	  	  In	   terms	   of	   relatedness,	   Fromm	   contends	   that	   this	   connection	   can	   be	  facilitated	   either	   through	   sado-­‐masochistic	   attachment	   or	   more	   productively,	  through	   love.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	   individual	   seeks	   union	   through	   submitting	  themselves	   to	  another	  person,	  a	  group	  or	  a	  higher	   force,	  and	   thus	  dissolving	   their	  separation	  through	  becoming	  part	  of	  this	  other	  entity	  (masochism).	  Union	  can	  also	  be	  achieved	  by	  making	  the	  other	  a	  part	  of	  oneself	  through	  domination	  (sadism).	  In	  both	   instances,	   Fromm	  warns	   that	   the	   individual	   gains	   relatedness	   at	   the	   cost	   of	  their	   integrity	   and	   freedom,	   preventing	   true	   satisfaction.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   more	  productive	  solution	  to	  our	  need	  for	  relatedness	  is	  love.	  Fromm	  defines	  love	  as	  “union	  with	   somebody,	   or	   something,	   outside	   oneself	  under	   the	  condition	  of	   retaining	   the	  
separateness	   and	   integrity	   of	   one’s	   own	   self.” 68 	  He	   discusses	   four	   different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Fromm’s	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “productive”	  is	  somewhat	  unfortunate	  due	  to	  the	  connotation	  productivity	  has	  with	  economic	  performance	  as	  per	  capitalist	  ideology.	  While	  Fromm	  attempts	  to	  redefine	  the	  word	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  philosophical	  principles,	  the	  connotation	  arguably	  persists.	  For	  Marcuse’s	  critique	  of	  this,	  see	  Eros	  and	  Civilization.	  67	  See	  paper	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man”,	  1977.	  	  This	  value	  judgment	  attached	  to	  how	  one	  fulfills	  these	  shared	  needs	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  Fromm	  labels	  his	  theory	  as	  “normative.”	  Indeed,	  as	  a	  clinical	  psychoanalyst,	  Fromm	  is	  not	  hesitant	  to	  evaluate	  human	  behaviour	  in	  this	  way,	  despite	  the	  dominance	  of	  relativist	  thinking	  in	  social	  theory.	  Aware	  of	  his	  unpopular	  perspective,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  false	  or	  incomplete	  ideas	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  beings	  should	  not	  dissuade	  us	  from	  our	  attempts	  to	  understand	  this	  nature.	  He	  contends	  that	  many	  of	  the	  sciences	  do	  not	  claim	  complete	  knowledge	  but	  are	  still	  willing	  to	  posit	  tentative	  theories.	  	  	  68	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  37,	  italics	  in	  original.	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expressions	   of	   this	   love:	   erotic	   love,	   which	   exists	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   romantic	  relationships;	  motherly	  love,	  which	  pertains	  to	  parental	  relationships;	  brotherly	  love,	  or	  the	  feeling	  of	  human	  solidarity;	  and	  self-­‐love	  which	  he	  contrasts	  with	  narcissism.	  Indeed,	  for	  Fromm,	  narcissism,	  which	  has	  often	  been	  confused	  with	  self-­‐love,	  signals	  the	  failure	  to	  relate	  appropriately	  to	  oneself	  and	  the	  world.	  	  	  	   Fromm	  argues	  that	  productive	  love	  is	  never	  exclusive	  to	  one	  person.	  Rather,	  “If	  I	  can	  say	  ‘I	  love	  you,”	  I	  say,	  ‘I	  love	  in	  you	  all	  of	  humanity,	  all	  that	  is	  alive;	  I	  love	  in	  you	   also	   myself.’” 69 	  Such	   love	   is	   marked	   by	   care,	   responsibility,	   respect	   and	  knowledge.	  Fromm	  describes	  each	  as	  follows:	  If	   I	   love,	   I	   care	   –	   that	   is,	   I	   am	   actively	   concerned	   with	   the	   other	   person’s	  growth	   and	   happiness;	   I	   am	   not	   a	   spectator.	   I	   am	   responsible,	   that	   is,	   I	  respond	  to	  his	  needs,	  to	  those	  he	  can	  express	  and	  more	  so	  to	  those	  he	  cannot	  or	  does	  not	  express.	  I	  respect	  him,	  that	  is…I	  look	  at	  him	  as	  he	  is,	  objectively	  and	   not	   distorted	   by	  my	   wishes	   and	   fears.	   I	   know	   him,	   I	   have	   penetrated	  through	  his	  surface	   to	   the	  core	  of	  his	  being	  and	  related	  myself	   to	  him	  from	  my	  core,	  from	  the	  center,	  as	  against	  the	  periphery,	  of	  my	  being.70	  	   The	  second	  of	  Fromm’s	  needs	  is	  that	  of	  transcendence.	  Our	  need	  to	  transcend	  comes	  from	  our	  urge	  to	  go	  beyond	  our	  situation	  as	  a	  “passive	  creature”	  who	  is	  born	  and	  who	  dies	  without	  consent,	  to	  an	  active	  “creator”	  of	  	  life.	  As	  he	  discusses,	  “in	  the	  act	   of	   creation	   man	   transcends	   himself	   as	   a	   creature,	   raises	   himself	   beyond	   the	  passivity	  and	  accidentalness	  of	  his	  existence	   into	   the	   realm	  of	  purposefulness	  and	  freedom.”71	  Creativity	   implies	   activity,	   as	   well	   as	   love	   and	   care	   for	   the	   object	   of	  creation.	  If	  one	  is	  not	  able	  to	  create	  as	  a	  means	  of	  attaining	  transcendence,	  Fromm	  argues	   that	   they	   may	   resort	   to	   destruction,	   the	   unproductive	   solution	   to	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  37.	  70	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  38.	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problem.	  As	  he	  contends,	  “there	  is	  another	  answer	  to	  this	  need	  for	  transcendence:	  if	  I	  
cannot	   create	   life,	   I	   can	   destroy	   it.	   To	   destroy	   life	   also	   makes	   me	   transcend	   it.”72	  Destroying	   life,	   like	   creating	   life,	   puts	   the	   individual	   above	   life	   in	   their	   ability	   to	  manipulate	   it.	  Fromm	  argues	   that	  understanding	   the	  nature	  of	  human	  beings	   is	   to	  understand	  the	  need	  that	  underlies	  the	  behaviour,	  rather	  than	  to	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   intrinsic	   quality.	  While	   Fromm	   sees	   creativity	   as	   the	   primary	   potentiality,	   he	  claims	   that	   this	   should	   not	   mislead	   us	   to	   the	   naïve	   belief	   in	   human	   “goodness.”	  Rather,	  destructiveness	  can	  take	  on	  the	  same	  power	  in	  a	  human	  being	  if	  creation	  is	  not	  possible.	  As	  Fromm	  emphasizes,	  “…this	  is	  the	  essential	  point	  of	  my	  argument	  –	  [destruction]	   is	  only	   the	  alternative	  to	  creativeness.	  Creation	  and	  destruction,	   love	  and	  hate,	  are	  not	   two	  instincts	   that	  exist	   independently.	  They	  are	  both	  answers	  to	  the	  same	  need	  of	  transcendence,	  and	  the	  will	  to	  destroy	  must	  rise	  when	  the	  will	  to	  create	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.”73	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  while	  creation	  results	  in	  happiness	  for	   the	   individual,	   destruction	   leads	   to	   suffering	   –	   especially	   for	   the	   destroyer	  him/herself.	  	  The	   third	   need	   is	   for	   rootedness.	   Rootedness	   emerges	   as	   a	   need	   as	   our	  severed	  ties	  to	  nature	   leave	  us	  with	  a	  terrifying	  sense	  of	  homelessness.	  As	  Fromm	  describes,	  this	  “severance	  is	  frightening;	  if	  man	  loses	  his	  natural	  roots,	  where	  is	  he	  and	  who	  is	  he?	  He	  would	  stand	  alone,	  without	  a	  home;	  without	  roots;	  he	  could	  not	  bear	  the	  isolation	  and	  helplessness	  of	  this	  position.”74	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  we	  must	  replace	  our	  natural	  roots	  with	  human	  roots	  in	  order	  to	  regain	  a	  sense	  of	  security	  in	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the	  world	  again.	  He	  notes,	  however,	  that	  the	  emergence	  from	  natural	  ties	  is	  difficult	  as	  we	  cling	  to	  that	  which	  is	  familiar	  and	  offers	  security.	  The	  most	  primary	  natural	  tie	  is	   that	   to	   the	  mother.	  While	   the	   adult	   is	   thought	   to	  obtain	   the	   independence	  with	  which	  to	  sever	  this	  tie,	  Fromm	  writes	  that	  the	  desire	  for	  motherly	  protection	  never	  completely	   vanishes:	   “every	   adult	   is	   in	   need	   of	   help,	   of	   warmth,	   of	   protection,	   in	  many	  ways	   differing	   and	   yet	   in	  many	  ways	   similar	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   child.	   Is	   it	  surprising	   to	   find	   in	   the	   average	   adult	   a	   deep	   longing	   for	   the	   security	   and	  rootedness	  which	  the	  relationship	  to	  his	  mother	  once	  gave	  him?”75	  When	  maternal	  fixation	  persists	  in	  the	  individual,	  it	  can	  result	  in	  psychopathology	  depending	  on	  its	  degree	   of	   severity.	   Fromm	   draws	   a	   parallel	   between	   the	   individual	   situation	   and	  that	   of	   human	  development,	   citing	   the	  universal	   incest	   taboo	   as	   that	  which	  keeps	  the	  human	  being	   from	   incestuous	   regression.	  As	  he	  explains,	   “Man,	   in	  order	   to	  be	  born,	  in	  order	  to	  progress,	  has	  to	  sever	  the	  umbilical	  cord;	  he	  has	  to	  overcome	  the	  deep	   craving	   to	   remain	   tied	   to	  mother.	  The	   incestuous	  desire	  has	   its	   strength	  not	  from	  the	  sexual	  attraction	  to	  mother,	  but	  from	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  craving	  to	  remain	  in,	  or	  to	  return	  to	  the	  all-­‐enveloping	  womb...”76	  The	  ties	  to	  mother	  are	  only	  the	  most	  elementary	  of	  incestuous	  fixation.	  The	  individual	   also	   looks	   for	   rootedness	   and	   belonging	   in	   wider	   blood	   ties	   including	  family,	  state,	  nation,	  and	  church.	  Indeed,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  human	  history	  reflects	  different	   stages	   in	   development	   from	   the	   incestuous	   rootedness	   of	   matriarchal	  societies	   that	   centered	   “relatedness	   to	   mother,	   blood,	   and	   soil,”	   to	   our	   current	  patriarchal	  configuration	  that,	  in	  Fromm’s	  view,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  deliver	  a	  more	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liberated	   human	   existence.77	  He	   sees	   this	   potentiality	   as	   reflected	   in	   the	   rise	   of	  patriarchal	   religions	   that	   emphasize	   that	   “man	   is	   created	   in	   the	   likeness	   of	   God;	  hence	  all	  men	  are	  equal	  –	  equal	  in	  their	  common	  spiritual	  qualities,	  in	  their	  common	  reason,	   and	   in	   their	   capacity	   for	   brotherly	   love.”78	  This	   liberating	   potential	   that	  Fromm	   traces	   in	   the	   Judeo-­‐Christian	   tradition	   was	   thwarted	   once	   Christianity	  became	   institutionalized	   by	   the	   Roman	   Empire,	   and	   was	   further	   extinguished	  during	   the	  Middle	  Ages.	  Emergence	   from	   the	  Middle	  Ages	   resulted	  only	   in	   further	  regression	  as	  the	  Western	  world	  has	  chosen	  nationalism	  and	  racism,	  over	  freedom	  and	  humanistic	  solidarity:	  “Man	  –	  freed	  from	  the	  traditional	  bonds	  of	  the	  medieval	  community,	  afraid	  of	  the	  new	  freedom	  that	  transformed	  him	  into	  an	  isolated	  atom	  –	  escaped	  into	  a	  new	  idolatry	  of	  blood	  and	  soil,	  of	  which	  nationalism	  and	  racism	  are	  two	  most	  evident	  expressions.”79	  	  What,	  then,	  is	  the	  productive	  way	  to	  gain	  rootedness	  for	  Fromm?	  He	  answers	  this	   question	   in	   the	   following	   terms:	   “Only	  when	  man	   succeeds	   in	   developing	   his	  reason	   and	   love	   further	   than	  he	   has	   done	   so	   far,	   only	  when	  he	   can	  build	   a	  world	  based	   on	   human	   solidarity	   and	   justice,	   only	   when	   he	   can	   feel	   rooted	   in	   the	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  and	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  that	  Fromm	  speaks	  of	  here	  is	  largely	  in	  reference	  to	  Nazism	  and	  other	  European	  nationalist	  projects	  of	  the	  time.	  	  	  “Blood	  and	  Soil”	  was	  a	  central	  tenant	  of	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  well	  as	  a	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  rallying	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  white	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  (see	  Kellner,	  “Erich	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  the	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  Illuminations:	  The	  Critical	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  Project,	  1991).	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experience	   of	   universal	   brotherliness,	   will	   he	   have	   found	   a	   new,	   human	   form	   of	  rootedness,	  will	  he	  have	  transformed	  his	  world	  into	  a	  truly	  human	  home.”80	  The	   fourth	   need	   is	   for	   identity.	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   our	   severed	   ties	   from	  nature	  and	  our	  self-­‐awareness	  necessitate	  that	  we	  form	  a	  concept	  of	  ourselves	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  and	  feel	  “I	  am	  I.”	  As	  Fromm	  explicates,	  “Because	  he	  is	  not	  lived	  but	  
lives,	   because	  he	   has	   lost	   the	   original	   unity	  with	  nature,	   has	   to	  make	  decisions,	   is	  aware	  of	  himself	  and	  of	  his	  neighbor	  as	  different	  persons,	  he	  must	  be	  able	  to	  sense	  himself	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  his	  actions.”81	  Fromm	  posits	  that	  the	  question	  of	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  became	  especially	  salient	  after	  the	  breakdown	  of	  feudalism,	  when	  the	  individual	  was	  no	  longer	  tied	  to	  “his	  inalterable	  station.”	  Although,	  from	  Fromm’s	  perspective,	  Western	   culture	   has	   provided	   the	   individual	   with	   the	   philosophical	   and	   political	  means	   with	   which	   to	   realize	   this	   true	   sense	   of	   individuality	   (the	   productive	  response	   to	   the	   need	   for	   identity),	   only	   a	   minority	   have	   been	   able	   to	   achieve	   it.	  Rather,	  the	  masses	  are	  attracted	  to	  the	  unproductive	  substitutes	  for	  identity	  found	  in	  “nation,	  religion,	  class,	  and	  occupation.”	  Fromm	  sees	  these	  alternative	  choices	  as	  unproductive	   because	   they	   are	   based	   in	   conformity	   rather	   than	   true	   individual	  expression:	   “instead	   of	   the	   pre-­‐individualistic	   clan	   identity,	   a	   new	   herd	   identity	  develops,	   in	   which	   the	   sense	   of	   identity	   rests	   on	   the	   sense	   of	   an	   unquestionable	  belonging	  to	  the	  crowd.”82	  This	  conformity	  obtains	  largely	  below	  the	  consciousness	  of	   most	   people	   who	   harbour	   the	   illusion	   that	   they	   are	   truly	   individuals.	   Fromm	  states	  that	  the	  need	  for	  identity	  is	  so	  imperative	  that	  “people	  are	  willing	  to	  risk	  their	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  61.	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lives,	   to	   give	   up	   their	   love,	   to	   surrender	   their	   freedom,	   to	   sacrifice	   their	   own	  thoughts,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  being	  one	  of	  the	  herd,	  of	  conforming,	  and	  thus	  of	  acquiring	  a	  sense	  of	  identity,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  an	  illusory	  one.”83	  The	  fifth	  of	  Fromm’s	  needs	  is	  our	  need	  for	  a	  frame	  of	  orientation,	  or	  a	  means	  of	   intellectually	   orienting	   ourselves	   in	   the	   world.	   Just	   as	   the	   child	   learns	   to	  physically	  orient	  him/herself	  in	  a	  strange	  world,	  “man	  finds	  himself	  surrounded	  by	  many	  puzzling	  phenomena	  and,	  having	  reason,	  he	  has	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  them,	  has	  to	  put	  them	  in	  some	  context	  which	  he	  can	  understand	  and	  which	  permits	  him	  to	  deal	  with	   them	   in	   his	   thoughts.”84	  The	   productive	   response	   to	   the	   need	   for	   a	   frame	   of	  orientation,	   for	   Fromm,	   is	   grasping	   the	   world	   in	   accordance	   with	   one’s	   reason.	  Reason,	  here,	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  arrive	  at	  objectivity,	  or	  the	  truth	  unhindered	  by	  one’s	   desires	   or	   fears.	   He	   sees	   reason	   as	   a	   uniquely	   human	   capacity	   to	   be	  distinguished	   from	   intelligence	   which	   he	   defines	   as	   the	   ability	   to	   successfully	  manipulate	   the	   physical	   world	   –	   a	   capacity	   that	  we	   share	  with	   other	   animals.	   As	  Fromm	  argues,	  however,	  one’s	  frame	  of	  orientation	  can	  be	  satisfied	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  based	  in	  reality:	  “…even	  if	  man’s	  frame	  of	  orientation	  is	  utterly	  illusory,	   it	  satisfies	  his	  need	   for	   some	  picture	  which	   is	  meaningful	   to	  him.	  Whether	  he	  believes	   in	   the	  power	  of	  a	  totem	  animal,	  in	  a	  rain	  god,	  or	  in	  the	  superiority	  and	  destiny	  of	  his	  race,	  his	  need	  for	  some	  frame	  of	  orientation	  is	  satisfied.”85	  This	  need	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  akin	   to	   the	   human	   need	   for	  meaning.	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   this	   need	   exists	   on	   two	  levels:	   firstly,	   and	   most	   importantly,	   there	   must	   be	   some	   frame	   of	   orientation	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whether	  it	  is	  based	  in	  truth	  or	  falsity.	  Without	  such,	  insanity	  would	  result.	  Secondly,	  and	   less	   immediately,	   this	   frame	   must	   “be	   in	   touch	   with	   reality	   by	   reason	   [and]	  grasp	  the	  world	  objectively.”86	  Fromm	  contends,	  however,	  that	  individuals	  employ	  a	  number	   of	   rationalizations	   to	   justify	   and	   support	   their	   irrational	   beliefs	   and	  behaviours,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  can	  convince	  others	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  motivated	  by	  some	   semblance	   of	   reason,	   or	   as	   far	   as	   they	   can	   appeal	   to	   social	   convention	   or	  popular	  morality.	  Reason,	   thus,	   leads	   the	  way	   to	   the	  productive	   response	   to	  one’s	  frame	  of	  orientation	  while	  irrationality	  paves	  the	  unproductive	  course.	  	  The	   above	   five	   needs	  were	   outlined	  by	   Fromm	   in	   his	   1955	  book,	  The	  Sane	  
Society.	  Almost	  twenty	  years	  later,	  in	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Human	  Destructiveness,	  Fromm	  added	   three	   additional	   needs	   to	   his	   list:	   the	   need	   for	   unity,	   effectiveness,	   and	  
excitation	   and	   stimulation.	   The	   need	   for	   unity,	   Fromm	   discusses,	   arises	   with	   the	  existential	  split	  occasioned	  by	  our	  self-­‐awareness.	  As	  he	  writes,	  this	  split	  would	  be	  intolerable	  if	  the	  individual	  was	  not	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  sense	  of	  unity	  within	  oneself,	  as	   well	   as	   between	   self	   and	   nature.	   This	   longing	   for	   oneness	   can	   be	   achieved	  unproductively	   through	   the	   “anesthetisation”	   of	   oneself:	   through	   inducing	   trance-­‐like	  states	  from	  use	  of	  drugs,	  sexual	  experiences,	  fasting,	  dancing,	  and	  cult	  rituals;	  or	  through	   identification	   with	   an	   animal	   totem	   as	   was	   practiced	   by	   “primitive	  religions”;	   or	   by	   submitting	   oneself	   to	   a	   strong	   passion	   such	   as	   power,	   fame	   or	  destruction.	  In	  today’s	  “cybernetic”	  society,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  common	  “to	  be	  identified	  with	  one’s	  social	  role;	  to	  feel	  little,	  to	  lose	  oneself	  by	  reducing	  oneself	  to	  a	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thing.”87	  In	   contrast	   to	   these	   regressive	   solutions,	   Fromm	   believes	   the	   only	   true	  answer	   to	   the	  human	  need	   for	  unity	   is	  by	  developing	  one’s	  powers	  of	   reason	  and	  love.	  He	  sees	  this	  as	  the	  common	  message	  throughout	  the	  world’s	  great	  cultures	  and	  religions:	   “Great	   as	   are	   the	   differences	   between	   Taoism,	   Buddhism,	   prophetic	  Judaism,	  and	  the	  Christianity	  of	  the	  Gospels,	  these	  religions	  had	  one	  common	  goal:	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  experience	  of	  oneness,	  not	  by	  regressing	  to	  animal	  existence	  but	  by	  becoming	  fully	  human-­‐oneness	  within	  man,	  oneness	  between	  man	  and	  nature,	  and	  oneness	  between	  man	  and	  other	  men.”88	  	  
Effectiveness,	  as	  a	  need,	  refers	  to	  the	  individual’s	  existential	  need	  to	  have	  an	  
effect	  on	  the	  world	  in	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  overwhelming	  helplessness	  of	  the	  human	  experience.	  As	  Fromm	  explains,	  “to	  be	  able	  to	  effect	  something	  is	  the	  assertion	  that	  one	   is	   not	   impotent,	   but	   that	   one	   is	   an	   alive,	   functioning	   human	   being.”89	  The	  effective	   person	   is	   the	   person	   who	   acts,	   accomplishes,	   realizes	   and	   fulfills	  something.	   This	   need	   begins	   in	   childhood,	   where	   the	   child’s	   play	   can	   often	   be	  observed	   as	   revolving	   around	   the	   joy	   of	   having	   an	   effect	   on	   objects.	   The	   child’s	  helplessness,	  however,	  means	  their	  will	  can	  easily	  be	  defeated	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  an	  adult.	  As	  Fromm	  notes,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  without	  consequences:	  “it	  would	  seem	  to	  activate	  a	  tendency	  to	  overcome	  the	  defeat	  by	  doing	  actively	  what	  one	  was	  forced	  to	  endure	  passively:	  to	  rule	  when	  one	  had	  to	  obey;	  to	  beat	  when	  one	  was	  beaten	  in	  short,	  to	  do	  what	  one	  was	  forced	  to	  suffer,	  or	  to	  do	  that	  what	  one	  was	  forbidden	  to	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do.”90	  Fromm	  reasons	   that	   this	   compulsive	  urge	   to	  actively	  do	  what	  was	  passively	  done	  to	  one	  attempts,	  although	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  “heal	  still	  open	  wounds.”91	  In	  such	  ways,	   the	   adult	   can	   achieve	   this	   sense	   of	   effectiveness	   through	   exercising	   power	  over	   others,	   and	   inspiring	   fear	   and	   suffering.	   The	   productive	   solution,	   however,	  rests	  in	  seeking	  to	  effect	  through	  one’s	  work	  –	  material,	  intellectual	  and	  artistic	  –	  as	  well	   as	   through	   receipt	   of	   another’s	   recognition	   that	   may	   come	   from	   “eliciting	   a	  smile	  of	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  baby	  being	  nursed,	  a	  smile	  from	  the	  loved	  person,	  sexual	  response	  from	  the	  lover,	  interest	  from	  the	  partner	  in	  conversation.”92	  	  Finally,	   we	   have	   the	   need	   for	   excitation	   and	   stimulation.	   Fromm	   uses	  neurophysiological	   research	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   nervous	   system	   requires	   excitation	  and	  stimulation	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  studies	  on	  brain	  activity,	  dreaming,	  and	  infant	  development.	   He	   posits	   that	   “observations	   of	   daily	   life	   indicate	   that	   the	   human	  organism	   as	   well	   as	   the	   animal	   organism	   are	   in	   need	   of	   a	   certain	   minimum	   of	  excitation	   and	   stimulation,	   as	   they	   are	   of	   a	   certain	   minimum	   of	   rest…[t]he	  differences	  between	  people	  –	  and	  cultures	  –	  lies	  only	  in	  the	  form	  taken	  by	  the	  main	  stimuli	  for	  excitation.”93	  Fromm	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  “simple	  stimulus”	  and	  “activating	   stimulus.”	   In	   the	   first	   instance,	   the	   person	   passively	   reacts	   to	   the	  situation	  at	  hand	  such	  as	  when	  threatened,	  or	   in	  satisfying	  physiological	  needs.	  As	  Fromm	   disparages,	   “contemporary	   life	   in	   industrial	   societies	   operates	   almost	  entirely	   with	   such	   simple	   stimuli.	   What	   is	   stimulated	   are	   such	   drives	   as	   sexual	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desire,	   greed,	   sadism,	   destructiveness,	   narcissism;	   these	   stimuli	   are	   mediated	  through	   movies,	   television,	   radio,	   newspapers,	   magazines,	   and	   the	   commodity	  market.” 94 	  Activating	   stimuli,	   in	   contrast,	   induce	   activity	   in	   the	   individual,	  generating	  a	  dynamic	  response:	  “you	  do	  not	  remain	  the	  passive	  object	  upon	  which	  the	  stimulus	  acts,	  to	  whose	  melody	  your	  body	  has	  to	  dance,	  as	  it	  were;	  instead	  you	  express	   your	   own	   faculties	   by	   being	   related	   to	   the	  world,	   you	   become	   active	   and	  productive.”95	  Together	   these	   eight	   needs	   are	   explained	   by	   Fromm	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	  human	  situation,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  it.96	  Fromm	  presents	  these	  needs	  somewhat	  unequally,	  dedicating	  detailed	  explanations	  to	  some	  while	  giving	  nominal	  attention	  to	  others.	  He	  also	  fails	  to	  discuss	  exactly	  how	  he	  has	  arrived	  at	  these	  needs	  although	  it	   can	   be	   surmised	   that	   his	   clinical	   work	   had	   at	   least	   some	   part	   in	   informing	   his	  theory.	   As	  Durkin	   argues,	   however,	   these	  weaknesses	   are	   “not	   a	   fatal	   blow	   to	   his	  wider	   radical	   humanism,”	   especially	   given	   that	   “Fromm	   did	   not	   claim	   to	   be	  conclusive	   in	   this	   regard.”	   I	   agree	   with	   Durkin	   that	   what	   is	   essential,	   rather,	   is	  Fromm’s	  “willingness	  to	  attempt	   to	  map	  out	  some	  fundamental	  human	  motivations	  in	  explicit	  terms.”97	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For	  Fromm,	  it	  is	  through	  understanding	  our	  existential	  human	  situation	  and	  the	  resultant	  needs	  that	  we	  can	  comprehend	  human	  nature.	  Fromm	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  one	  that	  is	  fraught	  with	  controversy.	  He	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  human	  “essence”	  was	  evident	  to	  the	  Greek	  philosophers,	  this	  view	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  our	  time	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  challenges	   comes	   in	   response	   to	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   this	   term	   has	   been	   exploited	  throughout	  history.	  As	  Fromm	  discusses,	  “the	  concept	  has	  so	  often	  been	  abused	  as	  a	  shield	  behind	  which	  the	  most	   inhuman	  acts	  are	  committed.	   In	   the	  name	  of	  human	  nature,	   for	   example,	   Aristotle	   and	   most	   thinkers	   up	   to	   the	   eighteenth	   century	  defended	  slavery.”98	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  justification	  for	  slavery,	  Fromm	  notes	  that	   human	   nature	   has	   also	   been	   used	   to	   make	   a	   case	   for	   the	   inevitability	   of	  capitalism,	   given	   the	   supposed	   universality	   of	   competitiveness	   and	   selfishness	   as	  human	  traits.	  As	  Fromm	  argues,	  this	  has	  led	  to	  the	  following	  development:	  Against	   such	   reactionary	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   human	  nature,	   the	   Liberals,	  since	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  have	  stressed	  the	  malleability	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  decisive	  influences	  of	  environmental	  factors.	  True	  and	  important	  as	  such	   emphasis	   is,	   it	   has	   led	   many	   social	   scientists	   to	   an	   assumption	   that	  man’s	  mental	   constitution	   is	   a	   blank	   piece	   of	   paper,	   on	  which	   society	   and	  culture	  write	   their	   text,	   and	  which	  has	   no	   intrinsic	   quality	   of	   its	   own.	   This	  assumption	  is	  just	  as	  untenable	  and	  just	  as	  destructive	  of	  social	  progress	  as	  the	  opposite	  view.	  	  If	  Fromm’s	  defense	  of	  human	  nature	  was	  unfashionable	  at	  his	  time	  of	  writing,	  his	   ideas	  would	   be	   treated	  with	   even	   greater	   suspicion	   today	   as	   such	   arguments	  have	   further	   declined	   in	   popularity.	   Fromm	   defends	   his	   claim,	   however,	   by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  “real	  problem	  is	  to	  infer	  the	  core	  common	  to	  the	  whole	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Fromm,	  The	  Anatomy,	  219.	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race	   from	   the	   innumerable	  manifestations	   of	  human	  nature,	   the	  normal	  as	  well	   as	  the	   pathological	   ones,	   as	   we	   can	   observe	   them	   in	   different	   individuals	   and	  cultures.”99	  What	   Fromm	   is	   advancing	   is	   what	   Durkin	   calls	   “a	   qualified	   form	   of	  essentialism	   compatible	   with	   the	   central	   ideas	   of	   constructionist	   thought.”100	  To	  understand	   the	   true	   essence	   of	   the	   human	   being,	   Fromm	   argues,	   we	   must	   look	  beyond	   these	   socially	  mediated	  manifestations	   (some	   conducive	   to	  happiness	   and	  health,	   others	   the	   opposite)	   to	   see	   our	   common	   existential	   situation	   and	   the	  contradiction	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   it.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   Fromm	   describes	   this	  contradiction	   as	   one	   that	   results	   from	   our	   liminal	   existence	   between	   the	   animal	  world	  and	  the	  human	  one;	  of	  at	  once	  being	  tethered	  to	  nature	  and	  cast	  out	  of	  it,	  and	  the	  questions	   that	   arise	   from	   this	  ontological	   situation.	  As	   such,	   “what	   constitutes	  the	  essence	  is	  the	  question	  and	  the	  need	  for	  an	  answer;	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  human	  existence	   are	   not	   the	   essence,	   but	   they	   are	   the	   answers	   to	   the	   conflict	   which,	   in	  itself,	  is	  the	  essence.”101	  It	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  human	  nature,	  and	  its	  existential	  moorings	  that	  give	  Fromm’s	  work	  a	  unique	  character	  and	  which	  animates	  his	  theory	  of	  radical	  humanism.	  	  
Radical	  Humanism	  	  
	  	   Although	  Fromm	  only	  employs	  the	  term	  “radical	  humanism”	  somewhat	  later	  in	  his	  career,	  Durkin	  argues	  that	  Fromm’s	  entire	  corpus	  is	  “primarily	  an	  expression	  of	   humanism”	   and	   more,	   that	   his	   work	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   “consistently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  22.	  100	  Durkin,	  2.	  	  101	  Fromm,	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  117,	  emphasis	  mine.	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radical[ly]	   humanist.”102	  So	   how	   might	   we	   understand	   Fromm’s	   theory	   of	   radical	  humanism?	  Fromm	  describes	  it	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  By	   radical	   humanism	   I	   refer	   to	   a	   global	   philosophy	  which	   emphasizes	   the	  oneness	  of	  the	  human	  race,	   the	  capacity	  of	  man	  to	  develop	  his	  own	  powers	  and	   arrive	   at	   inner	   harmony	   and	   at	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   peaceful	  world.	  Radical	   humanism	   considers	   the	   goal	   of	   man	   to	   be	   that	   of	   complete	  independence,	  and	  this	  implies	  penetrating	  through	  fictions	  and	  illusions	  to	  a	  full	  awareness	  of	  reality.	  It	  implies,	  furthermore,	  a	  skeptical	  attitude	  toward	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  precisely	  because	  during	  the	  history	  of	  man	  it	  has	  been,	  and	  still	   is,	   force-­‐creating	   fear	   –	  which	   has	  made	  man	   ready	   to	   take	   fiction	   for	  reality,	   illusion	   for	   truth.	   It	   was	   force	   which	   made	   man	   incapable	   of	  independence	  and	  hence	  warped	  his	  reason	  and	  his	  emotions.103	  	  Fromm’s	  humanism	  is	  radical	  in	  that	  he	  is	  concerned	  with	  “returning	  to	  the	  roots.”	  As	  Durkin	  explains:	  As	  a	  radical	  humanism,	  then,	  it	  is	  a	  humanism	  that	  seeks	  for	  consistency	  and	  that	   is	   self-­‐consciously	   grounded	   on	   a	   metaphysical	   realism/essentialism	  that	   recognizes	   the	   existence	  of	   the	  human	  being	  as	   an	  entity	  possessed	  of	  certain	   properties,	   the	   said	   properties	   constituting	   the	   ground	   upon	  which	  value	  for	  human	  beings	  exists	  and	  upon	  which	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  ethics	  makes	  sense.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  a	  humanism	  that	  is	  centrally	  motivated	  by	  a	  commitment	  to	   the	  belief	   in	   the	  dignity	  and	  unity	  of	  humankind	  and	   in	   the	  possibility	  of	  the	   unfolding	   toward	   perfection	   of	   human	   nature.	   Having	   such	   a	  commitment,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  humanism	  that	  is	  centrally	  focused	  on	  the	  individual	  and	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	   characteristically	   human	   powers	   of	   the	  individual	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  flourishing	  and	  well-­‐being.	  In	  particular,	  it	   is	   a	   humanism	   that	   places	   a	   marked	   stress	   on	   the	   goal	   of	   achieving	  authentic	  selfhood,	  the	  stripping	  away	  of	  illusions,	  achieving	  inner	  and	  outer	  harmony.104	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Durkin,	  3.	  Durkin	  makes	  this	  argument	  against	  claims	  that	  humanism	  arrives	  unexpectantly	  in	  Fromm’s	  work	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  Man	  for	  Himself	  in	  1947.	  	  	  “Radical	  humanism”	  as	  a	  concept	  was	  introduced	  by	  Fromm	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  You	  Shall	  be	  
as	  Gods	  in	  1966.	  Before	  then,	  however,	  as	  Durkin	  notes,	  Fromm	  had	  spoken	  of	  “normative	  humanism,”	  “socialist	  humanism,”	  “Enlightenment	  humanism,”	  “dialectic	  humanism,”	  as	  well	  as	  just	  “humanism.”	  	  103	  Fromm,	  You	  Shall	  be	  as	  Gods,	  15.	  104	  Durkin,	  4.	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Of	  central	  interest	  to	  the	  present	  discussion	  are	  two	  key	  aspects	  of	  Fromm’s	  radical	   humanism	   1)	   the	   oneness	   of	   human	   beings;	   and	   2)	   the	   development	   of	  political	   and	   psychological	   freedom.	   This	   section	   will	   discuss	   these	   two	   tenets	  before	  considering	  how	  they	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  
Human	  Unity	  	  	   Central	   to	  Fromm’s	   theory	  of	   radical	  humanism	   is	  his	  understanding	  of	   the	  oneness	   and	   interrelatedness	   of	   humanity.	   As	   explored	   in	   detail	   in	   the	   previous	  section,	  Fromm	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  our	  shared	  existential	  situation	  and	  the	  needs	  that	  arise	  from	  it	  that	  make	  up	  our	  common	  essence	  or	  nature.	  Despite	  our	  differences,	  we	   all	   are	   born	   into	   this	  world	  with	   an	   essential	   ontological	   insecurity	  which	  we	  must	   resolve.	   Fromm	   discusses	   this	   human	   connection	   in	   his	   explanation	   of	   the	  “common	  humanist	  creed”:	  the	  creed	  is	  that	  each	  individual	  carries	  all	  of	  humanity	  within	  himself,	   that	  the	  ‘human	  condition’	  is	  one	  and	  the	  same	  for	  all	  men,	  in	  spite	  of	  unavoidable	  differences	   in	   intelligence,	   talents,	   height,	   and	   color.	   This	   humanist	  experience	  consists	   in	   feeling	  that	  nothing	  human	  is	  alien	  to	  one,	   that	   ‘I	  am	  you,’	  that	  one	  can	  understand	  another	  human	  being	  because	  both	  share	  the	  elements	  of	  human	  existence.	  105	  	  This	   statement,	   “nothing	   human	   is	   alien	   to	   me,”	   borrowed	   from	   Terence,	   is	  foundational	   to	  what	   Fromm	   characterizes	   as	   the	   humanist	   experience.106	  Fromm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  93.	  106	  The	  oft-­‐quoted	  phrase,	  "Homo	  sum,	  humani	  nihil	  a	  me	  alienum	  puto",	  or	  "I	  am	  human,	  and	  I	  think	  nothing	  of	  which	  is	  human	  is	  alien	  to	  me"	  appeared	  in	  the	  Roman	  poet’s	  play	  
Heauton	  Timorumenos	  written	  between	  185-­‐159	  BC.	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argues	  that	  this	  experience	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  social	  unconscious,	  which	  he	  equates	  with	  humanity	  itself.107	  As	  he	  explains:	  This	  humanist	   experience	   is	   fully	  possible	  only	   if	  we	  enlarge	  our	   sphere	  of	  awareness.	  Our	  awareness	   is	  usually	   confined	   to	  what	   the	   society	  of	  which	  we	  are	  members	  permits	  us	  to	  be	  aware.	  Those	  human	  experiences	  which	  do	  not	   fit	   into	   this	   picture	   are	   repressed.	  Hence	   our	   consciousness	   represents	  mainly	   our	   own	   society	   and	   culture,	  while	   our	   unconscious	   represents	   the	  universal	  man	  in	  each	  of	  us.	  This	  broadening	  of	  self-­‐awareness,	  transcending	  consciousness	   and	   illuminating	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	   social	   unconscious,	   will	  enable	  man	  to	  experience	   in	  himself	  all	  of	  humanity;	  he	  will	  experience	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  a	  sinner	  and	  a	  saint,	  a	  child	  and	  an	  adult,	  a	  sane	  and	  an	  insane	  person,	   a	   man	   of	   the	   past	   and	   one	   of	   the	   future	   –	   that	   he	   carries	   within	  himself	  that	  which	  mankind	  has	  been	  and	  that	  which	  it	  will	  be.108	  	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   through	   expanding	   our	   individual	   and	   social	  unconsciousness	   that	   we	   can	   access	   this	   universal	   unconscious,	   and	   in	   so	   doing,	  cease	  judging	  others	  and	  imagining	  ourselves	  as	  superior	  to	  them.109	  We	  transcend	  the	   separation	   between	   us	   and	   them,	   allowing	   us	   to	   connect	   with	   our	   common	  humanity.	  Fromm	  contrasts	  this	  type	  of	  relatedness	  with	  nationalism	  and	  tribalism	  where	   “we	   are	  only	   in	   touch	  with	  one	   sector	   of	   humanity	   and	  we	  perform	  a	   very	  simple	  operation:	  we	  project	  all	  the	  evil	  in	  us	  on	  the	  stranger,	  and	  hence	  the	  result	  is	  that	  he	  is	  the	  devil	  and	  we	  are	  the	  angels.”110	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  type	  of	  oppositional	  thinking	   undergirds	   not	   only	   conflicts	   between	   groups	   of	   people,	   but	   also	  individuals	  in	  their	  personal	  disagreements	  –	  a	  relevant	  point	  for	  our	  discussion	  on	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  107	  See	  On	  Being	  Human	  (first	  published	  in	  1991)	  for	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  exploration	  of	  Fromm’s	  connection	  between	  the	  unconscious	  and	  the	  “total	  man.”	  108	  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  93.	  109	  While	  this	  belief	  bears	  considerable	  resemblance	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  universal	  unconscious	  in	  Jung’s	  work,	  Fromm’s	  theory	  does	  not	  exhibit	  the	  same	  occult/mystical	  elements	  of	  Jung’s.	  See	  Durkin	  (2014)	  for	  more	  on	  this.	  	  110	  Fromm,	  On	  Being	  Human,	  78.	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Freedom	  	   A	  central	  component	  of	  Fromm’s	  philosophy	  of	  radical	  humanism	  is	  human	  
freedom.	   As	   an	   existentially	   oriented	   thinker,	   freedom	   is	   a	   primary	   theme	   in	  Fromm’s	  work.	  We	  see,	  for	  example,	  his	  analysis	  on	  the	  fear	  of	  freedom,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Escape	  from	  Freedom,	  as	  resonant	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  existential	  thinkers	  like	  Sartre	  and	  de	  Beauvoir	  who	  were	  similarly	  sensitive	   to	   the	  burden	  posed	  by	   freedom	  on	  the	   modern	   individual.	   Despite	   this	   shared	   concern,	   Fromm	   is	   sharply	   critical	   of	  Sartre’s	   philosophy	   on	   freedom,	   especially	   its	   expectation	   that	   all	   individuals,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  social	  context,	  are	  equally	  free	  to	  make	  decisions.	  Fromm	  sees	  this	  perspective	  as	  “deeply	  unfair	  to	  the	  individual”.111	  As	  he	  argues,	  “Can	  one	  really	  claim	  that	  a	  man	  who	  has	  grown	  up	  in	  material	  and	  spiritual	  poverty,	  who	  has	  never	  experienced	   love	   or	   concern	   for	   anybody,	   whose	   body	   has	   been	   conditioned	   to	  drinking	   by	   years	   of	   alcoholic	   abuse,	   who	   has	   had	   no	   possibility	   of	   changing	   his	  circumstances	   –	   can	   one	   claim	   that	   he	   is	   ‘free’	   to	   make	   his	   choice?	   Is	   not	   this	  position	   contrary	   to	   the	   facts	   and	   is	   it	   not	   without	   compassion	   and,	   in	   the	   last	  analysis,	   a	   position	   which	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   reflects,	   like	  much	   of	   Sartre’s	   philosophy,	   the	   spirit	   of	   a	   bourgeois	   individualism	   and	  egocentricity…?”112	  Fromm	   thus	   tempers	   his	   own	   existential	   spirit	   of	   individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  125.	  	  	  112	  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  125.	  	  	  Fromm	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  bourgeois	  biases	  in	  social	  theory	  and	  philosophy.	  In	  addition	  to	  Sartre’s	  bourgeois	  individualism,	  Fromm	  was	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  patriarchy	  of	  Freud’s	  thought	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  Interestingly,	  Fromm	  found	  this	  fault	  in	  Marx’s	  work	  too,	  arguing	  that	  “as	  a	  child	  of	  his	  time	  Marx	  could	  not	  help	  adopting	  attitudes	  and	  concepts	  current	  in	  bourgeois	  thought	  and	  practice.	  Thus,	  for	  instance,	  certain	  authoritarian	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freedom	   with	   a	   compassionate	   regard	   for	   how	   the	   social	   situatedness	   of	   the	  individual	   might	   jeopardize	   their	   ability	   to	   seize	   the	   freedom	   that	   Sartre	   saw	   as	  invariably	  at	  one’s	  disposal.113	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	  Fromm	  held	   the	  deterministic	   view	   that	  one’s	   social	  situation	  or	  background	   inevitably	  determined	  their	   life’s	  course.	  His	  view,	  rather,	  was	   one	   that	   blended	   determinism	   with	   a	   belief	   in	   human	   agency	   –	   a	   complex	  perspective	   that	   is	   not	   without	   contradiction	   at	   times	   in	   his	   writing.	   As	   Fromm	  describes	   it,	   his	   theory	   of	   the	   human	   being	   is	   deterministic	   in	   that	   it	   is	   premised	  upon	   an	   existential	   backdrop,	   which	   fixes	   the	   individual	   to	   a	   number	   of	  correspondent	   needs.	   For	   sanity	   to	   obtain,	   every	   human	   being	  must	   satisfy	   these	  needs,	   whether	   productively	   or	   unproductively.	   There	   is	   also	   determinism	   in	  Fromm’s	  theory	  in	  terms	  of	  character.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  Fromm’s	  notion	  of	  social	  character	  refers	  to	  the	  somewhat	  permanent	  system	  of	  characteristics	  shared	  by	  a	  social	  group	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  social	  context.	  The	  relationships	  between	  social	  character	   and	   our	   universal	   needs	   is	   such	   that	   social	   character,	   and	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   system	   that	   it	   arises	   in	   relation	   to,	   both	   attempt	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  existential	  needs	  of	   the	   individual.	  The	  authoritarian	   social	  character,	   for	  example,	  employs	   sado-­‐masochism	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   the	   need	   for	   relatedness,	   while	   the	  
marketing	   orientation	   responds	   to	   the	   need	   for	   identity	   through	   the	   herd	  conformism	  that	  is	  rampant	  in	  commercial	  societies.	  From	  this	  description,	  Fromm’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  inclinations	  in	  his	  personality	  as	  well	  as	  in	  his	  writings	  are	  molded	  by	  the	  patriarchal	  bourgeois	  spirit	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  spirit	  of	  socialism”	  (To	  Have	  or	  To	  Be,	  159.)	  	  113	  It	  could	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  Sartre’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  Jew	  in	  Anti-­‐Semite	  and	  Jew	  is	  not	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  specific	  social	  structure	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism	  that	  underlies	  the	  Jewish	  condition.	  With	  this	  being	  said,	  the	  Jew	  is	  still	  given	  the	  choice	  of	  “authentic”	  being	  which,	  for	  Sartre,	  allows	  for	  a	  type	  of	  freedom.	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system	   appears	   overly	   functionalist	   and	   closed.	   He	   disturbs	   his	   determinism	   by	  proposing	  a	  way	  out:	  awareness.	  Fromm	  positions	  his	  view	  alongside	  that	  of	  Marx,	  and	   Freud.	   He	   argues	   that	   while	   both	   of	   them	   argued	   that	   human	   action	   is	  determined	  by	  previous	   forces,	   they	  were	  not	  strictly	  determinists	  given	  that	   they	  believed	   in,	   and	   indeed	   worked	   toward	   countering	   these	   forces.	   As	   Fromm	  discusses:	  They	  both	  believed	   in	   the	  possibility	   that	   a	   course	   already	   initiated	   can	  be	  altered.	  They	  both	  saw	  the	  possibility	  of	  change	  rooted	  in	  man’s	  capacity	  for	  
becoming	  aware	  of	  the	  forces	  which	  move	  him	  behind	  his	  back,	  so	  to	  speak	  –	  and	   thus	   enabling	   him	   to	   regain	   his	   freedom.	  Both	  were	   –	   like	   Spinoza,	   by	  whom	  Marx	  was	  influenced	  considerably	  –	  determinists	  and	   indeterminists,	  or	   neither	   determinists	   nor	   indeterminists.	   Both	   proposed	   that	   man	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  cause	  and	  effect,	  but	  that	  by	  awareness	  and	  right	  action	  he	  can	  create	  and	  enlarge	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom.	  It	  is	  up	  to	  him	  to	  gain	  the	  optimum	  of	  freedom	  and	  to	  extricate	  himself	  from	  the	  chains	  of	  necessity.	  For	   Freud	   the	   awareness	   of	   the	   unconscious,	   for	   Marx	   the	   awareness	   of	  socio-­‐economic	  forces	  and	  class	  interests,	  were	  the	  conditions	  for	  liberation;	  for	  both,	  in	  addition	  to	  awareness,	  an	  active	  will	  and	  struggle	  were	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  liberation.114	  	  	   Similarly,	   Fromm	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   both	   a	   determinist	   and	   an	  indeterminist	   (or	   neither)	   in	   that	   while	   being	   acutely	   aware	   of	   the	   play	   of	   social	  forces	  upon	  an	   individual,	   he	   also	  believed	   that	   these	   could	  be	  overcome	   through	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  active	  effort.	  Fromm	  builds	  on	  Marx	  and	  Freud	  in	  discussing	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  freedom	  that	  are	  available	  to	  the	  individual,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  various	  types	  of	  awareness	  that	  must	  precede	  them.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   this	   latter	   point,	   Fromm	   identifies	   six	   forms	   of	   awareness.	   The	  first	   relates	   to	   one’s	   ability	   to	   decipher	   good	   from	   evil,	   with	   these	   terms	   being	  defined	  as	  follows:	  “good	  is	  all	  that	  serves	  life;	  evil	   is	  all	  that	  serves	  death.	  Good	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Fromm,	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  127,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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reverence	  for	  life,	  all	  that	  enhances	  life,	  growth,	  unfolding.	  Evil	  is	  all	  that	  stifles	  life,	  narrows	   it	   down,	   cuts	   it	   into	   pieces.”115	  	   For	   freedom	   of	   choice	   to	   obtain,	   Fromm	  argues	  that	  one	  must	  have	  a	  true	  awareness	  of	  what	  will	  enhance	  one’s	  life	  and	  what	  will	   diminish	   it.	   This	   awareness	   must	   be	   developed	   through	   experience,	  experimentation,	  and	  observation	  rather	  than	  merely	  theoretical	  knowledge	  of	  what	  constitutes	  good	  and	  evil.	  Secondly,	  there	  must	  be	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  actions.	  One	  must	  be	  able	  to	  clearly	  grasp	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  actions,	  and	   to	   evaluate	  whether	   they	  will	   lead	   to	   their	  desired	  aim.	  This	  means	   that	   they	  must	   be	   aware	   of	   their	   unconscious	   motivations	   and	   desires	   –	   the	   third	   type	   of	  awareness	  that	  must	  be	  cultivated	  according	  to	  Fromm.	  This	  requires	  being	  able	  to	  understand	   the	   hidden	   forces	   that	   drive	   one’s	   actions	   as	   well	   as	   penetrate	   the	  rationalizations	  that	  hide	  these	  forces	  from	  one’s	  consciousness.	  The	  fourth	  kind	  of	  awareness	   that	   Fromm	   discusses	   relates	   to	   knowing	  when	   a	   true	   choice	   is	   being	  
made	   and	  what	   possibilities	   exist.	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   people	   often	   mistake	   their	  moment	  of	   true	  choice	  as	  occurring	  at	  a	  moment	  when	   in	  actuality,	   their	  decision	  has	   already	  been	  determined	   for	   them	  by	  virtue	  of	   their	  preceding	   choices.	  As	  he	  states,	  “one	  might	  generalize	  by	  saying	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  most	  people	  fail	  in	  their	  lives	  is	  precisely	  because	  they	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  point	  when	  they	  are	  still	  free	  to	  act	  according	  to	  reason,	  and	  because	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  choice	  only	  at	  the	  point	  when	  it	  is	  too	  late	  for	  them	  to	  make	  a	  decision.”116	  The	  fifth	  kind	  of	  awareness	  necessary	  for	  one	  to	  make	  a	  free	  choice	  is	  dependent	  on	  one’s	  ability	  to	  accurately	  
comprehend	  the	  real	  possibilities	  that	  that	  are	  open	  to	  them.	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  47.	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the	  determinist	  view	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  choice,	  and	  the	  indeterminist	  view	  that	  the	   individual	   is	   faced	   with	   innumerable	   choices,	   are	   incorrect.	   Rather,	   he	   posits	  that	   one’s	   choices	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   person’s	   environment	   (class,	   culture,	  family),	  as	  well	  as	  by	  hereditary	  and	  constitutional	  conditions,	  so	  that	  someone	  who	  is	  already	  predisposed	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  will	  have	  a	  choice	  of	  alternatives	  that	  are	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   this	   predisposition.	   Finally,	   Fromm	   emphasizes	   that	  awareness	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  will	  to	  act,	  and	  “by	  the	  readiness	  to	  suffer	  the	  pain	   of	   frustration	   that	   necessarily	   results	   from	   an	   action	   contrary	   to	   one’s	  passions.”117	  Freedom,	  for	  Fromm,	  requires	  struggle,	  effort,	  and	  action.	  	  Awareness,	   thus,	   in	   all	   of	   its	   different	   forms,	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   Fromm’s	  theory	  of	  freedom.	  Without	  awareness	  of	  how	  best	  to	  act,	  the	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  actions,	   the	   unconscious	   desires	   that	  motivate	   one’s	   choices,	   the	  moment	  when	   a	  true	  choice	   is	  being	  made,	   the	  real	  possibilities	   that	  one	  can	  choose	   from,	  and	   the	  will	   to	   act,	   freedom,	   in	   Fromm’s	   view,	   cannot	   be	   realized.	   As	   for	   the	   concept	   of	  freedom	   itself,	   Fromm	  makes	  a	   few	  distinctions.	  Thus	   far	   I	   have	  been	   speaking	  of	  freedom	  in	  terms	  of	  freedom	  of	  choice.118	  Fromm	  defines	  freedom	  in	  general	  terms	  as	  the	  “capacity	  to	  follow	  the	  voice	  of	  reason,	  of	  health,	  of	  well-­‐being,	  of	  conscience,	  against	  the	  voices	  of	  irrational	  passions.”119	  Freedom,	  as	  such,	  can	  be	  characterized	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  Fromm,	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  133.	  118	  Freedom	  of	  choice,	  however,	  is	  also	  a	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  character	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  that,	  “some	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  to	  act	  in	  accordance	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  good.”	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  “some	  people	  have	  lost	  the	  capacity	  of	  choosing	  evil,	  precisely	  because	  their	  character	  structure	  has	  lost	  the	  capacity	  for	  evil”	  (The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  132.)	  In	  both	  these	  cases,	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  has	  been	  extinguished	  due	  to	  the	  deterministic	  influence	  of	  character.	  In	  most	  cases,	  however,	  the	  opposing	  inclinations	  are	  “balanced”	  in	  the	  individual,	  so	  that	  there	  is	  room	  for	  choice.	  119	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further	  for	  Fromm,	  in	  terms	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  freedom,	  as	  well	  as	  inner	  and	  outer	  freedom.	  	  	  With	   respect	   to	   negative	   and	   positive	   freedom,	   Fromm	   understands	   the	  former	  as	   liberation	   from	  “the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  spiritual	  shackles	   that	  have	  bound	   men”	   throughout	   history.120	  Speaking	   in	   reference	   to	   Europe	   and	   North	  America,	   he	   sees	   our	  modern	   age	   as	   one	   in	  which	   considerable	   strides	  have	  been	  made	   toward	   achieving	   such	   freedom:	   “man	   had	   overthrown	   the	   domination	   of	  nature	   and	   made	   himself	   her	   master;	   he	   had	   overthrown	   the	   domination	   of	   the	  Church	  and	   the	  domination	  of	   the	  absolutist	   state.”121	  Although	   important,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  negative	  freedom	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  total	  liberation	  to	  obtain.	  Looking	  at	  the	  collapse	  of	  medieval	  society,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  masses	  were	  able	  to	  gain	  freedom	  from	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  bondage,	  they	  became	  subject	  to	  an	  acute	  anxiety	   triggered	  by	   the	  sudden	   loss	  of	   traditional	   ties	   that	  had	  provided	  the	   individual	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   security	   and	   belonging.	   As	   Fromm	   states,	   “the	  individual	  stands	  alone	  and	  faces	  the	  world	  –a	  stranger	  thrown	  into	  a	  limitless	  and	  threatening	  world.	  The	  new	  freedom	  is	  bound	  to	  create	  a	  deep	  feeling	  of	  insecurity,	  powerlessness,	  doubt,	  aloneness,	  and	  anxiety.”122	  Fromm	  argues	   that	   the	  appeal	  of	  Calvinism	   and	   Lutheranism	   was	   based	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   theologies	   gave	  expression	   to	   both	   the	   newly	   found	   freedom	   of	   the	   individual,	   as	  well	   as	   his/her	  anxiety	  and	  powerlessness.	  Moreover,	   these	  doctrines	  helped	   to	   intensify	   both	   the	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sense	   of	   independence	   and	   self-­‐reliance	   of	   the	   individual,	   as	   well	   as	   his/her	  loneliness	  and	  insecurity.	  They	  also	  served	  to	  psychologically	  prepare	  the	  individual	  for	   the	   demands	   of	   industrial	   capitalist	   society	   through	   their	   emphasis	   on	  productive	  work,	  thrift,	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  asceticism,	  and	  duty.	  Fromm	  argues	  that	   it	   is	  at	   this	   point,	   that	   is,	   upon	   the	   realization	   of	   negative	   freedom,	   that	   society	   has	   a	  choice.	  In	  the	  historical	  case	  of	  Europe,	  the	  masses	  were	  unable	  to	  bear	  the	  “burden	  of	  ‘freedom	  from,’”	  choosing	  to	  escape	  from	  it	  by	  submitting	  to	  fascism.	  	  North	   American	   society	   has	   also	   capitulated	   under	   the	   weight	   of	   modern	  freedom,	   although	   through	   what	   Fromm	   calls	   automaton	   conformity.	   	   Fromm	  explains	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  follows:	  	  to	   put	   it	   briefly,	   the	   individual	   ceases	   to	   be	   himself;	   he	   adopts	   entirely	   the	  kind	   of	   personality	   offered	   to	   him	   by	   cultural	   patterns;	   and	   he	   therefore	  becomes	   exactly	   as	   all	   others	   are	   and	   as	   they	   expect	   him	   to	   be.	   The	  discrepancy	  between	   ‘I’	  and	  the	  world	  disappears	  and	  with	   it	   the	  conscious	  fear	  or	  aloneness	  and	  powerlessness.123	  	  	  What	  results,	  according	  to	  Fromm,	  is	  an	  individual	  who	  thinks	  her	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  are	  her	  own	  but	  who	  has	  in	  fact	  surrendered	  her	  individuality	  entirely.	  Any	   original	   act	   is	   replaced	   with	   a	   pseudo	   act	   because	   it	   is	   rooted	   in	   pseudo	  thinking,	  feeling,	  and	  willing.	  While	  this	  forfeiture	  of	  an	  authentic	  self	  for	  a	  pseudo	  self	   allows	   some	   measure	   of	   relief	   from	   loneliness,	   it	   is	   marked	   by	   an	   intense	  insecurity	   as	   the	   individual	   is	   compelled	   to	   seek	   continuous	   approval	   and	  recognition	  from	  others.	  As	  Fromm	  writes,	  the	  effects	  of	  maintaining	  this	  false	  self	  are	  psychologically	  destructive	  to	  the	  individual:	  The	   inability	   to	  act	  spontaneously,	   to	  express	  what	  one	  genuinely	   feels	  and	  thinks,	   and	   the	   resulting	   necessity	   to	   present	   a	   pseudo	   self	   to	   others	   and	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oneself,	   are	   the	   root	  of	   the	   feeling	  of	   inferiority	   and	  weakness.	  Whether	  or	  not	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  it,	  there	  is	  nothing	  of	  which	  we	  are	  more	  ashamed	  than	  of	  not	  being	  ourselves,	  and	   there	   is	  nothing	   that	  gives	  us	  greater	  pride	  and	  happiness	  than	  to	  think,	  to	  feel,	  and	  to	  say	  what	  is	  ours.124	  	  The	   spontaneity	   and	   authenticity	   that	   Fromm	   refers	   to	   here	   are	   qualities	   that	   he	  ascribes	   to	   positive	   freedom.	   Positive	   freedom,	   or	   “freedom	   to,”	   is	   the	   alternative	  choice	   to	   escaping	   from	   the	   liberation	   delivered	   by	   negative	   freedom.	   Fromm	  describes	  positive	  freedom	  as	  based	  in	  spontaneous	  activity	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  love	  and	  work.	   In	   terms	   of	   love,	   he	   discusses	   the	   “spontaneous	   affirmation	   of	   others”	   that	  involves	  neither	  the	  dissolution	  of	  oneself	  nor	  the	  possession	  of	  another.125	  Rather,	  it	   is	   a	   love	   that	   overcomes	   separateness	   without	   threatening	   one’s	   individuality.	  	  Spontaneity	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  work	  refers	  to	  creative	  activity	  that	  brings	  the	  individual	  in	   union	   with	   nature	   rather	   than	   in	   domination	   of	   it.	   Work	   is	   no	   longer	   a	  “compulsive	   activity”	   undertaken	   to	   flee	   from	   loneliness,	   and	   resulting	   in	   an	  alienated	  relationship	  with	  the	  products	  of	  one’s	  labour.	  Indeed,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  all	   activity	   in	   one’s	   life	   should	   embody	   this	   quality	   of	   spontaneity	  whereby	   union	  with	  others	  and	  nature	  is	  forged	  while	  preserving	  one’s	  independence.	  It	  is	  through	  such	  activity	   that	   the	   individual	  can	  realize	  him/herself	  and	  relate	  affirmatively	   to	  the	  world.	  	  Positive	   freedom	   also	   necessitates	   realizing	   one’s	   uniqueness	   as	   a	   human	  being;	  refusing	  belief	  in	  a	  higher	  power	  so	  as	  never	  to	  subordinate	  human	  growth	  to	  a	  greater	  aim;	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  recognize	  genuine	  ideals	  from	  fictitious	  ones,	  based	  on	   that	  which	  contributes	   to	   the	  growth	  and	  happiness	  of	   the	  human	  being.	  Thus,	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positive	   freedom,	   for	  Fromm,	   is	   the	  affirmative	  seizing	  of	  one’s	   life	  so	  as	   to	   live	   in	  accordance	  with	  human	  unity,	  dignity,	  authenticity,	  and	  meaningful	  activity.	   It	   is	  a	  means	  of	  overcoming	  the	  burden	  of	  freedom	  through	  integrating	  it	  productively	  into	  one’s	   life.	   While	   Fromm’s	   concept	   of	   positive	   freedom	   is	   an	   important	   one,	   his	  explanation	  as	  to	  how	  one	  might	  achieve	  the	  qualities	  he	  outlines	  are	  only	  vaguely	  considered	   in	  Escape	   from	  Freedom.	   I	   turn	  now	   to	   his	   analysis	   on	   inner	  and	  outer	  
freedom	  to	  further	  flesh	  out	  exactly	  what	  positive	  freedom	  might	  look	  like.	  Fromm	   differentiates	   between	   inner	   and	   outer	   liberation	   in	   his	  posthumously	  published	  book	  The	  Art	  of	  Being.	   The	  differentiation	   can	  be	   applied	  retrospectively,	  however,	  to	  organize	  his	  thoughts	  on	  positive	  freedom.	  With	  outer	  liberation,	   Fromm	   is	   referring	   to	   emancipation	   from	   external	   forces.	   What	   did	  Fromm	  have	   in	  mind	  when	   he	   spoke	   of	   this	   type	   of	   freedom?	  He	   answers	   this	   in	  some	  detail	  in	  The	  Sane	  Society.	  Fromm’s	   vision	   of	   outer	   freedom	   was	   based	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  communitarian	  socialist	  society.	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  his	  vision,	  however,	  his	  critique	  of	  capitalism	  must	  be	  examined.	  Indeed,	  Fromm	  arguably	  offers	  one	  of	  the	  most	   astute	   challenges	   to	   capitalist	   society,	   based	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	   profound	  psychic	  damage	  that	  it	  does	  to	  the	  individual.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  modern	  individual	  has	  surrendered	  his/her	  individuality	  in	  exchange	  for	  automaton	  conformity.	  This	  phenomenon,	   for	  Fromm,	   is	  a	  response	  not	  only	   to	   the	  burden	  of	  freedom	  but	  also	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  forces	  of	  capitalism	  on	  the	  individual.	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Capitalism,	  Fromm	  states,	  is	  rooted	  in	  “the	  use	  of	  man	  by	  man.”126	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  a	  system	  invariably	  built	  on	  exploitation,	  resulting	   in	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  “a	   living	  human	   being	   ceases	   to	   be	   an	   end	   in	   himself	   and	   becomes	   the	   means	   for	   the	  economic	  interests	  of	  another	  man,	  or	  himself,	  or	  an	  impersonal	  giant,	  the	  economic	  machine.”127	  Fromm	   argues	   that	   capitalism	   reduces	   the	   human	   being	   to	   “labour,”	  and	  views	  material	  objects	  and	  their	  accumulation	  as	  more	  valuable	  than	  life	  itself.	  The	   processes	   of	   commodification,	   mechanization,	   quantification,	   and	   abstraction	  have	   led	   the	   individual	   to	   a	   profound	   state	   of	   alienation,	   as	   one	   comes	   to	   view	  him/herself	  as	  a	  thing,	  and	  the	  world	  as	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end.128	  Fromm	  provides	  the	  following	  definition	  for	  alienation:	  By	  alienation	  is	  meant	  a	  mode	  of	  experience	  in	  which	  the	  person	  experiences	  himself	   as	  an	  alien.	  He	  has	  become,	  one	  might	   say,	   estranged	   from	  himself.	  He	  does	  not	  experience	  himself	  as	   the	  center	  of	  his	  world,	  as	   the	  creator	  of	  his	   own	   acts	   –	   but	   his	   acts	   and	   consequences	   have	   become	   his	   masters,	  whom	  he	  obeys,	  or	  whom	  he	  may	  even	  worship.	  The	  alienated	  person	  is	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  himself	  as	  he	  is	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  any	  other	  person.	  He,	  like	  the	  others,	   is	   experienced	   as	   things	   are	   experienced;	  with	   the	   senses	   and	  with	  common	  sense,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  without	  being	  related	  to	  oneself	  and	  to	  the	  world	  outside	  productively.129	  	  	  Whether	   in	   production	   or	   consumption	   or	   daily	   living,	   the	   individual	   loses	  the	   ability	   to	   relate	   directly	  with	   him/herself,	  with	   others,	   and	  with	   the	  world	   at	  large.	  While	  relationships	  do	  exist,	  of	  course,	  they	  are	  characterized	  by	  a	  superficial	  friendliness	  that	  masks	  the	  distance,	   indifference,	  and	  distrust	   that	   lie	  beneath	  the	  surface.	  Individuals	  view	  each	  other	  as	  potential	  commodities	  to	  be	  used	  if	  not	  now,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  88.	  127	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  89.	  128	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  each	  of	  these	  processes,	  see	  The	  Sane	  
Society.	  	  129	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  111.	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then	  at	  some	  point	  down	  the	  line.	  Relationships	  between	  people	  and	  objects	  take	  on	  an	   idolatrous	   quality.	   Leaders,	   the	   state,	   and	   even	   money	   become	   objects	   of	  worship,	  as	  the	  individual	  eagerly	  submits	  him/herself	  to	  forces	  outside	  of	  the	  self.	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   one’s	   relationship	   with	   oneself,	   Fromm	   uses	   his	   concept	   of	   the	  
marketing	  orientation.	  As	  he	  recounts,	  	  In	   this	   orientation,	   man	   experiences	   himself	   as	   a	   thing	   to	   be	   employed	  successfully	   on	   the	   market…His	   aim	   is	   to	   sell	   himself	   successfully	   on	   the	  market.	   His	   sense	   of	   self	   does	   not	   stem	   from	   his	   activity	   as	   a	   loving	   and	  thinking	  individual,	  but	  from	  his	  socio-­‐economic	  role…his	  body,	  his	  mind	  and	  his	  soul	  are	  his	  capital,	  and	  his	  task	  in	  life	  is	  to	  invest	  it	  favourably,	  to	  make	  a	  profit	   of	   himself.	   Human	   qualities	   like	   friendliness,	   courtesy,	   kindness,	   are	  transformed	   into	   commodities,	   into	   assets	   of	   the	   ‘personality	   package,’	  conducive	  to	  a	  higher	  price	  on	  the	  personality	  market.130	  	  The	   individual	   that	   Fromm	   describes	   above	   is	   separated	   from	   “the	   fundamental	  facts	  of	  his	  existence…the	  exaltation	  of	  love	  and	  solidarity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  tragic	  fact	  of	  his	  aloneness	  and	  of	  the	  fragmentary	  character	  of	  his	  existence.”131	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  individual,	  lacking	  in	  any	  sense	  of	  authenticity	  or	  true	  relatedness,	  who	  submits	  to	   the	  automaton	   conformity	  described	  previously.	  What	  would	   freedom	   look	   like	  for	  such	  a	  person?	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Fromm	  advances	  a	  theory	  of	  communitarian	  socialism.	  Unlike	  Marx’s	  vision	  of	  socialism,	  Fromm	  eschews	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  socialization	  of	   the	   means	   of	   production.	   He	   argues	   that	   “the	   failure	   –	   as	   perhaps	   also	   the	  popularity	  –	  of	  Marxist	  Socialism	  lies	  precisely	   in	   this	  bourgeois	  overestimation	  of	  property	   rights	   and	   purely	   economic	   factors.”132	  	   What	   is	   of	   greater	   significance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  129.	  131	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  131.	  132	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  248.	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than	   ownership,	   according	   to	   Fromm,	   is	   the	   “social	   and	   human	   situation	   of	   the	  worker	   in	   his	   work	   and	   the	   kind	   of	   relatedness	   to	   his	   fellow	   workers.”133 	  In	  communitarian	  socialism,	  every	  worker	  would	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  governing	  of	   their	   society	   in	   which	   work	   is	   meaningful,	   and	   where	   labour	   would	   employ	  capital	   rather	   than	   the	   inverse.	   Anticipating	   a	   number	   of	   arguments	   against	   his	  positions,	   Fromm	   asserts	   that	   the	   idea	   that	   people	   are	   naturally	   lazy	   and	   only	  motivated	   to	  work	   for	  money	  or	  prestige	   is	   a	   fallacy.	   To	   the	   contrary,	  meaningful	  work	   that	   engages	   human	   skill	   is	   invigorating	   and	   contributes	   to	   one’s	   character.	  Fromm	  provides	  the	  example	  of	  European	  “Communities	  of	  Work,”	  referring	  to	  the	  one	  hundred	  or	  so	  communities	  at	  his	  time	  of	  writing	  that	  embodied	  a	  non-­‐alienated	  work	   ethic.134	  These	   communities	   attended	   not	   only	   to	   worker’s	   satisfaction	   in	  terms	   of	   labour	   conditions	   and	   relations,	   but	   also	   to	   the	  wellbeing	   of	   the	   overall	  human	   being.	   As	   such,	   the	   workplace	   was	   also	   a	   place	   of	   learning,	   recreation,	  bonding,	  and	  democratic	  self-­‐governance.	  	  Fromm	   asks	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   practices	   of	   the	   Communities	   of	  Work	  can	  be	  replicated	  on	  a	  wider	  scale	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  society.	  As	  he	  discusses:	  The	   aim	   then	  would	   be	   to	   create	   a	  work	   situation	   in	  which	  man	   gives	   his	  lifetime	   and	   energy	   to	   something	  which	   has	  meaning	   for	   him,	   in	  which	   he	  knows	  what	   he	   is	   doing,	   has	   an	   influence	   on	  what	   is	   being	   done,	   and	   feels	  united	  with,	  rather	  than	  separated	  from,	  his	  fellow	  man.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  work	  situation	   is	  made	  concrete	  again;	   that	   the	  workers	  are	  organized	   into	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  248.	  As	  Fromm	  further	  argues,	  “there	  is	  a	  growing	  insight	  among	  socialists	  into	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  property	  rights	  from	  the	  private	  capitalist	  to	  society	  or	  the	  state	  has,	  in	  itself,	  only	  a	  negligible	  effect	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  worker,	  and	  that	  the	  central	  problem	  of	  Socialism	  lies	  in	  the	  change	  of	  the	  work	  situation”	  (The	  Sane	  
Society,	  288).	  	  134	  Fromm	  especially	  focuses	  on	  the	  very	  interesting	  example	  of	  the	  Boimondau	  watch	  factory	  based	  in	  France.	  See	  Chapter	  8	  of	  The	  Sane	  Society	  for	  his	  description	  of	  this	  work	  community.	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sufficiently	   small	   groups	   to	   enable	   the	   individual	   to	   relate	   himself	   to	   the	  group	   as	   real,	   concrete	   human	   beings,	   even	   though	   the	   factory	   as	   a	  whole	  may	   have	  many	   thousands	   of	   workers.	   It	  means	   that	  methods	   of	   blending	  centralization	   and	   decentralization	   are	   found	   which	   permit	   active	  participation	  and	  responsibility	  for	  everybody,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  create	  a	  unified	  leadership	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  necessary.135	  	  	   Fromm	   lays	   out	   some	   suggestions	   for	   how	   such	   a	   situation	   of	   active	  participation	  might	  be	   achieved,	   including	  workers	  having	   technical	   knowledge	  of	  the	   entire	   enterprise;	   co-­‐management	   and	   participation	   in	   decision-­‐making;	   the	  limitation	   of	   property	   rights	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   owners;	   including	   unions	   as	  shareholders;	   and	   the	   cultivation	   of	   a	   spirit	   of	   humanistic	   solidarity	   that	   extends	  beyond	   the	   organization.	   All	   of	   Fromm’s	   suggestions	   here	   are	   geared	   toward	   the	  
humanization	   of	   labour,	   which	   ultimately	   results	   in	   a	   social	   system	   in	   which	  economic	  activity	  will	  be	  a	  subordinate	  component	  of	  social	  life.	  To	  this	  end,	  Fromm	  advocates	   for	   a	   universal	   subsistence	   guarantee	   that	   would	   ensure	   that	   basic	  income	  could	  be	  claimed	  by	  any	  worker	  beyond	  situations	  of	  unemployment,	  illness,	  and	  old	  age.	  This	  would	   remove	   the	   threat	  of	   starvation	  and	  prevent	  people	   from	  being	   forced	   to	  accept	  oppressive	  working	  conditions.	  Fromm	  furthermore	  argues	  that	  this	  would	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  establishing	  more	  equitable	  relationships	  not	  only	  between	  employees	  and	  employers,	  but	  in	  everyday	  life	  in	  general.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  humanization	  of	  the	  economic	  sphere,	  Fromm	  argues	  that	  political	  and	  cultural	  transformation	  are	  also	  required.	  In	  terms	  of	  politics,	  Fromm	  claims	   that	   if	   democracy	   is	   premised	   upon	   one’s	   ability	   to	   assert	   one’s	   will	   and	  convictions,	   then	   we	   currently	   lack	   the	   necessary	   conditions	   for	   democracy	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  280.	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prevail.	   Rather,	   the	   average	   voter	   is	   manipulated	   by	   propaganda	   and	  advertisements,	   and	   is	   only	   able	   to	   grasp	   the	  world	   in	   a	   distanced	   and	   alienated	  way.	   Moreover,	   he/she	   is	   dominated	   by	   conformist	   views,	   rather	   than	   authentic	  opinions.	   Voting	   becomes	   the	   “abdicat[ion]	   of	   [one’s]	   political	   will	   to	   his	  representative”	  rather	  than	  the	  true	  exercise	  of	  democracy.136	  In	  the	  place	  of	  mass	  voting,	   Fromm	   suggests	   the	   reintroduction	   of	   the	   Town	  Meeting	  whereby	   people	  could	   gather	   in	   smaller	   groups	   of	   five	   hundred	   or	   so.	   In	   such	   a	   setting,	   Fromm	  argues	   that	   each	  member	   could	  have	   an	   active	   role	   in	   expressing	   their	   views	   and	  making	  decisions	  in	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  format	  that	  would	  encourage	  accountability	  and	  facilitate	   community.	   These	   groups	   would	   share	   power	   with	   elected	   bodies,	  resulting	  in	  what	  Fromm	  sees	  as	  a	  truly	  democratic	  political	  system.	  With	  respect	   to	  cultural	   transformation,	  Fromm	  firstly	  proposes	  changes	   to	  the	  education	  system.	  He	  argues	  that	  our	  current	  system	  is	  narrowly	  geared	  toward	  shaping	  the	  individual	  in	  a	  way	  that	  prepares	  him/her	  for	  participation	  in	  capitalist	  society,	  and	  devoid	  of	  teaching	  one	  how	  to	  think	  critically.	  Moreover,	  Fromm	  finds	  fault	   in	   the	   tendency	   to	   separate	   theoretical	   learning	   from	  practical	   skill	   –	   a	   split	  that	   he	   argues	   contributes	   to	   the	   alienation	   between	   work	   and	   thought.	   What	   is	  needed,	   rather,	   is	   an	   integrated	   educational	   structure	   where	   practical	   and	  theoretical	  learning	  is	  combined,	  and	  where	  education	  becomes	  a	  lifelong	  pursuit	  to	  be	   continued	   into	   adulthood.137	  In	   addition	   to	   education,	   Fromm	  writes	   about	   the	  importance	   of	   art	   as	   an	   embodied	   human	   activity.	   Specifically,	   he	   discusses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  296	  137	  For	  more	  on	  Fromm’s	  views	  on	  education,	  see	  his	  forward	  in	  Summerhill:	  a	  Radical	  
Approach	  to	  Childrearing,	  by	  A.S.	  Neil,	  published	  in	  1960.	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“collective	   art”	   as	   ritual	   that	   allows	   for	   an	   engagement	  with	   the	  world	   using	   our	  senses	   “in	   a	  meaningful,	   skilled,	   productive,	   active,	   shared	  way.”138	  He	   sees	   artistic	  expression	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   life	   and	   necessary	   for	   meaningful	   and	  psychologically	   healthy	   living.	   Finally,	   Fromm	   discusses	   the	   need	   for	   a	   spiritual	  transformation	  that	  aims	  at	  reinstalling	  brotherly	  love,	  truth	  and	  justice	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   society.	   Fromm	   predicts	   the	   development	   of	   a	   new	   religion	   in	   the	   next	   few	  hundred	  years	  as	  humanity	  progresses.	  As	  he	  writes,	  “the	  most	  important	  feature	  of	  such	   a	   religion	   would	   be	   its	   universalistic	   character,	   corresponding	   to	   the	  unification	   of	  mankind	  which	   is	   taking	   place	   in	   this	   epoch,	   it	   would	   embrace	   the	  humanistic	  teachings	  common	  to	  all	  great	  religions	  of	  the	  East	  and	  of	  the	  West;	   its	  doctrines	   would	   not	   contradict	   the	   rational	   insight	   of	   mankind	   today,	   and	   its	  emphasis	  would	  be	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  life	  rather	  than	  on	  doctrinal	  beliefs.”139	  To	  sum	  up,	  Fromm	  believed	  that	  outer	  freedom	  must	  be	  premised	  upon	  the	  humanization	  of	  all	  sectors	  of	  life	  –	  economic,	  political,	  cultural,	  and	  spiritual.	  While	  some	  of	  his	  suggestions	  might	  appear	  idealistic	  or	  utopian,	  Durkin	  reminds	  us	  to	  be	  attentive	   to	   the	  period	   in	  which	  he	  was	  writing,	  when	   such	  experimental	  projects	  and	  thinking	  were	  much	  more	  common	  than	  they	  might	  be	  today.	  What	  is	  perhaps	  of	   greater	   importance	   than	   the	   feasibility	   of	   Fromm’s	   ideas	   is	   his	   willingness	   to	  imagine	  and	  express	  alternatives	  to	  the	  current	  system.	  	  Fromm	  argues,	  however,	   that	  such	  outer	  changes	  are	  not	  sufficient	   for	   true	  freedom	   to	   develop.	   Rather,	   total	   liberation	  must	   involve	   inner	   liberation	  as	  well.	  Fromm	   argues	   that	   this	   fact	   has	   not	   been	   adequately	   appreciated	   in	   our	  modern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  302,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  139	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  305,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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society	  which	  almost	  exclusively	  focuses	  on	  political	  liberation.	  This,	  for	  Fromm,	  has	  not	  been	  without	  consequences:	  …the	   one-­‐sidedness	   of	   the	   emphasis	   on	   outer	   liberation	   also	   did	   great	  damage.	   In	   the	   first	  place,	   the	   liberators	  often	   transformed	   themselves	   into	  new	   rulers,	   only	   mouthing	   the	   ideologies	   of	   freedom.	   Second,	   political	  liberation	  could	  hide	  the	  fact	  that	  new	  un-­‐freedom	  developed,	  but	  in	  hidden	  and	  anonymous	   forms….Most	   importantly,	  one	   forgot	  entirely	   that	  man	  can	  be	  a	  slave	  even	  without	  being	  put	  in	  chains	  –	  the	  reverse	  of	  an	  oft-­‐repeated	  religious	   statement	   that	   man	   can	   be	   free	   even	   when	   he	   is	   in	   chains….The	  outer	  chains	  have	  simply	  been	  put	  inside	  of	  man.140	  	  	   Fromm	  contends	  that	  this	  internalization	  of	  the	  “outer	  chains”	  is	  even	  more	  dangerous	  than	  the	  outer	  chains	  themselves	  because	  at	   least	  in	  the	  latter	  instance,	  the	  individual	   is	  aware	  of	  them.	  Inner	  chains,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	   insidious	  and	  not	  incompatible	  with	  the	  illusion	  of	  freedom.	  	  How	  might	  one	  liberate	  oneself	  psychologically	  and	  spiritually?	  Fromm	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  recommendations,	  including:	  to	  will	  one	  thing	  at	  a	  time;	  to	  achieve	  a	  state	  of	  awakeness;	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  inner	  and	  outer	  conflicts;	  to	  cultivate	  concentration;	  to	  meditate	  and	  practice	  mindfulness;	  to	  undergo	  psychoanalysis;	  to	  practice	  self-­‐analysis;	  and	  finally,	  to	  move	  from	  a	  “having”	  to	  a	  “being”	  orientation.	  Fromm	  shares	  that	  each	  of	  these	  suggestions	  is	  based	  in	  his	  own	  experience,	  and	  daily	  practice.	  This,	  however,	  should	  not	  limit	  an	  individual	  from	  discovering	  their	  own	  methods	  to	  achieving	  psychic	  and	  spiritual	  calmness,	  clarity,	  and	  insight.	  It	  is	  through	  developing	  one’s	  inner	  state	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  that	  the	  individual	  can	  undo	  the	  damage	  of	  socialization	  and	  alienation,	  and	  regain	  a	  sense	  of	  inner	  wellbeing	  and	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freedom.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  discuss	  at	  some	  length	  how	  one	  of	  his	  suggested	  methods	  –	  mindfulness,	  can	  be	  of	  great	  use	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  Thus,	   as	   Fromm	   argues,	   it	   is	   only	   by	   attending	   to	   both	   outer	   and	   inner	  freedom	   that	   true	   humanistic	   liberation	   can	   be	   attained:	   “the	   Church	   still	   by	   and	  large	   speaks	   only	   of	   inner	   liberation,	   and	   political	   parties,	   from	   liberals	   to	  communists,	  speak	  only	  about	  outer	  liberation.	  History	  has	  clearly	  shown	  that	  one	  ideology	  without	   the	   other	   leaves	  man	  dependent	   and	   crippled.	  The	  only	   realistic	  aim	   is	   total	   liberation,	   a	   goal	   that	   may	   well	   be	   called	   radical	   (or	   revolutionary)	  humanism.”141	  
(6.3)	  Applications	  to	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Feminism	  	   Fromm’s	   humanism	   provides	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   with	   a	   number	   of	  important	  insights	  that	  can	  aid	  us	  in	  overcoming	  the	  impasses	  thus	  far	  identified.	  In	  this	   section,	   I	  discuss	   three	  key	  points	   that	  are	  especially	  pertinent	   to	   the	  present	  investigation.	  	  Fromm	   is	   firstly	   useful	   to	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   in	   terms	   of	   his	   theory	   of	  
human	   connection	   and	   unity.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	   along	   with	   other	   forms	   of	   identity	   politics,	   suffers	   from	   a	   crippling	  divisiveness.	  Our	   “us	   against	   them”	  worldview	   limits	   appreciation	  of	   our	   common	  humanity,	   preventing	   true	   feelings	   of	   political	   solidarity	   and	   integrated	   political	  action.	  Fromm’s	  theory	  of	  our	  shared	  human	  essence	  can	  offer	  a	  concept	  of	  human	  connectivity	   that	   sidesteps	   many	   of	   the	   problematics	   that	   are	   often	   encountered	  with	   theories	   of	   human	   nature.	   In	   rooting	   our	   shared	   essence	   in	   the	   undeniable	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existential	  conditions	  that	  are	  common	  to	  all	  human	  beings,	  Fromm	  lays	  the	  ground	  for	   the	   cultivation	  of	   compassion	   and	  a	   sense	  of	   relatedness	   that	   transcends	   race,	  culture,	   gender,	   sexuality	   and	   other	   markers	   of	   identity.	   Significantly,	   Fromm’s	  understanding	  of	  human	  interrelatedness	  is	  also	  spiritually	  informed,	  influenced	  by	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  mystic	  elements,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  Buddhism.	  I	  believe	  that	  a	  concept	  of	  human	  unity	   that	  allows	  us	   to	   forge	  a	   sense	  of	   connection	  and	  compassion	  across	  lines	  of	   identity	   is	  of	  utmost	   importance	   for	  our	  movement,	  and	  as	  such,	  Fromm’s	  offering	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  invaluable.	  	  Secondly,	  Fromm’s	  existential	  human	  needs	  give	  some	  explanatory	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  understanding	  some	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  ressentimental	  tendencies.	  In	  particular,	   the	   need	   for	   relatedness,	   rootedness,	   and	   identity	   can	   help	   to	   explain	  how	  we	  may	  use	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  to	   fulfill	  not	  only	  our	  political	  aims	  but	  also	  underlying	   psychic	   strivings,	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two.	   In	   terms	   of	  relatedness,	   the	  primary	  psychological	  need	  as	   identified	  by	  Fromm,	   the	  effects	  of	  racism	   must	   be	   considered	   in	   order	   comprehend	   our	   relationship	   to	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	   in	   this	   regard.	   Racism	   effectively	   ejects	   the	   individual	   from	   social	  belonging,	  resulting	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  inferiority	  and	  shame	  that	  sever	  human	  connection	  –	  the	  connection	  with	  oneself,	  and	  the	  connection	  with	  others.	  In	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	   relatedness	   to	   similar	   others,	   I	   suggest	   that	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   importantly	  facilitates	  a	  process	  of	  re-­‐humanization.	  When	  we	  are	  together,	  we	  are	  seen,	  heard,	  supported,	   and	  valued.	  The	   existence	  of,	   and	  potentiality	   for	   such	   love	   is	   a	   crucial	  source	   of	   healing	   and	   survival	   for	   oppressed	   peoples,	   and	   something	   that	  will	   be	  discussed	   at	   greater	   length	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   Fromm’s	   definition	   of	   love	   is	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especially	  useful	   for	   thinking	   through	  how	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  might	  harness	  and	  find	  strength	  in	  the	  power	  of	  love,	  rather	  than	  ressentiment.	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  however,	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  currently	  finds	  at	  least	  some	  motivation	  in	  ressentimental	  strivings.	  Ressentiment	  is	  an	  emotional	  field	  with	  both	   sadistic	   and	   masochistic	   aspects.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  pleasure	   derived	   from	   shaming	   and	   morally	   overpowering	   others.	   There	   is	   a	  tendency	   to	   reproach	   and	   humiliate.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	  masochistic	   investment	   in	   one’s	   victimhood.	   Fromm’s	   analysis	   allows	   for	   an	  understanding	   of	   these	   ressentimental	   strategies	   as	   completely	   reasonable	   from	   a	  psychological	   perspective,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   irrational	   from	   a	   political	   one.	  He	   also	  encourages	   us,	   however,	   to	   seek	   productive	   solutions	   for	   the	   problem	   of	  relatedness,	  in	  order	  that	  we	  might	  find	  greater	  happiness	  and	  freedom.	  	  In	  addition	   to	   satisfying	   this	  need	   for	   relatedness,	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  also	  attends	  to	  the	  human	  need	  for	  identity.	  As	  Fromm	  argues,	  our	  need	  for	  identity	  has	  intensified	  in	  our	  modern	  age	  as	  traditional	  ties	  that	  once	  answered	  the	  question	  of	  “who	  am	  I?”	  have	  disappeared.	   Identity	   for	   racialized	  people	  serves	   the	  additional	  function	   of	   supplying	   a	   positive	   and	   powerful	   self-­‐identification	   in	   a	   situation	   in	  which	  such	  has	  been	  denied.	  One	  of	  the	  major	  critiques	  of	  identity	  politics,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed,	   however,	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   identity	   is	   essentialized,	   so	   as	   to	   erase	  differences	   within	   a	   group.	   This	   allows	   us	   to	   make	   demands	   as	   “women”	   or	   “as	  people	  of	   colour.”	   For	  Fromm,	   the	   sense	  of	   belonging	   that	   this	   type	  of	   conformity	  offers	  is	  inferior	  to	  the	  “truly	  individual	  sense	  of	  identity”	  of	  the	  person	  who	  is	  “the	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center	   and	   active	   subject	   of	   his	   powers.”142	  	   Of	   course	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	  we	  take	   on	   these	   identities	   as	   a	   political	   strategy.	   This	   does	   not	   take	   away,	   however,	  from	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   still	   derive	   an	   immense	   sense	  of	   security	   and	   stability	   from	  them.	  As	  noted	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   this	  has	  often	   taken	   the	   form	  of	   grasping	  onto	  identities	   tethered	   to	   injurious	   attachments.	   Fromm	   challenges	   us	   to	   ask	   how	  productive	  are	  our	  identities?	  Do	  they	  foster	  conformity	  or	  allow	  for	  individuality?	  	  Lastly,	   we	   come	   to	   the	   need	   for	   rootedness.	   Fromm	   argues	   that	   the	  productive	   solution	   to	   this	   need	   is	   finding	   a	   truly	   human	   home	   by	   embracing	  solidarity,	  whereas	   the	  unproductive	  response	   is	   forming	   incestuous	   ties	   that	   lead	  to	  nationalism	  and	   racism.	  Anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  could	  be	   considered	  a	  response	   to	  the	   unproductive	   rootedness	   of	   dominant	   society.	   But	   like	   many	   reactive	  formations,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   we	   have	   taken	   on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   our	  oppressors	  by	  also	  finding	  a	  sense	  of	  rootedness	  in	  our	  own	   incestuous	  ties	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  other.	  	  This	  point	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Fromm’s	  observation	  of	  the	  tendency	  to	  counter	  oppression	   through	   engaging	   in	   oppressive	   behaviour	   oneself,	   or	   as	   he	   states	   “by	  doing	   actively	  what	   one	  was	   forced	   to	   endure	  passively:	   to	   rule	  when	  one	  had	   to	  obey;	  to	  beat	  when	  one	  was	  beaten	  in	  short,	  to	  do	  what	  one	  was	  forced	  to	  suffer.”143	  	  In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   will	   consider	   how	   this	   ressentimental	   attempt	   to	   “heal	   still	  open	  wounds”	  has	  considerable	  impacts	  on	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  freedom	  –	  both	  in	  the	  inner	  and	  outer	  sense	  that	  Fromm	  discusses.144	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Fromm,	  The	  Sane	  Society,	  114.	  	  143	  Fromm,	  The	  Anatomy,	  236.	  144	  Fromm,	  The	  Anatomy,	  236.	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Viewing	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   Fromm’s	   framework	   of	  human	   needs	   thus	   depathologizes	   the	   earlier	   discussion	   on	   ressentiment,	   while	  challenging	   us	   to	   still	   reach	   beyond	   it	   in	   order	   to	   embrace	   more	   productive	  solutions.	  The	  deep	  attachment	  that	  many	  of	  us	  have	  to	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  can	  be	  understood	   as	   a	   means	   to	   satisfying	   needs	   that	   are	   universal	   and	   which	   we	   are	  attempting	  to	  respond	  to	  in	  a	  hostile	  social	  environment.	   I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  here	  that	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  is	  solely	  a	  project	  that	  aims	  to	  satisfy	  psychological	  needs	  under	   the	   banner	   of	   politics.	   Rather,	   rooting	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   in	   Fromm’s	  existential	   framework	  allows	  us	  to	  grasp	  how	  these	  needs	  themselves	  motivate	  all	  human	  action,	  including	  our	  political	  action.	  This	  re-­‐articulates	  a	  central	  argument	  of	  this	   dissertation,	  which	   is	   that	  all	   politics	   are	   psychological,	   and	   it	   is	   through	   the	  psychological	  that	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  our	  political	  behaviour.	  While	  looking	  at	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   practices	   through	   Fromm’s	   perspective	   “normalizes”	   them	  through	  demonstrating	  their	  universal	  psychic	  roots,	  Fromm	  still	  compels	  us	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  whether	  we	  are	  choosing	  solutions	  which	   facilitate	  our	  growth,	  or	  stunt	  our	  development	  as	  human	  beings	  and	  as	  a	  society.	  Finally,	   and	   significantly,	   Fromm’s	   visionary	   and	   liberatory	   spirit	   models	  what	  a	  future-­‐oriented	  emancipatory	  project	  could	  look	  like.	  As	  encountered	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  along	  with	  other	   identity-­‐based	  movements	  have	  been	   challenged	   for	   their	   backward	   facing	   politics,	  which	   seek	   to	   conjure	   up	   past	  grievances	   rather	   than	   imagine	   alternative	   futures.	   Of	   course	   this	   accusation	   is	  problematic	  because	  of	  its	  unjust	  disregard	  for	  the	  everyday	  ways	  in	  which	  racism,	  sexism,	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  oppression	  continue	   to	  pervade	  our	   society.	  Moreover,	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many	  past	  injuries	  have	  not	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  systems	  that	  perpetuated	  them,	  making	   it	   incredibly	   difficult	   for	   many	   of	   us	   to	   “move	   on.”	   With	   this	   being	   said,	  however,	   there	   are	   certainly	   elements	   in	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   that	   become	   fixated	  on	   past	   grievances,	   and	   moreover,	   there	   is	   a	   widespread	   lack	   of	   imagination	  dedicated	  toward	  realizing	  future	  alternatives	  or	  what	  Fromm	  calls	  positive	  freedom.	  Part	   of	   this,	   as	   I	   will	   discuss	   in	   the	   concluding	   chapter,	   may	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	  generalized	  despair	  that	  has	  gripped	  the	  political	  Left	  in	  the	  last	  many	  years.	  Instead	  of	  being	  able	  to	  imagine	  and	  work	  toward	  alternatives,	  our	  movements	  have	  largely	  settled	   for	   achieving	   recognition	   and	   equal	   opportunity	   within	   the	   pre-­‐existing	  system.	  What	   Fromm’s	   work	   convincingly	   illustrates,	   however,	   is	   the	   deeply	   and	  immutably	   destructive	   core	   of	   capitalism.	   Freedom	   cannot	   come	   from	   one	   being	  awarded	   a	   higher	   place	   within	   the	   capitalist	   hierarchy;	   it	   must	   involve	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   new	   economic	   and	   social	   system.	   And	   thus,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	  lesson	   to	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   here	   is	   twofold:	   firstly,	   we	   must	   recognize	   the	  inequality,	   injustice	  and	  dysfunction	  that	  are	   inherent	   features	  of	  capitalist	  society	  and	  stop	  equating	  success	  and	  progress	  with	  its	  rewards.	  Does	  this	  mean	  we	  should	  cease	   fighting	   for	   equality	   within	   the	   system	   altogether?	   No.	   Such	   an	   injunction	  would	   be	   insensitive	   to	   the	   everyday	   work	   that	   we	   must	   do	   just	   to	   survive	   in	   a	  society	  like	  ours.	  It	  does	  mean,	  however,	  balancing	  these	  more	  urgent	  struggles	  for	  survival	  with	   imagining	   and	  building	   a	  new	   future	  outside	  of	   the	   system.	   Stringer	  articulates	  this	  dual	  focus	  compellingly	  in	  the	  following:	  	  The	  political	  work	  of	  feminism,	  like	  that	  of	  other	  emancipatory	  movements,	  has	   always	   at	   least	   two	   kinds	   of	   tasks.	   There	   is	   the	   task	   of	   cultivating,	  through	   collective	   engagement	   and	  debate,	   a	   reflexive	  political	   imagination	  willing	   to	   ask	   how	   the	   world	   has	   become	   what	   it	   is	   and	   capable	   of	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envisioning	  the	  world	  otherwise.	  And	  there	  is	  the	  task	  of	  designing	  particular	  politics	  projects	  which	  can	  serve	  more	   immediately	   to	   improve	   the	  present	  conditions	  of	  women’s	  lives.145	  	  	  The	   second	   lesson	   here	   then	   refers	   to	   our	   need	   to	   develop	   this	   reflexive	  political	   imagination.	   Fromm’s	   work	   is	   characterized	   not	   only	   by	   his	   humanistic	  political	   visions	   but	   also	   by	   his	  willingness	   to	   make	   suggestions	   toward	   a	   better	  world.	  Although	  his	  solutions	  are	  not	  always	  tenable,	  his	  capacity	  to	  imagine	  and	  to	  formulate	   alternatives	   was	   key	   to	   his	   practice	   of	   freedom.	   I	   believe	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  is	  in	  dire	  need	  for	  such	  alternative	  visions,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  imagine	  them	  –	  a	  point	  I	  will	  re-­‐visit	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	  	  
Limitations	  	  	   While	   there	   are	   aspects	   of	   Fromm’s	   humanism	   that	   can	   be	   integrated,	   his	  theory	   as	   a	   whole	   is	   not	   without	   problematic	   features.	   Fromm	   writes	   from	   a	  heterosexual	   white	   male	   point	   of	   view	   for	   a	   largely	   heterosexual	   white	   male	  audience.	   For	   the	   most	   part,	   he	   does	   not	   consider	   sexism,	   racism	   (apart	   from	  nationalism	   and	   Nazism),	   and	   homophobia.	   Indeed,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   homophobia,	  Fromm	   participates	   in	   it	   by	   solely	   using	   heterosexist	   examples	   and	   by	   painting	  homosexuality	   as	   a	   perversion	   to	   normal	   sexuality.146	  For	   an	   unconventional	   and	  visionary	  thinker,	  Fromm	  is	  particularly	  “of	  his	  time”	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  As	   for	   sexism,	   Fromm	  makes	  mention	   of	   patriarchy,	   male	   domination	   and	  exploitation.	   Even	   so,	   the	   androcentrism	   in	   his	  work	   is	   undeniable	   –	   all	   the	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Stringer,	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim,’”	  355.	  146	  We	  see	  many	  examples	  of	  heterosexism	  and	  heteronormativity	  in	  Fromm’s	  writings.	  For	  example:	  “erotic	  love	  is	  directed	  to	  one	  person,	  normally	  of	  the	  opposite	  sex”	  (The	  Sane	  
Society,	  39,	  my	  emphasis).	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punctuated	  when	  Fromm	  does	   explicitly	   speak	  of	  women,	   rendering	  his	   universal	  language	   of	   “man”	   as	   decidedly	   male.	   Furthermore,	   Fromm	   contradicts	   himself	  throughout	   his	   work	   in	   regards	   to	   his	   awareness	   of	   sexism,	   at	   times	   granting	   its	  problematic	  status,	  while	  at	  others,	  seemingly	  dismissing	  it	  as	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past.	  147	  In	   terms	   of	   racism,	   we	   encounter	   definite	   moments	   of	   ethnocentrism	   in	  Fromm148	  although	   he	   counterbalances	   these	   with	   his	   appreciation	   for	   Eastern	  civilizations	   and	   cultures,	   which	   he	   generally	   discusses	   with	   respect	   and	  knowledge.149	  What	  is	  more	  perplexing	  is	  his	  oversight	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  racism	  –	  even	  more	  surprising	  given	   that	  he	  was	  writing	  during	   the	  Civil	  Rights	  Era.	  To	  be	  fair,	   there	  are	   some	  references	  but	   they	  are	  uniformly	   superficial.	   For	  example,	   in	  
The	  Heart	  of	  Man,	  in	  his	  section	  on	  group	  narcissism,	  Fromm	  classifies	  the	  racism	  of	  the	   white	   lower	   classes	   towards	   blacks	   in	   the	   United	   States	   as	   an	   example	   of	  collective	  narcissism.	  Deprived	  of	  material	  satisfactions	  and	  esteem,	  he	  argues	  that	  this	  group	  seizes	  the	  social	  capital	  offered	  by	  whiteness	  as	  a	  means	  of	  deflecting	  the	  class	  shame	  that	  they	  would	  otherwise	  experience.	  Another	  example	  from	  the	  same	  book	  is	  in	  Fromm’s	  chapter	  on	  freedom,	  where	  he	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  example	  of	  an	   8-­‐year-­‐old	   white	   boy	   belonging	   to	   an	   affluent	   family	   who	   is	   prohibited	   from	  playing	  with	   the	  son	  of	  his	   family’s	  black	  maid.	  When	  the	  white	  child	  disobeys	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  See	  for	  example,	  Escape	  from	  Freedom,	  127.	  148	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  “prehistoric”	  and	  indigenous	  cultures	  –	  see	  The	  Sane	  
Society,	  52	  and	  Escape	  from	  Freedom,	  20.	  149	  With	  this	  being	  said,	  Fromm’s	  thinking,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  his	  influencer	  Max	  Weber	  was	  certainly	  impacted	  by	  the	  German	  Orientalist	  discourse	  of	  his	  time.	  For	  more	  on	  German	  Orientalism,	  see	  Edward	  Said’s	  classic	  text	  Orientalism	  (Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2014);	  Jennifer	  Jenkins,	  “German	  Orientalism:	  Introduction,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	  
Asia,	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  24,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  97–100;	  and	  Sara	  R.	  Farris,	  “An	  ‘Ideal	  Type’	  Called	  Orientalism,”	  Interventions	  12,	  no.	  2	  (July	  1,	  2010):	  265–84.	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mother,	   she	   bribes	   him	   with	   a	   trip	   to	   the	   circus	   which	   he	   accepts,	   although,	   as	  Fromm	  argues,	  it	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  boy’s	  integrity.	  Fromm	  continues	  onward	  to	   show	   how	   every	   moral	   capitulation	   of	   this	   boy’s	   life	   weakens	   his	   freedom	   to	  choose	  what	  is	  “right.”	  	  In	  both	  examples,	  Fromm’s	  reference	  to	  racism	  is	  firstly,	  situational:	  that	  is,	  it	  occurs	  as	  a	  problem	  specific	  to	  the	  white	  lower	  classes,	  and	  then	  as	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  family	  in	  question.	  This	  type	  of	  analysis	  is	  indeed	  uncharacteristic	  for	  Fromm	  who	  typically	  exhibits	  a	  unique	  appreciation	  for	  the	  “big	  picture.”	  While	  the	  example	   of	   the	   white	   lower	   classes	   is	   certainly	   more	   sophisticated	   than	   the	  idiosyncratic	   prejudice	   of	   the	   affluent	   family,	   his	   analysis	   is	   nonetheless	  underdeveloped.	   Moreover,	   even	   as	   Fromm	   repeatedly	   speaks	   of	   the	   ills	   of	  nationalism	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   incestuous	   ties	   to	   blood	   and	   soil,	   and	   its	   pathological	  hindrance	  to	  one’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  freedom,	  it	  is	  confusing	  as	  to	  why	  he	  does	  not	  speak	   directly	   of	   racism,	   especially	   given	   its	   brutal	   and	   unavoidable	   centrality	   in	  American	  life	  during	  his	  period	  of	  writing.150	  What	  his	  oversight	  seems	  to	  suggest	  is	  that	   Fromm	   did	   not	   believe	   racism	   to	   be	   a	   generalized	   orientation	   among	   white	  people	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   He	   could	   see	   it	   in	   individuals	   and	   perhaps	   in	   certain	  classes	  but	  had	  no	  appreciation	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  white	  supremacy,	  not	  as	  a	  form	  of	  nationalism	   per	   se,	   but	   as	   a	   generalized	   ideology	   that	   undergirds	   every	   aspect	   of	  American	   life	   and	   consciousness.	   We	   only	   need	   to	   look	   to	   the	   work	   of	   James	  Baldwin,	   writing	   in	   the	   same	   period,	   to	   understand	   the	   inextricability	   of	   white	  supremacy	  and	  American	  culture.	  For	  a	   thinker	   like	  Fromm	  who	  demonstrates	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  To	  give	  just	  one	  example,	  the	  brutal	  abduction	  and	  lynching	  of	  14-­‐year	  old	  Emmett	  Till	  took	  place	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1955,	  the	  same	  year	  Fromm	  published	  The	  Sane	  Society.	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impressive	  grasp	  of	  the	  psychic	  structure	  and	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  the	  public,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  wonder	  where	  his	  analysis	  was	  of	  the	  widespread	  racism	  that	  was	  an	  intrinsic	  element	  of	  the	  social	  character	  of	  the	  nation.	  Secondly,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   examples	   given	   (as	   well	   as	   in	   terms	   of	   his	  other	   references),	   that	   Fromm	   is	   not	   trying	   to	   capture	   the	   psychic	   experience	   of	  those	   who	   experience	   the	   racism	   in	   the	   instances	   that	   he	   presents.	   What	   is	   the	  experience	   of	   those	   who	   suffer	   the	   racist	   wrath	   of	   the	   disgruntled	   white	   lower	  classes?	  What	  is	  their	  situation,	  both	  in	  material	  and	  psychological	  terms?	  And	  what	  about	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  little	  black	  boy	  who	  is	  told	  that	  his	  white	  companion	  will	  be	  attending	  the	  circus	  rather	  than	  playing	  with	  him?	  Who	  realizes	  shortly	  thereafter	  that	  he	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  playing	  with	  this	  boy,	  and	  who	  will	  grow	  up	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons	  for	  this?	  How	  does	  he	  react?	  How	  does	  this	  impact	  his	  personality,	  his	  psychic	  strivings?	  Fromm	  does	  not	   tell	  us.	  Not	  because	  his	  analysis	   is	   too	  general,	  but	   because	   people	   of	   colour	   were	   simply	   not	   his	   focus.	   Does	   this	   mean	   that	  Fromm’s	  insights	  are	  irrelevant	  for	  people	  of	  colour?	  No,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  so.	  Indeed,	  as	  previously	  indicated,	  I	  believe	  that	  his	  ideas	  around	  our	  existential	  situatedness,	  our	  shared	   human	   needs,	   the	   emotional	   substratum	   of	   our	   political	   actions,	   and	   his	  focus	  on	  positive	   freedom	  are	   certainly	   applicable	   and	   indeed	   instructive	   to	  us	   as	  people	   of	   colour,	   and	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists.	   I	   do,	   however,	   believe	   that	   his	  inattentiveness	   to	   the	   racial	   oppression	   that	   moulds	   our	   lives	   and	   identities	   in	  particular	  ways	  has	  implications	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  radical	  humanism.	  As	  such,	  while	  Fromm’s	  radical	  humanism	  offers	  a	  fruitful	  place	  to	  start,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  build	  on	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his	   insights	   to	  construct	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism.	  The	  next	   section	  attempts	   to	  do	  this	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  work	  of	  writer	  and	  Civil	  Rights	  activist	  James	  Baldwin.	  	  	  
(6.4)	  Towards	  an	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Humanism	  	   While	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  thinkers	  who	  could	  provide	  insights	  as	  how	  to	  construct	   an	   anti-­‐racist	   humanism,	   I	   have	   chosen	   to	   explore	   James	   Baldwin’s	  approach	   for	   two	   reasons.	  151	  Firstly,	   Baldwin	   advances	   a	   psychologically	   inflected	  social	   analysis	   that	   shares	  many	   observations	   and	   conclusions	   held	   by	   Fromm.152	  Although,	   as	   a	   literary	   figure,153	  his	   analysis	   and	   concepts	   are	   not	   developed	   as	  methodically,	   his	   perspective	   nevertheless	   adds	   a	   much-­‐needed	   dimension	   to	  Fromm’s	  approach,	  pushing	  it	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism.	  Secondly,	  Baldwin’s	   humanism	   is	   fraught	  with	   complexities	   and	   contradictions	   that	   capture	  important	   aspects	   of	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   consciousness,	   including	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Including	  but	  not	  limited	  to:	  Frantz	  Fanon,	  bell	  hooks,	  Sylvia	  Wynter,	  Katherine	  McKittrick,	  Gloria	  Anzaldua,	  Jaqui	  Alexander,	  Kwame	  Appiah,	  Dina	  Georgis,	  Paul	  Gilroy,	  and	  Cornel	  West.	  	  Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  obvious	  examples	  of	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism	  was	  that	  espoused	  by	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  Interestingly,	  King’s	  philosophy	  of	  nonviolence	  was	  influenced	  by	  Fromm’s	  thought,	  especially	  his	  concept	  of	  love	  (see	  King’s	  speech	  of	  1964,	  transcribed	  by	  
Democracy	  Now,	  January	  15,	  2018).	  	  152	  To	  say	  this	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  Baldwin	  was	  influenced	  by	  psychoanalysis,	  however.	  As	  he	  recounts,	  “I	  was	  not	  even	  remotely	  tempted	  by	  the	  possibilities	  of	  psychiatry	  or	  psychoanalysis.	  For	  on	  thing,	  there	  were	  too	  many	  schools	  -­‐	  Freud,	  Horney,	  Jung,	  Reich	  (to	  suggest	  merely	  the	  tip	  of	  that	  iceberg)	  -­‐	  and,	  for	  another,	  it	  seemed	  to	  me	  that	  anyone	  who	  thought	  seriously	  that	  I	  had	  any	  desire	  to	  be	  ‘adjusted’	  to	  this	  society	  had	  to	  be	  ill;	  too	  ill,	  certainly,	  as	  time	  was	  to	  prove,	  to	  be	  trusted”	  (“Freaks	  and	  the	  American	  Ideal	  of	  Manhood,”	  1985/1998,	  p	  826).	  	  Of	  course,	  Fromm	  articulates	  a	  similar	  critique	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  definitions	  of	  sanity	  that	  hinge	  on	  one’s	  ability	  to	  “adjust”	  to	  a	  pathological	  social	  arrangement.	  	  153	  	  As	  an	  essayist,	  novelist	  and	  playwright,	  James	  Baldwin’s	  collection	  of	  works	  is	  expansive	  and	  impressive.	  As	  a	  writer,	  he	  has	  been	  situated	  among	  other	  “black-­‐American	  polemical	  essayists”	  that	  include	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  Booker	  T.	  Washington	  and	  W.E.B	  DuBois,	  as	  well	  as	  among	  “American	  romantic-­‐moralists”	  like	  Ralph	  Waldo	  Emerson,	  Henry	  Thoreau	  and	  John	  Jay	  Chapman	  (see	  Mel	  Watkins,	  1972).	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ressentimental	   character.	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   are	   helpful	   in	   that	   they	   highlight	   the	  difficulties	  in	  constructing	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism.	  	  There	  is	  a	  caveat	  that	  must	  be	  tabled	  before	  starting	  this	  discussion.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Baldwin’s	  analysis	  is	  highly	  specific	  to	  black	  and	  white	  relations	  in	  the	  United	  States	  during	  his	  time	  of	  writing	  (1947-­‐1987).	  To	  say	  this	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  he	  was	  limited	  in	  his	  perspective.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  he	  frequently	  made	  insightful	  and	  relevant	   linkages	   between	   different	   types	   of	   oppression	   worldwide.154	  His	   focus,	  however,	  was	  predominantly	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  blacks	  and	  whites	  in	  the	  American	  context.	  Given	  the	  specificity	  of	  this	  relationship	  in	  historical	  terms,155	  it	  is	  fair	   to	   say	   that	   Baldwin’s	   analysis	   cannot	   simply	   be	   transferred	   to	   the	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  context	  as	  I	  have	  framed	  it	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  With	  that	  being	  said,	  there	  are	  many	  aspects	  that	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  current	  predicament	  as	  how	  to	  construct	  an	   anti-­‐racist	   humanism.	   Moreover,	   given	   that	   Baldwin	   was	   a	   contemporary	   of	  Fromm’s,	   his	   work	   provides	   a	   direct	   challenge	   to	   Fromm’s	   formulations,	   which	  while	  also	  rooted	  largely	  in	  the	  American	  context,	  fail	  to	  consider	  race	  relations.	  In	  this	   section	   I	   put	   Baldwin	   in	   conversation	  with	   Fromm	  as	   he	   discusses	   black	   and	  white	   race	   relations	   in	   the	  US,	  before	  examining	  what	  we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  might	  extract	  for	  our	  purposes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  For	  example,	  Baldwin	  often	  spoke	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  treatment	  of	  blacks	  in	  America	  and	  the	  US	  involvement	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  He	  also	  considered	  the	  plight	  of	  those	  colonized	  by	  Western	  powers	  worldwide	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  domestic	  suffering	  of	  people	  of	  colour	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  155	  As	  Baldwin	  writes,	  for	  example,	  “the	  American	  situation	  is	  very	  peculiar,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  without	  precedent	  in	  the	  world”	  in	  “White	  Man’s	  Guilt,”	  in	  Collected	  Essays	  (Library	  of	  America,	  1998),	  725.	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How	   might	   Baldwin’s	   humanism	   be	   characterized?	   While	   Baldwin	   never	  directly	  answers	  this	  question,	  there	  are	  perhaps	  two	  primary	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  identified	   in	  his	  writings.	  The	   first	   is	   the	   fundamental	   interconnection	  between	  all	  human	  beings	  and	  the	  transcendent	  power	  of	  love;	  and	  the	  second	  is	  the	  importance	  of	   penetrating	   one’s	   illusions	   and	   taking	   responsibility	   for	   one’s	   history,	   one’s	  identities,	   and	  one’s	   future.	  Baldwin	   takes	  up	   these	   two	  points	   in	  a	  way	   that	  both	  overlaps	  with,	  and	  challenges,	  Fromm’s	  approach.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   first	   concept	   of	   human	   interconnection	   and	   love,	   Baldwin	  speaks	   of	   a	   brotherhood	   in	   both	   the	   humanistic	   and	   literal	   sense.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	  latter,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  race	  problem	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  one	  based	  upon	  white	  people’s	   denial	   and	   mistreatment	   of	   their	   “dark	   brother,”	   referring	   here	   to	   the	  history	  of	  racial	  intermixing	  that	  literally	  binds	  blacks	  to	  whites	  in	  a	  familial	  sense.	  Baldwin	   also	   speaks	   of	   human	   unity	   in	   the	   broader	   sense	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   his	  statement	  that:	  “It	  is	  not	  a	  romantic	  matter.	  	  It	  is	  the	  unalterable	  truth:	  	  all	  men	  are	  brothers.	  	  That's	  the	  bottom	  line.	  	  If	  you	  can't	  take	  it	  from	  there,	  you	  can't	  take	  it	  at	  all.”156	  All	  human	  beings	  are	  not	  just	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  “brothers	  and	  sisters”	  but	  should	   also	   be	   understood	   as	   constitutive	   of	   one	   another.	   As	   Baldwin	   writes,	  	  “…each	  of	  us,	  helplessly	  and	   forever,	   contain	   the	  other	  –	  male	   in	   female,	   female	   in	  male,	  white	  in	  black	  and	  black	  in	  white.	  We	  are	  part	  of	  each	  other.”157	  	  Relatedly,	  Baldwin’s	  humanism	  is	  one	  premised	  on	  the	  transcendent	  power	  of	  love.	  As	  he	  argues,	  “love	  takes	  off	  the	  masks	  that	  we	  fear	  we	  cannot	  live	  without	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  Karen	  Thorsen,	  James	  Baldwin:	  The	  Price	  of	  the	  Ticket,	  1989.	  157	  James	  Baldwin,	  “Freaks	  and	  the	  American	  Ideal	  of	  Manhood,”	  in	  Collected	  Essays	  (Library	  of	  America,	  1998),	  828.	  
	   269	  
and	   know	   we	   cannot	   live	   within.	   I	   use	   the	   word	   ‘love’	   here	   not	   merely	   in	   the	  personal	   sense	  but	   as	   a	   state	  of	   being,	   or	   as	   a	   state	  of	   grace	   –	  not	   in	   the	   infantile	  American	  sense	  of	  being	  made	  happy	  but	  in	  the	  tough	  and	  universal	  sense	  of	  quest	  and	  daring	  and	  growth.”158	  Like	  with	  Fromm,	  Baldwin	  is	  forwarding	  a	  definition	  of	  love	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  mature	  and	  courageous	  reckoning	  with	  oneself	  and	  the	  other.	  	  In	  order	  for	  this	  love	  to	  obtain,	  Baldwin	  argues	  that	  white	  people	  must	  learn	  how	   to	   love	   themselves	   and	   others.	   As	   he	   writes,	   “white	   people…will	   have	   quite	  enough	   to	   do	   in	   learning	   how	   to	   accept	   and	   love	   themselves	   and	   each	   other,	   and	  when	  they	  have	  achieved	  this	  —	  which	  will	  not	  be	  tomorrow	  and	  may	  very	  well	  be	  never	  —	  the	  Negro	  problem	  will	  no	  longer	  exist,	  for	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  needed.”159	  Black	  people,	  for	  their	  part,	  must	  not	  let	  their	  hearts	  be	  hardened	  by	  hate	  or	  revenge	  but	   rather	   learn	   to	   generate	   love	   for	   themselves	   and	   their	   communities	   while	  remaining	  compassionate	  towards	  their	  brainwashed	  and	  lost	  white	  “countrymen.”	  In	   an	   essay	   addressed	   to	   his	   nephew	   he	   writes:	   “…these	   [white]	   men	   are	   your	  brothers	  –	  your	  lost,	  younger	  brothers.	  And	  if	  the	  word	  integration	  means	  anything,	  this	  is	  what	  it	  means:	  that	  we,	  with	  love,	  shall	  force	  our	  brothers	  to	  see	  themselves	  as	  they	  are,	  to	  cease	  fleeing	  from	  reality	  and	  begin	  to	  change	  it.”160	  What	  is	  required	  from	  both	  sides	  is	  the	  realization	  that	  freedom	  for	  one	  can	  
only	  exist	  if	  there	  is	  also	  freedom	  for	  the	  other.	  As	  Baldwin	  writes	  in	  one	  of	  his	  most	  oft	  quoted	  passages,	  “If	  we	  –	  and	  now	  I	  mean	  the	  relatively	  conscious	  whites	  and	  the	  relatively	   conscious	   blacks,	   who	   must,	   like	   lovers,	   insist	   on,	   or	   create,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	  James	  Baldwin,	  The	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  Reissue	  edition	  (New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1992),	  95.	  159	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  17.	  	  160	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  10.	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consciousness	  of	  the	  others	  –	  do	  not	  falter	  in	  our	  duty	  now,	  we	  may	  be	  able,	  handful	  that	  we	  are,	   to	  end	   the	  racial	  nightmare,	  and	  achieve	  our	  country,	  and	  change	   the	  history	  of	  the	  world.”161	  	  For	  Baldwin,	  however,	  the	  achievement	  of	  human	  unity	  and	  interracial	   love	  are	   dependent	   on	   the	  willingness	   of	   Americans	   to	   discard	   their	   illusions	   of	  white	  supremacy	  and	  American	  exceptionality,	  which	  hurt	  not	  only	  people	  of	   colour	  but	  whites	  too.	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  Baldwin’s	  humanism	  is	  based	   in	  his	  demand	  that	  both	  groups	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  their	  histories,	  identities,	  and	  futures.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   what	   this	   means	   for	   white	   society,	   Baldwin	   identifies	   some	  common	  myths	  held	  by	  white	  Americans.	  These	  include:	  “that	  their	  ancestors	  were	  all	  freedom-­‐loving	  heroes,	  that	  they	  were	  born	  in	  the	  greatest	  country	  the	  world	  has	  ever	   seen,	   or	   that	   Americans	   are	   invincible	   in	   battle	   and	   wise	   in	   peace,	   that	  Americans	  have	  always	  dealt	  honourably	  with	  Mexicans	  and	   Indians	  and	  all	  other	  neighbors	   or	   inferiors,	   that	   American	  men	   are	   the	  world’s	  most	   direct	   and	   virile,	  that	   American	   women	   are	   pure.”162	  Baldwin	   tracks	   a	   dual	   response	   in	   the	   white	  person	  who	   is	  confronted	  –	  whether	  actually	  or	  seemingly	  –	  with	   the	  rap	  sheet	  of	  history:	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  stammering	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  plea:	  Do	  not	  blame	  me,	  I	  was	  not	  there.	  I	  did	  not	  do	  it.	  My	  history	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  Europe	  or	  the	  slave	  trade.	  Anyway,	  it	  was	  your	  chiefs	  who	  sold	  you	  to	  me.	  I	  was	  not	  present	  on	   the	   middle	   passage,	   I	   am	   not	   responsible	   for	   the	   textile	   mills	   of	  Manchester,	   or	   the	   cotton	   fields	   of	   Mississippi.	   Besides,	   consider	   how	   the	  English,	   too,	   suffered	   in	   those	  mills	   and	   in	   those	  awful	   cities.	   I	  also	   despise	  the	  governors	  of	  southern	  states	  and	  the	  sheriffs	  of	  southern	  counties,	  and	  I	  
also	  want	   your	   child	   to	   have	   a	   decent	   education	   and	   rise	   as	   high	   as	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  105.	  162	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  102.	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capabilities	   will	   permit.	   I	   have	   nothing	   against	   you,	   nothing!	  What	   do	   you	  have	  against	  me?	  What	  do	  you	  want?163	  
	  This	  plea	  for	  exoneration,	  however,	  is	  often	  expressed	  alongside	  another	  sentiment	  in	  which,	  “on	  the	  same	  day,	  in	  another	  gathering,	  and	  in	  the	  most	  private	  chamber	  of	  his	   heart,	   always,	   the	  white	  American	   remains	  proud	  of	   that	   history	   for	  which	  he	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  pay,	  and	  from	  which,	  materially,	  he	  has	  profited	  so	  much.”164	  	  Baldwin’s	   emphasis	   of	   the	  material	   nature	   of	   the	   profits	   afforded	   by	   racial	  capitalism	   is	   significant	   given	   his	   attentiveness	   to	   the	   related	   emotional	   and	  spiritual	  costs.	  Indeed,	  the	  fantasy	  and	  exercise	  of	  white	  supremacy	  has	  come	  at	  an	  exorbitant	  price	  for	  white	  people	  who	  have	  not	  only	  lost	  touch	  with	  reality	  but	  most	  tragically,	  their	  own	  humanness.	  As	  Baldwin	  argues,	  whiteness	  is	  an	  edifice	  of	  power	  and	  superiority	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  deep	  fear	  of	  life,	  leading	  to	  the	  denial	  and	  excision	  of	   all	   of	   life’s	   dark	   elements	   –	   suffering,	   tragedy,	   and	   death	   –	   which	   get	   racially	  projected	  onto	  black	  people.	  As	  he	  explains,	  	  Life	  is	  tragic	  simply	  because	  the	  earth	  turns	  and	  the	  sun	  inexorably	  rises	  and	  sets,	  and	  one	  day,	  for	  each	  of	  us,	  the	  sun	  will	  go	  down	  for	  the	  last,	  last	  time.	  Perhaps	   the	  whole	   root	   of	   our	   trouble,	   the	   human	   trouble,	   is	   that	   we	  will	  sacrifice	  all	  the	  beauty	  of	  our	  lives,	  will	  imprison	  ourselves	  in	  totems,	  taboos,	  crosses,	   blood	   sacrifices,	   steeples,	  mosques,	   races,	   armies,	   flags,	   nations,	   in	  order	  to	  deny	  the	  fact	  of	  death,	  which	  is	  the	  only	  fact	  we	  have.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  rejoice	  in	  the	  fact	  of	  death—ought	  to	  decide,	  indeed,	  to	  earn	  one’s	   death	   by	   confronting	   with	   passion	   the	   conundrum	   of	   life.	   One	   is	  responsible	   to	   life:	   It	   is	   the	   small	   beacon	   in	   that	   terrifying	   darkness	   from	  which	   we	   come	   and	   to	   which	   we	   shall	   return.	   One	   must	   negotiate	   this	  passage	  as	  nobly	  as	  possible,	   for	  the	  sake	  of	  those	  who	  are	  coming	  after	  us.	  But	  white	  Americans	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  death,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  darkness	  of	  my	  skin	  so	  intimidates	  them.165	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  Baldwin,	  “The	  White	  Man’s	  Guilt,”	  723-­‐724.	  164	  Baldwin,	  “The	  White	  Man’s	  Guilt,”	  724.	  	  165	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  91-­‐92.	  Interestingly,	  Fromm	  thinks	  that	  we	  are	  in	  a	  necrophilic	  state	  –	  the	  love	  of	  dead	  things.	  I	  wonder,	  though,	  following	  Baldwin,	  if	  capitalism	  itself	  is	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  The	   result	   of	   this	   situation	   has	   been	   perilous	   for	   white	   culture,	   which	   Baldwin	  describes	  as	  exhibiting	  "an	  emotional	  poverty	  so	  bottomless	  and	  a	  terror	  of	  human	  life,	  of	  human	  touch,	  so	  deep	  that	  virtually	  no	  American	  appears	  able	  to	  achieve	  any	  viable	  organic	  connection	  between	  his	  public	  stance	  and	  his	  private	  life.”166	  	  What	  Baldwin	  offers	  white	  Americans	  is	  a	  choice.	  Firstly,	  he	  instructs	  white	  people	   to	   understand	   that	   they	   “are	   not	  white”	   and	   that	   “part	   of	   the	   price	   of	   the	  white	   ticket	   is	   to	   delude	   themselves	   into	   believing	   that	   they	   are.”167	  For	   Baldwin	  whiteness	   is	   a	   subjectivity	   based	   in	   a	   false	   supremacy,	   a	   denial	   of	   reality,	   the	  dehumanization	   of	   self	   and	   other,	   the	   worship	   of	   things	   over	   human	   life,	   and	   a	  terror	  of	  life	  itself.	  White	  people	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  their	  fictitious	  whiteness	  and	   take	   responsibility	   for	   their	   history,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   present.168	  As	   Baldwin	  implores:	  White	  man,	  hear	  me!	  History,	  as	  nearly	  no	  one	  seems	  to	  know,	  is	  not	  merely	  something	  to	  be	  read.	  And	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  merely,	  or	  even	  principally,	  to	  the	  past.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  great	  force	  of	  history	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  carry	   it	   within	   us,	   are	   unconsciously	   controlled	   by	   it	   in	   many	   ways,	   and	  history	   is	   literally	  present	   in	   all	   that	  we	  do.	   It	   could	   scarcely	   be	   otherwise,	  since	  it	  is	  to	  history	  that	  we	  owe	  our	  frames	  of	  reference,	  our	  identities,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  based	  more	  in	  the	  fear	  of	  death	  than	  in	  the	  love	  of	  dead	  things.	  That	  is,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  material	  world	  that	  cannot	  die	  and	  that	  one	  can	  flee	  into	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  death,	  and	  to	  escape	  nature,	  which	  is	  replete	  with	  it.	  	  166	  	  Baldwin,	  No	  Name	  in	  the	  Streets,	  in	  Collected	  Essays	  (Library	  of	  America,	  1998):	  385.	  167	  Baldwin,	  Price	  of	  the	  Ticket,	  in	  Collected	  Essays	  (Library	  of	  America,	  1998):	  835.	  168	  As	  Baldwin	  elaborates:	  “Or,	  to	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  as	  long	  as	  white	  Americans	  take	  refuge	  in	  their	  whiteness—for	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  walk	  out	  of	  this	  most	  monstrous	  of	  traps—they	  will	  allow	  millions	  of	  people	  to	  be	  slaughtered	  in	  their	  name,	  and	  will	  be	  manipulated	  into	  and	  surrender	  themselves	  to	  what	  they	  will	  think	  of—and	  justify—as	  a	  racial	  war.	  They	  will	  never,	  so	  long	  as	  their	  whiteness	  puts	  so	  sinister	  a	  distance	  between	  themselves	  and	  their	  own	  experience	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  others,	  feel	  themselves	  sufficiently	  human,	  sufficiently	  worthwhile,	  to	  become	  responsible	  for	  themselves,	  their	  leaders,	  their	  country,	  their	  children,	  or	  their	  fate”	  (in	  “An	  Open	  Letter	  to	  My	  Sister,	  Miss	  Angela	  Davis,”	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  of	  Books,	  January	  7,	  1971).	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our	  aspirations.	  And	  it	  is	  with	  great	  pain	  and	  terror	  that	  one	  begins	  to	  realize	  this.	   In	   great	   pain	   and	   terror	   one	   begins	   to	   assess	   the	   history	   which	   has	  placed	  one	  where	  one	   is,	  and	   formed	  one’s	  point	  of	  view.	   In	  great	  pain	  and	  terror	  because,	  thereafter,	  one	  enters	  into	  battle	  with	  that	  historical	  creation,	  Oneself,	   and	   attempts	   to	   recreate	   oneself	   according	   to	   a	   principle	   more	  humane	   and	  more	   liberating:	   one	   begins	   the	   attempt	   to	   achieve	   a	   level	   of	  personal	  maturity	   and	   freedom	  which	   robs	   history	   of	   its	   tyrannical	   power,	  and	  also	  changes	  history.169	  	   What	   Baldwin	   is	   calling	   for	   is	   a	   courageous	   self-­‐confrontation	   which,	  although	   painful	   and	   terrifying,	   is	   the	   only	   path	   from	   “moral	  monster”	   to	   human	  being.170	  He	  invites	  the	  white	  person	  to	  “consent,	  in	  effect,	  to	  become	  black	  himself,	  to	   become	   a	   part	   of	   that	   suffering	   and	   dancing	   country	   that	   he	   now	   watches	  wistfully	   from	  the	  heights	  of	  his	   lonely	  power,	  and	  armed	  with	  spiritual	  traveller’s	  cheques,	  visits	  secretly	  after	  dark.”171	  In	   terms	  of	   the	  treatment	  of	  blacks	  by	  white	  Americans,	  Baldwin	  puts	  the	  onus	  on	  white	  people	  to	  “try	  to	  find	  out	  in	  their	  hearts	  why	  it	  was	  necessary	  for	  them	  to	  have	  a	  n**ger	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Because	  I	  am	  not	  a	  n**ger.	  I'm	  a	  man.	  If	  I'm	  not	  the	  n**ger	  here,	  and	  if	  you	  invented	  him,	  you	  the	  white	  people	  invented	  him,	  then	  you	  have	  to	  find	  out	  why.	  And	  the	  future	  of	  the	  country	  depends	   on	   that.	   Whether	   or	   not	   it	   is	   able	   to	   ask	   that	   question.”172	  Baldwin’s	  unequivocal	   demand	   that	  white	   people	   take	   responsibility	   not	   only	   for	   their	   own	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  Baldwin,	  “The	  White	  Man’s	  Guilt”	  723.	  170	  "These	  people,"	  Baldwin	  says,	  "have	  deluded	  themselves	  so	  long,	  they	  really	  don't	  think	  I'm	  human.	  I	  base	  this	  on	  their	  conduct,	  not	  on	  what	  they	  say.	  And	  this	  means	  ...	  they	  have	  become	  moral	  monsters	  (from	  Raoul	  Peck's,	  I	  Am	  Not	  Your	  Negro,	  Documentary,	  2017).	  171	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  96.	  172	  From	  Raoul	  Peck's	  documentary,	  I	  Am	  Not	  Your	  Negro,	  2017.	  Novelist	  Toni	  Morrison	  in	  a	  1993	  interview	  with	  Charlie	  Rose	  makes	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  statement	  when	  she	  says,	  “If	  you	  can	  only	  be	  tall	  because	  somebody	  is	  on	  their	  knees	  then	  you	  have	  a	  serious	  problem.	  And	  my	  feeling	  is	  white	  people	  have	  a	  very	  very	  serious	  problem.	  And	  they	  should	  start	  think	  about	  what	  they	  can	  do	  about	  it.”	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moral	  state	  of	  being	  but	  also	  for	  the	  terror	  that	  they	  inflict	  on	  others	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  racially	  united	  future.173	  	  	  	   For	   black	   people,	   the	   delusions	   that	   must	   be	   confronted	   and	   the	  responsibilities	   that	  are	   to	  be	  seized	  are	  of	  an	  entirely	  different	  order.	   In	   terms	  of	  delusions,	   Baldwin	   argues	   that	   blacks	   have	   never	   been	   deceived	   by	   the	   lies	   that	  white	  people	  tell	  themselves	  and	  live	  by,	  often	  viewing	  them	  instead	  as	  the	  “slightly	  mad	   victims	   of	   their	   own	   brainwashing.” 174 	  Rather,	   there	   are	   perhaps	   two	  alternative	   tasks	   that	   must	   be	   undertaken.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   of	   shedding	   “black”	  identity	   insofar	  as	  blackness	   is	  equated	  with	   that	  which	   is	  base,	   immoral,	   inferior,	  and	   subhuman.	  One	   of	   the	   central	   achievements	   of	   Baldwin’s	  writing	   has	   been	   to	  write	   the	   black	   American	   experience	   into	   existence.	   For	   Baldwin,	   this	   experience	  cannot	  be	  conveyed	  without	  understanding	  the	  centrality	  of	  black	  suffering:	  This	  past,	  the	  Negro's	  past,	  of	  rope,	  fire,	  torture,	  castration,	  infanticide,	  rape;	  death	  and	  humiliation;	  fear	  by	  day	  and	  night,	  fear	  as	  deep	  as	  the	  marrow	  of	  the	  bone;	  doubt	  that	  he	  was	  worthy	  of	  life,	  since	  everyone	  around	  him	  denied	  it;	   sorrow	   for	   his	  women,	   for	   his	   kinfolk,	   for	   his	   children,	  who	   needed	   his	  protection,	  and	  whom	  he	  could	  not	  protect;	  rage,	  hatred,	  and	  murder,	  hatred	  for	  white	  men	  so	  deep	  that	  it	  often	  turned	  against	  him	  and	  his	  own,	  and	  made	  all	  love,	  all	  trust,	  all	  joy	  impossible.175	   	  	  He	   describes	   this	   feeling	   of	   unworthiness	   further	   as	   “the	   American	  triumph—in	   which	   the	   American	   tragedy	   has	   always	   been	   implicit”	   that	   aims	   at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Perhaps	  a	  step	  in	  this	  direction	  is	  Tim	  Wise’s	  Speaking	  Treason	  Fluently:	  Anti-­‐Racist	  
Reflections	  From	  an	  Angry	  White	  Male	  (2008).	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  Wise	  is	  not	  without	  controversy.	  See	  for	  example:	  R.L.	  Stephens,	  “Tim	  Wise	  &	  The	  Failure	  of	  Privilege	  Discourse,”	  Orchestrated	  Pulse,	  October	  1,	  2013;	  and	  The	  Stream	  Team,	  “Anti-­‐Racism	  Activist	  Gets	  Backlash	  over	  Facebook	  Rant,”	  The	  Stream	  Blog	  Aljazeera	  America,	  accessed	  March	  14,	  2018.	  174	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  102.	  	  175	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  98.	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inciting	  self-­‐hatred	  among	  black	  people.	  As	  he	  shares,	  “When	  I	  was	  little	  I	  despised	  myself,	   I	  did	  not	  know	  any	  better.	  And	  this	  meant,	  albeit	  unconsciously,	  or	  against	  my	   will,	   or	   in	   great	   pain,	   that	   I	   also	   despised	   my	   father.	  And	  my	   mother.	  And	  my	  brothers.	   And	  my	   sisters.”176	  For	   Baldwin	   himself,	   the	   overwhelming	   humiliation	  and	   despair	   of	   the	   black	   experience	   is	  what	   led	   him	   to	   flee	   the	   United	   States	   for	  Europe	   where	   he	   was	   able	   to	   metabolize	   some	   of	   the	   pain	   of	   his	   racialized	  experience	  and	  engage	  in	  a	  project	  of	  self-­‐creation.	  As	  he	  describes,	  In	   America,	   the	   color	   of	   my	   skin	   had	   stood	   between	   myself	   and	   me;	   in	  Europe,	  that	  barrier	  was	  down.	  Nothing	  is	  more	  desirable	  than	  to	  be	  released	  from	  an	   affliction,	   but	   nothing	   is	  more	   frightening	   than	   to	   be	   divested	   of	   a	  crutch.	  It	  turned	  out	  that	  the	  question	  of	  who	  I	  was	  was	  not	  solved	  because	  I	  had	   removed	   myself	   from	   the	   social	   forces	   which	   menaced	   me—anyway,	  these	   forces	  had	  become	  interior,	  and	  I	  had	  dragged	  them	  across	  the	  ocean	  with	  me.	  The	  question	  of	  who	  I	  was	  had	  at	  last	  become	  a	  personal	  question,	  and	  the	  answer	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  me.177	  	  	   What	  Baldwin	  is	  speaking	  of	  here	  is	  the	  struggle	  to	  rehumanize	  oneself.	  This	  is	  needed	   for	  black	  people	  and	  other	  people	  of	   colour	   in	  order	   that	   they	  may	   find	  their	  rightful	  place	  at	  the	  table	  of	  human	  belonging.	  Baldwin	  emphasizes	  that	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  wanting	   to	  be	  white	  or	  striving	   toward	  white	  civility.	  To	   the	  contrary,	  he	  is	  quick	  to	  admonish	  and	  expose	  white	  civilization	  for	  the	  dishonesty,	  narcissism,	   and	   cruelty	   that	   have	   been	   hallmarks	   of	   its	   rule.	   After	   all,	   as	   Baldwin	  states,	  “How	  can	  one	  respect,	  let	  alone	  adopt,	  the	  values	  of	  a	  people	  who	  do	  not,	  on	  any	   level	   whatever,	   live	   the	   way	   they	   say	   they	   do,	   or	   the	   way	   they	   say	   they	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  Baldwin,	  “An	  Open	  Letter	  to	  My	  Sister,	  Miss	  Angela	  Davis.”	  	  177	  Baldwin	  in	  Henry	  Louis	  Gates	  Jr.,	  “From	  the	  Stacks:	  ‘The	  Fire	  Last	  Time,’”	  The	  New	  
Republic,	  August	  2,	  2013.	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should?”178	  What	  is	  needed,	  rather,	  is	  for	  black	  people	  to	  love	  themselves	  and	  accept	  themselves	  as	  they	  are.	  That	  is,	  to	  accept	  their	  history	  and	  struggle,	  and	  to	  not	  only	  remember	  where	  they	  came	  from	  but	  to	  reap	  the	  bitter	  fruits	  of	  their	  experiences	  to	  guide	  them	  into	  the	  future.179	  	  The	   second	   task	   is	   to	   avoid	   the	   temptations	   of	   resurrecting	   an	   ideology	   of	  counter	   supremacy	   while	   undertaking	   this	   rehumanization	   process.	   Baldwin	  discusses	  this	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  Nation	  of	  Islam	  who	  he	  at	  once	  deeply	  sympathizes	  with,	  while	  also	  remaining	  skeptical	  that	  a	  doctrine	  of	  black	  superiority	  grounded	  in	  a	  mythical	  history	  can	  provide	  the	  type	  of	  spiritual	  and	  material	  emancipation	  that	  is	  needed.	  As	  he	  states:	  “I	  am	  very	  much	  concerned	  that	  American	  Negroes	  achieve	  their	  freedom	  here	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  But	  I	  am	  also	  concerned	  for	  their	  dignity,	  for	  the	  health	  of	  their	  souls,	  and	  must	  oppose	  any	  attempt	  that	  Negroes	  may	  make	  to	  do	  to	  others	  what	  has	  been	  done	  to	  them.	   I	   think	  I	  know	  –	  we	  see	   it	  around	  us	  every	  day	  –	  the	  spiritual	  wasteland	  to	  which	  that	  road	  leads.	  It	  is	  so	  simple	  a	  fact	  and	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  96.	  As	  Baldwin	  further	  writes,	  “White	  Americans	  find	  it	  as	  difficult	  as	  white	  people	  elsewhere	  do	  to	  divest	  themselves	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  they	  are	  in	  possession	  of	  some	  intrinsic	  value	  that	  black	  people	  need,	  or	  want.	  And	  this	  assumption—which,	  for	  example,	  makes	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  Negro	  problem	  depend	  on	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  Negroes	  accept	  and	  adopt	  white	  standards—is	  revealed	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  striking	  ways,	  from	  Bobby	  Kennedy's	  assurance	  that	  a	  Negro	  can	  become	  President	  in	  forty	  years	  to	  the	  unfortunate	  tone	  of	  warm	  congratulation	  with	  which	  so	  many	  liberals	  address	  their	  Negro	  equals.	  It	  is	  the	  Negro,	  of	  course,	  who	  is	  presumed	  to	  have	  become	  equal	  –	  an	  achievement	  that	  not	  only	  proves	  the	  comforting	  fact	  that	  perseverance	  has	  no	  color	  but	  also	  overwhelmingly	  corroborates	  the	  white	  man’s	  sense	  of	  his	  own	  value.	  Alas,	  this	  value	  can	  scarcely	  be	  corroborated	  in	  any	  other	  way;	  there	  is	  certainly	  little	  enough	  in	  the	  white	  man's	  public	  or	  private	  life	  that	  one	  should	  desire	  to	  imitate.	  White	  men,	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  their	  hearts,	  know	  this”	  (Fire	  Next	  Time,	  95).	  179	  In	  Baldwin’s	  words:	  “this	  past,	  this	  endless	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  and	  reveal	  and	  confirm	  a	  human	  identity,	  human	  authority,	  yet	  contains,	  for	  all	  its	  horror,	  something	  very	  beautiful.	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  be	  sentimental	  about	  suffering-­‐-­‐enough	  is	  certainly	  as	  good	  as	  a	  feast	  –	  but	  people	  who	  cannot	  suffer	  can	  never	  grow	  up,	  can	  never	  discover	  who	  they	  are.”	  (Fire	  Next	  
Time,	  98)	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that	   is	  so	  hard,	  apparently,	   to	  grasp:	  whoever	  debases	  others	  is	  debasing	  himself.”180	  Baldwin	   argues	   that	   black	   people	   must	   not	   commit	   the	   “European	   error”	   of	  presuming	   their	   own	   superiority	   over	   others.	   Rejecting	   the	   model	   of	   racial	  separatism	  proposed	  by	   the	  Nation	  of	   Islam,	  Baldwin	  makes	   the	  radical	  statement	  that	  white	  people	  and	  black	  people	  deeply	  need	  one	  another.181	  In	   what	   way	   is	   Baldwin’s	   humanistic	   vision	   similar	   to	   Fromm’s?	   The	   two	  writers	  emphasize	  a	  number	  of	  common	  points,	  including	  the	  interrelatedness	  of	  all	  human	   beings;	   the	   importance	   and	   primacy	   of	   love;	   the	   necessity	   of	   breaking	  through	  illusions	  and	  giving	  up	  comforting	  falsities;	  and	  the	  need	  for	  people	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  lives	  and	  actions.	  Both	  are	  also	  harsh	  critics	  of	  the	  emptiness	  and	   superficiality	   that	   governs	   mainstream	   culture,	   and	   speak	   of	   the	   need	   to	  overcome	  the	  destructive	  system	  of	  capitalism	  and	  embrace	  a	  socialist	  alternative.	  Baldwin,	  however,	  corrects	  the	  two	  limitations	  of	  Fromm’s	  humanism	  as	  identified	  in	  the	  last	  section.	  That	  is,	  his	  generalizing	  of	  the	  white	  experience	  (in	  the	  American	  context)	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  all	  Americans;	  and	  his	  failure	  to	  include	  a	  discussion	  of	  white	   supremacy	   into	   his	   analysis	   which,	   in	   turn,	   impoverishes	   his	   analysis	   of	  mainstream	  culture;	  socialism;	  and	  his	  theory	  of	  humanism	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Reading	   Fromm	   next	   to	   Baldwin	   reveals	   the	   one-­‐sidedness	   of	   Fromm’s	  understanding	   of	   the	   American	   experience	   and	   consciousness.	  We	   remember,	   for	  example,	  that	  Fromm’s	  starting	  point	  as	  established	  in	  his	  breakthrough	  monograph	  
Escape	  From	  Freedom,	   is	   that	   negative	   freedom	   has	   been	   achieved	   in	   Europe	   and	  North	  America.	  Given	  the	  situation	  of	  blacks	   in	  the	  United	  States	   in	  1941,	  the	  year	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  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  83.	  181	  Baldwin,	  Fire	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  97.	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his	  book	  was	  published,	  it	  is	  undeniably	  clear	  that	  in	  speaking	  of	  negative	  freedom,	  or	   the	   liberation	   from	   social,	   economic,	   and	   political	   bondage,	   Fromm	   was	   not	  considering	   black	   people	   or	   people	   of	   colour	   generally.	   The	   situation	   of	   black	  people,	  as	  Baldwin’s	  work	  plainly	  shows,	  was	  that	  of	  an	  entirely	  different	  nature.182	  Indeed,	   the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  was	   an	   attempt	   to	   address	   and	   seek	   liberation	  from	  the	  bondage	  that	  was	  long	  ago	  achieved	  by	  the	  white	  people	  that	  Fromm	  takes	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  culture.	  Fromm’s	  omission	  here	  should	  not	  be	  pardoned	  on	  the	  grounds	   that	  he	  was	   forwarding	  a	  general	  argument	  based	  on	   the	   situation	  of	  the	  majority.	  Rather,	  it	  could	  be	  asked	  how	  Fromm’s	  denial	  of	  white	  supremacy,	  and	  the	  suffering	   it	   causes	  people	  of	  colour,	  distorts	  his	  understanding	  of	   this	  majority	  itself.	   It	   furthermore	  begs	   the	  question	   as	   to	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  white	  American	  society	   was	   (and	   is)	   truly	   poised	   to	   seize	   positive	   freedom,	   given	   its	   position	   as	  captor	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  others.	  Thus,	  what	   is	  missing	   in	  Fromm’s	  analysis	   is	  a	   thoughtful	   investigation	   into	  how	   white	   supremacy,	   as	   an	   undergirding	   ideology	   of	   North	   American	   society,	  positions	  us	  differentially	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  determines	  our	  differential	  access	   to	   love,	   belonging,	   existential	   security,	   material	   resources,	   power,	   and	  freedom.	  As	  both	  authors	  realize,	  the	  relationship	  between	  opposing	  groups	  cannot	  be	   constructed	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   simple	   oppressor/victim	   binary	   as	   oppression	  guarantees	   suffering	   and	   dehumanization	   of	   both	   sides.	   With	   that	   being	   said,	  however,	  each	  side	   is	  presented	  with	  separate	  challenges	  and	  responsibilities	   that	  accompany	  the	  re-­‐humanization	  of	  one’s	  relationship	  to	  self	  and	  other.	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  Contemporary	  author	  Ta-­‐Nehisi	  Coates	  writes	  in	  similarly	  stirring	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  black	  in	  the	  United	  States	  today.	  See	  Between	  the	  World	  and	  Me	  (2015).	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As	  it	  stands,	  this	  omission	  weakens	  Fromm’s	  notion	  of	  humanism,	  not	  only	  in	  regards	  to	  his	  faulty	  starting	  premise	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  types	  of	  future	  that	  he	  imagines.	   Like	   Fromm,	   Baldwin	   also	   supports	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   socialist	  society,	   stating	   that:	   “the	   necessity	   for	   a	   form	   of	   socialism	   is	   based	   on	   the	  observation	   that	   the	   world’s	   present	   economic	   arrangements	   doom	   most	   of	   the	  world	  to	  misery;	  that	  the	  way	  of	  life	  dictated	  by	  these	  arrangements	  is	  both	  sterile	  and	   immoral;	   and	   finally,	   that	   there	   is	   no	   hope	   for	   peace	   in	   the	  world	   so	   long	   as	  these	   arrangements	   obtain.”183	  	   The	   difference	   between	   Fromm’s	   ideal	   of	   socialist	  humanism	  and	  Baldwin’s,	  however,	   is	   that	  Baldwin	  has	   little	   faith	   in	   the	  humanist	  predecessors	   that	  Fromm	  celebrates.184	  Indeed,	  Baldwin	  makes	   the	  statement	   that	  “all	   of	   the	   Western	   nations	   have	   been	   caught	   in	   a	   lie,	   the	   lie	   of	   their	   pretended	  humanism”185	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  treatment	  of	  people	  of	  colour.	  What	  Baldwin	  is	  calling	   for	   instead,	   is	   an	   “indigenous	   socialism,	   formed	  by,	   and	   responding	   to,	   the	  real	  needs	  of	   the	  American	  people.”186	  Bill	  Lyne	  makes	   the	  argument	   that	  Baldwin	  should	  be	   read	  here	  as	   a	  part	  of	   a	  black	   socialist	   tradition	   that	  demonstrates	   that	  “black	   isn’t	   just	  an	  auxiliary	  to	  a	   left	  moved	  to	  the	  center;	  Black	   is	   left	  as	  was	   long	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Baldwin,	  No	  Name	  in	  the	  Street,	  461.	  	  184	  Of	  course	  this	  is	  not	  an	  entirely	  fair	  statement	  given	  that	  Fromm	  was	  inspired	  by	  diverse	  traditions	  –	  not	  all	  of	  which	  were	  of	  Western	  origin.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  Fromm	  traced	  his	  humanistic	  lineage	  to	  Enlightenment/Judeo-­‐Christian	  writings	  and	  thinkers.	  	  185	  Baldwin,	  No	  Name	  in	  the	  Street,	  406.	  	  186	  Baldwin,	  No	  Name	  in	  the	  Street,	  461.	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before	  Marx.”187	  That	  is,	  black	  socialism	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  struggles	  and	  experiences	  of	  black	  people,	  and	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  needs	  and	  knowledge	  that	  arise	  from	  these.188	  	  The	  central	  point	  here	  is	  that	  given	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  European	  humanism	  has	   reigned	  alongside	   the	   slavery,	   colonization,	   and	   symbolic	   erasure	  of	  people	  of	  colour,	   the	   “moral	   authority”	   of	   the	  West	  must	  be	   called	   into	  question.189	  An	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism	  must	  thus	  construct	  an	  alternative	  that	  does	  not	  merely	  attempt	  to	  install	   a	   pre-­‐existing	   Western	   form	   of	   humanism	   but	   that	   perhaps	   cautiously	  borrows	   from	   it	   while	   centrally	   being	   informed	   by	   our	   own	   experiences	   and	  struggles	   as	   people	   of	   colour.	   For	   this	   “indigenous”	   or	   grassroots	   (and	   non-­‐doctrinaire)	  movement	  to	  take	  form,	  however,	  we	  must	  heed	  Baldwin’s	  counsel	  and	  begin	  to	  release	  ourselves	  from	  the	  grasp	  of	  white	  supremacy,	  and	  do	  the	  work	  that	  is	  required	  to	  re-­‐humanize	  ourselves.	  	  	  As	   Baldwin’s	   own	   life	   reveals,	   however,	   he	   was	   not	   always	   able	   to	   stand	  behind	   this	   project	   himself.	   What	   makes	   his	   humanism	   all	   the	   more	   honest	   and	  instructive	  is	  his	  anger,	  frustration,	  despair,	  bitterness,	  and	  contempt	  –	  feelings	  that	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  ressentimental.	   Indeed,	  his	  career	  has	  been	  split	   into	  two	  phases:	  his	  pre-­‐1963	  works,	  dubbed	  humanist-­‐integrationalist,	  and	  celebrated	  by	  the	  white	  liberal	  literary	  community;	  and	  his	  post-­‐1963	  writings	  which	  are	  seen	  to	  suffer	  from	  “bitterness	   and	   pamphleteering”	   and	   which	   have	   largely	   been	   ignored	   by	   the	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  Bill	  Lyne,	  “God’s	  Black	  Revolutionary	  Mouth:	  James	  Baldwin’s	  Black	  Radicalism,”	  Science	  
&	  Society	  74,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  34.	  188	  For	  a	  deeper	  discussion	  of	  this,	  see	  Cedric	  J.	  Robinson’s	  Black	  Marxism:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  
Black	  Radical	  Tradition	  (Zed,	  1983).	  189	  Baldwin,	  No	  Name	  in	  the	  Street,	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mainstream	  establishment.190	  These	   two	  phases	  have	  come	  to	  represent	   the	  break	  between	   humanist	   or	   “good”	   Baldwin,	   and	   black	   radical	   or	   “bad”	   Baldwin.191	  Scholars	  and	  literary	  commentators	  have	  offered	  conflicting	  theories	  to	  explain	  this	  shift	   in	   perspectives.	   It	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   black	   radicalism	   was	   always	   a	  current	   in	   Baldwin’s	   writing,	   including	   in	   his	   “integrationalist”	   early	   period,	   but	  which	  developed	  to	   its	   full	  potential	   in	  his	   later	  writings.192	  On	  the	  contrary,	   it	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  authentic	  Baldwin	  is	  the	  humanist	  one	  and	  his	  capitulation	  to	  Black	  Panther	  separatist	  radicalism	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  his	  relevance	  and	  redeem	   himself	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   black	   activists	   who	   had	   no	  patience	   for	   his	   conciliatory	   cadence.193	  From	   Baldwin’s	   own	   accounts,	   we	   know	  that	  he	  was	  deeply	  affected	  by	  the	  murder	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  murders	   of	   other	   civil	   rights	   leaders	   –	   all	   of	  whom	   represented	   the	  hope	  of	   a	  certain	   dream	   that,	   for	   Baldwin,	   died	   along	  with	   them.	  We	  may	   never	   fully	   know	  what	  accounted	  for	  Baldwin’s	  change	  in	  tone	  from	  humanist	  to	  what	  could	  be	  called	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  Lyne,	  12.	  	  191	  Lyne	  29.	  The	  rejection	  of	  Baldwin	  by	  the	  white	  liberal	  establishment	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  other	  African	  American	  writers	  and	  political	  figures	  –	  such	  as	  W.E.B	  Du	  Bois,	  Amiri	  Baraka,	  Langston	  Hughes	  and	  even	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr	  –	  who	  were	  also	  ousted	  from	  white	  liberal	  acceptance	  once	  their	  views	  became	  too	  “radical.”	  	  192	  See	  Bill	  Lyne’s	  article	  “God’s	  Black	  Revolutionary	  Mouth:	  James	  Baldwin’s	  Black	  Radicalism,”	  for	  this	  point	  of	  view.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  Baldwin	  never	  saw	  himself	  as	  an	  “integrationalist,”	  he	  would	  grow	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  the	  role	  that	  he	  played	  in	  white	  liberal	  imagination.	  As	  he	  would	  recount,	  “I	  was,	  in	  some	  way,	  in	  those	  years,	  without	  entirely	  realizing	  it,	  the	  Great	  Black	  Hope	  of	  the	  Great	  White	  Father”	  (Raoul	  Peck,	  I	  Am	  Not	  Your	  Negro,	  Documentary,	  2017).	  	  	  	  193	  See	  Henry	  Louis	  Gates	  Jr.’s	  “From	  the	  Stacks:	  the	  Fire	  Last	  Time”	  for	  this	  view.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  cutting	  criticism	  came	  from	  Eldridge	  Cleaver,	  Minister	  of	  Information	  for	  the	  Black	  Panther	  Party,	  who	  reproached	  Baldwin	  for	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  “the	  most	  gruelling,	  agonizing,	  total	  hatred	  of	  the	  blacks,	  particularly	  of	  himself,	  and	  the	  most	  shameful,	  fanatical,	  fawning,	  sycophantic	  love	  of	  the	  whites	  that	  one	  can	  find	  in	  any	  black	  American	  writer	  of	  note	  in	  our	  time”	  (in	  Gates,	  2013).	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ressentimental.	  What	  can	  be	  said,	  however,	   is	   that	  his	  earlier	  work	   is	  certainly	  not	  devoid	   of	   ressentimental	   elements,	   just	   as	   his	   later	   work	   still	   contains	   humanist	  features	   in	   which	   he	   speaks	   of	   interconnection,	   and	   an	   interracial	   effort	   toward	  freedom.194	  	  Gates	  argues	  that	  rather	  than	  forcing	  upon	  Baldwin	  the	  role	  of	  spokesperson,	  we	  should	  accept	  his	  own	  self-­‐chosen	  position	  as	   “witness.”	  For	  Gates,	   “the	  puzzle	  was	   that	   his	   arguments,	   richly	   nuanced	   and	   self-­‐consciously	   ambivalent,	  were	   far	  too	  complex	  to	  serve	  straightforwardly	  political	  ends.”195	  As	  such,	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	   commit	   him	   to	   a	   certain	   political	   position,	   Baldwin	   serves	   us	   best	   as	   a	  contradictory	  figure	  who,	   in	  his	  own	  words,	  was	  caught	  “between	  love	  and	  power,	  between	   pain	   and	   rage…perpetually	   attempting	   to	   choose	   the	   better	   of	   the	  worse.”196	  Baldwin	  thus	  signals	  that	  the	  path	  to	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism	  may	  likely	  be	  a	   shaky	  one,	   replete	  with	   tensions	  and	   contradictions.	   Like	  with	  Baldwin,	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  ressentimental	  feelings	  of	  hatred,	  bitterness,	  anger,	  and	  despair	  may	  exist	  alongside	  a	  desire	  for	  courageous	  self-­‐responsibility,	  racial	  reconciliation,	  and	  a	  future	  built	  on	  the	  foundations	  of	  love,	  truth,	  accountability,	  and	  peace.	  	  While	  Baldwin	  is	  speaking	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  American	  situation	  of	  black	  and	  white	  relations,	  his	  words	  are	  also	  helpful	  in	  directing	  white	  people	  in	  the	  Canadian	  context	   toward	  undergoing	   their	   own	   “pain	   and	   terror”	  of	   self-­‐confrontation.	  This	  means	   “open[ing]	   a	   dialogue	   which	   must,	   if	   it	   is	   honest,	   become	   a	   personal	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  See	  Henry	  Louis	  Gates	  Jr.	  (2013)	  195	  Gates	  Jr.	  	  196	  Baldwin,	  Fire	  Next	  Time,	  60.	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confession	  –	  a	  cry	  for	  help	  and	  healing.”197	  As	  Baldwin	  discusses,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  shedding,	  what	  we	  discussed	  earlier	  as,	   “white	   tears”	  rooted	   in	  a	  guilt	   for	  one’s	  unearned	   privilege	  while	   secretly	   valuing	   the	   social	   order	   that	   it	   permits.	   Indeed,	  Baldwin	   is	   calling	   into	   question	   the	   very	   basis	   of	   this	   “privilege”	   by	   stressing	   the	  dehumanizing	   costs	   of	   it.	   He	   is	   not	   asking	  white	   people	   to	   simply	   own	   up	   to	   the	  material	   benefits	   they	   are	   assumed	   to	   enjoy	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   people	   of	   colour,	   but	  rather	  to	  stop	  deceiving	  themselves	  into	  thinking	  that	  they	  are	  truly	  happy	  given	  the	  moral	  decay,	  emotional	  poverty,	  and	  alienation	  that	  can	  so	  readily	  be	  sensed	  under	  their	  postures	  of	  “power.”	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  white	  people	  do	  not	  have	  greater	  opportunities,	  access,	  representation,	  recognition,	  wealth,	  and	  the	  psychic	  comforts	  that	  follow	  (belonging,	  self-­‐esteem,	  ease	  of	  being,	  safety)	  within	  our	  current	  system.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  treating	  white	  privilege	  as	  some	  type	  of	  ontological	  jackpot	  1)	  obscures	  the	  costs	  of	  whiteness	  on	  one’s	  humanity;	  and	  2)	  marks	  these	  privileges	  as	  desirable/aspirational,	  foreclosing	  a	  meditation	  as	  to	  whether	  we	  should	  want	  to	  live	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (i.e.	  in	  an	  alienated	  and	  exploitative	  capitalist	  society).	  	  	  Instead	   of	   feeling	   guilty	   and	   engaging	   in	   inane	   performances	   of	  remorsefulness,	   what	   Baldwin	   is	   demanding	   is	   that	   white	   people	   do	   their	   “first	  works	  over,”	  which	  means	  “to	  re-­‐examine	  everything…go	  back	  to	  where	  you	  started,	  or	  as	  far	  back	  as	  you	  can,	  examine	  all	  of	  it,	  travel	  your	  road	  again	  and	  tell	  the	  truth	  about	   it.”198	  The	   crucial	   point	   here	   is	   that	   this	   work	   is	   not	   simply	   to	   be	   done	   for	  people	  of	  colour	   in	   the	  name	  of	   “social	   justice”	  or	   “equality”	   (as	  seen	  with	  current	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Baldwin,	  “The	  White	  Man’s	  Guilt,”	  725	  198	  Baldwin,	  Price	  of	  the	  Ticket,	  841.	  
	   284	  
conceptions	   of	   white	   allyship).	   Rather,	   what	   white	   people	   must	   realize	   is	   that	  dismantling	  white	  supremacy	  and	   its	  attendant	  economy	  of	  racial	  capitalism	   is	   for	  
their	  freedom	  too.	  In	  the	  Canadian	  context,	  part	  of	  this	  reckoning	  must	  involve	  taking	  responsibility	   for	   the	   genocide	   of	   Indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   treatment	   of	   Asian	  immigrants,	   Islamophobia,	   anti-­‐black	   racism	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   oppression,	   in	  order	  to	  engage	  honestly	  and	  with	  humility	  in	  the	  work	  of	  reconciliation.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  and	  people	  of	  colour	  in	  general,	  Baldwin	  also	  instructs	  us	  to	  do	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  facing	  ourselves	  with	  courage	  and	  honesty,	  and	  renouncing	   our	   faith	   in	   a	   system	   that	   is	   incapable	   of	   justice	   and	   equality.	   While	  Baldwin	  may	  be	  correct	   in	   saying	   that	  people	  of	   colour	  are	   skeptical	  of	   the	  myths	  propagated	   by	   white	   supremacy,	   many	   of	   us	   have	   indeed	   fallen	   victim	   to	   the	  temptations	   and	   promises	   of	   capitalism.	   As	   both	   Baldwin	   and	   Fromm	   remind	   us,	  capitalism	   is	   structurally	   incapable	   of	   (if	   not	   averse	   to)	   the	   justice,	   equality,	   and	  peace	   that	  we	   are	   seeking.	   In	   the	   same	  way,	   a	   politics	   based	   in	   a	   reversed	   racial	  supremacy	  is	  also	  not	  amenable	  with	  emancipatory	  and	  social	  justice	  goals.	  While	  a	  socialist	  alternative	  might	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  we	  go,	  I	  believe	  that	   we	   most	   definitely	   need	   to	   begin	   to	   do	   the	   difficult	   work	   of	   imagining	   and	  working	  towards	  a	  future	  that	  allows	  us	  a	  different	  way	  of	  living,	  and	  relating	  to	  one	  another.	  As	  I	  suggest,	  our	  ability	  to	  do	  this,	  however,	  involves	  moving	  through	  and	  metabolizing	  our	  pain.	  As	  Baldwin	  shares,	  “It	  took	  many	  years	  of	  vomiting	  up	  all	  the	  filth	  I’d	  been	  taught	  about	  myself,	  and	  half-­‐believed,	  before	  I	  was	  able	  to	  walk	  on	  the	  earth	   as	   though	   I	   had	   a	   right	   to	   be	   here.”199	  As	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	   we	   might	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Baldwin,	  “They	  Can’t	  Turn	  Back”	  Collected	  Essays	  (Library	  of	  America,	  1998):	  636.	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consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we,	   like	  Baldwin,	  are	  also	  caught	  between	  the	  poles	  of	  love	   and	   power,	   and	   pain	   and	   rage.	   The	   next	   chapter	   considers	   this	   tension	   in	  greater	  detail,	  exploring	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  move	  from	  pain	  to	  power.	  	  Before	   moving	   on,	   however,	   it	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   sum	   up	   this	   chapter’s	  discussion	  of	  Fromm.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  given	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism’s	  current	  state	  of	  divisiveness,	   capitulation	   to	   legal	   recognition	   and	   capitalist	   attainment,	   and	  insufficient	   focus	   on	   self-­‐determination,	   Fromm’s	   humanism	   provides	   us	   with	   an	  especially	  cogent	  theory	  with	  which	  to	  reconsider:	  our	  relationship	  to	  one	  another,	  the	  common	  needs	  that	  drive	  our	  political	  behaviours,	  the	  deeply	  psychic	  harms	  of	  capitalist	  society,	  and	  how	  we	  might	  move	  toward	  an	  affirmative	  sense	  of	  freedom	  –	  a	  goal	  that	  has	  been	  marked	  with	  ambivalence	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	  Against	  the	  risk	   of	   appearing	   naïve	   and	   idealistic,	   Fromm’s	  work	   persistently	   emphasizes	   the	  possibilities	   for	   authentic	   human	   connections	  built	   on	   love,	   reason,	   responsibility,	  and	   compassion;	   a	   re-­‐humanized	   society	   that	   embraces	   alternative	   political,	  economic,	  cultural	  forms;	  and	  an	  invigorated	  relationship	  with	  oneself	  that	  centers	  one’s	   spiritual	   and	   psychic	   health.	   In	   most	   general	   terms,	   Fromm’s	   humanism	   is	  geared	  toward	  creating	  the	  inner	  and	  outer	  conditions	  that	  can	  best	  respond	  to	  our	  needs	   as	   human	   beings,	   and	   while	   his	   ideas	   may	   not	   always	   be	   achievable	   (or	  necessarily	  desirable),	  his	  optimism,	  hope,	  and	  willingness	   to	   imagine	  alternatives	  are	   qualities	   that	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   could	   benefit	   from	   considerably.	  	  	  	  
	   286	  
Chapter	  7	  –	  From	  Pain	  to	  Power	  
“I	  imagine	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  people	  cling	  to	  their	  hates	  so	  stubbornly	  is	  because	  they	  
sense,	  once	  hate	  is	  gone,	  they	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  deal	  with	  pain.”	  	  -­‐James	  A.	  Baldwin,	  The	  Fire	  Next	  Time	  	  
“The	  word	  ‘power’	  has	  a	  twofold	  meaning.	  One	  is	  the	  possession	  of	  power	  over	  
somebody,	  the	  ability	  to	  dominate	  him;	  the	  other	  meaning	  is	  the	  possession	  of	  power	  to	  
do	  something,	  to	  be	  able,	  to	  be	  potent.	  The	  latter	  meaning	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  
domination;	  it	  expresses	  mastery	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ability”	  	  
-­‐Erich	  Fromm,	  Escape	  from	  Freedom.	  	   The	   title	   of	   this	   chapter,	   and	   indeed	   the	   dissertation	   itself,	   comes	   from	   a	  panel	  discussion	  held	  by	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  scholar	  bell	  hooks,	  on	  October	  7,	  2015	  at	   the	  New	  School	   in	  New	  York	  City.	  This	  discussion,	   entitled	  Moving	  from	  Pain	  to	  
Power,	   along	  with	   a	   talk	   she	   gave	   at	   York	   University	   a	   few	  weeks	   later,	   shared	   a	  number	  of	  themes	  central	  to	  my	  investigation	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  Chief	  among	  these	  was	  the	  message	  that	  people	  of	  colour	  must	  begin	  to	  do	  the	  work	  of	  moving	  from	  a	  place	  of	  racial	  and	  gender	  trauma,	  to	  healing	  and	  empowerment.	  Hooks	  emphasized	  that	  the	  power	  she	  is	  discussing	  here	  is	  not	  power	  over	  someone	  or	  something,	  but	  rather	   the	  personal	  power	   that	  people	  of	   colour	  are	  often	  estranged	   from.	  Part	  of	  reclaiming	   this	   power	   involves	  doing	   the	   inner	  work	  of	   healing	   and	  psychological	  decolonization,	  as	  hooks	  believes	  that	  “revolution	  begins	  with	   inner	  work.”	  Hook’s	  work	  has	  been	   influenced	  by	  Fromm’s	  definition	  of	   love	  as	  a	   transformative	   force,	  which	   she	   believes	   encourages	   us	   to	   act	   with	   self-­‐compassion	   and	   to	   help	   one	  another	  heal.1	  This,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  hooks	  is	  unaware	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  oppressive	  forces	  of	  what	  she	  calls	  “imperialist,	  white	  supremacist,	  capitalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  bell	  hooks,	  All	  About	  Love:	  New	  Visions,	  unknown	  edition	  (New	  York:	  William	  Morrow	  Paperbacks,	  2018).	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patriarchy.”	   Rather,	   she	   argues	   that	   psychological	   decolonization	   and	   self-­‐determination	   are	   the	   biggest	   threats	   to	   oppressive	   power,	   and	   thus	   should	   be	  projects	   that	  are	  actively	  pursued.	  While	  hooks	   is	  critical	  of	  movements	  that	   focus	  on	   rage	   rather	   than	   taking	   care	   of	   the	   “PTSD	   and	   the	   trauma	   of	   racism,”2	  she	  recognizes,	  that	  attending	  to	  our	  pain	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  experience.	  	  Indeed,	   as	   I	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   the	   anger	   and	   resentment	   of	   racial	  trauma	   is	   much	   easier	   to	   face	   than	   the	   raw	   hurt	   of	   it.	   The	   question	   remains,	  however,	   what	   is	   lost	   when	   grief	   is	   too	   quickly	   converted	   into	   grievance?	   This	  question,	   as	   posed	   by	   Georgis,	   leads	   her	   to	   consider	   the	   transformative	   effects	   of	  touching	  our	  pain,	  and	  in	  so	  doing,	  preventing	  it	  from	  hardening	  into	  ressentiment.	  How	  might	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  do	  this	  work	  of	  making	  contact	  with	  our	  pain?	  While	  we	   might	   consider	   various	   responses	   to	   this	   question,	   the	   first	   section	   of	   this	  chapter	   examines	   one	   specific	   approach	   developed	   by	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   Sandra	  Kim.	  Based	   in	   the	   secularized	  Buddhist	   practice	   of	  mindfulness,	  Kim	  offers	   a	   five-­‐stage	   online	   course	   that	   provides	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   (and	   other	   activists)	   with	  practical	  tools	  with	  which	  to	  work	  through	  the	  negative	  emotions	  that	  arise	  in	  our	  activist	  work.	  While	  Kim’s	  program	  gives	  us	  a	  helpful	  means	  of	  touching	  our	  pain	  as	  well	   as	   moving	   towards	   the	   humanist	   aims	   discussed	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   her	  approach	   could	   be	   perceived	   as	   belonging	   to	   a	   popular	   discourse	   that	   privileges	  reconciliation	  and	  forgiveness	  over	  recognizing	  the	  value	  of	  negative	  emotions	  The	  second	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   examines	   an	   argument	   made	   by	   Danish	   scholar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  October	  22,	  2015,	  bell	  hooks	  talk,	  York	  University.	  Hooks	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  Black	  Lives	  Matter	  here.	  	  	  
	   288	  
Thomas	   Brudholm	   who	   follows	   the	   thought	   of	   Austrian	   Holocaust	   survivor	   Jean	  Améry.	   These	   thinkers	   not	   only	   warn	   against	   dominant	   trends	   in	   reconciliation	  scholarship	   and	  policy	   but	   also	   signal	   the	  moral	   virtues	   of	   negative	   emotions	   like	  
ressentiment.	   Here	   I	   review	   and	   build	   upon	   some	   of	   the	   helpful	   aspects	   of	  
ressentiment	   as	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   while	   remaining	   cautious	   of	   its	   overall	  troubling	   nature.	   I	   conclude	   by	   considering	   how	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   might	  simultaneously	   appreciate	   ressentiment	   as	   a	   legitimate	   and	   morally	   instructive	  political	  emotion,	  while	  still	  doing	  the	  emotional	  and	  political	  work	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  does	  not	  subvert	  our	  emancipatory	  struggles,	  and	  debilitate	  our	  psychological	  and	  physical	  health.	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   from	   the	   outset	   that	   the	   next	   section	   by	   no	   means	  attempts	  to	  offer	  a	  conclusive	  method	  that	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  might	  use	  towards	  working	   through	   racial	   pain	   and	   embracing	   interrelation	   over	   divisiveness.	   My	  intention	  in	  including	  this	  section	  is	  rather	  to	  counter	  a	  dominant	  trend	  in	  academic	  research	  in	  which	  critique	  is	  offered	  without	  providing	  a	  workable	  means	  through	  which	   we	   might	   begin	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   in	   practical	   terms.	   Given	   the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  ressentiment	   in	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  I	  am	  less	  interested	  in	  finding	  a	  definitive	  “solution”	  per	  se,	  and	  more	  looking	  to	  identify	  practices	  that	  may	  help	  us	  work	  through	  some	  of	  the	  more	  troubling	  and	  self-­‐defeating	  tendencies	  that	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  identified.	  I	  explore	  Kim’s	  approach	  as	  one	  such	  practice.3	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  another	  embodied	  approach	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  activists	  towards	  the	  goal	  of	  inner	  liberation,	  see	  Roxana	  Ng’s	  ‘integrative	  embodied	  antiracist	  feminist	  approach’	  in	  “Embodied	  Learning	  and	  Qi	  Gong:	  Integrating	  the	  Body	  in	  Graduate	  Education,”	  in	  Within	  
and	  beyond	  Borders:	  Critical	  Multicultural	  Counselling	  in	  Practice,	  ed.	  O.	  Oulanova	  et	  al.	  (Centre	  for	  Diversity	  in	  Counseling	  And	  Psychotherapy,	  OISE,	  University	  of	  Toronto.,	  2009).	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(7.1)	  Compassionate	  Activism	  	   Since	   2016,	   Sandra	   Kim	   has	   been	   running	   an	   online	   seminar	   specifically	  designed	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  and	  other	  progressive	  activists	  who	  are	  struggling	  with	   pain,	   anger,	   resentment,	   and	   bitterness	   in	   their	   anti-­‐oppressionist	   activist	  work.	   Kim,	   who	   is	   the	   founder	   and	   president	   of	   the	   online	   magazine	   Everyday	  
Feminism,	  bases	  her	  approach	  in	  her	  “decade	  long	  journey	  of	  Zen	  Buddhism-­‐based	  healing	   and	   spiritual	   growth.”4 	  She	   applies	   the	   practice	   of	   mindfulness	   –	   the	  focusing	   of	   one’s	   attention	   on	   the	   present	   moment	   in	   order	   to	   inspire	   self-­‐awareness,	   clarity,	   and	  wisdom	  –	   to	   the	   sphere	  of	   activism,	   taught	  over	  10	  weeks	  through	  an	  interactive	  video	  forum.5	  Entitled	  “Compassionate	  Activism,”	  the	  course	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  wider	  movement	  that	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  Spiritual	  
Activism,	  or	  social	  justice	  praxis	  rooted	  in	  spiritual	  beliefs	  and	  commitments.6	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Sandra	  Kim,	  “About	  Everyday	  Liberation	  and	  Sandra	  Kim,”	  Everyday	  Liberation,	  2018,	  https://sandrakim.com/about/.	  5	  Mindfulness,	  translated	  from	  the	  Pali	  word	  sati,	  has	  been	  a	  growing	  buzzword	  in	  the	  West	  and	  is	  readily	  applied	  –	  with	  varying	  intentions	  –	  to	  a	  number	  of	  everyday	  practices	  (eating,	  exercising,	  walking	  etc.).	  One	  of	  the	  leading	  teachers	  of	  mindfulness	  in	  the	  West	  is	  Vietnamese	  Buddhist	  Monk	  Thich	  Nhat	  Hanh.	  	  	  6	  Spiritual	  Activism	  (also	  called	  “sacred	  activism”	  or	  “engaged	  spirituality”)	  is	  an	  umbrella	  term	  used	  to	  connote	  “action	  in	  society	  that	  is	  motivated	  by	  transcendent	  moral	  values	  and	  is	  supported	  by	  regular	  practices	  that	  seek	  some	  connection	  with	  God	  or	  the	  sacred”	  (Miller	  2008:	  159).	  While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  provide	  an	  in	  depth	  discussion	  of	  Spiritual	  Activism,	  the	  movement	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  topic	  of	  interest	  among	  academics	  from	  various	  fields	  (see	  for	  example	  Baskin	  2002;	  Dillard	  2012;	  Edwards	  &	  Post	  2008;	  Gottlieb	  2002;	  Hodge	  2012;	  Hunt	  2004;	  Hutchison	  2012;	  Jones	  2003;	  Keating	  2006,	  2008;	  MacIntosh	  2008;	  Miller	  2008;	  Seidlitz	  2011;	  Sheridan	  2012).	  	  In	  regards	  to	  Spiritual	  Activism	  and	  Buddhism,	  Thich	  Nhat	  Hanh	  developed	  the	  phrase	  “engaged	  Buddhism”	  as	  a	  type	  of	  activism	  that	  applies	  Buddhist	  insights	  and	  practice	  to	  social	  justice	  struggles.	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I	   have	   chosen	   to	   examine	   Kim’s	   course	   due	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   her	  orientation	   complements	   the	   direction	   of	   this	   dissertation.	   Firstly,	   as	   a	  woman	   of	  colour,	  Kim	  is	  acutely	  familiar	  with	  both	  the	  experiences	  of	  racism	  and	  sexism,	  and	  the	   deep	   ways	   in	   which	   these	   injure	   one’s	   psyche.	   Secondly,	   as	   an	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist,	   she	   is	   also	   aware	   of	   some	   of	   the	   problematic	  ways	   in	  which	  many	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	  and	  other	  activists	   respond	   to	   this	  pain,	   especially	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  anger,	   hatred,	   resentment,	   bitterness,	   and	   despair	   that	   we	   feel	   and	   the	   types	   of	  behaviours	   that	   stem	   from	   these	   emotions.	   Kim	   is	   both	   sympathetic	   to	   these	  
ressentimental	   emotions	   and	   behaviours	   given	   the	   conditions	   of	   oppression	   that	  provoke	  them,	  while	  also	  concerned	  that	  they	  limit	  us	  in	  important	  ways.	  Third,	  she	  is	  interested	  in	  mounting	  an	  activism	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  unity,	  rather	  than	  divisiveness.	   In	   the	   last	   chapter	   I	   discussed	   how	   this	   could	   be	   accomplished	  philosophically	  through	  embracing	  a	  humanistic	  ethic.	  	  Describing	  her	  approach	  as	  a	  “synthesi[s]	   [of]…Buddhism-­‐based	   healing	   and	   spiritual	   practices	   and	   anti-­‐oppression	  and	  pro-­‐liberation	  work,”7	  her	  course	  stresses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  human	  interrelatedness	   can	   be	   known	   through	   compassion,	   mindful	   awareness,	   self-­‐reflexivity,	   and	   love.	   As	   such,	   Kim’s	   approach	   is	   resonant	   with	   Fromm’s	   radical	  humanism	  in	  many	  ways.	  Most	  notably,	  Fromm	  offers	  mindfulness	  as	  one	  especially	  potent	  practice	  to	  achieving	  the	  awareness	  that	   is	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	   inner	  liberation.	   As	   he	   states,	   “every	   experience,	   if	   it	   is	   done	  with	  mindfulness,	   is	   clear,	  distinct,	   real,	   and	   hence	   not	   automatic,	   mechanical,	   diffuse.	   The	   person	   who	   has	  reached	  a	  state	  of	  full	  mindfulness	  is	  wide	  awake,	  aware	  of	  reality	  in	  its	  depth	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Sandra	  Kim,	  “About	  Everyday	  Liberation	  and	  Sandra	  Kim.”	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concreteness.” 8 	  I	   thus	   present	   Kim’s	   application	   of	   mindfulness	   to	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  as	  a	  practical	  method	  of	  moving	  toward	  the	  inner	  freedom	  as	  discussed	  by	  Fromm	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.9	  	  I	  also	  write	  about	  mindfulness	  because	  of	   the	  role	   it	  has	  played	   in	  my	  own	  personal	  evolution	  –	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  political	  engagements	  and	  everyday	  life.	  As	  a	   participant	   of	   Kim’s	   Compassionate	   Activism	   seminar	  myself,	   I	   believe	   that	   her	  approach	   offers	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   a	   helpful	   starting	   point	   from	  which	   to	  move	  from	  a	  politics	  of	  pain	  to	  one	  of	  power.	  	  	  Kim’s	  seminar	  presents	  five	  practices	  that	  she	  describes	  as	  offering	  “a	  deeply	  loving	   and	  humanity-­‐affirming	   alternative	   to	   the	   standard	  dominating	   approaches	  we’ve	  been	  taught.”10	  Kim	  contends	  that	  “only	  a	  truly	   loving	  approach	  can	  address	  injustice...	  it’s	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  heals	  the	  psychic	  wound	  created	  and	  restores	  the	  broken	  connection	  in	  our	  sense	  of	  shared	  humanity.”11	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Kim’s	  model	  is	  responding	  to	  the	  emotional	  state	  that	  she	  has	  observed	  among	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	  That	  is,	  the	  anger	  and	  self-­‐righteousness	  that	  we	  often	  express	  in	  our	  anti-­‐oppression	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pain	  that	  underlies	  it.	  For	  Kim,	  this	  pain	  often	  stems	  from	  the	  powerlessness	  of	  childhood,	  which	  gets	  triggered	  in	  situations	  of	  systemic	  oppression.	  Central	   to	  her	  approach	   to	  dealing	  with	   this	  pain	   is	   to	   engage	  with	   it,	  rather	  than	  escaping	  into	  the	  defensive	  and	  reactive	  emotions	  that	  I	  have	  identified	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Fromm,	  The	  Art	  of	  Being,	  51.	  	  9	  Admittedly,	  Fromm	  offered	  mindfulness	  as	  one	  of	  many	  integrated	  practices	  toward	  the	  attainment	  of	  inner	  liberation.	  While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation	  to	  explore	  each	  of	  them	  within	  the	  context	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  I	  offer	  the	  present	  discussion	  as	  an	  exploratory	  starting	  point.	  	  10	  Sandra	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Curriculum	  document	  (permission	  to	  cite	  curriculum	  and	  other	  documents	  was	  obtained	  by	  Sandra	  Kim).	  	  11	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Curriculum	  document.	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with	   ressentiment.	   It	   is	   this	   presence	   with	   our	   pain	   that	   I	   believe	   can	   grant	   us	   a	  choice	   with	   which	   to	   act,	   rather	   than	   react,	   and	   importantly,	   make	   political	   and	  personal	   decisions	   that	   can	   allow	   us	   to	   work	   towards	   creating	   affirmative	   social	  change.	  	  Before	  exploring	  Kim’s	  five	  practices,	  an	  important	  caveat	  must	  be	  forwarded	  concerning	   the	  problematics	  of	   cultural	   appropriation	   in	   taking	  Eastern	   traditions	  and	  putting	  them	  to	  Western	  use.	  Kim’s	  evocation	  of	  Buddhist	  philosophy	  through	  the	   concept	   of	   mindfulness	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Western	   appropriation	   of	  Buddhist	  ideas	  that	  has	  been	  ongoing	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe	  for	  some	  years	  now.	   From	   an	   anti-­‐racist,	   anti-­‐colonial	   perspective,	   such	   appropriation	   might	   be	  critiqued	  as	  belonging	   to	  a	   long	   tradition	  of	   cultural	   theft	   that	  often	   results	   in	   the	  simplification,	   misinterpretation,	   commodification,	   and	   exploitation	   of	   complex	  cultural	  ideas	  and	  heritages	  of	  people	  of	  colour	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  This	  critique	  is	  certainly	  relevant	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Buddhism	  in	  the	  West.12	  Indeed,	   in	   his	   article	   “Is	   Mindfulness	   Buddhist?”,	   Buddhist	   Studies	   scholar	  Robert	  Sharf	  argues	  that	  the	  word	  sati	  (the	  Pali	  word	  for	  mindfulness)	  and	  the	  role	  of	   mindfulness	   in	   general	   have	   been	   distorted	   by	   Buddhist	   modernism.13 	  He	  characterizes	   Buddhist	   modernism	   as	   rooted	   in	   “the	   notion	   that	   Buddhism	   is	   a	  rational,	  empirical,	  and	  therapeutically	  oriented	  tradition	  compatible	  with	  modern	  science,”	  and	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  product	  of	  “a	  complex	  intellectual	  exchange	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Kim	  acknowledges	  this	  in	  the	  third	  session	  of	  the	  online	  seminar	  although	  fails	  to	  unpack	  it	  further.	  	  13	  Robert	  Sharf,	  “Is	  Mindfulness	  Buddhist?	  (And	  Why	  It	  Matters),”	  Transcultural	  Psychiatry	  52,	  no.	  4	  (2015):	  470–84.	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Asia	  and	   the	  West	   that	   took	  place	  over	   the	   last	  150	  years	  or	  so.”14	  Sharf	   is	   critical	  that	  Western	   uses	   of	  mindfulness,	   removed	   from	   their	   original	   philosophical	   and	  doctrinal	  context,	  not	  only	  encourage	  an	  ethical	  passivity	  but	  also	  blend	  uncritically	  with	   Western	   ideals	   of	   instrumentality,	   consumerism,	   and	   superficial	   ideals	   of	  happiness.	  He	  argues	  that	  Western	  forms	  of	  Buddhism	  that	  emphasize	  mindfulness	  practice	  in	  fact	  derive	  from	  a	  specific	  Theravādan	  Burmese	  reformist	  movement	  at	  the	   start	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   that	   developed	   techniques	   for	   the	   layperson	   largely	  removed	  from	  greater	  Buddhist	  philosophy	  and	  practice.	  While,	  for	  Sharf,	  this	  does	  not	   necessarily	   negate	   the	   benefit	   of	   these	   practices,	   he	   advocates	   for	   a	   better	  understanding	   of	   their	   development	   and	   in	   some	   cases,	   distortion.15	  Thus,	   while	  Kim	  may	  locate	  her	  approach	  in	  “Zen	  Buddhism”	  and	  “Buddhism-­‐based	  healing	  and	  spiritual	   practices,”	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   her	   use	   of	   mindfulness	   techniques	   might	  more	   accurately	   be	   identified	   as	   descending	   from	   this	   particular	   secularized	  tradition	  that	  has	  been	  popularized	  in	  the	  West	  over	  the	  last	  many	  years.16	  I	  agree	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Robert	  Sharf,	  “Is	  Mindfulness	  Buddhist?	  (And	  Why	  It	  Matters),”472.	  For	  more	  on	  Buddhist	  Modernism,	  see	  Robert	  Sharf,	  “Buddhist	  Modernism	  and	  the	  Rhetoric	  of	  Meditative	  Experience,”	  Numen	  42,	  no.	  3	  (January	  1,	  1995):	  228–83;	  and	  David	  L.	  McMahan,	  The	  
Making	  of	  Buddhist	  Modernism	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  15	  For	  another	  critique	  on	  the	  secularization	  of	  Buddhism,	  see	  Ven.	  Bhikkhu	  Bodhi’s	  article	  “Facing	  the	  Great	  Divide,”	  Inquiring	  Mind	  31,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2015).	  16	  To	  be	  clear	  then,	  this	  secularized	  tradition	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  Westerners	  simply	  appropriating	  and	  translating	  Buddhist	  practices	  (although	  this	  of	  course	  happens)	  but	  rather	  derived	  from	  a	  more	  complex	  historical	  interchange	  that	  has	  involved	  the	  participation	  of	  many	  Eastern	  Buddhist	  monks.	  Many	  such	  monks,	  for	  example,	  trained	  Western	  monks	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  sending	  them	  back	  to	  North	  America	  and	  Europe	  to	  spread	  their	  teachings.	  One	  such	  master	  was	  Ajahn	  Chah	  who	  trained	  a	  number	  of	  Western	  students	  at	  his	  forest	  monastery	  in	  Thailand,	  and	  who	  he	  later	  sent	  out	  across	  the	  West	  to	  become	  well-­‐known	  teachers	  and	  translators	  of	  a	  more	  secularized	  and	  “modernized”	  Theravadan	  tradition	  to	  Western	  practitioners.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  Eastern	  monks	  have	  made	  their	  residence	  in	  monasteries	  in	  the	  West.	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  of	  these	  is	  the	  Vietnamese	  Monk	  Thich	  Nhat	  Hanh	  who	  founded	  a	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with	   Sharf	   that	   while	   this	   does	   not	   vitiate	   the	   usefulness	   or	   application	   of	   these	  practices,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   register	   that	  popularized	  practices	   of	  mindfulness	   are	  not	   without	   criticism	   and	   should	   be	   properly	   contextualized.	   With	   these	  considerations	  in	  mind,	  I	  now	  explore	  the	  five	  practices	  that	  Kim	  offers.	  	  Practice	  1:	  Humility	  and	  Curiosity	  	  The	  first	  practice	  of	  humility	  and	  curiosity	  targets	  what	  Kim	  identifies	  as	  the	  common	   tendency	   for	   marginalized	   activists	   to	   assume	   that	   we	   understand	   the	  intentions	  and	  motivations	  of	  people	  of	  the	  dominant	  group.	  As	  she	  explains,	  	  What	  most	  people	  do	  is	  they	  come	  into	  these	  situations	  based	  on	  their	  past,	  and	   are	   very	   strong[ly]	   anti-­‐oppression	   now,	   so	   they	   assume	   they	   know	  what’s	   going	   on.	  We	   assume	  we	   know	  why	   the	   other	   person’s	   doing	  what	  they’re	  doing.	  It	  flares	  up	  both	  our	  individual	  trauma,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  collective	  trauma	   of	   what	   we	   experience	   related	   to	   the	   situation….	   Because	   it’s	   so	  loaded	  and	  big	   for	  us,	  we	   feel	   like	  we	  know	  everything	  that’s	  going	  on,	  and	  it’s	  possible	  what	  you	  think	  is	  true.	  It’s	  possible	  what	  you	  think	  is	  true	  about	  the	   other	   person,	   and	  what’s	   happening	   in	   that	   situation.	   It’s	   also	   possible	  that	  it’s	  not	  true.	  When	  we	  assume	  that	  we	  already	  know,	  there’s	  no	  place	  to	  learn.	   There’s	   no	   place	   to	   actually	   deal	   with	   it	   when	   it’s	   so	   emotionally	  charged	  for	  us.17	  	  	   What	  Kim	   is	   pointing	   to	   here	   is	  what	   she	   calls	   the	   “emotional	   charge”	   that	  acts	   as	   a	   mediating	   factor	   in	   interactions	   between	   marginalized	   activists	   and	  members	  of	   the	  dominant	   group.	  This	   emotionality	   is	   rooted	   in	   our	   racial	   trauma	  and	  given	  language	  through	  our	  anti-­‐oppressive	  politics.	  Kim	  suggests	  that	  instead	  of	  meeting	   the	   other	  with	   a	   sense	   of	   openness	   and	   curiosity,	  we	   assume	   that	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  living	  community	  and	  retreat	  centre	  called	  Plum	  Village	  in	  the	  south	  of	  France.	  See	  https://plumvillage.org/about/thich-­‐nhat-­‐hanh/	  	  	  17	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	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already	  know	  who	  they	  are	  and	  what	  they	  are	  about	  based	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  systemic	  oppression.	  According	   to	   this	  understanding,	  we	  also	  assume	   that	   “we’re	  better	   than	   the[se]	   other	   people	   because	   we’re	   more	   socially	   conscious.”18	  The	  result	   is	   that	   we	   foreclose	   meeting	   others	   compassionately	   and	   with	   a	   sense	   of	  curiosity	  for	  where	  they	  may	  be	  coming	  from.	  Kim	  is	  clear	  in	  stating	  that	  she	  is	  not	  suggesting	   that	  we	   are	   imagining	   oppression	   in	   situations	  where	   it	   is	   absent,	   nor	  that	   it	   is	  unreasonable	   that	  we	  might	   assume	   that	   someone	   is	   acting	  oppressively	  given	  our	  past	  experiences.	  Rather,	  she	  is	  pointing	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  automatically	  villainize	  members	  of	   the	  dominant	  group	  without	  considering	   the	  possibility	   that	  we	  may	  not	  necessarily	  know	  their	  intentions.	  This	  tendency,	  she	  argues,	  prevents	  us	   from	   seeing	   them	   as	   human	   beings	  who	   have	   also	   been	   “raised…on	   the	   lies	   of	  systemic	   oppression	   just	   like	   we	   have.” 19 	  Moreover,	   we	   lose	   the	   humility	   of	  remembering	  that	  we,	  too,	  were	  not	  always	  so	  informed	  and	  critical	  ourselves.	  And	  perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  we	  thwart	  the	  possibility	  of	  engaging	  in	  a	  “different	  type	  of	  conversation”20	  of	  which	  Kim	  discusses	  in	  her	  subsequent	  practices.	  	  	  Practice	  2:	  Distinguishing	  Realities	  and	  Acknowledging	  External	  Reality	  Related	   to	   the	   last	   practice,	   this	   step	   focuses	   on	   separating	   our	   subjective	  experience	  from	  that	  of	  the	  other	  person’s	  subjective	  experience.	  As	  Kim	  discusses,	  “You're	   understanding	   of	   what	   is	   happening	   in	   this	   conversation	   is	   very	   much	  informed	  by	  your	  own	  filters	  that	  come	  from	  your	  past;	  your	  personality;	  fears	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	  19	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	  20	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	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traumas;	  the	  information	  that	  you	  have;	  things	  that	  you've	  been	  exposed	  to;	  critical	  thinking.	   All	   this	   stuff	   informe[s]	  what	  meaning	  we	   give	   to	  what	   is	   happening.”21	  Kim	   argues	   that	   in	   assuming	   that	   our	   reality	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	   other	   person’s	  internal	   reality,	  we	   often	   invite	   a	   breakdown	   in	   communication,	   and	   conflict.	   She	  contends	   that	   we	  must	   acknowledge	   that	   our	   understanding	   of	   a	   situation	   is	   not	  only	  different,	  but	  also	  as	  valid	  as	  the	  experience	  that	  the	  other	  person	  is	  having.	  For	  Kim,	   it	   is	  through	  the	  acknowledgment	  that	  different	  realities	  exist	  and	  can	  coexist	  that	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  say	  “this	  is	  what’s	  true	  for	  me.	  What’s	  true	  for	  you?”	  In	  asking	  “what’s	  true	  for	  you?”	  and	  “tell	  me	  more,”	  we	  suspend	  our	  inner	  narrative	  and	  open	  ourselves	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  making	   true	   contact	  with	   the	  other	  person	  –	   a	   step	  that	  requires	  our	  humility	  and	  curiosity.	  	  Kim	  posits	  that	  our	  difficulty	  in	  making	  space	  for	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  other	  often	  has	   to	  do	  with	  our	  pain:	   “Often	   times	   in	   these	  emotionally	   charged	  conversations,	  what's	  happening	  is	  that	  the	  pain	  that	  we	  feel	  is	  pushing	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  have	  a	  different	  reality.	  For	  them	  to	  be	  told	  that	  they've	  done	  something	  harmful	  is	  also	  really	  painful	  for	  them,	  so	  they're	  pushing	  back	  on	  our	  reality	  at	  this.	  We	  end	  up	  doing	   this…just	   try[ing]	   to	   push	   our	   realities	   [in]to	   each	   other.”22	  As	   discussed	  previously,	   it	  can	  be	  challenging	  for	  those	   in	  the	  dominant	  group	  to	  hear	  what	  the	  other	  person	  is	  saying	  when	  it	  threatens	  to	  disturb	  the	  beliefs	  that	  they	  might	  hold	  about	   themselves	   in	   terms	   of	   being	   “anti-­‐oppressive”	   or	   “progressive.”	   This,	   of	  course,	   is	   also	   something	   that	   people	   of	   colour	   might	   experience	   when	   someone	  calls	  us	  out	  on	  an	  issue	  that	  we	  may	  have	  been	  insensitive	  to.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  2.	  22	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  2.	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Kim	  differentiates	   the	   inner	   realities	  of	   the	  participants	   in	  a	   situation,	  with	  the	  “external	  reality”	  that	  frames	  the	  situation	  itself.	  She	  refers	  to	  this	  third	  type	  of	  reality	  as	  that	  which	  can	  be	  ascertained	  through	  “words,	  actions,	  and	  energy.”	  That	  is,	  we	  must	  ask	  what	  words	  were	  actually	  spoken,	  what	  actions	  took	  place,	  and	  what	  was	   the	   energy	   that	  was	   communicated.	  Kim	  believes	   that	   asking	   these	  questions	  can	  allow	  us	  a	  perspective	  that	  is	  less	  clouded	  by	  the	  “toxic	  swirl”	  of	  pain,	  fear,	  and	  the	   trauma	   of	   the	   past	   that	   effects	   the	   present.	   As	   she	   explains,	   “The	   more	  emotionally	   charged	   something	   is,	   the	   more	   filters	   we	   have	   getting	   in	   the	   way	  because	  we	  have	  more	  of	  the	  past	  impacting	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  present	  moment.	  Often	  times	  when	  you're	  calmer,	  you're	  more	  peaceful,	  [and]	  your	  ability	  to	  receive	  what	  is	  going	  on	  as	  it	  is,	  goes	  up.”23	  	  Practice	  3:	  Gentle	  Mindfulness	  and	  Compassionate	  Self-­‐	  Accountability	  This	   third	   practice	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   heart	   of	  Kim’s	   approach.	   She	   describes	  mindfulness	  as	  “gentle	  attention	  –	  it’s	  not	  trying	  to	  change	  what’s	  going	  on;	  it’s	  not	  trying	  to	  judge,	  shame,	  critique	  –	  it’s	  just	  noticing.	  Noticing	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  present	  moment	  for	  me.”24	  She	  stresses	  that,	  “when	  we	  get	  present,	  we	  get	  in	  touch	  with	   our	   feelings	   and	   needs	   in	   that	   moment…[and	   in]	   that	   really	   emotionally	  charged	  situation,	  we	  can	  do	  something	  about	  it.”25	  	  Kim	   discusses	   how	   in	   situations	   where	   we	   are	   emotionally	   triggered,	   we	  most	   commonly	  escape	   from	  our	  pain	   for	   fear	   that	  we	  will	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	   it.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  2.	  24	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  3.	  25	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  3.	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Mindfulness,	   however,	   gives	   us	   the	   inner	   spaciousness	   with	   which	   to	   hold	   our	  feelings	  and	  work	  through	  them	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  choice	  and	  healing.	  That	  is,	  it	  gives	  us	  the	  opportunity	  to	  touch	  our	  pain.	  As	  Kim	  explains:	  Those	  situations	  where	  we	  bring	  mindfulness	  to	  what’s	  going	  on	  with	  us,	  we	  get	   present	   to	   our	   feelings	   and	   needs	   that	   [are]	   underneath	   that	   stress,	  frustration,	  and	  anger.	  We	  can	  choose	  what	  to	  do	  about	  it.	  This	  is	  once	  again	  where	   we’re	   talking	   about…put[ting]	   all	   our	   energy…into	   make-­‐believe	   or	  resisting	   reality	   instead	  of	  dealing	  with	  what’s	   inside	  of	  us.	   If	  we	  deal	  with	  what’s	   inside	   of	   us,	   we	   can	   heal	   it	   [and]	   take	   care	   of	   ourselves	   in	   that	  moment.26	  	   In	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   how	  we	   can	   use	  mindfulness	   to	   contact	   our	   pain,	  Kim	   incorporates	   many	   exercises,	   group	   discussions	   and	   coaching	   sessions	  throughout	  the	  seminar,	  stressing	  that	  a	  central	  intention	  of	  the	  course	  is	  to	  provide	  students	  with	  practical	  tools.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  exercises,	  students	  are	  asked	  to	  pick	  an	   incident	   that	   was	   moderately	   emotionally	   charged	   for	   them	   to	   work	   with,	  whether	  from	  the	  classroom,	  the	  workplace,	  their	  activism	  or	  everyday	  life.	  In	  order	  to	  teach	  the	  class	  how	  to	  apply	  mindfulness	  to	  their	  chosen	  situations,	  Kim	  leads	  a	  guided	  meditation	  in	  which	  students	  are	  instructed	  to	  close	  their	  eyes	  and	  begin	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  breath.	  From	  there,	  she	  asks	  the	  class	   to	  do	  a	  body	  scan	  exercise	   in	  which	  they	  slowly	  bring	  their	  attention	  up	  from	  their	  feet	  to	  the	  top	  of	  their	  heads.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  not	  to	  change	  anything	  but	  rather	  to	  move	  from	  thought	  to	  the	  felt	  sense	   of	   the	   body,	   noting	   places	   of	   tension,	   as	  well	   as	   laxity.	   	   Kim	   then	   instructs	  students	  to	  think	  about	  the	  emotionally	  charged	  situation	  that	  they	  had	  chosen.	  She	  asks	  for	  them	  to	  notice	  where	  it	  is	  arising	  in	  the	  body	  and	  to	  open	  their	  awareness	  to	  it:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	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You	  are	  not	  trying	  to	  change	  it,	   judge	  it,	  make	  it	  go	  away.	  No,	  say	  yes	  to	  it.	  I	  feel	  X	  and	  that’s	  ok.	   Just	  pay	  attention,	  what	  does	  it	   feel	   like?	  How	  big	   is	   it?	  What	  does	  it	  look	  like?	  Just	  pay	  gentle	  attention	  to	  it	  and	  listen	  to	  it.	  Listen	  to	  it	  with	  your	  body.	  Breathe	   into	   it.	  Tell	   it	   “yes	   I	  hear	  you,	  what	  do	  you	  need	  from	  me?”27	  	   The	  intention	  behind	  this	  exercise	  is	  to	  get	  in	  touch	  with	  our	  inner	  reality,	  not	  in	   terms	  of	   the	   circular	  and	  reactive	   thought	  processes	   that	  often	  arise	  but	   rather	  the	  affective	   field	   that	   is	   created	   in	   the	  present	  moment	  and	   felt	   in	   the	  body.	  Kim	  argues	  that	  bringing	  such	  attention	  to	  this	  felt	  experience	  allows	  us	  to	  access,	  layer	  by	  layer,	  the	  complex	  emotions	  that	  we	  often	  escape	  from.	  As	  she	  explains:	  Our	  feelings	  just	  are	  what	  they	  are,	  and	  we	  can	  start	  to	  be	  like,	  "Okay,	  I	  feel	  something.	  What	  am	  I	  feeling?"	  Then	  as	  we	  keep	  acknowledging	  and	  holding	  it	  as	  being	  important	  and	  real	  and	  legitimate,	  we	  start	  to	  notice	  that	  there's	  layers	   to	   this,	   so	   we	   go	   from	   the	   initial	   reaction,	   whether	   that's	   stress,	  frustration	  or	  anger,	  resentment,	   irritation,	  whatever	  that	   initial	  reaction	  is,	  we	  need	  to	  unpack	  it,	  and	  it	  will	  shift	  to	  maybe	  there's	  some	  sadness.	  Maybe	  there's	   some	   pain.	   It's	   really	  what	   it's	   about.	   There's	   some	   pain	   that	  we're	  trying	   to	   avoid.	   That's	   why	   we	   stay	   in	   the	  make-­‐believe	   world,	   because	   it	  distracts	  us	  from	  the	  actual	  pain,	  because	  we	  don't	  know	  how	  to	  be	  with	  pain.	  We	  find	  it	  very	  overwhelming.28	  	   Kim	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  through	  making	  space	  for	  our	  pain	  and	  holding	  it	  with	  “gentle,	  loving	  and	  non-­‐judgmental	  attention”29	  that	  we	  begin	  to	  heal	  it	  by	  affirming	  its	   existence.	   This	   affirmation	   is	   important	   given	   dominant	   society’s	   tendency	   to	  deny	  and	  belittle	  our	  experiences	  of	  racial	  oppression.	  It	  is	  only	  through	  recognizing	  our	  pain	   that	  we	   can	   take	   care	  of	   it	   by	   asking	  what	   it	   needs.	  Kim	  mobilizes	   a	  key	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Kim’s	  body	  awareness	  exercise	  is	  familiar	  to	  anyone	  who	  practices	  Western	  secularized	  applications	  of	  mindfulness.	  The	  uniqueness	  of	  her	  approach	  is	  rather	  in	  using	  mindfulness	  visualization	  and	  meditative	  techniques	  that	  respond	  to	  the	  specific	  emotional	  struggles	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	  	  	  	  28	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  5.	  29	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Curriculum	  document.	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tenet	   of	   secularized	   Buddhist	   psychology	   here,	   which	   teaches	   that	   bringing	  receptivity	   to	   the	   felt	   experience	   of	   emotion	   in	   the	   body,	   allows	   the	   emotion	   the	  space	   with	   which	   to	   move	   and	   change. 30 	  Emotions,	   according	   to	   Buddhist	  psychology,	  are	  seen	  as	  temporary	  movements	  or	  weather	  systems	  that	  are	  always	  in	  flux,	  and	  which	  become	  fixed	  only	  when	  there	  is	  a	  cognitive	  narrative	  that	  keeps	  them	   in	   place.	   Thus,	   in	   situations	   where	   the	   emotion	   resists	   movement,	   Kim	  encourages	  exploration	  around	  this	  resistance	  through	  inquiring:	  Why	  do	  you	  need	  to	  feel	  this	  way?	  What	  kind	  of	  investment	  do	  you	  have	  around	  this	  emotion?	  What	  kind	  of	  identity	  is	  it	  fuelling	  for	  you?	  Kim	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  in	  becoming	  familiar	  with	  our	   inner	  world	   through	   such	   exploration	   that	  we	   can	   interrupt	   the	   “toxic	   swirl”	  that	   leads	   us	   to	   anger	   and	   resentment,	   and	   instead,	   remain	   open,	   compassionate,	  and	  present	  to	  the	  situation	  at	  hand.	  	  Bringing	  mindfulness	  to	  our	  inner	  process	  allows	  us	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  second	  half	  of	  Kim’s	  third	  practice,	  which	  is	  “compassionate	  self-­‐accountability.”	  This	  step,	  she	  explains,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  choice	  that	  opens	  up	  for	  us	  once	  we	  become	  aware	  of	  our	  internal	  process.	  It	  is	  only	  at	  this	  point	  that	  we	  have	  the	  consciousness	  with	  which	   to	   respond,	   rather	   than	   react	   to	   life.	   Kim	   offers	   three	   statements	   to	   help	  facilitate	  this	  process.	  The	  first	  is,	  “I	  feel	  X	  and	  it’s	  ok/it	  matters”	  which	  encourages	  us	  to	  become	  mindful	  of	  our	  feelings	  and	  validate	  them.	  The	  second	  is,	  “I	  did/didn’t	  do	   X	   and	   that	   happened.”	   This	   statement	   allows	   us	   to	   accept	   how	   we	   may	   have	  reacted	  to	  a	  problem	  with	  compassion,	  rather	  than	  self-­‐judgment.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For	  more	  on	  Buddhist	  psychology,	  see	  	  Jack	  Kornfield,	  The	  Wise	  Heart:	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  
Universal	  Teachings	  of	  Buddhist	  Psychology,	  Reprint	  edition	  (Bantam,	  2009);	  and	  Mark	  Epstein,	  Thoughts	  Without	  A	  Thinker:	  Psychotherapy	  from	  a	  Buddhist	  Perspective,	  Revised	  ed.	  edition	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Basic	  Books,	  2013).	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“When	  X	   happens,	   I	   feel	   Y	   because	   I	   need	   Z.	   I	  will	   do	  A/invite	   someone	   to	   do	  A.”	  Here,	  we	   learn	  how	   to	   anticipate	   and	   respond	   to	  our	  own	  emotional	  needs,	  while	  considering	  how	  we	   can	   act	  with	   another	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   responsible	   and	   in	   line	  with	  our	  social	  justice	  commitments.	  	  	  	  Practice	  4:	  Compassionate	  Truth-­‐Telling	  and	  Consciousness-­‐Raising	  Inquiry	  The	  fourth	  practice	  relates	  to	  how	  we	  might	  engage	  differently	  with	  someone	  who	   is	   triggering	  us	  emotionally.	  Kim	  contends	   that	  once	  we	  have	  gotten	   in	   touch	  with	   our	   inner	   emotional	   process	   through	   mindfulness,	   we	   are	   now	   ready	   to	  communicate	   our	   truth	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   non-­‐violent	   and	   non-­‐reactive.	   	   This	   is	   in	  contrast	   to	   our	   habitual	   way	   of	   engaging	   with	   the	   other,	   which,	   Kim	   argues,	   is:	  informed	   by	   our	   past	   pain,	   and	   assumptions	   about	   the	   other	   person’s	   intentions	  rather	  than	  on	  what	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  present	  moment;	  resistant	  to	  what	  is	  actually	  happening	   by	   insisting	   that	   it	   “should”	   not	   have	   occurred;	   based	   in	   shaming	   and	  judging	  the	  other	  for	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  unacceptable;	  and	  rooted	  in	  our	  “make-­‐believe”	   narrative	   of	   the	   world.	   Compassionate	   truth-­‐telling,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  requires	   that	  we	  become	  connected	   to	   the	  present	  moment;	   that	  we	  acknowledge	  and	  accept	  what	   is	  actually	  happening;	   that	  we	  do	  not	   judge	  what	   is	  happening	  or	  the	  other	  person	  as	  inherently	  right	  or	  wrong;	  and	  that	  we	  act	  from	  a	  place	  that	  is	  rooted	   in	   our	   emotional	   truth,	   rather	   than	   the	   secondary	   emotions	   and	   thoughts	  that	  we	  erect	  to	  cover	  our	  truth.	  	  Kim	   discusses	   how	   compassionate	   truth-­‐telling	   and	   consciousness-­‐raising	  inquiry	  happens	  in	  two	  parts	  (although	  not	  necessarily	  in	  the	  following	  order).	  The	  
	   302	  
first	   part	   involves	   us	   communicating	   the	   truth	   of	   our	   experience	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	  honest,	  based	  in	  our	  true	  inner	  reality,	  and	  devoid	  of	  shaming,	  policing	  or	  punishing.	  We	  might	  say	  “I	  found	  what	  you	  said	  to	  be	  very	  hurtful	  because	  of	  X”	  or	  “When	  you	  said	  this,	  what	  came	  up	  for	  me	  was	  X.”31	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  invite	  the	  other	  to	  share	  our	  inner	   reality.	   Kim	   stresses	   that	   this	   can	   only	   ever	   be	   an	   invitation,	   and	   never	   an	  imposition.	   She	   also	   emphasizes	   that	  while	   sharing	   our	   truth	  may	   hopefully	   raise	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  other,	  this	  practice	  is	  primarily	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  our	  own	  healing.	  It	  is	  about	  stating	  our	  truth	  in	  a	  way	  that	  responds	  to	  our	  needs,	  rather	  than	  hoping	  for	  a	  specific	  response:	  “It’s	  about	  you	  and	  what	  you	  need	  to	  give	  yourself.	  It’s	  not	  about	  how	  they	  receive	   it	  or	   if	   they	  agree	  with	   it…	  At	  most,	  you	  can	   invite	  them	  to	  consider	  it	  as	  your	  experience	  while	  acknowledging	  that	  they	  also	  may	  have	  a	  different	  experience	  of	  the	  situation.	  They	  have	  the	  right	  to	  say	  no	  [but]	  they	  just	  may	  say	  yes.”32	  	  The	  second	  part	  is	  related	  to	  this	  acknowledgment	  around	  the	  other	  person’s	  experience.	  Here	  we	   become	   curious	   to	   know	  what	   is	   happening	   in	   their	   internal	  reality,	   listening	   to	   their	   experience	   of	   what	   occurred,	   and	   the	   feelings	   they	   are	  having	  around	  it.	  Kim	  encourages	  us	  to	  help	  unpack	  their	  experience	  by	  asking	  them	  questions	  such	  as	  “What	  did	  you	  mean	  when	  you	  said	  X?”	  and	  prompts	  like	  “Tell	  me	  more.”	   In	   this	   way,	   we	   can	   also	   be	   curious	   about	   the	   pain	   under	   their	   emotional	  reaction	  and	  consider	  what	  created	  it.	  As	  Kim	  explains,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Kim’s	  approach	  here	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  non-­‐violent	  forms	  of	  communication.	  For	  more	  on	  non-­‐violent	  communication,	  see	  Marshall	  B.	  Rosenberg,	  Nonviolent	  Communication:	  A	  
Language	  of	  Life,	  3rd	  Edition:	  Life-­‐Changing	  Tools	  for	  Healthy	  Relationships,	  Third	  Edition,	  Third	  edition	  edition	  (Encinitas,	  CA:	  PuddleDancer	  Press,	  2015).	  32	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  8.	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When	  we	  hold	  the	  space	  for	  us	  to	  share	  our	  truth,	  we	  are	  more	  able	  to	  hold	  the	  space	  for	  others	  to	  also	  share	  their	  truth	  –	  even	  when	  it’s	  very	  different	  from	   our	   own.	   This	   allows	   us	   to	   dig	   deeper	   into	   where	   their	   biased	  perspective	  comes	  from	  so	  they	  can	  become	  conscious	  of	  their	  conditioning	  from	  systemic	  oppression.	  In	  that	  sharing	  of	  our	  truths	  and	  genuine	  listening,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  honor	  our	  feelings	  and	  needs	  as	  well	  as	  reconnect	  with	  each	  other.33	  	   This	   practice,	   as	   can	   be	   clearly	   seen,	   is	   starkly	   different	   to	   that	   of	   “calling-­‐out,”	  discussed	  earlier	   in	  the	  dissertation.	   Indeed,	  Kim’s	  emphasis	  on	   listening	  and	  empathy	   make	   her	   approach	   compatible	   with	   what	   some	   activists	   have	   called	  “calling-­‐in.”	   Calling-­‐in	   has	   been	   proposed	   as	   an	   alternative	   practice	   to	   calling-­‐out,	  and	  refers	  to	  “speaking	  privately	  with	  an	   individual	  who	  has	  done	  some	  wrong,	   in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  behaviour	  without	  making	  a	  spectacle	  of	  the	  address	  itself.”34	  As	  opposed	  to	  calling-­‐out,	  “[Call	  ins]	  address	  the	  harm	  caused	  without	  invalidating	  our	   own	   responses	   to	   being	   hurt	   and	   without	   erasing	   someone	   else’s	   humanity,	  which	  in	  turn	  keeps	  our	  humanity	  intact.”35	  As	   such,	   the	   key	   focus	   in	   terms	   of	   this	   practice,	   along	   with	   Kim’s,	   is	  
compassion.	  It	  is	  with	  compassion	  towards	  ourselves	  that	  we	  take	  care	  of	  ourselves	  and	  share	  our	  truth	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  our	  healing	  and	  raise	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  other;	  and	  it	  is	  with	  compassion	  that	  we	  view	  the	  other	  as	  a	  human	  being	  with	  his/her	  own	  experience,	  perspective,	  and	  pain.	  Kim	  emphasizes	  that	  compassion	  is	  not	   to	   be	   forced	   but	   rather,	   arises	   naturally	   once	  we	   become	   attuned	   to	   our	   own	  suffering,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	  other.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Curriculum	  document.	  34	  Ahmad,	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture,”	  Briarpatch	  Magazine,	  March	  2,	  2015.	  	  35	  Ngoc	  Loan,	  quoted	  in	  Katelyn	  Burns,	  “This	  Simple	  Technique	  Could	  End	  Toxic	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture	  Forever,”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  August	  5,	  2017.	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Practice	  5:	  Shared	  Envisioning	  and	  Non-­‐Cooperation	  The	  last	  practice	  of	  Kim’s	  model	  is	  that	  of	  creating	  a	  shared	  vision	  with	  which	  to	  realize	  our	  common	  goals.	  As	  she	  discusses:	  When	  we	  view	  the	  other	  person	  as	  our	  adversary,	  then	  much	  of	  our	  time	  and	  energy	  goes	  into	  handling	  the	  resistance	  in	  our	  relationship.	  However,	  once	  we’re	   reconnected	   through	   compassion	   and	   empathy	   for	   our	   respective	  truths,	  we’re	  able	  to	  identify	  our	  shared	  values	  and	  co-­‐create	  a	  vision	  that	  is	  inspiring	  and	  strategic	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  our	  shared	  goals.36	  	  The	   idea	   here	   is	   that	   once	   we	   have	   dealt	   with	   our	   emotional	   charge	   and	  communicated	   our	   truth,	   as	   well	   as	   allowed	   the	   other	   person	   to	   do	   likewise,	   we	  finally	  find	  ourselves	  on	  common	  ground.	  Through	  compassion	  and	  understanding	  we	  allow	  ourselves	  to	  open	  to	  the	  other	  individual	  who	  we	  are	  now	  able	  to	  see	  as	  a	  fellow	   human	   being,	   rather	   than	   the	   enemy.	   It	   is	   from	   here	   that	   we	   can	   identify	  whether	  we	  indeed	  share	  common	  goals	  toward	  creating	  a	  just,	  equitable	  world.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  we	  can	  begin	  the	  work	  of	  envisioning	  this	  world	  together	  as	  co-­‐creators.	  	  As	  Kim	  cautions,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case:	  Sometimes	  it	  doesn’t	  work	  out.	  Then	  you	  can	  practice	  non-­‐cooperation.	  But	  we	   don’t	   non-­‐cooperate	   in	   passive	   aggressive	   ways	   but	   non-­‐cooperate	   in	  ways	   that	  still	   can	  grieve	   for	   the	   lost	  hope,	   the	   lost	  opportunity	   [and]	  hope	  that	  things	  will	  heal	  in	  the	  future,	  where	  you	  will	  be	  able	  to	  create	  something	  together.	  You’re	  not	  making	  them	  wrong	  for	  it	  as	  a	  human	  being,	  you’re	  not	  making	   yourself	   wrong	   for	   it	   as	   a	   human	   being	   not	   being	   able	   to	   do	   that	  together.	  We’re	  just	  choosing	  not	  to	  cooperate	  together.37	  	   Non-­‐cooperation	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  deny	   the	  humanity	  of	   the	  other	  or	  villainize	  them.	  Nor	  does	  it	  mean	  we	  allow	  it	  to	  feed	  into	  our	  narrative	  around	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Curriculum	  document.	  	  37	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  1.	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incorrigibility	  of	  the	  “oppressor”	  and	  his/her	  inherent	  evilness.	  We	  disengage	  out	  of	  integrity	  for	  our	  political	  vision,	  while	  still	  retaining	  our	  sense	  of	  compassion.	  Kim’s	   five-­‐practice	   model	   of	   Compassionate	   Activism	   is	   important	   for	   the	  present	   discussion	   in	   that	   it	   directly	   attends	   to	   the	   psychological	   process	   that	  underlies	  political	  conflicts	  between	  us	  and	  them.	  That	  is,	  in	  situations	  where	  we,	  as	  anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  encounter	  someone	  from	  the	  dominant	  group	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  triggers	  us	  emotionally,	  Kim	  illuminates	  how	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  taken	  over	  by	  an	   “emotional	   charge”	   that	   directs	   us	   to	   perceive	   the	   situation	   and	   act	   upon	   it	   in	  certain	  ways.	  What	   is	   triggered,	  of	  course,	   is	  our	  pain	  –	   the	  deep	   injury	  of	   living	  a	  lifetime	  of	  racial	  and	  gendered	  exclusion	  and	  humiliation.	  The	  experiencing	  of	   this	  pain	  is	  often	  too	  raw	  and	  too	  overwhelming	  for	  us	  to	  manage,	  and	  so	  we	  cover	  the	  wound	  with	   the	   less	  vulnerable	  emotions	  of	   anger,	   resentment,	  bitterness,	  malice,	  envy	   –	   which	   I	   have	   referred	   to	   in	   this	   dissertation	   as	   ressentiment.	   These	  
ressentimental	   feelings	   can	   be	   accompanied	   by	   ressentimental	   thoughts	   and	  rationalizations	  which	   assure	   us	   that	  we	   are	   indeed	  being	   oppressed	   in	   the	   given	  situation,	  and	  that,	  by	  virtue	  of	  our	  oppressed	  positionality	  and	  our	  anti-­‐oppressive	  commitments	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  we	  possess	   a	  moral	   authority	   and	   access	   to	  reality	  that	  is	  denied	  to	  those	  we	  identify	  as	  oppressors.	  What	  Kim	  is	  discussing	  is	  that	   once	   this	   emotional	   and	   cognitive	   process	   is	   complete,	  we	   are	   left	  with	   little	  choice	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  we	  act.	  In	  Fromm’s	  terms,	  we	  have	  surrendered	  our	  freedom	  through	  capitulating	  to	  our	  habituated	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  a	  certain	  situation.	  That	  is,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  our	  emotional	  charge	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leaves	  little	  space	  with	  which	  to	  1)	  heal	   the	  pain	   that	   lies	  underneath	   this	  emotional	   configuration;	  2)	  deal	  with	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the	   actual	   situation	   –	  whether	   oppressive	   or	   not	   –	  which	   lies	   in	   front	   of	   us.	  More	  specifically,	  we	   are	   unable	   to	   imagine	  nor	   construct	   a	   reality	   that	   is	   actually	   anti-­‐oppressive,	  even	  as	  we	  pledge	  our	  allegiance	  to	  such	  a	  political	  project.	  	  What	   happens	   instead,	   as	  Kim	  argues,	   is	   that	  we	  participate	   in	   the	   logic	   of	  domination	  ourselves,	   through	  asserting	  our	  moral	   superiority	  and	  acting	   in	  ways	  that	   are	   aggressive,	   dehumanizing,	   and	   divisive.	   We	   are	   reminded	   once	   again	   of	  Fromm’s	  statement	  that	  victimization:	  activate[s]	  a	  tendency	  to	  overcome	  the	  defeat	  by	  doing	  actively	  what	  one	  was	  forced	  to	  endure	  passively:	  to	  rule	  when	  one	  had	  to	  obey;	  to	  beat	  when	  one	  was	  beaten	  in	  short,	   to	  do	  what	  one	  was	   forced	  to	  suffer,	  or	  to	  do	  that	  what	  one	  was	  forbidden	  to	  do.38	  	  	  This	  type	  of	  emotional	  and	  political	  expression,	  in	  turn,	  takes	  a	  considerable	  toll	  on	  our	  psyches	  as	  well	  as	  our	  physical	  health.	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  latter	  point,	  there	  were	  numerous	   instances	   during	   the	   10-­‐week	   course	   where	   participants	   shared	   the	  emotional	  and	  physical	  health	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  psychological	  stress	  associated	  with	  their	  activism.39	  	  It	  is	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  this	  predictable	  and	  common	  cycle,	  that	  Kim	  offers	  an	   alternative.	   Through	   mindfulness,	   she	   invites	   us	   to	   take	   a	   pause	   at	   the	   very	  moment	   in	   which	   our	   emotional	   spiralling	   (or	   “toxic	   swirling”)	   would	   begin.	   In	  grounding	   ourselves	   in	   the	   present	   moment,	   rather	   than	   in	   past	   personal	   or	  collective	  trauma,	  or	  in	  our	  theories	  of	  oppression	  and	  domination,	  Kim	  asks	  what	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Fromm,	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Human	  Destructiveness,	  236.	  39	  Most	  frequently,	  as	  discussed	  previously,	  the	  emotional	  and	  physical	  effects	  of	  social	  justice	  work	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  “burnout.”	  	  For	  an	  illuminating	  reflection	  on	  racism	  and	  psychological	  distress,	  see	  Guilaine	  Kinouani,	  “White	  Denial,	  Black	  Mental	  Health	  and	  Ontological	  Insecurity,”	  Race	  Reflections	  (blog),	  December	  11,	  2016.	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might	   mean	   to	   risk	   coming	   into	   true	   contact	   with	   ourselves	   and	   the	   other.	  Mindfulness	  becomes	  the	  technology	  through	  which	  we	  soften	  and	  open	  ourselves	  
to	  ourselves.	  In	  Kim’s	  words:	  	  Systemic	   oppression	   cuts	   us	   off	   from	   ourselves	   and	   from	   other	   people	   so	  [you]	   can't	   connect	   to	   your	   own	   humanity	   and	   other	   people's	  humanities…Our	   realities	   are	   erased	   by	   systemic	   oppression.	   Mindfulness	  actually	   gets	   us	   back	   in	   touch	   with	   that.	   With	   that	   reality,	   our	   internal	  realities…[I]t	  wasn't	  designed	  to	  fight	  [for]	  social	  justice,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  can.	  I	  think	   it’s	   the	  only	  thing	  that	  does.	  That	  brings	  forth	  our	  own	  humanity,	  our	  own	  stories.40	  	  Mindfulness	  allows	  us	   to	   touch	  our	  pain,	   and	   in	   so	  doing,	  provides	  us	  with	  the	   possibility	   to	   begin	   to	   heal	   ourselves	   and	   act	   from	   a	   place	   of	   empowerment,	  rather	  than	  constant	  re-­‐traumatization.	  As	  Kim	  describes:	  The	  goal	   is	  not	   to	  have	  no	   feelings	   that	  are	  difficult	   for	  us.	   It’s	   just	   that	  we	  know	   how	   to	   be	   with	   our	   feelings.	   We	   know	   how	   to	   acknowledge	   their	  legitimacy,	  their	  right	  to	  exist,	  and	  identify	  the	  needs	  underlying	  them	  so	  that	  we	  can	  take	  care	  of	  ourselves.	  We	  can	  offer	  that	  compassion	  to	  ourselves	  and	  do	  something	  about	   that	  pain.	  Because	  until	  we	  can	  acknowledge	   it,	   there’s	  nothing	   we	   can	   do	   to	   take	   care	   of	   our	   pain.	   We	   keep	   having	   these	   open	  wounds	   on	   us	   and	   then	   as	   we	   go	   about	   the	   world,	   salt	   just	   keeps	   getting	  thrown	   on	   these	   open	   wounds	   by	   other	   people	   and	   by	   ourselves.	   There’s	  never	  really	  a	  chance	   for	  us	   to	  heal,	   to	   feel	  empowered,	  and	   to	   feel	   like	  we	  can	   do	   something	   about	   this.	   Instead,	   it’s	   just	   constant	   reopening	   of	   the	  wounds,	  constant	  salt	  being	  thrown	  on	  them.41	  	  As	   such,	   Kim,	   like	   hooks,	   is	   speaking	   of	   a	  means	   through	  which	  we	  might	  move	  from	  pain	  to	  power	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  her	  application	  of	  mindfulness	   to	   anti-­‐oppressive	   activism	   provides	   us	  with	   a	   powerful	   tool	  with	  which	   to	   1)	   remain	   self-­‐aware	   and	   self-­‐reflexive	   while	   engaging	   with	   others;	   2)	  attend	  to	  our	  psychological	  wounds	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  our	  healing,	  and	  interrupt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  3.	  41	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  6.	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automatic	  spiralling	  into	  ressentimental	  feeling	  and	  thinking;	  3)	  ground	  our	  activism	  in	   a	   sense	   of	   self-­‐compassion	   and	   compassion	   for	   the	   other	   so	   as	   to	   come	   from	  a	  place	  of	  interrelation,	  rather	  than	  divisiveness;	  and	  4)	  free	  up	  some	  emotional	  space	  and	  energy	  with	  which	  to	  create	  affirmative	  visions	  for	  the	  future.	  	  Central	  to	  Kim’s	  approach	  is	  facilitating	  the	  re-­‐humanization	  of	  self	  and	  other	  through	   recognizing	   and	   validating	   our	   own	   suffering	   as	  well	   as	   that	   of	   the	   other	  person,	   and	   harnessing	   the	   compassion	   that	   emerges	   from	   this	   realization	   in	   the	  service	  of	  co-­‐creating	  an	  alternative	  reality.	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  we	   cannot	   find	  weaknesses	  with	   her	  model,	   nor	   to	   suggest	   that	  mindfulness	   is	   a	  definitive	   solution	   for	   moving	   toward	   a	   non-­‐ressentimental	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism.	  Rather,	   it	   is	   to	  provide	  one	  practical	   and	  effective42	  method	   that	  we	  might	   further	  explore	   as	   a	  means	   to	   helping	   us	   realize	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   humanistic	   ethic	   that	  was	  explored	   in	   the	   last	   chapter.	   Specifically,	   mindfulness	   gives	   us	   a	   technique	   with	  which	   to	  move	   toward	   the	   inner	   liberation	   that	   Fromm	  discusses	   as	   necessary	   to	  positive	  freedom.	  	  With	  this	  being	  said,	  there	  remains	  a	  discomfort	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  her	  model	  is	  asking	  us	  to	  surrender.	  As	  one	  student	  put	  it,	  “Anger	  is	  a	  motivator	  for	  me,	  and	  I’m	  not	   ready	   to	   give	   it	   up.	   I’ll	   just	   tell	   you	   that.	   I’m	   just	   not	   ready	   to	   give	   it	   up.”43	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  In	  terms	  of	  evaluating	  the	  efficacy	  of	  this	  method,	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  the	  positive	  feedback	  that	  was	  given	  by	  students	  throughout	  the	  course,	  and	  especially	  during	  the	  live	  coaching	  sessions,	  and	  in	  the	  chat	  box	  that	  allowed	  students	  to	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  during	  the	  seminar.	  Of	  course	  these	  are	  not	  empirical	  measures	  but	  they	  in	  the	  very	  least	  suggest	  that	  the	  method	  is	  worth	  exploring	  further.	  Moreover,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Kim’s	  application	  of	  mindfulness	  and	  Buddhist	  psychology	  to	  activism	  is	  not	  unique.	  Although	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  current	  chapter,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  study	  the	  achievements	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  Spiritual	  Activism	  that	  also	  use	  mindfulness	  for	  political	  aims.	  	  43	  Kim,	  Compassionate	  Activism,	  Session	  9.	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Although	  Kim	  contends	   that	   the	  compassionate	  path	   toward	  healing	  and	   justice	   is	  not	  one	  that	  embraces	  political	  congeniality	  or	  complacency,	  but	  which	  has	  a	  place	  for	   negative	   emotions,	   it	   is	   unclear	   exactly	   which	   of	   these	   we	   should	   retain,	   and	  what	   value	   they	   bring	   to	   our	   movements.	   It	   is	   also	   unclear	   as	   to	   how	   we	   might	  manage	  negative	  emotions	  and	  achieve	  healing	  in	  situations	  (like	  ours)	  where	  racial	  oppression	  persists,	   and	   is	   not	   always	  manifested	   in	   a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   encounter.	   The	  next	  section	  examines	  these	  concerns	  through	  re-­‐visiting	  ressentiment	   through	  the	  work	   of	   Thomas	   Brudholm	   and	   Jean	   Améry,	   who	   make	   the	   case	   for	   the	   moral	  significance	  of	  negative	  emotions.	  
(7.2)	  Revisiting	  Ressentiment	  	  	   Kim’s	  system	  of	  Compassionate	  Activism	  offers	  a	  possible	  model	  with	  which	  to	  work	  with	  negative	  emotions	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  crystalize	  into	  the	  encumbering	  character	  of	  ressentiment.	  While	  an	  approach	  that	  encourages	  healing,	  compassion,	  and	   reconciliation	  might	   appear	  morally	   commendable,	   Thomas	   Brudholm	  warns	  against	   submitting	   to	   premature	   pressures	   to	   forgive	   and	   heal.	   Rather,	   following	  Holocaust	   survivor	   Jean	   Améry,	   he	   advances	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   moral	  rehabilitation	  of	  ressentiment.	  	  	  Before	   considering	   his	   argument,	   it	  would	   be	  worthwhile	   to	   review	  what	   I	  have	   thus	   far	  discussed	   in	   terms	  of	  ressentiment	   in	   this	  dissertation.	   In	  Chapter	  4,	  after	   delineating	   Nietzsche’s	   construction	   and	   Scheler’s	   elaboration	   of	   the	   term,	   I	  explored	  how	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  contemporary	  expressions	  of	   feminism.	  Looking	  specifically	   at	   some	   practices	   and	   tendencies	   in	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism,	   I	   made	   the	  argument	   that	   the	   concept	   does	   have	   explanatory	   power,	   although	   such	   an	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explanation	  must	  be	  balanced	  by	  the	  reality	  of	  past	  and	  current	  oppression	  to	  which	  it	  responds.	   I	   then	  considered	  Rebecca	  Stringer’s	  assertion	  that	  ressentiment	  holds	  revolutionary	   potentiality	   capable	   of	   catapulting	   feminism	   from	   a	   stance	   of	  reactivity	   to	   creative	   social	   change.	   I	   argued	   that	   while	   I	   agree	   that	   ressentiment	  furnishes	   the	  oppressed	  with	   the	  ontological	   contingency	   to	   realize	   themselves	   as	  capable	   of	   new	   possibilities	   of	   being	   and	   doing,	   its	   tendency	   towards	   bitterness,	  invective,	   envy,	   and	   contempt	   obstructs	   this	   initial	   contingency	   from	   developing	  into	   affirmative	   empowerment	   and	   action.	   I	   then	   suggested	   that	   in	   order	   to	   free	  ourselves	  from	  the	  grasp	  of	  ressentiment,	  we	  must	  attend	  to	  the	  pain	  that	  underlies	  this	   emotional	   formation	   –	   leading	  us	   to	   consider	  Kim’s	   system	  of	   Compassionate	  Activism.	  	  The	   implicit	   suggestion	   throughout	   this	   dissertation	   has	   thus	   been	   that	  although	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  ressentiment	  might	  be	  understandable,	   it	   is	  ultimately	  something	  that	  must	  be	  overcome.	  As	  my	  discussion	  of	  Baldwin	  revealed,	  however,	  an	  anti-­‐racist	  humanism	  based	  in	  interrelationality,	  responsibility,	  and	  love,	  can	  still	  be	   one	   that	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   grasp	   of	   ressentiment	   at	   times.	   In	   this	   section	   I	  investigate	  Brudholm	  and	  Améry’s	  argument	  of	  how	  this	  might	  be	  a	  valuable	  thing,	  not	   so	   much	   in	   terms	   of	   offering	   the	   political	   momentum	   with	   which	   to	   achieve	  emancipatory	   goals	   (as	   per	   Stringer’s	   analysis),	   but	   rather	   for	   the	  moral	   power	  contained	   in	   ressentimental	   emotions.	   My	   choice	   in	   selectively	   engaging	   with	  Brudholm	  and	  Améry’s	  defense	  of	  ressentiment	  over	  other	  such	  arguments44	  is	  due	  to	   a	   few	   reasons:	   firstly,	   Brudholm’s	   specific	   critique	   of	   the	   impetus	   toward	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Another	  very	  good	  defense	  for	  ressentiment,	  which	  also	  draws	  upon	  Brudholm’s	  work,	  is	  that	  of	  Glen	  Coulthard	  in	  Red	  Skins,	  White	  Masks.	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reconciliation	  and	  compassion	  addresses	  a	  limitation	  in	  Kim’s	  approach	  around	  the	  proper	  role,	  and	  importance	  of,	  negative	  emotions;	  secondly,	  Améry’s	  position	  as	  a	  humanist	  and	  a	   self-­‐described	   “man	   of	   ressentiment”	   is	   especially	   relevant	   for	   the	  current	   investigation	   in	   that	   it	   continues	   last	   chapter’s	   inquiry	   around	   the	  coexistence	   of	   humanism	   and	   ressentiment;	   and	   finally,	   focusing	   on	   Améry’s	  
ressentiment	   permits	   a	   deep	   engagement	   with	   his	   case,	   providing	   insights	   of	   a	  deeper	  register	  than	  what	  could	  be	  achieved	  otherwise.	  Exasperated	  by	  the	  mainstream	  paradigm	  of	  “reconciliation	  discourse”	  which	  commends	   victim	   forgiveness	   and	   compassion,	   while	   disparaging	   negative	  emotions,	  Brudholm	  inquires	  into	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  the	  latter.	  His	  work	  intends	  to	  serve	  as	   a	   “counterpoint”	   to	   the	   “scores	  of	  writings	   in	  which	  outrage,	   resentment,	  and	   refusals	   to	   forgive	   or	   reconcile	   are	   hastily	   rejected	   as	   the	   negative	   to	   be	  overcome:	   the	   irrational,	   immoral,	   and	   unhealthy	   or	   understandable	   but	  unfortunate	  attitudes	  of	  victims	  who	  are	  not—at	  least	  not	  yet—	  ‘ready’	  or	  ‘capable’	  of	   forgiving	  and	  healing.”45	  In	  contrast	   to	  this	  perspective,	  Brudholm	  argues	   for	  an	  understanding	   of	   resentment,	   anger,	   and	   the	   refusal	   to	   forgive	   as	   possessing	   a	  “moral	   protest	   and	   ambition	   that	   might	   be	   as	   permissible	   and	   admirable	   as	   the	  posture	  of	   forgiveness.”46	  He	  does	  this	   through	  a	  close	  reading	  of	   the	  work	  of	   Jean	  Améry,	  Holocaust	  survivor	  and	  essayist,	  who,	  in	  the	  1960s,	  writes	  in	  defense	  of	  his	  choice	   to	  retain	  his	  ressentiment	  against	   the	  Nazis	  and	  German	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Recognizing	   the	  unpopularity	  of	  his	   choice	  given	   the	  predominance	  of	  both	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Thomas	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue:	  Jean	  Améry	  and	  the	  Refusal	  to	  Forgive	  (Temple	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  3.	  46	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  4.	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and	  psychological	  arguments	  against	  ressentimental	  attachment,	  Améry	  presents	  his	  as	   an	   intervention	   intended	   to	   restore	  both	   the	   moral	   order,	   as	   well	   as	   relations	  between	   victim	   and	   perpetrator.	   But	   how	   could	   ressentiment,	   as	   it	   has	   been	  discussed	   thus	   far,	   accomplish	   such	   a	   feat?	   In	   order	   to	   answer	   this	   I	   examine	   the	  distinction	   that	   Brudholm	   makes	   between	   ressentiment	   and	   resentment,	   and	   his	  placement	  of	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  as	  a	  special	  species	  between	  the	  two.	  	  What,	  for	  Brudholm,	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  ressentiment	  and	  resentment?	  Starting	  with	   the	   latter,	  he	  discusses	   the	  history	  and	  significance	  of	   resentment	   in	  the	   Euro-­‐American	   philosophical	   tradition	   of	   moral	   emotions.	   Moving	   from	  Aristotle,	   to	   Joseph	   Butler	   and	   Adam	   Smith,	   to	   the	   more	   recent	   work	   of	   Jeffrie	  Murphy	   and	   Richard	   Wallace,	   Brudholm	   explores	   how	   resentment	   has	   been	  defended	  as	  a	  “legitimate	  and	  valuable”	  response	  to	  “perceived	  moral	  wrongs.”47	  For	  example,	   Murphy	   makes	   the	   argument	   that	   “resentment	   stands	   as	   emotional	  testimony	   that	  we	   care	   about	   ourselves	   and	   our	   rights,”48	  while	  Wallace	   contends	  that	   in	   expressing	   resentment,	   we	   are	   not	   just	   “venting	   feelings,”	   but	   rather	  “demonstrating	  our	  commitment	  to	  certain	  moral	  standards,	  as	  regulative	  of	  social	  life.”49 	  Moreover,	   resentment	   represents	   a	   desire	   to	   provoke	   a	   response	   in	   a	  community	  or	  society	   to	  both	  recognize	   the	  victim’s	  claims,	  and	  restore	   the	  moral	  order.	  As	  such,	  Brudholm	  argues	  that	  “being	  susceptible	  to	  anger	  or	  resentment	   is	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  participation	   in	   ‘the	  general	   framework	  of	  human	  life.’	  A	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  9.	  48	  Murphy	  in	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  10.	  49	  Wallace	  in	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  10.	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life	   bereft	   of	   resentment	   is	   an	   impossible	   and,	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   imaginable,	  impoverished	  life.”50	  While	   there	   may	   be	   an	   argument	   to	   be	   made	   for	   the	   moral	   function	   of	  resentment,	  Brudholm	  notes	  that	  “it	  seems	  nearly	  absurd	  to	  try	  something	  similar	  with	   regard	   to	  ressentiment	  or	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  moral	   standing	  of	   its	  holders.”51	  Although	   ressentiment	   overlaps	   with	   resentment	   in	   terms	   of	   describing	   anger	  toward	  a	  personal	  or	  social	  injury,	  Brudholm	  argues	  that	  the	  former	  term	  has	  been	  “strongly	  colored	  by	  Nietzsche’s	  picture	  of	   the	   loathsome	  and	  pathological	   ‘man	  of	  
ressentiment’”	   who	   is	   characterized	   by	   “self-­‐poisoning,	   hypersensitivity,	  deceitfulness,	  and	  emotions	  like	  vindictiveness,	  hatred,	  malice,	  spite,	  and	  envy.”52	  In	  fact,	   the	  defense	  of	  resentment	  as	  a	   justifiable	  and	  rational	  moral	  emotion	   is	  often	  made	   through	   articulating	   its	   distinctiveness	   from	   ressentiment.	   Despite	   this,	  Brudholm	   follows	   Améry	   in	   his	   attempt	   to	   rehabilitate	   ressentiment	   as	   morally	  worthy.	  He	  does	  this	  through	  arguing	  that	  Améry’s	  notion	  of	  ressentiment	  is	  a	  cross	  between	   resentment,	   and	   the	   Nietzschean	   breed	   that	   we	   have	   thus	   far	   been	  discussing.	  	  In	   order	   to	   understand	   Améry’s	   ressentiment,	   the	   context	   from	   which	   it	  arises,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   own	   understanding	   of	   it,	   must	   be	   examined.	   While	   a	  comprehensive	  exploration	  of	  Améry’s	  thought	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  section,	  let	   me	   briefly	   provide	   a	   few	   central	   points.	   Améry	   was	   a	   Holocaust	   survivor,	  captured	  and	   tortured	  by	   the	  Belgian	  Gestapo	   in	   the	   later	  years	  of	   the	  war	   for	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  11.	  51	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  12.	  52	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  11.	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political	   activities,	   after	  which	   he	  was	   transferred	   to	   Auschwitz,	   and	   then,	   to	   two	  other	   internment	   camps.	   Améry	   notes	   that	   his	   ressentiment	   arose	   not	   in	   the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  rather	  grew	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  The	  reason	  for	   this,	   he	   shares,	   is	   because	   the	  widespread	   outrage	   and	   condemnation	   against	  Germany	  after	   its	  defeat	  permitted	  him	  a	  measure	  of	  moral	  redemption	  and	  relief.	  As	  he	  describes,	   “Still,	   for	   quite	   some	   time	   there	   lasted	  what	  was	   for	  me	  a	   totally	  unprecedented	  social	  and	  moral	  status,	  and	  it	  elated	  me	  to	  the	  extreme:	  being	  what	  I	  was	   –	   a	   surviving	   Resistance	   fighter,	   Jew,	   victim	   of	   persecution	   by	   a	   universally	  hated	   regime	   –	   there	  was	  mutual	   understanding	   between	  me	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world.”53	  Within	  a	  few	  years,	  however,	  Améry	  would	  witness	  a	  drastic	  shift	  in	  public	  opinion	   from	   one	   of	   shame	   and	   remorse,	   to	   that	   of	   “overcoming”	   the	   past.54	  As	  German	  people	  spoke	  of	  moving	  on,	  his	  fellow	  Holocaust	  survivors	  “trembled	  with	  the	   pathos	   of	   forgiveness	   and	   reconciliation,”55	  and	   the	   world	   re-­‐embraced	   the	  fallen	  country	  into	  its	  fold,	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  grew.	  	  How	   does	   Améry	   characterize	   his	   ressentiment?	   We	   might	   answer	   this	  question	   by	   considering	  what	   functions	   he	   assigns	   to	   it.	   As	  mentioned	   earlier,	   he	  defends	  his	  ressentiment	  on	  moral	  grounds.	  He	  does	  not	  disagree	  that	  his	  negative	  emotions	  have	  come	  at	  a	  cost	  to	  his	  health,	  but	  he	  rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  should	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Jean	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits:	  Contemplations	  by	  a	  Survivor	  on	  Auschwitz	  and	  Its	  
Realities	  (Bloomington:	  University	  of	  Indiana	  Press,	  1980),	  64.	  As	  Brudholm	  writes	  in	  response	  to	  Améry’s	  statement,	  “The	  importance	  of	  “third-­‐party”	  expressions	  of	  strong	  reprobation	  cannot	  be	  underestimated	  when	  one	  is	  dealing	  with	  responses	  to	  state-­‐sponsored	  mass	  crime”	  (Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  96).	  	  
	  54	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  considerable	  effort	  has	  gone	  into	  memorializing	  the	  Holocaust	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  during	  Améry’s	  time	  of	  writing.	  	  55	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  65.	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a	  deterring	  factor.	  Rather,	  he	  hopes	  that	  his	  ressentiment	  might	  accomplish	  a	  greater	  purpose	  than	  whatever	  personal	  effect	  it	  may	  have	  on	  him.	  As	  he	  writes:	  Perhaps	   it	   is	   only	   concern	   for	   my	   own	   purification,	   but	   I	   hope	   that	   my	  resentment	   –	   which	   is	   my	   personal	   protest	   against	   the	   anti-­‐moral	   natural	  process	  of	  healing	  that	  time	  brings	  about,	  and	  by	  which	  I	  make	  the	  genuinely	  humane	  and	  absurd	  demand	  that	  time	  be	  turned	  back	  –	  will	  also	  perform	  a	  historical	  function.	  Were	  it	  to	  fulfill	  the	  task	  that	  I	  set	  it,	  it	  could	  historically	  represent,	  as	  a	  stage	  of	  the	  world's	  moral	  dynamics	  of	  progress,	  the	  German	  revolution	  that	  did	  not	  take	  place.	  This	  demand	  is	  no	  less	  absurd	  and	  no	  less	  moral	  than	  the	  individual	  demand	  that	  irreversible	  processes	  be	  reversible.56	  	  What	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  thus	  aspires	  to	  do	  is	  halt	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  natural	  process	  of	  time,	  which	  affords	  perpetrators	  a	  “healing”	  that	  he	  identifies	  as	  profoundly	  anti-­‐moral.	  He	  concedes	  that	  the	  adage	  that	  “time	  heals	  all	  wounds”	  also	  applies	   to	   victims	   but	   argues	   that	   forgiveness	   is	   only	   available	   to	   the	   one	   who	  “submerges	  his	  individuality	  in	  society	  and	  is	  able	  to	  comprehend	  himself	  only	  as	  a	  function	   of	   the	   social,	   that	   is,	   the	   insensitive	   and	   indifferent	   person.”57	  Améry	  complements	  this	  somewhat	  Frommian	  statement	  with	  the	  analysis	  that	  the	  “loudly	  proclaimed	  readiness	  for	  reconciliation	  by	  Nazi	  victims	  can	  only	  be	  either	   insanity	  and	   indifference	   to	   life	   or	   the	   masochistic	   conversion	   of	   a	   suppressed	   genuine	  demand	   for	   revenge.”58	  In	   opposition	   to	   this	   normal,	   forward-­‐facing	   time	   sense,	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  commits	  him	  to	  a	  distorted	  or	  warped	  temporality	  that	  is	  not	  only	   backward	   oriented,	   but	   which	   also	   rejects	   that	   what	   has	   occurred	   (in	  distinction	  to	  Kim’s	  instruction	  that	  we	  must	  first	  accept	  what	  has	  happened).	  As	  he	  states:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  77.	  57	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  71.	  58	  Améry,	  At	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Man	  has	  the	  right	  and	  the	  privilege	  to	  declare	  himself	  to	  be	  in	  disagreement	  with	   every	   natural	   occurrence,	   including	   the	   biological	   healing	   that	   time	  brings	  about.	  What	  happened,	  happened.	  This	  sentence	  is	  just	  as	  true	  as	  it	  is	  hostile	   to	   morals	   and	   intellect.	   The	   moral	   power	   to	   resist	   contains	   the	  protest,	  the	  revolt	  against	  reality,	  which	  is	  rational	  only	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  moral.	  The	  moral	  person	  demands	  annulment	  of	  time	  –	  in	  the	  particular	  case	  under	  question,	  by	  nailing	   the	   criminal	   to	  his	  deed.	  Thereby	  and	   through	  a	  moral	  turning	  –	  back	  of	   the	  clock,	   the	   latter	  can	   join	  his	  victim	  as	  a	   fellow	  human	  being.59	  	  	   The	   “nailing	   the	   criminal	   to	  his	  deed”	   is	   less	   a	   call	   for	   revenge	   and	  more	   a	  demand	  that	  both	  victim	  and	  perpetrator	  might	  occupy	  the	  same	  moral	  space,	  which	  for	  Améry,	  can	  be	  facilitated	  through	  a	  shared	  rejection	  of	  what	  took	  place.	  As	  such,	  Améry’s	   ressentiment	   expresses	   a	   “vision	  of	   a	   restoration	  of	   human	   solidarity	   and	  responsibility.”60	  He	  maintains	   that	   if	   only	   the	   perpetrator	   could	   stand	   beside	   the	  victim	  –	  who	  remains	  fixed	  to	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  their	  humanity	  was	  violated	  and	  their	  belonging	   to	   the	  world	  was	  broken	  –	   they	  might	   find	   in	   themself	   the	  proper	  moral	   reaction	   with	   which	   to	   mend	   the	   divide	   between	   both	   groups,	   as	   well	   as	  “perform	   the	   historical	   function”	   of	   integrating	   what	   happened,	   rather	   than	  overcoming	  it.	  His	  argument,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  ressentiment	  that	  can	  deliver	  this	  aim	  by	  demanding	  a	  true	  moral	  reckoning,	  which	  discourses	  of	  reconciliation	  fail	  to	  accomplish.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  Améry’s	  ressentiment,	  especially	  in	  its	  humanistic	  strivings,	  is	  one	  that	   is	  quite	  different	  from	  that	  which	  I	  have	  thus	  far	  been	  discussing.	  Indeed,	  even	   he	   argues	   that	   his	   ressentiment	   is	   beyond	   the	   grasp	   of	   both	   Nietzsche	   and	  Scheler.	   While	   he	   does	   not	   unpack	   this	   “special	   type”	   systematically,	   Brudholm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Améry,	  At	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  72.	  60	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	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identifies	  it	  as	  having	  affinities	  to	  both	  resentment	  and	  ressentiment.	  In	  terms	  of	  its	  similarities	   with	   resentment,	   a	   number	   of	   parallels	   can	   be	   tracked,	   including	   a	  conviction	   that	   a	  moral	   violation	   has	   occurred	   and	   that	   “at	   stake	   are	   a	   cluster	   of	  deeply	   ethical	   concerns	   about	   dignity	   and	   humanity,	   moral	   acknowledgment	   and	  repair”;	  a	  demand	  for	  justice	  and	  responsibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  offenders;	  a	  desire	  for	  reassurance	  that	  offenders	  may	  be	  trusted	  again	  and	  that	  a	  “common	  life”	  may	  be	  restored	  between	  offender	  and	  victim;	  and	  an	  insistence	  that	  resentment	  can	  be	  “testimony	  of	  a	  moral	  character	  worthy	  of	  respect,”	  rather	  than	  “someone	  who	  has	  ‘failed’	   to	   feel	  and	  do	  something	  more	  appropriate	  or	  humane.”61	  Améry	   insists	  on	  the	   “socio-­‐ethical	   function”	  of	   resentment	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   signal	   a	  moral	   violation,	  demand	  repentance	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  offender,	  and	  rebuild	  ties	  between	  offender	  and	  victim,	  based	  on	  a	  re-­‐invigorated	  commitment	  to	  the	  moral	  order.	  Asserting	  his	  negative	   feelings	   is	   thus	   not	   only	   about	   reclaiming	   his	   personal	   dignity	   but	  importantly	  also	  “contribut[ing]	  to	  moral	  repair	  on	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  level.”62	  These	   factors	  make	   a	   strong	   argument	   that	   Améry’s	   ressentiment	  might	   be	  better	   characterized	   as	   resentment	   proper,	   rather	   than	   ressentiment	   at	   all.	   As	  Brudholm	  discusses,	  	  Améryean	  ressentiment—if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  ressentiment	  at	  all—is	   certainly	   of	   a	   special	   kind.	   It	   is	   not	   fueled	   by	   spiteful	   and	  malicious	  envy—which	  is	  often	  used	  to	  distinguish	  ressentiment	  from	  resentment—and	  it	  is	  not	  characterized	  by	  an	  excessive	  self-­‐concern.	  It	  does	  not	  crave	  revenge,	  its	   attributions	  of	   guilt	   and	   responsibility	  are	  not	  expressive	  of	   a	  blind	  and	  unjustifiable	  generalization	  of	  blame,	  and	  Améry	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  take	  secret	  delight	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  his	  ressentiments.	  Also	  unlike	  the	  conventional	  image	   of	   the	   “man	   of	   ressentiment,”	   Améry’s	   anger	   and	   fear	   are	   not	  expressive	  of	  an	  irrational	  or	  disturbed	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  reality.	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   And	   yet,	   despite	   Améry’s	   significant	   overlaps	   with	   resentment,	   Brudholm	  identifies	   three	  significant	   “family	   resemblances”	  between	  his	   feeling	  and	  classical	  
ressentiment.	  The	  first	  is	  Améry’s	  inability	  to	  exist	  outside	  of	  his	  identity	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  Nazism.	  We	  remember	  from	  Nietzsche,	  and	  as	  further	  elaborated	  by	  Brown	  that	  the	  person	  of	  ressentiment	  is	  one	  who	  is	  irrevocably	  attached	  to	  their	  injury.	  Améry	  describes	   ressentiment	   as	   the	   “existential	   determinant”	   for	   people	   like	   him	   who	  cannot	   enjoy	   the	  world	   in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   the	   “uninjured.”63	  Secondly,	   Améry	   is	  bound	  to	  an	  irrational	  backward	  orientation	  to	  the	  past,	  characterized	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  craving	   reminiscent	   of	   Nietzsche’s	  man	   of	   ressentiment.	   Finally,	   Brudholm	   argues	  that	   “Améry’s	   ressentiments	   harbor	   a	   vivid	   sense	   of	   what	   has	   been	   violated;	  
ressentiment	  relates	   to	  discussions	  about	  memory	  and	  history	   in	  ways	   that	  are	   far	  from	  the	  ethical	  and	  social	  concerns	  of	  philosophers	  of	  resentment.”64	  	  In	   sum,	   then,	  while	   Améry’s	   ressentiment	  bears	   resemblance	   to	  Nietzsche’s	  definition	  –	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  consumes	  the	  character	  and	  identity	  of	  the	  victim	  who	  is	  confined	  to	  his/her	  victimhood,	  is	  unable	  to	  let	  go	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  is	  vividly	  fixated	  on	  its	  violation	  –	   it	  also	  defies	  his	  formulation.	  As	  Brudholm’s	  above	  quote	  argues,	  Améry	  is	  not	  occupied	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  revenge,	  he	  takes	  no	  pleasure	  in	  his	  reproach,	  and	  he	   is	  not	  motivated	  by	   spite,	  malice	  or	   envy.	  Améry	   further	  distances	  himself	  from	  Nietzsche’s	   formulation	   in	   the	  moral	  demands	  his	  ressentiment	   expresses,	   as	  well	   as	   his	   ultimate	   desire	   that	   his	   ressentiment	   acts	   as	   a	   conduit	   to	   repairing	  relations	  between	  fractured	  groups.	  Inherent	  in	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  is	  a	  wish	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  64.	  	  64	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	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the	  perpetrators	  rise	  to	  the	  moral	  standard	  that	  he	  holds	  them	  to	  and	  in	  taking	  such	  responsibility,	  makes	  his	  need	  for	  ressentiment	  obsolete.	  	  As	  Brudholm	  elaborates:	  Yet,	  the	  preservation	  of	  ressentiment	  is	  not	  only	  compatible	  with	  a	  wish	  that	  the	   resented	  persons	  would	  make	   the	  resentment	   inappropriate.	  More	   than	  that,	   one	   might	   even	   say	   that	   [Améry’s]	   ressentiment	   is	   expressive	   of	   a	  stubborn	   holding	   on	   to	   a	   demand	   that	   the	   communities	   of	   judgment	   from	  which	  he	  expected	  better	  will	  change…What	  the	  victims,	  according	  to	  Améry,	  can	   do	   to	   promote	   this	   outcome	   is	   solely	   to	   keep	   alive	   and	   express	   their	  
ressentiment.	   This	   is	   the	   objective	   task	   of	   the	   victims’	   publicly	   manifested	  
ressentiments:	  to	  make	  the	  crime	  a	  reality	  to	  the	  perpetrator	  and	  to	  catalyze	  
self-­‐mistrust	   among	   the	   broader	   masses	   of	   German	   citizens….In	   this	   way	  Améry	   actively	   uses	   his	   ressentiments	   to	   promote	   a	   process	   aimed	   at	   their	  overcoming.	   A	   “politics	   of	   ressentiment”	   can	  be	   combined	   with	   a	   vision	   of	  reconstructing	  the	  relationship	  between	  antagonistic	  groups;	  more	  precisely,	  between	  ‘all	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  live	  together	  as	  fellow	  human	  beings’.”65	  	   This	   last	  statement	  signals	  a	  shift	   from	  the	  moral	   to	  the	  political	  with	  great	  significance	  for	  this	  dissertation’s	  purposes	  in	  that	  it	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  whether	  a	  
politics	  of	  ressentiment	   is	   capable	  of	   leading	   to	   a	  humanistic	   future.	  Or	   to	  put	   it	   in	  slightly	   different	   terms,	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   conceive	   of	   a	   humanist	  
ressentiment.	  	  
A	  Humanist	  Ressentiment?	  	   This	  dissertation	  has	  thus	  far	  suggested	  that	  ressentiment	  is	  harmful	  to	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  movement	  and	  that	  a	  politics	  grounded	  in	  a	  humanistic	  vision	  and	  practice	  might	  better	  lead	  us	  to	  more	  emancipatory	  and	  affirmative	  objectives.	  Améry’s	  thought	  provides	  a	  challenge	  in	  suggesting	  that	  ressentiment	  might	  be	  the	  exact	  mechanism	  that	  can	  lead	  us	  to	  this	  sense	  of	  humanist	  solidarity.	  But	  is	  a	  humanist	  ressentiment	  possible?	  In	  this	  section	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  this	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  159.	  
	   320	  
provocative	  concept,	  and	  although	  Améry’s	  special	  kind	  of	  ressentiment	  may	  have	  been	  useful	  for	  his	  specific	  purposes,	  it	  is	  less	  useful	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  Améry’s	  thought	  encourages	  us	  to	  consider	  whether	  perhaps	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  not	  so	  much	  Georgis	  and	  Kim’s	  counsel	  around	  touching	  our	  pain	  and	  moving	  past	  it,	  but	  rather	  grasping	  our	  ressentiment	  even	  more	  tightly,	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  humanist	  aims	  through	  it.	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  tenable	  for	  our	  movement	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  ressentiment	  presents	  a	  social	  character	  that	  bears	   more	   resemblance	   to	   Nietzsche’s	   “man	   of	   ressentiment”	   than	   to	   Améry’s	  special	   and	   more	   “humanist,”	   kind.	   This	   is	   significant	   because	   it	   is	   exactly	   the	  absence	  of	  traits	  such	  as	  spitefulness,	  malice,	  envy,	  vengefulness,	  and	  a	  pleasure	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  one’s	  ressentiment	  –	  qualities	  that	  we	  as	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists	  at	  times	  unfortunately	  betray	  –	   that	  makes	  Améry’s	   concept	   capable	  of	   a	  humanistic	  vision.	  The	   inclusion	  of	   these	  qualities,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  makes	  our	  ressentiment	  especially	   vulnerable	   to	   divisiveness,	   rather	   than	   a	   desire	   for	   coexistence	   and	  reconciliation.	  	  Is	  the	  answer,	  then,	  to	  convert	  or	  refashion	  our	  ressentiment	  from	  Nietzsche’s	  toxic	  kind	  to	  Améry’s	  humanistic	  one?	   I	  do	  not	  believe	   this	   is	   the	  most	  productive	  aim	   for	   at	   least	   a	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   it	   must	   be	   emphasized	   that	   Améry’s	  
ressentiment	  is	  particular	  to	  his	  context.	  As	  a	  victim	  of	  Nazi	  torture	  and	  internment,	  he	   is	   seeking	   to	  use	  his	   ressentiment	   as	   an	   adamant	  protest	   against	   a	   society	   that	  wishes	   to	   turn	   the	   page	   of	   history	  without	   holding	   accountable	   a	   population	   that	  Améry	   insists	   is	   steeped	   in	   collective	   guilt.	   This,	   however,	   is	   not	   what	   makes	  Améry’s	   context	   incommensurate	  with	   our	   own,	   given	   that	   part	   of	   the	   anti-­‐racist	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feminist	   project	   is	   also	   to	   insist	   that	   historical	   injuries	   be	   accounted	   for	   in	   the	  historical	  register,	  and	  that	  responsibility	  be	  taken	  by	  those	  who	  were	  both	  directly	  and	   indirectly	   complicit,	   including	   contemporary	   beneficiaries	   of	   past	   violations.	  The	   fundamental	  difference	  between	  such	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  aims	  and	  his,	   is	   that	  Améry’s	   mission	   was	   not	   one	   of	   an	   emancipatory	   social	   justice	   movement.	   His	  motivation	   was	   surely	   tied	   to	   justice	   in	   that	   he	   demands	   accountability,	   but	   his	  central	   aim	   is	   one	   of	  moral	  restoration	  rather	   than	  political	   liberation.	   For	  Améry,	  the	  Holocaust	  signified	  a	  serious	  breach	  in	  human	  relations	  between	  Jewish	  citizens	  and	  the	  German	  masses.	  His	  ressentiment	  urges	  both	   forgiving	   Jews	  and	  forgetting	  Germans	  to	  return	  temporally	  to	  the	  site	  of	  this	  rupture,	  and	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  in	  the	  proper	  moral	  tenor	  of	  outrage	  and	  unacceptability,	  so	  that	  the	  moral	  fabric	  between	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  society	  at	  large,	  might	  be	  repaired.	  It	  is	  only	  upon	  these	  grounds	  that	   true	   reconciliation	   can	   take	   place	   and	   a	   future	   of	   human	   coexistence	   and	  solidarity	   might	   flourish.	   Améry	   moulds	   his	   ressentiment	   to	   suit	   his	   specific	   aim,	  using	  it	  to	  “hol[d]	  its	  finger	  raised”	  in	  the	  “midst	  of	  the	  world’s	  silence.”66	  While	  “the	  accusing	  finger	  of	  blame	  [is]	  very	  apt	  to	  his	  historical	  situation,”67	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  Améry’s	  ressentiment	  is	  capacious	  enough	  to	  facilitate	  political	  aims	  that	  seek	  more	  to	  disrupt	  and	  replace,	  rather	  than	  to	  restore.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  consider	  Brudholm’s	  idea	  that	  “a	  ‘politics	  of	  ressentiment’	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  a	  vision	  of	  reconstructing	  the	   relationship	   between	   antagonistic	   groups;	   more	   precisely,	   between	   ‘all	   those	  who	  wish	   to	   live	   together	   as	   fellow	  human	   beings’”68	  then	  what	  must	   be	   asked	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  78.	  67	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  133.	  	  68	  Brudholm,	  Resentment’s	  Virtue,	  159.	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precisely	  what	  kind	  of	  vision	  might	  such	  a	  politics	  achieve?	  My	  strong	  suspicion	   is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  one	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  emancipatory	  aims	  of	  dismantling	  current	  structures	  of	  oppression	  and	  building	  affirmative	  alternatives.	  	  Secondly,	   despite	   Améry’s	   humanist	   tone	   and	   wish	   for	   ultimate	  reconciliation,	   the	   Nietzschean	   aspects	   of	   his	   ressentiment	   –	   his	   over-­‐determined	  victim	   identity,	   staunchly	  backward	   facing	  orientation,	   and	  vivid	   replaying	  of	  past	  injury	  –	  were	  enough	  to	  considerably	  cripple	  Améry	  psychologically	  and	  physically.	  Indeed,	  Améry	  would	  sadly	  take	  his	  own	  life	  at	  the	  age	  of	  66	  in	  1978,	  citing	  that	  he	  was	   at	   “the	   end	   of	   my	   powers.”69	  It	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   his	   ressentiment	   was	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  the	  process	  of	  healing	  and	  positive	  self-­‐creation.	  Améry	  indeed	  spurned	  the	  prospect	  of	  healing,	  and	  the	  natural	  process	  of	  time	  that	  would	  facilitate	  it,	  as	  distinctly	   “antimoral,”70	  and	  resigned	  himself	   to	   living	   the	  rest	  of	  his	   life	  as	  a	  victim	  of	  Nazism.	  	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  difficult	  to	  compare	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  situation	  to	  that	  of	  Améry’s	  given	  that	  his	  was	  an	  experience	  of	  surviving	  mass	  atrocity.	  The	  point	  to	  be	  made	   here,	   however,	   is	   that	   an	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism	   that	   is	   tethered	   to	   its	   own	  injury,	  whether	  with	  an	  ultimately	  humanist	  aim	  or	  not,	  is	  still	  unable	  to	  develop	  the	  creative	   long	   term	  potential	  with	  which	   to	   transform	  pain	   into	   power,	   and	   create	  affirmative	  visions	  for	  the	  future	  –	  or	  in	  Fromm’s	  words,	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  process	  of	  positive	   freedom.	  Again,	   it	   can	  be	   seen	   that	  even	  a	  more	  enlightened,	   so	   to	   speak,	  
ressentiment	  is	  still	  at	  odds	  with	  any	  anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  aims	  of	  affirmative	  future-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Taken	  from	  Améry’s	  suicide	  note	  to	  his	  wife	  Maria	  Améry,	  Salzburg,	  October	  16,	  1978.	  The	  note	  can	  be	  viewed	  online	  here:	  http://www.asymptotejournal.com/nonfiction/jean-­‐Améry-­‐suicide-­‐notes/	  70	  Améry,	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits,	  72,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	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making.	   This	   perhaps	   also	   emphasizes	   the	   value	   of	   Kim’s	   approach,	   which	   in	  providing	  a	  means	  of	  healing	  injury,	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  empowered	  action.	  	  While	   it	  may	  be	   the	  case	   that	  Améry’s	   “humanist	  ressentiment”	   is	  unable	   to	  facilitate	  emancipatory	  ambitions	  for	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism,	  this	  is	  certainly	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Améry	  does	  not	  offer	  us	   important	   insights,	   and	  perhaps	  even	   correctives,	   to	  the	   current	   discussion.	   There	   are	   three	   points	   that	   I	   would	   like	   to	   emphasize	   in	  particular.	  	  Firstly,	   Améry	   and	   Brudholm	   make	   a	   good	   case	   for	   the	   value	   of	   negative	  emotions,	  providing	  an	   interesting	  counterpoint	   to	  Kim’s	  approach	  by	  questioning	  the	  moral	   value	   of	   compassion	   in	   situations	   of	   social	   injury.	  While	   it	   has	   become	  popular	   to	   speak	   of	   forgiveness	   and	   reconciliation,	   they	   ask	   us	   to	   consider	   the	  possibility	   that	   premature	   overcoming	   might	   damage	   the	   moral	   health	   of	   the	  individual.	  This	  especially	  pertains	  to	  situation	  like	  ours	  in	  which	  racial	  oppression	  has	   not	   been	   eliminated,	   and	  where	   a	   forgiving	   and	   reconciliatory	   posture	  would	  indeed	   be	   premature.	  While	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  should	   submit	   to	   our	   ressentimental	   feelings,	   Améry’s	   emphasis	   on	   their	   socio-­‐ethical	   function	   is	   important	   in	   that	   it	   alerts	   us	   to	   how	   negative	   emotions	   signal	  moral	  violation.	  	  As	   Brudholm	   argues,	   in	   not	   forgiving	   we	   re-­‐assert	   the	   humanity	   that	   was	  taken	  from	  us	  in	  our	  moment	  of	  injury,	  and	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  oppressor	  our	  sense	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  self-­‐worth.	  For	  Améry,	  resisting	  society’s	  pressure	  towards	  social	  harmony	   is	   one’s	   moral	   right,	   as	   well	   as	   testament	   to	   one’s	   true	   care	   for,	   and	  participation	   in	   society	   (in	   distinction	   to	   his	   condemnation	   against	   the	   one	   who	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“submerges	  his	  individuality	  in	  society	  and	  is	  able	  to	  comprehend	  himself	  only	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  social”).	  	  What	   Améry	   and	   Brudholm	   thus	   alert	   us	   to	   is	   the	   positive	  moral	   value	   of	  
ressentiment	  that	  may	  exist,	  even	  if	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  political	  efficaciousness.	   In	   cautioning	   against	   the	   harms	   of	   premature	   forgiveness,	   they	  furthermore	  signal	   the	   issue	  of	  readiness.	  Perhaps	   there	   is	  a	  certain	   time	  at	  which	  one	   is	   able	   to	   move	   from	   a	   place	   of	   ressentiment	   to	   a	   place	   of	   compassion	   and	  reconciliation.	  As	  was	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  4	  while	  exploring	  Stringer’s	  argument,	  
ressentiment	   can	   provide	   the	   injured	   with	   the	   necessary	   emotional	   energy	   to	  occasion	   an	   ontological	   break	   in	  which	   they	   realize	   that	   their	   possibilities	   of	   self-­‐becoming	   and	   social	   change	   are	   open	   to	   contingency.	   There	   may	   be	   a	   point,	  however,	  when	   ressentiment	   no	   longer	   provides	   the	   necessary	   re-­‐humanizing	   and	  mobilizing	  energy	  that	  it	  did	  and,	  instead,	  starts	  growing	  roots	  and	  settling	  into	  the	  victim’s	   personality	   in	   the	   toxic	   manner	   described	   by	   Nietzsche	   –	   perhaps	   the	  moment	   in	  which	   resentment	   turns	   to	   ressentiment.	   The	   crucial	   point	  here	   is	   that	  
perhaps	  our	  aim	  should	  not	  be	  overcoming	  ressentiment	  but	  rather	  acknowledging	  its	  
usefulness	   as	   a	   morally	   and	   (initially)	   politically	   instructive	   emotion,	   while	  
safeguarding	  against	  its	  long	  term	  self-­‐subversive	  tendencies	  on	  both	  the	  political	  and	  
psychological	  front.	  Kim’s	  approach	  of	  Compassionate	  Activism	  provides	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  with	  a	  helpful	  practice	  towards	  achieving	  this	  aim.	  Indeed,	  mindfulness	  –	  with	   its	  attention	  to	  one’s	   inner	  process	  –	  can	   furnish	  us	  with	   the	  awareness	  with	  which	   to	   balance	   our	   healthy	   expression	   of	   negative	   emotions,	  with	   our	   need	   for	  healing	  and	  compassion.	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A	   second	   contribution	   of	   Améry’s	   is	   his	   insistence	   that	   his	   ressentiment	   is	  directly	   related	   to	   the	   actions	   and	   behaviour	   of	   those	   who	   he	   identifies	   as	   his	  oppressors.	  This	  contention,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  further	  claim	  that	  in	  taking	  responsibility,	  his	  oppressors	  are	  capable	  of	  dissolving	  his	  ressentiment,	  are	  important	  in	  that	  they	  suggest	   that	  Améry’s	  negative	   feelings	   are	   less	   the	  product	  of	  personal	  pathology,	  and	   more	   a	   valid	   response	   to	   the	   immoral	   behaviour	   of	   others.	   What	   Améry’s	  thinking	  stresses	  is	  the	  interpersonal	  and	  dynamic	  quality	  of	  ressentiment.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	   not	   just	   something	   that	   “we”	   feel	   against	   “them,”	   but	   rather	   an	   emotional	   state	  that	   implicates	   both	   sides,	   even	   if	   one	   side	   meets	   it	   with	   denial.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	  proper	   response	   that	   the	   oppressor	   should	   assume	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   injury	   they	  have	   caused,	   Améry	   speaks	   of	   remorse,	   guilt,	   and	   ignominy.	   Interestingly,	   I	   have	  discussed	   earlier	   how	   these	   exact	   emotions	   (e.g.	   white	   guilt)	   fail	   on	   the	   political	  front	  due	  to	  the	  self-­‐indulgence	  and	  impotence	  they	  can	  foster.	  What	  Améry	  offers	  is	  the	   possibility	   that	   while	   these	   responses	   may	   be	   politically	   counter-­‐productive,	  they	   are	   the	   appropriate	   expressions	   of	   accountability	   on	   moral	   grounds.	   The	  challenge	   for	   those	   of	   the	   dominant	   group	  who	   are	   committed	   to	   social	   justice	   is	  thus	  learning	  how	  to	  manage	  their	  contrition	  (much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  must	  learn	  to	  manage	  our	  ressentiment),	  rather	  than	  eradicate	  it.	  	  A	  third	  point	  that	  might	  be	  taken	  from	  the	  above	  discussion	  is	  related	  to	  this	  distinction	   between	   resentment	   and	   ressentiment.	  While	   it	   is	   attractive	   to	   suggest	  that	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   anti-­‐racist	   feminist	   impasse	   is	   simply	   to	   re-­‐shape	   our	  
ressentiment	  to	  resemble	  the	  more	  honourable	  affective	  state	  of	  resentment,	  such	  an	  exercise	  would	   prevent	   us	   from	   understanding	  why	   our	   ressentiment	  grew	   in	   the	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first	   place.	   If	   Améry’s	   ressentiment	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   outgrowth	   of	   his	  experience,	   we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists	   might	   ask	   how	   is	   our	   ressentiment	   an	  outgrowth	  of	  our	  experiences?	  I	  have	  discussed	  how	  I	  believe	  that	  our	  ressentiment	  is	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  our	  unexamined	  pain,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  in	  repression	  of	  this	  pain	  that	  
ressentiment	  grows	  as	  a	  protective	   layer.	  While	  mindfulness	  may	  allow	  a	  means	  to	  touching	  and	  beginning	   to	  heal	  our	  pain,	   the	  question	  still	   remains	  as	   to	  why	   it	   is	  
ressentiment	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  the	  grasp	  of,	  and	  not	  resentment?	  I	  think	  part	  of	  the	  answer	  to	  this	   is	  related	  to	  the	  immense	  despair	  that	  underlies	  our	  political	  consciousness.	  While	  many	  of	  us	  wish	  for	  political	  change,	  I	  believe	  that	  most	  of	  us	  feel	   overwhelmed	   by	   the	   overpowering	   presence	   of	   the	   “white	   supremacist	  capitalist	  patriarchy”	   discussed	   by	   hooks. 71 	  Indeed,	   we	   recall	   how	   Baldwin’s	  episodes	  of	  ressentiment	  –	  such	  as	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  –	  were	  moments	  not	  only	  of	  immense	  pain,	  but	  also	  deep	  despair.	  We	  remember	  also	  from	  Nietzsche	  that	  the	  man	  of	  ressentiment	  is	  steeped	  in	  his	  own	  impotence	  –	  which	  we	  need	  not	  interpret	  as	  a	  personal	  lack	  of	  power,	  but	  rather	  a	  sense	  of	  helplessness	  in	  the	   face	  of	  overwhelming	  domination.	   If	  part	  of	   the	  anti-­‐racist	   feminist	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  have	  lost	  the	  faith	  in	  our	  ability	  to	  build	  a	  different	  world	  and	  the	  creativity	  with	  which	  to	   imagine	   it,	  how	  might	  we	   learn	  how	  to	  dream	  again?	  I	  examine	  this	  question	   in	   the	   concluding	   chapter.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Hooks,	  lecture	  at	  York	  University,	  October	  22,	  2015.	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Chapter	  8	  –	  Conclusion:	  Learning	  to	  Dream	  Again	  
“Another	  world	  is	  not	  only	  possible,	  she	  is	  on	  her	  way.	  Maybe	  many	  of	  us	  won’t	  be	  here	  
to	  greet	  her,	  but	  on	  a	  quiet	  day,	  if	  I	  listen	  very	  carefully,	  I	  can	  hear	  her	  breathing.”	  -­‐	  Arundhati	  Roy,	  War	  Talk	  	  
“I’m	  afraid	  that	  ours	  in	  the	  West	  is	  a	  period	  of	  a	  great	  lack	  of	  faith,	  that	  actually	  the	  
hate	  we	  find	  so	  rampant	  more	  and	  more	  in	  the	  Western	  World	  and	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
is	  only	  an	  expression	  that	  people	  do	  not	  love	  and	  in	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  what	  
they	  live	  for.	  Certainly	  the	  hate	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  moral	  despair	  and	  moral	  defeatism.”	  	  
-­‐Erich	  Fromm,	  On	  Being	  Human.	  	  
	  
“The	  question	  remains:	  What	  are	  today’s	  young	  activists	  dreaming	  about?	  We	  know	  
what	  they	  are	  fighting	  against,	  but	  what	  are	  they	  fighting	  for?”	  
-­‐Robin	  Kelley,	  Freedom	  Dreams	  
	  
“To	  express	  hope	  for	  another	  kind	  of	  world,	  one	  that	  is	  unimaginable	  in	  the	  present,	  is	  
a	  political	  action,	  and	  it	  remains	  so	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  exhaustion	  and	  despair.”	  -­‐	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion	  
	   In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   have	   charted	   an	   unconventional	   journey	   from	  Nietzsche’s	   ressentiment	   to	   Erich	   Fromm’s	   humanism	   to	   practices	   of	  mindfulness,	  with	  many	  stops	  in	  between.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  anti-­‐racist	  feminism	  suffers	  from	  a	   social	   character	   that	   bears	   similarity	   to	   Nietzsche’s	   ressentiment;	   and	   I	   have	  contended	   that	   this	   character	   is	   nurtured	   by	   our	   specific	   type	   of	   political	  engagement	  –	   identity	  politics	  –	  which	  increases	  divisiveness,	  requires	  attachment	  to	   injury,	   and	   encourages	   gains	   within	   the	   system	   over	   seeking	   emancipatory	  alternatives	   for	   the	   future.	   In	  the	  second	  part	  of	   the	  dissertation,	   I	   looked	  to	  some	  ideas	  and	  practices	   from	  outside	  of	  anti-­‐racist	   feminism	  that	  address	  the	  concerns	  raised	  in	  the	  first	  half.	  Specifically,	  I	  explored	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  theory	  of	  humanism	  for	  his	  articulation	  of	  human	  interconnection	  based	  in	  our	  shared	  existential	  needs;	  his	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explanation	   of	   how	   these	   needs	   drive	   our	   behaviour,	   including	   our	   political	  activism;	  and	  his	  vision	  of	  a	  positive	  freedom	  that	  centers	  affirmative	  self-­‐becoming	  and	  co-­‐creating.	  I	  then	  explored	  mindfulness	  as	  one	  concrete	  practice	  that	  might	  not	  only	   help	   us	  move	   toward	   Fromm’s	   notion	   of	   positive	   freedom,	   but	   that	   can	   also	  allow	   us	   to	   touch	   into	   our	   pain	   before	   it	   hardens	   into	   ressentiment.	   Finally,	   I	  considered	  how	  given	   that	   racialization	  and	  other	  oppressions	  persist	   in	  a	   society	  like	  ours,	  perhaps	  our	  aim	  is	  less	  to	  eliminate	  or	  overcome	  ressentiment,	  and	  rather	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  operate	  within	  its	  socio-­‐ethical	  function	  of	  signalling	  a	  moral	  breach.	  I	  suggested	  that	  mindfulness	  could	   furnish	  us	  with	  the	  technology	  to	  appreciate	   the	  moral	   value	   of	   ressentiment	   without	   allowing	   it	   to	   overtake	   our	   psyches,	   and	   our	  political	  movements.	  	  I	  have	   intended,	   in	   this	  dissertation,	   to	  open	  up	  a	   conversation	   that	   I	   think	  we,	   as	   anti-­‐racist	   feminists,	  must	   have.	   In	   bringing	   together	   a	   number	   of	   thinkers	  and	   theories	   that	   may	   not	   conventionally	   stand	   next	   to	   one	   another,	   I	   have	  attempted	   at	   “recovering	   a	   certain	   openness”	   that	   belongs	   to	   the	   tradition	   of	   the	  radical	  left.1	  As	  Brown	  discusses:	  This	  openness	  often	  collapses	  soon	  after	   the	   left	  or	  a	  radical	   justice	  project	  attaches	   itself	   to	   a	   certain	   vision,	   to	   a	   certain	   end	   or	   to	   a	   certain	   practice.	  What	  we	  might	  need	  to	  give	  now,	  or	  what	  we	  might	  need	  to	  inhabit	  now,	  is	  that	   founding	   openness	   to	   possibility,	   to	   seeing	   the	   world	   differently,	   to	  seeing	   power	   differently,	   to	   seeing	   the	   future	   differently.	   This	   involves	   a	  brave	  and	  humble	  intellectual	  and	  political	  openness.2	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Wendy	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  “Learning	  to	  Love	  Again	  -­‐	  An	  Interview	  With	  Wendy	  Brown,”	  
Contretemps	  6	  (January	  2006):	  41.	  	  2	  Wendy	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  “Learning	  to	  Love	  Again,”	  41.	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Brown	   argues	   that	   this	   brave	   and	   humble	   openness	   must	   include	   an	   allowing	   of	  different	  kinds	  of	   ideas	  to	  “enter	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  productive	  fusion,”	  even	  if	  they	  are	  projects	   that	   normally	   assume	   a	   suspicious	   distance	   from	   one	   another.3	  In	   this	  dissertation	   I	   have	   endeavoured	   to	   engender	   such	   a	   productive	   fusion	   between	  Erich	   Fromm’s	   humanism,	   secularized	   mindfulnessness	   practice,	   and	   anti-­‐racist	  feminism.	  	  But	   there	   still	   remains	   the	   question	   of	  where	   do	   we	   go	   from	   here?	   I	   have	  spoken	   about	   anti-­‐racist	   feminism’s	   need	   to	   reinvigorate	   our	   emancipatory	   spirit	  and	  work	   toward	   building	   alternatives	   for	   the	   future	   but	  many	   of	   us	   have	   never	  learned	  to	  do	  this	  work	  of	  envisioning.	  Indeed,	  this	  has	  become	  abundantly	  clear	  to	  me	   in	  my	  tenure	  as	  a	  Teaching	  Assistant	  during	  my	  graduate	  education.	   In	  classes	  where	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  curriculum	  was	  more	  to	  impress	  upon	  students	  the	  gravity	  of	  societal	   oppression,	   the	   tutorials	  were	  not	  often	  places	  of	  hope	  or	   imagination.	   In	  spite	  of	  this,	  and	  perhaps	  also	  in	  light	  of	  it,	  I	  would	  pose	  questions	  to	  the	  students	  at	  the	  end	  of	  term	  such	  as:	  So	  what	  should	  we	  do?	  How	  might	  we	  get	  through	  this?	  What	  
kind	  of	  a	  world	  do	  you	  want	  to	  live	  in?	  What	  kind	  of	  a	  world	  might	  we	  make	  together?	  I	  was	   invariably	  met	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	   apathy	  and	  despair.	  After	  many	  months	  of	  teaching	   concepts	   like	   “hegemony”,	   “patriarchy”,	   “heteronormativity”,	  “racialization,”	   “cultural	   genocide,”	   and	   “neoliberalism,”	   this	   was	   not	   surprising.	  Finally,	  and	  predictably,	  the	  students	  would	  pose	  these	  questions	  back	  at	  me.	  What	  could	   I	   give	   them?	   Nothing	   in	  my	   almost	   two	   decades	   of	   feminist	   and	   anti-­‐racist	  feminist	  education	  had	  taught	  me	  how	  to	  answer	  these	  questions.	  The	  imagination	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Wendy	  Brown	  et	  al.,	  “Learning	  to	  Love	  Again,”	  41.	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asked	  from	  them	  had	  not	  been	  nurtured	  in	  me.	  It’s	  not	  that	  I	  couldn’t	  talk	  to	  them	  about	  resistance	  or	  even	  empowerment	  –	  I	  could	  and	  I	  did	  –	  but	  I	  was	  left	  with	  the	  abiding	  dissatisfaction	  that	  this	  was	  not	  enough.	  It	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  fight	  back,	  we	  
had	  to	  build	  too.	  	  In	  various	  forms,	  the	  overwhelming	  despair	  of	  our	  current	  moment	  and	  the	  inability	   of	   many	   of	   us	   to	   imagine	   alternatives	   have	   been	   noted	   by	   a	   number	   of	  thinkers.	  As	  Brown	  vividly	  accounts,	  the	  modern	  individual	  is	  at	  once	  flanked	  with	  the	  enormous	  burden	  to	  become	  something,	  to	  produce	  something,	  to	  gain	  mastery	  over	   their	   life,	   and	   the	   paradoxical	   sense	   of	   disempowerment,	   overwhelm,	   and	  despair	  they	  feel	  from	  the	  striking	  lack	  of	  support,	  guidance,	  opportunity,	  resources,	  and	   possibilities	   that	   might	   facilitate	   this	   achievement.	   Neoliberal	   domination	  coupled	   with	   the	   political	   melancholia	   suffered	   by	   a	   Left	   still	   tethered	   to	   its	   lost	  object	   of	   socialist	   revolution,	   have	  made	   for	   an	   especially	   despairing	   situation	   for	  Leftist	  progressives.4	  	  	  For	   Stuart	   Hall,	   who	   for	   some	   time	   spoke	   of	   the	   ‘crisis	   of	   the	   Left,’	  progressives	   have	   retreated	   under	   a	   “cynical	   protective	   shell”	   that	   keeps	   us	   from	  realizing	  potential	  solutions:	  There	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   ‘nothing	   ever	   changes,	   the	   system	  always	  wins’	   attitude,	  which	   I	   read	  as	   the	  cynical	  protective	  shell	   that,	   I’m	  sorry	   to	  say,	  American	  cultural	  critics	   frequently	  wear,	  a	  shell	   that	  sometimes	  prevents	   them	  from	  developing	  cultural	  strategies	  that	  can	  made	  a	  difference.	  It	  is	  as	  if,	   in	  order	  to	   protect	   themselves	   against	   the	   occasional	   defeat,	   they	   have	   to	   pretend	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  more	  on	  Left	  Melancholia	  see	  Brown’s	  “Resisting	  Left	  Melancholy,”	  Boundary	  2	  26,	  no.	  3	  (October	  1,	  1999):	  19–27.	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they	   can	   see	   right	   through	   everything	   –	   and	   it’s	   just	   the	   same	   as	   it	   always	  was.5	  	  Similarly	  for	  Robin	  Kelley,	  “we	  have	  lost	  our	  sense	  of	  utopia.”6	  As	  he	  states,	  	  Sometimes	   I	   think	   the	   conditions	   of	   daily	   life,	   of	   everyday	   oppressions,	   of	  survival,	   not	   to	  mention	   the	   temporary	   pleasures	   accessible	   to	  most	   of	   us,	  render	  much	   of	   our	   imagination	   inert.	  We	   are	   constantly	   putting	   out	   fires,	  responding	   to	   emergencies,	   finding	   temporary	   refuge,	   all	   of	  which	  make	   it	  difficult	  to	  see	  anything	  other	  than	  the	  present.7	  	  	  Kelley	   is	   interested	   in	   reinvigorating	   the	   revolutionary	   political	   energy	   of	  Martin	   Luther	   King	   Jr.	   in	   our	   current	   movements.	   In	   his	   view,	   contemporary	  progressive	  struggles	  are	  more	  geared	  toward	  “dialling	  back	  to	  some	  version	  of	  the	  welfare	   state”	   rather	   than	   implementing	   “new	   values	   and	   new	   morals.”8	  Kelley	  argues	   that	   we	   can	   do	   better	   than	   this,	   and	   indeed,	   our	   success	   depends	   on	   our	  ability	   to	   “seize	   the	   future”	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   King,	   rather	   than	   settling	   for	   the	  restoration	  of	  policies	   from	  the	  past.	  He	  reminds	  us	  that	  King	  was	  concerned	  with	  moral	  principles	  that	  governed	  society,	  not	  solidarity	  based	  in	  race	  or	  nationalism.	  As	  King	  would	  declare	  in	  his	  1967	  anti-­‐war	  speech:	  We	  must	  rapidly	  begin	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  'thing-­‐oriented'	  society	  to	  a	  'person-­‐oriented'	   society.	   When	   machines	   and	   computers,	   profit	   motives	   and	  property	  rights	  are	  considered	  more	  important	  than	  people,	  the	  giant	  triplets	  of	  racism,	  materialism,	  and	  militarism	  are	  incapable	  of	  being	  conquered.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Stuart	  Hall,	  The	  Hard	  Road	  to	  Renewal:	  Thatcherism	  and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  the	  Left	  (London ;	  New	  York:	  Verso	  Books,	  1988);	  and	  “What	  Is	  This	  ‘Black’	  in	  Black	  Popular	  Culture?,”	  Social	  
Justice	  20,	  no.	  1/2	  (51-­‐52)	  (1993):	  104–14.	  6	  Robin	  Kelley,	  public	  lecture:	  “Fifty	  Years	  ‘Beyond	  Vietnam’:	  Dr.	  King’s	  Revolutionary	  Dream	  Against	  Our	  Neoliberal/Neofascist	  Nightmare,”	  April	  1,	  2017,	  Bloor	  United	  Church,	  Toronto.	  7	  Robin	  Kelley,	  Freedom	  Dreams:	  The	  Black	  Radical	  Imagination	  (Beacon	  Press,	  2002),	  11.	  8	  Robin	  Kelley,	  Freedom	  Dreams,	  11.	  9	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  “Beyond	  Vietnam,”	  April	  4,	  1967,	  New	  York	  City’s	  Riverside	  Church.	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The	   Frommian	   resonances	   in	   King’s	   thinking	   are	   not	   coincidental.	   Indeed,	  King	  was	  influenced	  by	  Fromm’s	  work,	  especially	  his	  concept	  of	  love	  as	  a	  “supreme	  unifying	  force	  of	  life.”10	  As	  King	  would	  contend:	  I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  a	  weak	  love.	  I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  emotional	  bosh	  here.	  I’m	   not	   talking	   about	   some	   sentimental	   quality.	   I’m	   not	   talking	   about	   an	  affectionate	  response.	  It	  would	  be	  nonsense	  to	  urge	  oppressed	  people	  to	  love	  their	   violent	   oppressors	   in	   an	   affectionate	   sense,	   and	   I	   have	   never	   advised	  that…	   Love	   is	   understanding,	   creative,	   redemptive	   goodwill	   for	   all	   men.	  Theologians	  talk	  about	  this	  kind	  of	  love	  with	  the	  Greek	  word	  agape,	  which	  is	  a	   sort	   of	   overflowing	   love	   that	   seeks	   nothing	   in	   return.	   And	   when	   one	  develops	   this,	  you	  rise	   to	   the	  position	  of	  being	  able	   to	   love	   the	  person	  who	  does	  the	  evil	  deed,	  while	  hating	  the	  deed	  that	  the	  person	  does.	  And	  I	  believe	  that	   this	   can	   be	   done.	   Psychiatrists	   are	   telling	   us	   now	   that	   hatred	   is	   a	  dangerous	   force,	   not	  merely	   for	   the	   hated,	   but	   also	   the	   hater.	  Many	   of	   the	  strange	  things	  that	  happen	  in	  the	  subconscious,	  many	  of	  the	  inner	  conflicts,	  are	  rooted	  in	  hate.	  And	  so	  they	  are	  saying,	  “Love	  or	  perish.”11	  	  It	   would	   be	   disingenuous	   of	   me	   to	   demand	   that	   we	   replace	   our	   negative	  emotions	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  love	  that	  King	  is	  speaking	  about	  but	  I	  do	  think	  we	  could	  profit	  from	  more	  of	  it	  in	  our	  movements.	  As	  anti-­‐racist	  feminists,	  we	  already	  access	  this	   love	   in	   the	   moments	   in	   which	   we	   expose	   ourselves	   from	   beneath	   our	  
ressentimental	   exteriors	   and	   provide	   each	   other	  with	   the	   compassionate	   care	   and	  recognition	   that	  we	   yearn	   for.	   I	   believe	   that	   a	   politics	   that	   foregrounds	   love	   as	   a	  motivating	  force	  can	  give	  us	  the	  inner	  resources	  with	  which	  to	  imagine	  alternative	  worlds	  beyond	   ressentiment,	  while	   still	   respecting	   and	   recognizing	   the	   function	  of	  negative	  emotions.	   Indeed,	  having	  an	  affirmative	  vision	   that	  we	  work	   toward	  may	  naturally	  dissolve	  much	  of	  the	  ressentiment	  that	  is	  generated	  out	  of	  the	  despair	  that	  marks	  our	  current	  situation.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  this	  vision,	  we	  must	  be	  willing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  King,	  Speech,	  London,	  December	  7,	  1964.	  For	  full	  transcript,	  see:	  https://www.democracynow.org/2016/1/18/newly_discovered_1964_mlk_speech_on	  11	  King,	  Speech,	  London,	  December	  7,	  1964.	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to	  ask	  one	  another	  the	  very	  questions	  that	  were	  never	  asked	  of	  us:	  So	  what	  should	  
we	  do?	  How	  might	  we	  get	  through	  this?	  What	  kind	  of	  a	  world	  do	  you	  want	  to	  live	  in?	  
What	  kind	  of	  a	  world	  might	  we	  make	  together?	  	  	  	  What	   is	   certain	   is	   that	   learning	   to	   dream	   again	   and	   forge	   a	   path	   into	   the	  future	  is	  going	  to	  take	  humility,	  bravery,	  compassion,	  self-­‐awareness,	  humour,	  and	  patience.	   It	  will	   likely	  be	  an	   incremental,	   experimental,	   and	  clumsy	  project,	  but	  as	  such,	  it	  will	  be	  a	  deeply	  humanizing	  one.	  I	  believe	  our	  ability	  to	  develop	  this	  capacity	  is	  crucial	  for	  our	  collective	  and	  individual	  health	  as	  political	  and	  spiritual	  beings.	  For	  as	  Fromm	  reminds	  us,	  “As	  long	  as	  we	  can	  think	  of	  other	  alternatives,	  we	  are	  not	  lost;	  as	   long	   as	   we	   can	   consult	   together	   and	   plan	   together,	   we	   can	   hope.” 12
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Fromm,	  Sane	  Society,	  315.	  
	   334	  
Bibliography	  	  Abel,	  Theodore.	  The	  Nazi	  Movement.	  Routledge,	  2017.	  Adorno,	  Theodor	  W.	  The	  Authoritarian	  Personality.	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1950.	  Ahmad,	  Assam.	  “A	  Note	  on	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture.”	  Briarpatch	  Magazine,	  March	  2,	  2015.	  https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/a-­‐note-­‐on-­‐call-­‐out-­‐culture.	  ———.	  “When	  Calling	  Out	  Makes	  Sense.”	  Briarpatch	  Magazine,	  August	  29,	  2017.	  https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/when-­‐calling-­‐out-­‐makes-­‐sense.	  Ahmed,	  Sara.	  Living	  a	  Feminist	  Life.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2017.	  ———.	  On	  Being	  Included:	  Racism	  and	  Diversity	  in	  Institutional	  Life.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  ———.	  Queer	  Phenomenology:	  Orientations,	  Objects,	  Others.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  ———.	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  Post-­‐Coloniality.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2000.	  ———.	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion.	  Routledge,	  2013.	  Alcoff,	  Linda	  Martin.	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  Identity	  Politics?,”	  2000.	  http://www.alcoff.com/content/afraidid.html.	  Allport,	  Floyd	  Henry.	  Social	  Psychology.	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  1924.	  Améry,	  Jean.	  At	  the	  Mind’s	  Limits:	  Contemplations	  by	  a	  Survivor	  on	  Auschwitz	  and	  Its	  
Realities.	  Bloomington:	  University	  of	  Indiana	  Press,	  1980.	  Anzaldúa,	  Gloria.	  Borderlands:	  The	  New	  Mestiza.	  Aunt	  Lute	  Books,	  2007.	  Arat-­‐Koç,	  Sedef.	  “New	  White(Ness),	  Beyond	  the	  Colour	  Line?”	  In	  States	  of	  Race:	  Critical	  
Race	  Feminism	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  edited	  by	  Sherene	  Razack,	  Sunera	  Thobani,	  and	  Malinda	  Smith.	  Between	  the	  Lines,	  2010.	  Baldwin,	  James.	  “An	  Open	  Letter	  to	  My	  Sister,	  Miss	  Angela	  Davis.”	  The	  New	  York	  Review	  
of	  Books,	  January	  7,	  1971.	  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/01/07/an-­‐open-­‐letter-­‐to-­‐my-­‐sister-­‐miss-­‐angela-­‐davis/.	  ———.	  “Freaks	  and	  the	  American	  Ideal	  of	  Manhood.”	  In	  Collected	  Essays.	  Library	  of	  America,	  1998.	  ———.	  “Price	  of	  the	  Ticket.”	  In	  Collected	  Essays.	  Library	  of	  America,	  1998.	  ———.	  The	  Fire	  Next	  Time.	  Reissue	  edition.	  New	  York:	  Vintage,	  1992.	  ———.	  The	  Fire	  Next	  Time.	  Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2013.	  ———.	  “They	  Can’t	  Turn	  Back.”	  In	  Collected	  Essays.	  Library	  of	  America,	  1998.	  ———.	  “White	  Man’s	  Guilt.”	  In	  Collected	  Essays.	  Library	  of	  America,	  1998.	  Bannerji,	  Himani.	  Returning	  the	  Gaze:	  Essays	  on	  Racism,	  Feminism	  and	  Politics.	  Sister	  Vision,	  1993.	  ———.	  Unsettling	  Relations:	  The	  University	  as	  a	  Site	  of	  Feminist	  Struggles.	  South	  End	  Press,	  1992.	  Baskin,	  Cyndy.	  “Circles	  of	  Resistance:	  Spirituality	  in	  Social	  Work	  Practice,	  Education	  and	  Transformative	  Change.”	  Currents:	  New	  Scholarship	  in	  the	  Human	  Services,	  2002.	  Beauvoir,	  Simone	  de.	  Force	  of	  Circumstance.	  André	  Deutsch,	  1965.	  Benjamin,	  Jessica.	  The	  Bonds	  of	  Love:	  Psychoanalysis,	  Feminism,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  
Domination.	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1988.	  Berlant,	  Lauren,	  ed.	  Compassion:	  The	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  of	  an	  Emotion.	  1	  edition.	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2004.	  
	   335	  
———.	  Cruel	  Optimism.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2011.	  ———.	  The	  Female	  Complaint:	  The	  Unfinished	  Business	  of	  Sentimentality	  in	  American	  
Culture.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  Berlin,	  Isaiah.	  Four	  Essays	  on	  Liberty.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1969.	  Berlinger,	  Joe.	  “Dave	  Chappelle	  &	  Maya	  Angelou.”	  Iconoclasts,	  November	  30,	  2006.	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0874578/.	  Bevensee,	  Emmi.	  “The	  Conversations	  We	  Can’t	  Have:	  Social	  Capital	  and	  Violence	  in	  Radical	  Communities,”	  November	  25,	  2016.	  https://emmibe.wordpress.com/2016/11/25/the-­‐conversations-­‐we-­‐cant-­‐have/.	  Bichell,	  Rae	  Ellen.	  “Scientists	  Start	  To	  Tease	  Out	  The	  Subtler	  Ways	  Racism	  Hurts	  Health.”	  
NPR,	  November	  11,	  2017.	  https://www.npr.org/sections/health-­‐shots/2017/11/11/562623815/scientists-­‐start-­‐to-­‐tease-­‐out-­‐the-­‐subtler-­‐ways-­‐racism-­‐hurts-­‐health.	  Bindel,	  Julie.	  “Feminism	  Is	  in	  Danger	  of	  Becoming	  Toxic	  |	  Julie	  Bindel.”	  The	  Guardian,	  November	  18,	  2014,	  sec.	  Opinion.	  http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/18/feminism-­‐rosetta-­‐scientist-­‐shirt-­‐dapper-­‐laughs-­‐julien-­‐blanc-­‐inequality.	  Bixler,	  Melina.	  “The	  Use	  of	  Anger	  in	  Constructing	  Inclusive	  Feminist	  Movements.”	  
Academia.Edu.	  Accessed	  February	  11,	  2018.	  https://www.academia.edu/8884417/The_Use_of_Anger_in_Constructing_Inclusive_Feminist_Movements.	  Bloor,	  David.	  Wittgenstein:	  A	  Social	  Theory	  of	  Knowledge.	  First	  Edition	  edition.	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  Univ	  Pr,	  1983.	  Blumer,	  Herbert.	  “Collective	  Behaviour.”	  In	  Principles	  of	  Sociology,	  edited	  by	  Alfred	  McClung	  Lee.	  New	  York:	  Barnes	  and	  Noble,	  1939.	  Bodenner,	  Chris.	  “The	  Surprising	  Revolt	  at	  the	  Most	  Liberal	  College	  in	  the	  Country.”	  The	  
Atlantic,	  November	  2,	  2017.	  https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/11/the-­‐surprising-­‐revolt-­‐at-­‐reed/544682/?utm_source=atlfb.	  Bodhi,	  Ven.	  Bhikkhu.	  “Facing	  the	  Great	  Divide.”	  Inquiring	  Mind	  31,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  2015).	  Bon,	  Gustave	  Le.	  The	  Crowd:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Popular	  Mind.	  Macmillan,	  1896.	  Bordo,	  Susan.	  Unbearable	  Weight:	  Feminism,	  Western	  Culture,	  and	  the	  Body.	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2004.	  Bourdieu,	  Pierre.	  Outline	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Practice.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1977.	  ———.	  The	  Logic	  of	  Practice.	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  Bourdieu,	  Pierre,	  and	  Loïc	  J.	  D.	  Wacquant.	  An	  Invitation	  to	  Reflexive	  Sociology.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992.	  Bramen,	  Carrie	  Tirado.	  “Why	  the	  Academic	  Left	  Hates	  Identity	  Politics.”	  Textual	  Practice	  16,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1,	  2002):	  1–11.	  	  Braune,	  Joan.	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Revolutionary	  Hope:	  Prophetic	  Messianism	  as	  a	  Critical	  
Theory	  of	  the	  Future.	  Imagination	  and	  Praxis:	  Criticality	  and	  Creativity	  in	  Education	  and	  Educational	  Research.	  Sense	  Publishers,	  2014.	  	  Brennan,	  Teresa.	  The	  Transmission	  of	  Affect.	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  Bronner,	  Stephen.	  Of	  Critical	  Theory	  and	  Its	  Theorists.	  Wiley,	  1994.	  Brown,	  Wendy.	  “Resisting	  Left	  Melancholy.”	  Boundary	  2	  26,	  no.	  3	  (October	  1,	  1999):	  19–27.	  
	   336	  
———.	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity.	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  Brown,	  Wendy,	  Christina	  Colegate,	  John	  Dalton,	  Timothy	  Rayner,	  and	  Cate	  Till.	  “Learning	  to	  Love	  Again	  -­‐	  An	  Interview	  With	  Wendy	  Brown.”	  Contretemps	  6	  (January	  2006).	  https://www.scribd.com/document/114796047/Wendy-­‐Brown-­‐Learning-­‐to-­‐Love-­‐Again-­‐An-­‐Interview-­‐With-­‐Wendy-­‐Brown.	  Brubaker,	  Rogers.	  “The	  Uproar	  Over	  ‘Transracialism.’”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  18,	  2017.	  https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/opinion/the-­‐uproar-­‐over-­‐transracialism.html?referer.	  Brudholm,	  Thomas.	  Resentment’s	  Virtue:	  Jean	  Améry	  and	  the	  Refusal	  to	  Forgive.	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  Burns,	  Katelyn.	  “This	  Simple	  Technique	  Could	  End	  Toxic	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture	  Forever.”	  
Everyday	  Feminism,	  August	  5,	  2017.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/08/this-­‐simple-­‐technique-­‐could-­‐end-­‐toxic-­‐call-­‐out-­‐culture-­‐forever/.	  Burston,	  Daniel.	  The	  Legacy	  of	  Erich	  Fromm.	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1991.	  Butler,	  Judith.	  Bodies	  That	  Matter:	  On	  the	  Discursive	  Limits	  of	  “Sex.”	  Psychology	  Press,	  1993.	  ———.	  Excitable	  Speech:	  A	  Politics	  of	  the	  Performative.	  Psychology	  Press,	  1997a.	  ———.	  Gender	  Trouble:	  Feminism	  and	  the	  Subversion	  of	  Identity.	  Routledge,	  2011.	  ———.	  Precarious	  Life:	  The	  Powers	  of	  Mourning	  and	  Violence.	  Verso,	  2006.	  ———.	  The	  Psychic	  Life	  of	  Power:	  Theories	  in	  Subjection.	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1997b.	  ———.	  Undoing	  Gender.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2004.	  Calhoun,	  Craig.	  “Putting	  Emotions	  in	  Their	  Place.”	  In	  Social	  Movements:	  A	  Reader,	  edited	  by	  V.	  Ruggiero	  and	  N.	  Montagna.	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2008.	  Cameron,	  Frank,	  and	  Don	  Dombowsky.	  Political	  Writings	  of	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche:	  An	  Edited	  
Anthology.	  Springer,	  2008.	  Chakrabarty,	  Dipesh.	  Habitations	  of	  Modernity:	  Essays	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Subaltern	  Studies.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002.	  Chodorow,	  Nancy	  J.	  The	  Reproduction	  of	  Mothering:	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  Sociology	  of	  
Gender,	  Updated	  Edition.	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1978.	  Cocks,	  Joan.	  “Augustine,	  Nietzsche	  and	  Contemporary	  Body	  Politics.”	  Differences	  3,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  1991):	  144–58.	  Collins,	  Patricia	  Hill.	  Black	  Feminist	  Thought:	  Knowledge,	  Consciousness,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Empowerment.	  Routledge,	  2002.	  Collins,	  Randall.	  Conflict	  Sociology.	  New	  York:	  Academic,	  1975.	  Comaroff,	  John	  L.	  “Ethnicity,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Revolution.”	  In	  The	  Politics	  of	  Difference:	  Ethnic	  Premises	  in	  a	  World	  of	  Power,	  edited	  by	  Edwin	  N.	  Wilmsen	  and	  P.	  A.	  McAllister.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996.	  Combahee	  River	  Collective.	  The	  Combahee	  River	  Collective	  Statement:	  Black	  Feminist	  
Organizing	  in	  the	  Seventies	  and	  Eighties.	  Kitchen	  Table:	  Women	  of	  Color	  Press,	  1986.	  Cortina,	  Mauricio.	  “The	  Greatness	  and	  Limitations	  of	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Humanism.”	  
Contemporary	  Psychoanalysis	  51,	  no.	  3	  (July	  3,	  2015):	  388–422.	  	  Coulthard,	  Glen.	  Red	  Skin,	  White	  Masks.	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2014.	  	  
	   337	  
Craven,	  Christa.	  “Women’s	  and	  Feminist	  Activism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.”	  In	  
The	  Wiley	  Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Gender	  and	  Sexuality	  Studies.	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Ltd,	  2016.	  	  Crenshaw,	  Kimberle.	  “Mapping	  the	  Margins:	  Intersectionality,	  Identity	  Politics,	  and	  Violence	  against	  Women	  of	  Color.”	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  43,	  no.	  6	  (1991):	  1241–99.	  	  Crossley,	  Nick.	  Making	  Sense	  Of	  Social	  Movements.	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Education	  (UK),	  2002.	  Cvetkovich,	  Ann.	  Depression:	  A	  Public	  Feeling.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2012.	  Das,	  Veena.	  “Language	  and	  Body-­‐	  Transactions	  in	  the	  Construction	  of	  Pain.”	  Daedalus	  125,	  no.	  1	  (Winter	  1996).	  	  Davis,	  Angela	  Y.	  Freedom	  Is	  a	  Constant	  Struggle:	  Ferguson,	  Palestine,	  and	  the	  Foundations	  
of	  a	  Movement.	  Haymarket	  Books,	  2016.	  ———.	  Women,	  Race,	  &	  Class.	  Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2011.	  
Dear	  White	  People.	  Comedy,	  Drama.	  Accessed	  February	  11,	  2018.	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt5707802/.	  Deleuze,	  Gilles.	  Nietzsche	  and	  Philosophy.	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  Della	  Porta,	  Donatella,	  and	  Mario	  Diani.	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Introduction.	  Wiley,	  1999.	  Delmos,	  Otto	  E.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Ressentiment	  as	  Developed	  by	  Max	  Scheler	  and	  Its	  
Occurence	  Among	  the	  Black	  Minority	  Group:	  (Microfilm).	  National	  Library	  of	  Canada,	  1971.	  DePass,	  Tanya.	  “One	  Last	  Time…on	  Performative	  Allyship.”	  Medium,	  July	  16,	  2016.	  https://medium.com/@cypheroftyr/one-­‐last-­‐time-­‐on-­‐performative-­‐allyship-­‐1a2151beb0fe.	  DiAngelo,	  Robin.	  “White	  Women’s	  Tears	  and	  the	  Men	  Who	  Love	  Them	  -­‐.”	  The	  Good	  Men	  
Project,	  September	  19,	  2015.	  https://goodmenproject.com/featured-­‐content/white-­‐womens-­‐tears-­‐and-­‐the-­‐men-­‐who-­‐love-­‐them-­‐twlm/.	  Dillard,	  Cynthia	  B.	  Learning	  to	  (Re)Member	  the	  Things	  We’ve	  Learned	  to	  Forget:	  
Endarkened	  Feminisms,	  Spirituality,	  and	  the	  Sacred	  Nature	  of	  Research	  and	  Teaching.	  First	  printing	  edition.	  New	  York:	  Peter	  Lang	  Inc.,	  International	  Academic	  Publishers,	  2012.	  Dolezal,	  Rachel,	  and	  Storms	  Reback.	  In	  Full	  Color:	  Finding	  My	  Place	  in	  a	  Black	  and	  White	  
World.	  Dallas,	  TX:	  BenBella	  Books,	  2017.	  Dombowsky,	  Don.	  Nietzsche	  and	  Napoleon:	  The	  Dionysian	  Conspiracy.	  University	  of	  Wales	  Press,	  2014.	  Dore,	  Mary.	  She’s	  Beautiful	  When	  She’s	  Angry.	  Documentary,	  History,	  2014.	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3319508/.	  D’Souza,	  Radha.	  “What	  Can	  Activist	  Scholars	  Learn	  from	  Rumi?”	  In	  Pathways	  of	  Creative	  
Research:	  Towards	  a	  Festival	  of	  Dialogues,	  edited	  by	  Ananta	  Kumar	  Giri.	  Delhi:	  Primus	  Books,	  2010.	  Dua,	  Enakshi,	  and	  Angela	  Robertson.	  Scratching	  the	  Surface:	  Canadian,	  Anti-­‐Racist,	  
Feminist	  Thought.	  Canadian	  Scholars’	  Press,	  1999.	  Duplessie,	  Jennifer.	  “Berkeley	  Students	  Attempt	  To	  Protest	  Exam,	  Tell	  Professor	  To	  ‘Check	  His	  Privilege.’”	  Turning	  Point	  News,	  October	  2,	  2017.	  https://www.turningpoint.news/berkeley-­‐students-­‐protest-­‐exam/.	  Durkin,	  Kieran.	  The	  Radical	  Humanism	  of	  Erich	  Fromm.	  Springer,	  2014.	  Edwards,	  Michael	  A.,	  and	  Stephen	  G.	  Post,	  eds.	  1st	  edition.	  Stony	  Brook,	  N.Y.:	  Unlimited	  Love	  Press,	  2008.	  
	   338	  
Ellis,	  Carolyn,	  Tony	  E.	  Adams,	  and	  Arthur	  P.	  Bochner.	  “Autoethnography:	  An	  Overview.”	  
Forum	  Qualitative	  Sozialforschung	  /	  Forum:	  Qualitative	  Social	  Research	  12,	  no.	  1	  (November	  24,	  2010).	  	  Emden,	  Christian.	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  History.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  Emirbayer,	  Mustafa,	  and	  Chad	  Alan	  Goldberg.	  “Pragmatism,	  Bourdieu,	  and	  Collective	  Emotions	  in	  Contentious	  Politics.”	  Theory	  and	  Society	  34,	  no.	  5–6	  (December	  1,	  2005):	  469–518.	  	  Epstein,	  Mark.	  Thoughts	  Without	  A	  Thinker:	  Psychotherapy	  from	  a	  Buddhist	  Perspective.	  Revised	  ed.	  edition.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Basic	  Books,	  2013.	  Fabello,	  Melissa	  A.	  “Burn-­‐Out	  Prevention	  and	  Intervention.”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  February	  7,	  2014.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2014/02/burn-­‐out/.	  Fanon,	  Frantz.	  Black	  Skin,	  White	  Masks.	  Grove	  Press,	  1967.	  Farred,	  Grant.	  “Endgame	  Identity?	  Mapping	  the	  New	  Left	  Roots	  of	  Identity	  Politics.”	  New	  
Literary	  History	  31,	  no.	  4	  (2000):	  627–48.	  Farris,	  Sara	  R.	  “An	  ‘Ideal	  Type’	  Called	  Orientalism.”	  Interventions	  12,	  no.	  2	  (July	  1,	  2010):	  265–84.	  	  Ferenczi,	  Sándor.	  The	  Clinical	  Diary	  of	  Sándor	  Ferenczi.	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  Foucault,	  Michel.	  Power/Knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  and	  Other	  Writings,	  1972-­‐1977.	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1980.	  Fraser,	  Nancy.	  “Recognition	  without	  Ethics?”	  Theory,	  Culture	  &	  Society	  18,	  no.	  2–3	  (June	  1,	  2001):	  21–42.	  	  ———.	  “Rethinking	  Recognition.”	  New	  Left	  Review,	  II,	  no.	  3	  (2000):	  107–20.	  Fraser,	  Nancy,	  Seyla	  Benhabib,	  Judith	  Butler,	  and	  Drucilla	  Cornell.	  Feminist	  Contentions:	  A	  
Philosophical	  Exchange.	  Routledge,	  2013.	  Fraser,	  Nancy,	  and	  Axel	  Honneth.	  Redistribution	  Or	  Recognition?:	  A	  Political-­‐Philosophical	  
Exchange.	  Verso,	  2003.	  Freud,	  Sigmund.	  Beyond	  the	  Pleasure	  Principle.	  CreateSpace	  Independent	  Publishing	  Platform,	  2015.	  ———.	  “Group	  Psychology	  and	  the	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Ego.”	  In	  Civilization,	  Society	  and	  
Religion:	  Group	  Psychology,	  Civilization	  and	  Its	  Discontents	  and	  Other	  Works,	  edited	  by	  Albert	  Dickinson.	  Penguin,	  1991.	  Friedman,	  Lawrence	  J.	  The	  Lives	  of	  Erich	  Fromm:	  Love’s	  Prophet.	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  Fromm,	  Erich.	  Beyond	  the	  Chains	  of	  Illusion:	  My	  Encounter	  with	  Marx	  and	  Freud.	  New	  York:	  Continuum,	  2009.	  ———.	  Escape	  From	  Freedom.	  New	  York:	  Discus	  Books,	  1965.	  ———.	  Love,	  Sexuality,	  and	  Matriarchy:	  About	  Gender.	  Fromm	  International	  Publishing	  Corporation,	  1999.	  ———.	  Man	  for	  Himself:	  An	  Inquiry	  Into	  the	  Psychology	  of	  Ethics.	  Henry	  Holt	  and	  Company,	  1990.	  ———.	  “Man’s	  Impulse	  Structure	  and	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Culture.”	  In	  From	  Beyond	  Freud:	  
From	  Individual	  to	  Social	  Psychoanalysis,	  edited	  by	  Rainer	  Funk,	  17–74.	  New	  York:	  American	  Mental	  Health	  Foundation,	  2010.	  	  ———.	  Marx’s	  Concept	  of	  Man.	  F.	  Ungar,	  1961.	  ———.	  “My	  Own	  Concept	  of	  Man.”	  Fromm	  Forum	  17	  (1969	  2013):	  5–10.	  
	   339	  
———.	  On	  Being	  Human.	  A&C	  Black,	  1997.	  ———.	  On	  Disobedience	  and	  Other	  Essays.	  Seabury	  Press,	  1981.	  ———.	  “On	  My	  Psychoanalytic	  Approach.”	  In	  The	  Revision	  of	  Psychoanalysis.	  Westview	  Press,	  1992.	  ———.	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Religion.	  Terry	  Lectures.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1950.	  ———.	  Selfishness	  and	  Self-­‐Love.	  William	  Alanson	  White	  Psychiatric	  Foundation,	  1939.	  ———.	  Sigmund	  Freud’s	  Mission:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  His	  Personality	  and	  Influence.	  Grove	  Press,	  1959.	  ———.	  Social	  Character	  in	  a	  Mexican	  Village.	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1970.	  ———.	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Human	  Destructiveness.	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1973.	  ———.	  The	  Art	  of	  Being.	  Constable,	  1993.	  ———.	  The	  Art	  of	  Loving.	  A&C	  Black,	  2000.	  ———.	  The	  Crisis	  of	  Psychoanalysis:	  Essays	  on	  Freud,	  Marx	  and	  Social	  Psychology.	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1976.	  ———.	  The	  Dogma	  of	  Christ.	  Henry	  Holt,	  1963.	  ———.	  The	  Heart	  of	  Man.	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1964.	  ———.	  The	  Revolution	  of	  Hope:	  Toward	  a	  Humanized	  Technology.	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1968.	  ———.	  The	  Sane	  Society.	  New	  York:	  Fawcett	  World	  Library,	  1967.	  ———.	  The	  Working	  Class	  in	  Weimar	  Germany:	  A	  Psychological	  and	  Sociological	  Study.	  Berg,	  1984.	  ———.	  To	  Have	  Or	  To	  Be ?	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  Publ.,	  1976.	  ———.	  You	  Shall	  Be	  as	  Gods:	  A	  Radical	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Old	  Testament	  and	  Its	  
Tradition.	  Holt,	  Rinehart	  and	  Winston,	  1966.	  Fromm,	  Erich,	  and	  Michael	  Maccoby.	  Social	  Character	  in	  a	  Mexican	  Village.	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1970.	  Funk,	  Rainer.	  Erich	  Fromm:	  His	  Life	  and	  Ideas :	  An	  Illustrated	  Biography.	  Continuum,	  2000.	  ———.	  The	  Clinical	  Erich	  Fromm:	  Personal	  Accounts	  and	  Papers	  on	  Therapeutic	  
Technique.	  Rodopi,	  2009.	  Gates	  Jr,	  Henry	  Louis.	  “From	  the	  Stacks:	  ‘The	  Fire	  Last	  Time.’”	  The	  New	  Republic,	  August	  2,	  2013.	  https://newrepublic.com/article/114134/henry-­‐louis-­‐gates-­‐james-­‐baldwin-­‐fire-­‐last-­‐time.	  Georgis,	  Dina.	  “Moving	  Past	  Ressentiment:	  War	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Feminist	  Freedom.”	  
TOPIA:	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  0,	  no.	  20	  (September	  1,	  2008):	  109.	  ———	  and	  R.M.	  Kennedy.	  “Touched	  by	  Injury:	  Toward	  an	  Educational	  Theory	  of	  Anti-­‐racist	  Humanism.”	  Ethics	  and	  Education	  4,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  19-­‐30.	  Gilligan,	  Carol.	  In	  a	  Different	  Voice.	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1982.	  Gilman,	  Sander	  L.	  “The	  Figure	  of	  the	  Black	  in	  the	  Thought	  of	  Hegel	  and	  Nietzsche.”	  The	  
German	  Quarterly	  53,	  no.	  2	  (1980):	  141–58.	  	  Gilroy,	  Paul.	  The	  Black	  Atlantic:	  Modernity	  and	  Double	  Consciousness.	  Verso,	  1993.	  ———.	  “There	  Ain’t	  No	  Black	  in	  the	  Union	  Jack”:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Race	  and	  Nation.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1991.	  ———.	  Against	  Race.	  Belknap	  Press,	  2000.	  Gitlin,	  Todd.	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Common	  Dreams:	  Why	  America	  Is	  Wracked	  by	  Culture	  Wars.	  Metropolitan	  Books,	  1995.	  
	   340	  
Goodman,	  Amy.	  “Newly	  Discovered	  1964	  MLK	  Speech	  on	  Civil	  Rights,	  Segregation	  &	  Apartheid	  South	  Africa.”	  Democracy	  Now,	  January	  15,	  2018.	  https://www.democracynow.org/2018/1/15/newly_discovered_1964_mlk_speech_on.	  Goodwin,	  Jeff,	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  and	  Francesca	  Polletta.	  Passionate	  Politics:	  Emotions	  and	  
Social	  Movements.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009.	  Gopinath,	  Gayatri.	  Impossible	  Desires:	  Queer	  Diasporas	  and	  South	  Asian	  Public	  Cultures.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  Gordon,	  Avery.	  Ghostly	  Matters:	  Haunting	  and	  the	  Sociological	  Imagination.	  U	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1997.	  Gottlieb,	  Roger	  S.	  Joining	  Hands:	  Politics	  And	  Religion	  Together	  For	  Social	  Change.	  1	  edition.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Routledge,	  2002.	  Gould,	  Deborah	  B.	  Moving	  Politics:	  Emotion	  and	  ACT	  UP’s	  Fight	  against	  AIDS.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009.	  Green,	  Thomas	  Hill.	  Lectures	  on	  the	  Principles	  of	  Political	  Obligation	  and	  Other	  Writings.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1986.	  Greenberg,	  Joanne.	  I	  Never	  Promised	  You	  a	  Rose	  Garden.	  Perma-­‐Bound	  Books,	  1964.	  Groddeck,	  Georg.	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Illness:	  Selected	  Psychoanalytic	  Writings.	  International	  Universities	  Press,	  1977.	  Gunew,	  Sneja	  Marina,	  and	  Anna	  Yeatman.	  Feminism	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference.	  Westview	  Press,	  1993.	  Gupta,	  Tania	  Das.	  Racism	  and	  Paid	  Work.	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2008.	  Hall,	  Stuart.	  “Negotiating	  Caribbean	  Identities.”	  In	  Postcolonial	  Discourses:	  An	  Anthology,	  edited	  by	  Gregory	  Castle,	  281–92.	  Wiley,	  2001.	  ———.	  The	  Hard	  Road	  to	  Renewal:	  Thatcherism	  and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  the	  Left.	  London ;	  New	  York:	  Verso	  Books,	  1988.	  ———.	  “What	  Is	  This	  ‘Black’	  in	  Black	  Popular	  Culture?”	  Social	  Justice	  20,	  no.	  1/2	  (51-­‐52)	  (1993):	  104–14.	  ———.	  New	  Left	  Review,	  I,	  no.	  209	  (1995):	  3–14.	  Harding,	  Sandra.	  “Introduction:	  Is	  There	  a	  Feminist	  Method?”	  In	  Feminism	  and	  
Methodology,	  edited	  by	  Sandra	  Harding.	  Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  Harding,	  Sandra	  G.	  Feminism	  and	  Methodology:	  Social	  Science	  Issues.	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  ———.	  The	  Feminist	  Standpoint	  Theory	  Reader:	  Intellectual	  and	  Political	  Controversies.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2004.	  Hartocollis,	  Anemona.	  “A	  Campus	  Argument	  Goes	  Viral.	  Now	  the	  College	  Is	  Under	  Siege.”	  
The	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  16,	  2017.	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/evergreen-­‐state-­‐protests.html.	  Hartsock,	  Nancy.	  “The	  Feminist	  Standpoint.”	  In	  The	  Feminist	  Standpoint	  Theory	  Reader:	  
Intellectual	  and	  Political	  Controversies,	  edited	  by	  Sandra	  G.	  Harding.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2004.	  Heise,	  David	  R.	  Understanding	  Events:	  Affect	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Social	  Action.	  CUP	  Archive,	  1979.	  Hemmings,	  Clare.	  “Affective	  Solidarity:	  Feminist	  Reflexivity	  and	  Political	  Transformation.”	  Feminist	  Theory	  13,	  no.	  2	  (August	  1,	  2012):	  147–61.	  	  
	   341	  
———.	  “Invoking	  Affect.”	  Cultural	  Studies	  19,	  no.	  5	  (September	  1,	  2005):	  548–67.	  	  Hennessy,	  Rosemary.	  Profit	  and	  Pleasure:	  Sexual	  Identities	  in	  Late	  Capitalism.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2000.	  Henry,	  Frances,	  Enakshi	  Dua,	  Carl	  E.	  James,	  Audrey	  Kobayashi,	  Peter	  Li,	  Howard	  Ramos,	  and	  Malinda	  S.	  Smith.	  The	  Equity	  Myth:	  Racialization	  and	  Indigeneity	  at	  Canadian	  
Universities.	  UBC	  Press,	  2017.	  Heyes,	  Cressida.	  “Identity	  Politics.”	  In	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  edited	  by	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta.	  Spring	  2018	  Edition,	  n.d.	  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/identity-­‐politics/.	  Hochschild,	  Arlie	  Russel.	  The	  Managed	  Heart:	  Commercialization	  of	  Human	  Feeling.	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1983.	  Hochschild,	  Arlie	  Russell.	  “The	  Sociology	  of	  Feeling	  and	  Emotion:	  Selected	  Possibilities.”	  
Sociological	  Inquiry	  45,	  no.	  2–3	  (April	  1,	  1975):	  280–307.	  	  Hodge,	  David	  R.	  “The	  Conceptual	  and	  Empirical	  Relationship	  Between	  Spirituality	  and	  Social	  Justice:	  Exemplars	  from	  Diverse	  Faith	  Traditions.”	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  &	  
Spirituality	  in	  Social	  Work	  31	  (January	  1,	  2012):	  32–50.	  	  hooks,	  bell.	  Ain’t	  I	  a	  Woman:	  Black	  Women	  and	  Feminism.	  Routledge,	  2014.	  ———.	  All	  About	  Love:	  New	  Visions.	  Unknown	  edition.	  New	  York:	  William	  Morrow	  Paperbacks,	  2018.	  ———.	  Feminist	  Theory:	  From	  Margin	  to	  Center.	  Routledge,	  2014.	  Hunt,	  Helen	  LaKelly.	  Faith	  and	  Feminism:	  A	  Holy	  Alliance.	  New	  York:	  Atria	  Books,	  2004.	  Husu,	  Hanna-­‐Mari.	  “Bourdieu	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Considering	  Identity	  Movements	  in	  Terms	  of	  Field,	  Capital	  and	  Habitus.”	  Social	  Movement	  Studies	  12,	  no.	  3	  (August	  1,	  2013):	  264–79.	  	  Hutchison,	  Elizabeth	  D.	  “Spirituality,	  Religion,	  and	  Progressive	  Social	  Movements:	  Resources	  and	  Motivation	  for	  Social	  Change.”	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  &	  Spirituality	  in	  
Social	  Work:	  Social	  Thought	  31,	  no.	  1–2	  (January	  1,	  2012):	  105–27.	  	  Ibrahim,	  Amali.	  “The	  (In)Communicability	  of	  Pain:	  Some	  Issues	  from	  the	  Anthropology	  of	  Violence.”	  The	  Reading	  Group,	  December	  28,	  2006.	  http://www.thereadinggroup.sg/Articles/The%20In-­‐Communicability%20of%20Pain.pdf.	  Ibrahim,	  Joseph.	  Bourdieu	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Ideological	  Struggles	  in	  the	  British	  Anti-­‐
Capitalist	  Movement.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2015.	  //www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137371027.	  
Interview	  with	  Toni	  Morrison.	  Charlie	  Rose,	  1993.	  https://charlierose.com/videos/18778.	  Jasper,	  James	  M.	  “Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  Twenty	  Years	  of	  Theory	  and	  Research.”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2011):	  285–303.	  ———.	  “The	  Emotions	  of	  Protest:	  Affective	  and	  Reactive	  Emotions	  In	  and	  Around	  Social	  Movements.”	  Sociological	  Forum	  13,	  no.	  3	  (September	  1,	  1998):	  397–424.	  	  Javad,	  Miri	  Seyed,	  Robert	  Lake,	  and	  Tricia	  M.	  Kress,	  eds.	  Reclaiming	  the	  Sane	  Society:	  
Essays	  on	  Erich	  Fromm’s	  Thought.	  Imagination	  and	  Praxis:	  Criticality	  and	  Creativity	  in	  Education	  and	  Educational	  Research.	  Sense	  Publishers,	  2014.	  //www.springer.com/gp/book/9789462096073.	  Jay,	  Martin.	  The	  Dialectical	  Imagination:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School	  and	  the	  Institute	  
of	  Social	  Research,	  1923-­‐1950.	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1973.	  
	   342	  
Jeffries,	  Stuart.	  Grand	  Hotel	  Abyss:	  The	  Lives	  of	  the	  Frankfurt	  School.	  Verso	  Books,	  2016.	  Jenkins,	  Jennifer.	  “German	  Orientalism:	  Introduction.”	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	  Asia,	  
Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  24,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  97–100.	  Jones,	  Michal.	  “4	  Reasons	  People	  of	  Color	  Can’t	  Cater	  to	  White	  People’s	  Guilt	  –	  Or	  Their	  Tears.”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  November	  22,	  2015.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/11/poc-­‐cant-­‐cater-­‐white-­‐guilt/.	  Kane,	  Anne.	  “Finding	  Emotion	  in	  Social	  Movement	  Processes:	  Irish	  Land	  Movement	  Metaphors	  and	  Narratives.”	  In	  Passionate	  Politics:	  Emotions	  and	  Social	  Movements,	  edited	  by	  Jeff	  Goodwin,	  James	  M.	  Jasper,	  and	  Francesca	  Polletta,	  251–66.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  n.d.	  Kaufmann,	  Walter.	  Existentialism	  From	  Dostoevsky	  To	  Sartre.	  Pickle	  Partners	  Publishing,	  2016.	  Kaufmann,	  Walter	  Arnold.	  Hegel,	  Reinterpretation,	  Texts,	  and	  Commentary.	  Doubleday,	  1965.	  ———.	  Nietzsche:	  Philosopher,	  Psychologist,	  Antichrist.	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1950.	  Keating,	  AnaLouise.	  “‘	  I’m	  a	  Citizen	  of	  the	  Universe’:	  Gloria	  Anzaldúa’s	  Spiritual	  Activism	  as	  Catalyst	  for	  Social	  Change.”	  Feminist	  Studies	  34,	  no.	  1–2	  (2008):	  53–69.	  ———.	  “From	  Borderlands	  and	  New	  Mestizas	  to	  Nepantlas	  and	  Nepantleras	  Anzaldúan	  Theories	  for	  Social	  Change.”	  Human	  Architecture:	  Journal	  of	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Self-­‐
Knowledge	  IV	  (2006):	  5–16.	  Kelley,	  Robin	  D.	  G.	  Freedom	  Dreams:	  The	  Black	  Radical	  Imagination.	  Beacon	  Press,	  2002.	  Kellner,	  Douglas.	  Critical	  Theory,	  Marxism,	  and	  Modernity.	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1989.	  ———.	  “Erich	  Fromm,	  Feminism,	  and	  the	  Frankfurt	  School.”	  Illuminations:	  The	  Critical	  Theory	  Project,	  1991.	  https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell8.htm.	  ———.	  “Erich	  Fromm,	  Judaism	  and	  the	  Frankfurt	  School.”	  Illuminations:	  The	  Critical	  Theory	  Project.	  Accessed	  February	  28,	  2018.	  https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell24.htm.	  Kemper,	  Theodore	  D.	  A	  Social	  Interactional	  Theory	  of	  Emotions.	  Wiley,	  1978.	  Khan,	  Aliya.	  “Activist	  Burnout	  Is	  Real	  –	  And	  You	  Probably	  Need	  to	  Read	  These	  4	  Ways	  to	  Manage	  It.”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  May	  27,	  2015.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/05/dealing-­‐with-­‐activist-­‐burnout/.	  Khanna,	  Ranjana.	  Dark	  Continents:	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Colonialism.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2003.	  Kim,	  Sandra.	  “About	  Everyday	  Liberation	  and	  Sandra	  Kim.”	  Everyday	  Liberation,	  May	  8,	  2015.	  https://sandrakim.com/about/.	  Kinouani,	  Guilaine.	  “White	  Denial,	  Black	  Mental	  Health	  and	  Ontological	  Insecurity.”	  Race	  
Reflections	  (blog),	  December	  11,	  2016.	  https://racereflections.co.uk/2016/12/11/white-­‐denial-­‐black-­‐mental-­‐health-­‐and-­‐ontological-­‐insecurity/.	  Klapp,	  Orrin	  Edgar.	  Collective	  Search	  for	  Identity.	  Holt,	  Rinehart,	  and	  Winston,	  1969.	  Kornfield,	  Jack.	  The	  Wise	  Heart:	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Universal	  Teachings	  of	  Buddhist	  Psychology.	  Reprint	  edition.	  Bantam,	  2009.	  Kornhauser,	  William.	  The	  Politics	  of	  Mass	  Society.	  New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1959.	  
	   343	  
Kraft,	  Ken	  Jones;Kenneth.	  The	  New	  Social	  Face	  of	  Buddhism:	  A	  Call	  to	  Action	  by	  Ken	  Jones.	  Wisdom	  Publications,	  2003.	  Kusch,	  Martin,	  and	  Reader	  in	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  Martin	  Kusch.	  
Psychologism:	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Philosophical	  Knowledge.	  Routledge,	  2005.	  LaDuke,	  Winona.	  Recovering	  the	  Sacred:	  The	  Power	  of	  Naming	  and	  Claiming.	  Haymarket	  Books,	  2005.	  Lamon,	  Bailey.	  “Why	  This	  Radical	  Activist	  Is	  Disillusioned	  by	  the	  Toxic	  Culture	  of	  the	  Left.”	  The	  Independent,	  February	  29,	  2016.	  http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-­‐this-­‐radical-­‐activist-­‐is-­‐disillusioned-­‐by-­‐the-­‐toxic-­‐culture-­‐of-­‐the-­‐left-­‐a6895211.html.	  Lasswell,	  Harold	  D.	  Psychopathology	  and	  Politics.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1986.	  Lawrence,	  Bonita,	  and	  Enakshi	  Dua.	  “Decolonizing	  Anti-­‐Racism.”	  Social	  Justice	  32,	  no.	  4	  (2005):	  120–43.	  Limone,	  Noa.	  “Chronicling	  Walter	  Benjamin’s	  Final	  Hours.”	  Haaretz,	  July	  9,	  2012.	  https://www.haaretz.com/chronicling-­‐walter-­‐benjamin-­‐s-­‐final-­‐hours-­‐1.5265296.	  Lorde,	  Audre.	  Sister	  Outsider:	  Essays	  and	  Speeches.	  Potter/TenSpeed/Harmony,	  1984.	  ———.	  Sister	  Outsider:	  Essays	  and	  Speeches.	  Crossing	  Press,	  1984.	  ———.	  “The	  Uses	  of	  Anger:	  Women	  Responding	  to	  Racism.”	  presented	  at	  the	  National	  Women’s	  Studies	  Association	  Conference,	  Storrs,	  Connecticut,	  June	  1981.	  http://www.blackpast.org/1981-­‐audre-­‐lorde-­‐uses-­‐anger-­‐women-­‐responding-­‐racism.	  Loubriel,	  Jennifer.	  “4	  Ways	  White	  People	  Can	  Process	  Their	  Emotions	  Without	  Bringing	  the	  White	  Tears.”	  Everyday	  Feminism,	  February	  16,	  2016.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2016/02/white-­‐people-­‐emotions-­‐tears/.	  Lyne,	  Bill.	  “God’s	  Black	  Revolutionary	  Mouth:	  James	  Baldwin’s	  Black	  Radicalism.”	  Science	  
&	  Society	  74,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  12–36.	  MacIntosh,	  Alistair.	  Rekindling	  Community:	  Connecting	  People,	  Environment,	  and	  
Spirituality.	  Devon,	  UK:	  Green	  Books,	  2008.	  MacKinnon,	  Catharine	  A.	  Feminism	  Unmodified:	  Discourses	  on	  Life	  and	  Law.	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  Mahmood,	  Saba.	  Politics	  of	  Piety:	  The	  Islamic	  Revival	  and	  the	  Feminist	  Subject.	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2011.	  Marcuse,	  Herbert.	  Eros	  and	  Civilization:	  A	  Philosophical	  Inquiry	  into	  Freud.	  Beacon	  Press,	  2015.	  Massumi,	  Brian.	  “The	  Autonomy	  of	  Affect.”	  Cultural	  Critique,	  no.	  31	  (1995):	  83–109.	  	  May,	  Rollo.	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Being.	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1994.	  ———.	  The	  Discovery	  of	  Being.	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1994.	  McAdam,	  Doug.	  “Culture	  and	  Social	  Movements.”	  In	  Culture	  and	  Politics:	  A	  Reader,	  edited	  by	  Lane	  Corthers	  and	  Charles	  Lockhart.	  Springer,	  2000.	  McKenzie,	  Lindsay.	  “Journal	  Apologizes	  for	  Article	  Likening	  Transracialism	  to	  Being	  Transgender.”	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  Higher	  Education,	  May	  1,	  2017.	  https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/journal-­‐apologizes-­‐for-­‐article-­‐likening-­‐transracialism-­‐to-­‐transgenderism/118084.	  McKittrick,	  Katherine.	  Demonic	  Grounds:	  Black	  Women	  And	  the	  Cartographies	  of	  Struggle.	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2006.	  
	   344	  
McLaughlin,	  Neil.	  “How	  to	  Become	  a	  Forgotten	  Intellectual:	  Intellectual	  Movements	  and	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Erich	  Fromm.”	  Sociological	  Forum	  13,	  no.	  2	  (June	  1,	  1998):	  215–46.	  	  ———.	  “Nazism,	  Nationalism,	  and	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions:	  Escape	  from	  Freedom	  Revisited.”	  Sociological	  Theory	  14,	  no.	  3	  (1996):	  241–61.	  	  McMahan,	  David	  L.	  The	  Making	  of	  Buddhist	  Modernism.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183276.001.0001/acprof-­‐9780195183276.	  McQueen,	  Paddy.	  “Social	  and	  Political	  Recognition.”	  Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy.	  Accessed	  February	  20,	  2018.	  http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp/#H3.	  Meisenhelder,	  Thomas.	  “From	  Character	  to	  Habitus	  in	  Sociology.”	  The	  Social	  Science	  
Journal	  43,	  no.	  1	  (January	  1,	  2006):	  55–66.	  	  Merrill,	  Barbara,	  and	  Linden	  West.	  Using	  Biographical	  Methods	  in	  Social	  Research.	  SAGE,	  2009.	  Mieth,	  Dietmar.	  “Meister	  Eckhart:	  Leidenschaft	  des	  Denkens,	  Spiritualitaet	  und	  Lebenskunst.”	  In	  Meister	  Eckhart	  aus	  theologischer	  Sicht,	  edited	  by	  Christine	  Büchner.	  W.	  Kohlhammer	  Verlag,	  2007.	  Miller,	  Donald.	  “Chapter	  29.”	  In	  The	  Love	  That	  Does	  Justice,	  Spiritual	  Activism	  in	  Dialogue	  
with	  Social	  Science,	  edited	  by	  Michael	  A.	  Edwards	  and	  Stephen	  G.	  Post,	  1st	  edition.	  Stony	  Brook,	  N.Y.:	  Unlimited	  Love	  Press,	  2008.	  Mills,	  C.	  Wright.	  “Letter	  to	  the	  New	  Left.”	  New	  Left	  Review,	  I,	  no.	  5	  (1960):	  18–23.	  Mirza,	  Aisha.	  “White	  Women	  Drive	  Me	  Crazy.”	  BuzzFeed,	  May	  23,	  2017.	  https://www.buzzfeed.com/aishamirza/until-­‐white-­‐women-­‐ruined-­‐it.	  Moodey,	  Richard	  W.	  “Psychologism,	  Sociologism,	  and	  the	  Madness	  of	  Social	  Science.”	  In	  
Perspectives	  on	  Psychologism,	  edited	  by	  Mark	  Amadeus	  Notturno.	  BRILL,	  1989.	  Mueller,	  Karen,	  and	  Margie	  Whittaker	  Leidig.	  “Women’s	  Anger	  and	  Feminist	  Therapy.”	  
Frontiers:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Women	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  3	  (1976):	  23–30.	  	  Naples,	  Nancy	  A.	  Feminism	  and	  Method:	  Ethnography,	  Discourse	  Analysis,	  and	  Activist	  
Research.	  Psychology	  Press,	  2003.	  Neill,	  Alexander	  Sutherland.	  Summerhill:	  A	  Radical	  Approach	  to	  Child	  Rearing.	  Hart	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1960.	  Ng,	  Roxana.	  “Embodied	  Learning	  and	  Qi	  Gong:	  Integrating	  the	  Body	  in	  Graduate	  Education.”	  In	  Within	  and	  beyond	  Borders:	  Critical	  Multicultural	  Counselling	  in	  
Practice,	  edited	  by	  O.	  Oulanova,	  I.	  Stein,	  A.	  Rai,	  M.	  Hammer,	  and	  P.A.	  Poulin.	  Centre	  for	  Diversity	  in	  Counseling	  And	  Psychotherapy,	  OISE,	  University	  of	  Toronto.,	  2009.	  NGAI,	  Sianne.	  Ugly	  Feelings.	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  Nietzsche,	  Friedrich.	  Beyond	  Good	  &	  Evil:	  Prelude	  to	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Future.	  Translated	  by	  Walter	  Kaufmann.	  New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1966.	  ———.	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morals	  and	  Ecce	  Homo.	  Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2010.	  Omi,	  Michael,	  and	  Howard	  Winant.	  Racial	  Formation	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Routledge,	  2014.	  Park,	  Suey.	  “Challenging	  Racism	  and	  the	  Problem	  with	  White	  ‘Allies’:	  A	  Conversation	  with	  David	  Leonard.”	  [Young]Ist	  (blog),	  December	  26,	  2013.	  http://www.youngist.org/challenging-­‐racism-­‐and-­‐the-­‐problem-­‐with-­‐white-­‐allies.	  
	   345	  
Patel,	  Aaisha	  Dadi,	  and	  Dana	  da	  Silva.	  “Calling	  out	  Racism	  Online	  –	  Is	  It	  Helping?”	  IOL,	  February	  10,	  2016.	  http://stopracism.iol.co.za/calling-­‐out-­‐racism-­‐online-­‐is-­‐it-­‐helping/.	  Patton,	  Stacey.	  “Is	  Outrage	  Addiction	  Derailing	  Our	  Most	  Important	  Conversations?”	  
Dame	  Magazine,	  June	  26,	  2017.	  https://www.damemagazine.com/2017/06/26/outrage-­‐addiction-­‐derailing-­‐our-­‐most-­‐important-­‐conversations/.	  Peck,	  Raoul.	  I	  Am	  Not	  Your	  Negro.	  Documentary,	  2017.	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt5804038/.	  Pedwell,	  Carolyn,	  and	  Anne	  Whitehead.	  “Affecting	  Feminism:	  Questions	  of	  Feeling	  in	  Feminist	  Theory.”	  Feminist	  Theory	  13,	  no.	  2	  (August	  1,	  2012):	  115–29.	  	  PeerNetBC.	  “Allyship.”	  The	  Anti-­‐Oppression	  Network,	  November	  22,	  2016.	  https://theantioppressionnetwork.com/allyship/.	  Peterson,	  Jordan	  B.	  2016/10/03:	  Part	  2:	  Compulsory	  Political	  Education:	  A	  Real	  World	  
Case	  Study	  at	  the	  U	  of	  Toronto.	  Accessed	  May	  16,	  2018.	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2u62u4entc&t=279s.	  ———.	  2016/10/05:	  Part	  3:	  The	  PC	  Game	  (and	  Some	  Counter-­‐Tactics).	  Accessed	  May	  16,	  2018.	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2u62u4entc&t=279s.	  ———.	  2016/10/05:	  Part	  3:	  The	  PC	  Game	  (and	  Some	  Counter-­‐Tactics).	  Accessed	  May	  16,	  2018.	  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCL_f53ZEJxp8TtlOkHwMV9Q.	  ———.	  2017/05/17:	  Senate	  Hearing	  on	  Bill	  C16.	  Accessed	  May	  16,	  2018.	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnIAAkSNtqo&feature=youtu.be.	  Puar,	  Jasbir	  K.	  Terrorist	  Assemblages:	  Homonationalism	  in	  Queer	  Times.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  Razack,	  Sherene.	  Casting	  Out:	  The	  Eviction	  of	  Muslims	  from	  Western	  Law	  and	  Politics.	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2008.	  ———.	  Looking	  White	  People	  in	  the	  Eye:	  Gender,	  Race,	  and	  Culture	  in	  Courtrooms	  and	  
Classrooms.	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  1998.	  Razack,	  Sherene.	  “Gendered	  Racial	  Violence	  and	  Spatialized	  Justice:	  The	  Murder	  Pamela	  George.”	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Law	  &amp;	  Society	  /	  La	  Revue	  Canadienne	  Droit	  et	  
Société	  15,	  no.	  2	  (August	  2000):	  91–130.	  	  Razack,	  Sherene,	  Sunera	  Thobani,	  and	  Malinda	  Smith.	  States	  of	  Race:	  Critical	  Race	  
Feminism	  for	  the	  21st	  Century.	  Between	  the	  Lines,	  2010.	  Reay,	  Diane.	  “Habitus	  and	  the	  Psychosocial:	  Bourdieu	  with	  Feelings.”	  Cambridge	  Journal	  
of	  Education	  45,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2,	  2015):	  9–23.	  	  Reed	  Jr.,	  Adolph.	  “Black	  Particularity	  Reconsidered.”	  Telos	  1979,	  no.	  39	  (March	  20,	  1979):	  71–93.	  	  ———.	  “From	  Jenner	  to	  Dolezal:	  One	  Trans	  Good,	  the	  Other	  Not	  So	  Much.”	  Common	  
Dreams,	  June	  15,	  2015.	  https://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/06/15/jenner-­‐dolezal-­‐one-­‐trans-­‐good-­‐other-­‐not-­‐so-­‐much.	  ———.	  “The	  Limits	  of	  Anti-­‐Racism.”	  Left	  Business	  Observer	  121	  (September	  2009).	  http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Antiracism.html.	  Riesman,	  David,	  Todd	  Gitlin,	  Reuel	  Denney,	  and	  Nathan	  Glazer.	  The	  Lonely	  Crowd:	  A	  Study	  
of	  the	  Changing	  American	  Character,	  Abridged	  and	  Revised	  Edition.	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2001.	  
	   346	  
Robinson,	  Cedric	  J.	  Black	  Marxism:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Black	  Radical	  Tradition.	  Zed,	  1983.	  Rosenberg,	  Marshall	  B.	  Nonviolent	  Communication:	  A	  Language	  of	  Life,	  3rd	  Edition:	  Life-­‐
Changing	  Tools	  for	  Healthy	  Relationships.	  Third	  Edition,	  Third	  edition	  edition.	  Encinitas,	  CA:	  PuddleDancer	  Press,	  2015.	  Roy,	  Arundhati.	  War	  Talk.	  South	  End	  Press,	  2003.	  Said,	  Edward	  W.	  Orientalism.	  Knopf	  Doubleday	  Publishing	  Group,	  2014.	  Sartre,	  Jean-­‐Paul.	  Anti-­‐Semite	  and	  Jew.	  Schocken	  Books,	  1948.	  ———.	  Existentialism	  Is	  a	  Humanism.	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  Scarry,	  Elaine.	  The	  Body	  in	  Pain:	  The	  Making	  and	  Unmaking	  of	  the	  World.	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  Scheler,	  Max.	  Ressentiment.	  Marquette	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  Sedgwick,	  Eve	  Kosofsky.	  Touching	  Feeling:	  Affect,	  Pedagogy,	  Performativity.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  Seidlitz,	  Larry.	  “Spiritual	  Activism,	  Spiritual	  Passivity	  and	  Integral	  Yoga.”	  New	  Race	  12,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  18–33.	  Sharf,	  Robert.	  “Buddhist	  Modernism	  and	  the	  Rhetoric	  of	  Meditative	  Experience.”	  Numen	  42,	  no.	  3	  (January	  1,	  1995):	  228–83.	  	  ———.	  “Is	  Mindfulness	  Buddhist?	  (And	  Why	  It	  Matters).”	  Transcultural	  Psychiatry	  52,	  no.	  4	  (2015):	  470–84.	  Sharma,	  Nandita,	  and	  Cynthia	  Wright.	  “Decolonizing	  Resistance,	  Challenging	  Colonial	  States.”	  Social	  Justice	  35,	  no.	  3	  (2008):	  120–38.	  Sheridan,	  Michael.	  “Spiritual	  Activism:	  Grounding	  Ourselves	  in	  the	  Spirit.”	  Journal	  of	  
Religion	  &	  Spirituality	  in	  Social	  Work	  31	  (2012):	  193–208.	  Silvera,	  Makeda.	  Silenced:	  Talks	  with	  Working	  Class	  Caribbean	  Women	  about	  Their	  Lives	  
and	  Struggles	  as	  Domestic	  Workers	  in	  Canada.	  Sister	  Vision	  Press,	  1989.	  Simhony,	  Avital.	  “Beyond	  Negative	  and	  Positive	  Freedom:	  T.	  H.	  Green’s	  View	  of	  Freedom.”	  Political	  Theory	  21,	  no.	  1	  (1993):	  28–54.	  Simpson,	  Audra.	  Mohawk	  Interruptus:	  Political	  Life	  Across	  the	  Borders	  of	  Settler	  States.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2014.	  Simpson,	  Leanne.	  Dancing	  on	  Our	  Turtle’s	  Back:	  Stories	  of	  Nishnaabeg	  Re-­‐Creation,	  
Resurgence	  and	  a	  New	  Emergence.	  Arbeiter	  Ring	  Pub.,	  2011.	  ———.	  Lighting	  the	  Eighth	  Fire:	  The	  Liberation,	  Resurgence,	  and	  Protection	  of	  Indigenous	  
Nations.	  Arbeiter	  Ring	  Pub.,	  2008.	  ———.	  Lighting	  the	  Eighth	  Fire:	  The	  Liberation,	  Resurgence,	  and	  Protection	  of	  Indigenous	  
Nations.	  Arbeiter	  Ring	  Pub.,	  2008.	  Smelser,	  Neil.	  Theory	  of	  Collective	  Behavior.	  New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1963.	  Smith,	  Andrea.	  Conquest:	  Sexual	  Violence	  and	  American	  Indian	  Genocide.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2015.	  ———.	  “Heteropatriarchy	  and	  the	  Three	  Pillars	  of	  White	  Supremacy:	  Rethinking	  Women	  of	  Color	  Organizing.”	  In	  Are	  All	  the	  Women	  Still	  White?:	  Rethinking	  Race,	  Expanding	  
Feminisms,	  edited	  by	  Janell	  Hobson,	  61–71.	  SUNY	  Press,	  2016.	  ———.	  “Native	  American	  Feminism,	  Sovereignty,	  and	  Social	  Change.”	  Feminist	  Studies	  31,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  116–132.	  ———.	  “The	  Problem	  with	  ‘Privilege.’”	  Andrea	  Smith’s	  Blog	  (blog),	  August	  14,	  2013.	  https://andrea366.wordpress.com/2013/08/14/the-­‐problem-­‐with-­‐privilege-­‐by-­‐andrea-­‐smith/.	  
	   347	  
Spivak,	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty.	  In	  Other	  Worlds:	  Essays	  in	  Cultural	  Politics.	  Routledge,	  2006.	  ———.	  Other	  Asias.	  BLackwell	  Pub.,	  2008.	  Srivastava,	  Sarita.	  “‘You’re	  Calling	  Me	  a	  Racist?’	  The	  Moral	  and	  Emotional	  Regulation	  of	  Antiracism	  and	  Feminism.”	  Signs	  31,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  29–62.	  	  Stephens,	  R.L.	  “Tim	  Wise	  &	  The	  Failure	  of	  Privilege	  Discourse.”	  Orchestrated	  Pulse	  (blog),	  October	  1,	  2013.	  http://www.orchestratedpulse.com/2013/10/tim-­‐wise-­‐failure-­‐privilege-­‐discourse/.	  Stringer,	  Rebecca.	  Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Agency	  and	  Victim	  Politics	  in	  Neoliberal	  
Times.	  Routledge,	  2014.	  ———.	  “Knowing	  Victims:	  Feminism,	  Ressentiment	  and	  the	  Category	  ‘Victim.’”	  Australian	  National	  University,	  2003.	  Stryker,	  Kitty.	  “The	  Problem	  with	  Callout	  Culture.”	  The	  Walrus,	  May	  30,	  2016.	  /the-­‐problem-­‐with-­‐callout-­‐culture/.	  Suzuki,	  Daisetz	  Teitaro,	  Erich	  Fromm,	  and	  Richard	  De	  Martino.	  Zen	  Buddhism	  and	  
Psychoanalysis.	  Colophon	  Books	  (New	  York,	  N.Y.)	  CN	  175.	  New	  York:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1970.	  Tapper,	  Marion.	  “Ressentment	  and	  Power.”	  Arena	  Magazine	  (Fitzroy,	  Vic),	  no.	  1	  (November	  1992):	  41.	  Tavris,	  Carol.	  Anger:	  The	  Misunderstood	  Emotion.	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1989.	  Taylor,	  Charles.	  Multiculturalism:	  (Expanded	  Paperback	  Edition).	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  ———.	  “What’s	  Wrong	  with	  Negative	  Liberty.”	  In	  Philosophical	  Papers,	  211–29.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  Taylor,	  Verta,	  and	  Nancy	  Whittier.	  “Analytical	  Approaches	  to	  Social	  Movement	  Culture:	  The	  Culture	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Movement.”	  In	  Social	  Movements	  And	  Culture,	  edited	  by	  Hank	  Johnston.	  Routledge,	  2003.	  The	  Stream	  Team.	  “Anti-­‐Racism	  Activist	  Gets	  Backlash	  over	  Facebook	  Rant.”	  The	  Stream	  
Blog	  Aljazeera	  America	  (blog).	  Accessed	  March	  14,	  2018.	  http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/the-­‐stream/the-­‐stream-­‐officialblog/2013/9/17/anti-­‐racism-­‐activistgetsbacklashoverrant.html.	  Thobani,	  Sunera.	  “War	  Frenzy.”	  Meridians:	  Feminism,	  Race,	  Transnationalism	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2002):	  289–97.	  Thomson,	  Annette.	  Erich	  Fromm:	  Shaper	  of	  the	  Human	  Condition.	  Macmillan	  International	  Higher	  Education,	  2009.	  Thorsen,	  Karen.	  James	  Baldwin:	  The	  Price	  of	  the	  Ticket,	  1989.	  http://www.tiff.net/films/james-­‐baldwin-­‐the-­‐price-­‐of-­‐the-­‐ticket/index.html.	  Tomkins,	  Silvan	  S.	  Exploring	  Affect:	  The	  Selected	  Writings	  of	  Silvan	  S	  Tomkins.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  Turner,	  Jonathan	  H.,	  and	  Jan	  E.	  Stets.	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Emotions.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  Turner,	  Ralph,	  and	  Lewis	  Killian.	  Collective	  Behavior.	  Englewood	  Cliffs,	  N.	  J.:	  Prentice-­‐Hall,	  1957.	  Tuvel,	  Rebecca.	  “In	  Defense	  of	  Transracialism.”	  Hypatia	  32,	  no.	  2	  (May	  1,	  2017):	  263–78.	  	  Utt,	  Jamie.	  “So	  You	  Call	  Yourself	  an	  Ally:	  10	  Things	  All	  ‘Allies’	  Need	  to	  Know.”	  Everyday	  
Feminism,	  November	  8,	  2013.	  https://everydayfeminism.com/2013/11/things-­‐allies-­‐need-­‐to-­‐know/.	  
	   348	  
Wallerstein,	  Immanuel	  Maurice.	  World-­‐Systems	  Analysis:	  An	  Introduction.	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2004.	  Walters,	  Suzanna	  Danuta.	  “Academe’s	  Poisonous	  Call-­‐Out	  Culture.”	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  
Higher	  Education,	  May	  5,	  2017.	  https://www.chronicle.com/article/Academe-­‐s-­‐Poisonous-­‐Call-­‐Out/240016.	  Watkins,	  Mel.	  “No	  Name	  in	  The	  Street.”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  28,	  1972.	  https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/03/29/specials/baldwin-­‐street.html.	  Wiggershaus,	  Rolf.	  The	  Frankfurt	  School:	  Its	  History,	  Theories,	  and	  Political	  Significance.	  MIT	  Press,	  1995.	  Wilde,	  Lawrence.	  Erich	  Fromm	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Solidarity.	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2004.	  //www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781403961419.	  Williams,	  Lynne.	  “Calling	  People	  Out.”	  Rabble,	  (no	  listed	  date).	  http://rabble.ca/toolkit/3-­‐minute-­‐action/calling-­‐people-­‐out.	  Williams,	  Vanessa.	  “Analysis	  |	  An	  Identity	  Crisis	  for	  Identity	  Politics.”	  Washington	  Post,	  July	  27,	  2017.	  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-­‐nation/wp/2017/07/27/an-­‐identity-­‐crisis-­‐for-­‐identity-­‐politics/.	  Wise,	  Tim.	  Speaking	  Treason	  Fluently:	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Reflections	  From	  an	  Angry	  White	  Male.	  Soft	  Skull	  Press,	  2008.	  Wolin,	  Richard.	  Heidegger’s	  Children:	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Karl	  Löwith,	  Hans	  Jonas,	  and	  
Herbert	  Marcuse.	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2003.	  Wong,	  Nellie.	  “When	  I	  Was	  Growing	  Up.”	  In	  This	  Bridge	  Called	  My	  Back,	  Fourth	  Edition:	  
Writings	  by	  Radical	  Women	  of	  Color,	  edited	  by	  Cherríe	  Moraga	  and	  Gloria	  Anzaldúa.	  SUNY	  Press,	  2015.	  Young,	  Michelle	  D.,	  and	  Linda	  Skrla.	  Reconsidering	  Feminist	  Research	  in	  Educational	  
Leadership.	  SUNY	  Press,	  2012.	  	  
